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ABSTRACT 
The aim of the study is to explore and compare the rhetoric produced for public 
consumption by British scientists and economists in the period from c. 1900 to C. 1925, which 
was aimed at securing executive influence over government policy-making for these expert 
groups. I argue that members of each group followed characteristic strategies and produced 
distinctive rhetorics, but that they shared a common aim: the formalisation of influence over 
policy. I am testing the hypothesis, first put forward by Frank Turner in relation to natural 
scientists that a new type of public scientific rhetoric emerged from circa 1870 and was voiced 
by a sizeable minority of scientists in the Edwardian period. The key feature of this new 
rhetoric (which Turner dubs 'Public Science') was a call for scientists to be involved in 
government policy-making, on the basis of the transferability of scientific method to the areas 
covered by policy problems. I apply this model to scientists and to economists beyond the 
period initially considered by Turner. I argue that important sections of the economic and 
scientific communities actively pursued executive influence over policy in this period. I trace 
the course of the public arguments noting how they change over time in response to 
perceptions of the attitude of the State towards outside expertise and the changing context of 
national concerns. I examine the rhetoric in action in a case study of the Food (War) 
Committee of the Royal Society, which contained both scientists and economists. I argue that 
such a study of rhetoric is of great importance as a prerequisite for a correct understanding of 
the relations between experts and government in this period. Rhetoric must be recognised for 
what it is, a changing partisan account of the importance of science and scientific method. 
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INTRODUCTION 
But what I-thought altogether unaccountable, was the strong Disposition I 
observed in them towards News and Politics, perpetually enquiring into Public 
Affairs, giving theirjudgernents in matters of State, and passionately disputing 
every inch of a Party Opinion. I have, indeed, observed the same Disposition 
among most of the Mathematicians I have known in Europe, though I could 
never discover the least Analogy between the two Sciences; unless those 
people suppose, that, because the smallest Circle hath as many Degrees as the 
largest, therefore the Regulations and Management of the World require no 
more Abilities, than the Handling and Turping of a Globe. But, I rather take 
this Quality to spring from a very common Infirmity of human Nature, 
inclining us to be more curious and conceited in Matters where we have least 
Concern, and for which we are least adapted either by Study or Nature. 1 
Most accounts of the relations of British science and the State in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries tend to focus on how the State became the major patron of 
science. A number of factors are usually cited as contributing to this development: the 
encroachment of State activity into new areas 'combining statistical, intelligence and 
inspectorial expertise, 2; the growing expense of scientific activity itself, and a sharpened 
perception of its importance. to national security and economic prosperity. %fle none of this 
can, or should, be disputed, it has led to an approach which focuses on the attitude of the 
State to science. Even the title of the most recent comprehensive account (Peter Alter's The 
Reluctant Patron- Science and-the State in Britain. 1850-19203 ) embodies this perspective. 4 
Thus most accounts simply detail the setting up of the various State sponsored schemes for 
scientific research (for instance the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research - DSIR). 
Little attention has been given to the scientists' own political, social and professional 
agendas, or how they were expressed. The political aspirations of scientists have only been 
I Jonathan Smift comments on the Laputan philosophers in Gulliver's Trayels, p. 206, (Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1986 edition). 
2 Roy MacLeod, 'Science for Imperial Efficiency and Social Change: Reflections on the British Science 
Guild, 1905-1936. Public Understanding of Science, Vol. 3, (1994), pp. 155-193. See also Macleod (ecQ. 
Government and Ex, 3Lcrtisv Spgcialists. E. =rts and Professionals, 1850.1912, (Cambridge, CUP. 1988), 
especially MacLeod's Introduction. pp. 1-24. 
3 Peter Alter, Tle Reluctant Patron: Science and the State in Britain. l8j. (o). 1920, (Berg, C). -&Td, 1987). 
4 See also for example, Donald Cardwell The Orggnisation of Science in-Engj_and, (London. Hcinemann, 
1957); Steven and Hilary Rose, Science and Society. (Harmondsworth, Penguin. 1969) 
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considered in the limited sense of campaigns to secure better funding for science and 
economic and social status for scientists. This faure to interrogate scientific rhetoric fully 
has meant that the interaction of scientists with society has not been properly understood. 
The rhetoric which presented scientists as objective decision-makers, somehow above society 
and pohtics, has been uncritically incorporated at a fundamental level into historical accounts. 
Scientists have not been viewed as a professional expert group vying for political influence. 
In this study I want to invert this perspective and to focus on the attitudes of 'science' 
(broadly defined as those disciplines which publicly adhered to a scientific method) to the 
State. I focus on the voicing of a public rationale for expert influence over central 
government policy-mding by natural scientists c. 1900-1925, and I compare this with 
developments in the emerging British economics profession. I argue that each group 
produced a distinctive and historically specific rhetoric for public consumption geared to 
obtaining executive influence. This influence was seen as the crowning achievement of a 
process of professionalisation. Thus the initial nature of the rhetoric, and accompanying 
strategy for policy influence, depended on the degree, and form, of professional status each 
group perceived itself to have attained. The style of the rhetoric, and the preferred means to 
policy influence which it embodied, was then changed, over time, to capitalise on its own 
success in moving the profession closer to influence, as well as to bring it into fine with the 
changing context of contemporary concerns. Faced with a British State culture which was 
reluctant to bring experts formally into the heart of the poficy-making process (even when 
forced to go part of the way by the crisis of the First World War), both natural scientists and 
economists adjusted their pubHc science accordingly. Scientists moved away from 
campaigning for formalised technocracy to supporting a new State organisation of science, 
with new bodies which could be informally linked to produce a power-base within the 
machinery of government. Economist; split over what form professionalisation should take 
because of an ongoing methodological dispute which led to continuing schism over the very 
nature and scope of the discipline, adopted two varying positions. One pursued only informal 
contacts, while the public image of economics was being rebuilt. The other pressed for 
12 
formalised mechanisms for integrating economists in policy-making in the short term. As with 
the natural scientists, it was the more politically astute approach which yielded the best reults. 
I will argue that in order for a clear understanding of the relations of the State and 
science' to be formed, an awareness of the nature of the demands on the State must be 
integrated into the history of * science'/State relations. I want to suggest that such an analysis 
of rhetoric is also a useful indicator of the degree of professionalisation of a given group. I 
concentrate on scientists and economists because they are linked in their public and private 
use of the scientific method as the key to professionalisation and policy influence, and 
because they represent, respectively, one of the most, and one of the least professionalised 
groups. 
The critical concept in this study is rhetoric, or what Frank Turner has dubbed 'public 
science'. 5 Turner has described this as 'the body of rhetoric, argument and polemic' that 
scientists employ to 'justify their activities to the political powers and other social institutions 
upon whose good will, patronage, and co-operation they depend'. 6 In a context of 
professionalisation, scientists' demands were careffifly and deliberately framed in the 
language of key contemporary debates to urge the social value of scientific method. Turner 
suggests that the goals of public science were increased funding and professional status. He 
also begins to suggest a further dimension: that scientists were seeking some kind of political 
influence. A failure to decode this rhetoric may have led to inaccuracies and oversights. Thus 
Scientists naturally tended to talk down the state of British science when publicly appeafing 
for more funding. Taking their rhetoric at face value has meant that most accounts 
underestimate developments in the scope and organisation of British science. But public 
science didn't only press for more science, it also pressed for more power for scientists, and 
in so doing it often painted a self-servingly dismal picture of the level of scientific input into 
policy-making. Here again, a too literal reading of rhetoric has found its way into most 
accounts. 
5 F. M. Turner, 'Public Scicncc in Britain. 1880-1919. ', Lsis Vol. 71. (1980). pp. 589-608. 
6 Ibid-, p. 589. 
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I will apply Turner's concept of public science as a tool to make the general point that 
expert groups which have publicly claimed to be above involvement in any form of politics to 
protect their scientific objectivity, have been written about as apolitical. I will argue that this 
failure has led to two further dangerous misconceptions. Firstly, that the integration of 
experts into the policy-mak-ing machinery of the British State was back-ward in this period, 
and secondly, that this meant that the British State did not receive sufficient expert advice in 
the framing of policy, in comparison with its international rivals. Neither of these is 
necessarily true, but my point is that historians cannot begin to seriously address these 
questions without an understanding of the rhetoric of public science. I will argue that not 
only did the formal mechanisms for the incorporation of expert advice into policy-mak-ing 
develop apace, especially during and immediately after the war years, but that networks of 
less visible informal contacts were at least as important as channels of influence; channels 
which may have hitherto gone unnoticed because of a historical agenda taken, uncritically, 
direct from the rhetoric of public science. 
Some historians of natural science have drawn attention to the public efforts of the 
scientific community to obtain increased State funding for science, but the full implications of 
such activities have not been explored. Instead the rhetoric has been used directly as evidence 
for the reluctance of the State to *properly fund scientific activity. 7 Moreover, the 
implications of scientists' (and other expert groups') claims for executive influence over 
policy-making itself have been neglected. Only Frank Turner and Gary Werskey have argued 
that scientists were also attempting to obtain some kind of authoritative voice in policy- 
making at the same time. 8 Tumer originated the concept of public science in his pioneering 
7 See for example, Alter, pp. cit.., p. 75,131 and 23. 
8 Roy and Kay MacLeod have noted in their article 'The Social Relations of Science and Technology 1914- 
1939'. pp. 301-63 in C. M. Cippolla (ed. ) The Fontana Economic H-iston: of - The Twentieth Centuly 
Vol. .5 Pt. 1 (Glasgow, Collins/Fontana, 1976), that scientists became politicised during the 1920s. but they 
say nothing of the War, much less of the Edwardian periocL Moreover they give no sense of the form the 
scientists' political aspirations took, nor of the arguments used in securing them. The same is true of much of 
MacLeod's other work: for example his 'Into the Twentieth Century', Nature. Vol. 224 (1969)ý pp. 457- 
461; 'Science and the Treasury: Personalities and Policies, 1870-85', in GIT. Turner (ed. ), The Patronage of 
ly Science in the Nineteenth Centu ,, (Leiden, Noordhoff International, 1976), pp. 115-172. In his most recent 
work, cited in footnote 2 above, MacLeod dismisses Turner's concept of public science altogether as too 
restricted a -*ie-A, of scientists activities. though he offers no alternative explanation for the Idnd of rhetoric being producej wk ck, in fact he largely ignores. 
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article in Isis in 1980.9 Turner argued for the recognition of the rhetoric of science for what 
it really was: a changing partisan account of the importance of science. It evolved (as did its 
political goals) in response to changing social and political ideologies, both within the 
scientific community and in society as a whole. Turner argues that 'Public Scientists: 
... do not propagate scientific knowledge for its own sake, and their work may have little or nothing to do with the actual motivations or goals of scientific 
research. Rather they consciously attempt to persuade the public or influential 
sectors thereof that science both supports and nurtures broadly accepted 
social, political and religious goals and values, and that it is therefore worthy 
of receiving pubhc attention, encouragement and financing. The pursuit of 
public science has involved lobbying various non-scientific elites, persuading 
the pubfic or government that science can perform desired social and 
economic functions, defining as important those public issues that scientists 
can address , through their particular knowledge or expertise, stressing 
professional standards among scientists, and defining the position of scientists 
vis-a-vis other rival intellectual or social elites. 10 
This definition enables Turner to discern three distinct periods of public science in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The first, from approximately 1800-1851, saw 
public scientists such as Davy, Brewster and Babbage urging the importance of science as 
useful knowledge, an instrument of self-improvement, an aid to profitable, rational and 
usually individualistic economic activity, and a pillar of natural religion'. 11 During the 
second period, from the mid 1840s to the late 1870s, public scientists such as Huxey and 
Tyndall utilised the theory of biological evolution to stage a public battle with theology and 
metaphysics, partly in order to win a professional contest for social and cultural authority. 
Public science argued that whereas theology was all dogma, scientific methodology ensured 
free intellectual endeavour and objectivity. It was argued that rather than being subordinate 
to theology, science should have intellectual, and thus social, authority over it. Turner notes 
that in order to gain the advantage in this rhetorical battle, public science in this period 
emphasised the, 'values of peace, cosmopolitanism, self-improvement, material comfort, 
social mobility and intellectual progress'. 12 
9 Tumer. op. cit. 
10 Ibid.. p. 590 
11 kiLCL. P. 591 
12 &J-d-, p. 592 
is 
Turner posits a third period beginning in about 1875, in which the themes of public 
science shifted dramatically 'towards the values of collectivism, nationalism, military 
preparedness, patriotism, political elitism and social imperialism'. 13 Scientists had changed 
the political orientation of their rhetoric and its political objectives, partly because they 
themselves were influenced by the new dominant ideologies of the period, and partly to 
capitalise on this ideological shift in national values. The target of the rhetoric had thus now 
become political authority rather than the defeated enemy, theology. Hence, 'science came to 
be portrayed as a means to create and educate better citizens for State service and stable 
politics, and to ensure the military security and economic efficiency of the nation'. 14 
However, Turner seems to have a somewhat limited view of the political objectives of 
Edwardian public science. He certainly suggests that scientists were seeking, 'power or 
influence in the civic arena'15 but he does not clearly state what form the scientists envisaged 
this influence as taking. 
I deepen this analysis by looking at what kind of influence over policy-making the 
scientists aimed at, and the mechanisms for achieving it. In so doing I expand Turner's 
concept of public science (which he largely took to mean public addresses, newspaper and 
journal articles) to include a range of public activities (including popular science texts, and 
the organisation of exhibitions). I also include the expression of the desire for increased 
policy-influence as it is privately voiced in letters between leading public scientists. In 
Chapter One I examine the scientific rhetoric of the Edwardian period, and, briefly, its 
provenance. In Chapter Two I take a detailed look at the War years, showing how a taste of 
the kind of power they wanted spurred the scientists to re-double their campaign, and the 
impact of widening access to influence on the rhetoric itself. In Chapter Three I examine the 
inter-war period, thus linking the work of Turner with that of Werskey16. Werskey has 
argued that the 1930s saw the bifurcation of the scientific community into 'Radicals' (those 
who wanted a restructuring of society along socialist lines, seeing this as the only way 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid, 
16 See Gary Wcrskc3-, 'British Scientists and "Outsider- Politics, 1931.1945', Science Studies. Vol. 1 
(1971), pp. 67-83. 
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scientists could achieve power) and 'Reformists' (those who wanted to maintain and gain 
power through the social status quo). I argue that the 1920s was a transitional phase between 
Turner's final period of public science and Werskey's picture of the 1930s. Chapter Four is a 
case-study of public science in pracfice: I examine the campaign of the leading members of 
the Royal Society's Food (War) Committee to formalise the relations of the committee with 
the State and turn it into the official centre, of scientifically framed food policy. This chapter 
shows how both scientists and economists worked together to press for formalisation, and 
thus forms a bridge to the section of the thesis (the last three chapters) which deals with the 
public science of economists. 
A further part of my argument is that a radical public science was not restricted to 
natural scientists but was a common and characteristic part of the process of 
professionalisation of a variety of expert groups. I next examine the public science of 
economists. This group provides a useful comparison for a number of reasons. They were an 
increasingly academic-based expert group, but were not a cohesive profession at the opening 
of the study. In fact, Alfred Marshall deliberately sought to employ scientific metaphors for 
the business of economic investigation (likening it in turn to biology and physics), in an 
attempt to capture, by association, some of the authority of scientific method. MarshaU 
wished to unify economics as a scientific discipline, so that economists might, in time, follow 
the rest of the professional path of science, which, as we saw, was geared to lead to 
increasingly formalised policy-making influence. 
Much of the history of economic thought is still at the level of Whiggish internal 
accounts of the development of economic theory, writh little or no social contextualisation. It 
is for this reason that Margaret Schabas has recently, and controversially, suggested that the 
field is ripe for the application of the methods and approach of the history of science. 17 I 
want to contribute to this potentially very rewarding cross-fertilisation of the histories of 
economics and science: the process which Schabas recommends of making historians of 
science more: 
17 M. Schabas, 'Breaking Aumy: I-listory of Economics as Iiistory of Science, and the 'various 'Comments' 
making up thcMinisymposium', History of Political Economy, Vol. 24, No. 1, Spring 1992. pp-185-247. 
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aware of the richness of the history of economics as a subject of 
enquiry ... whether one goes in search of great minds, technical achievements, 
conceptual revolutions, ideological clashes, or political and religious 
controversies. 18 
A start has already been made in this direction in the work of A. W. Coats and John 
Maloney19. Maloney has covered Marshall's strategy for the professionalisation of 
economics in fine detail, but still he has not brought out that a crucial part of that strategy, 
one could even say a crucial reason for the employment of that strategy, was the eventual 
achievement of policy-influence for economists. 20 My fifth chapter re-examines Marshall's 
strategy for the professionalisation of economics in this light. In the sixth chapter I contrast 
MarshaU's vision of the professional economist, with its plan for long-term formalisation of 
influence over policy with an alternative, competing, though ultimately unsuccessful version, 
that of the historical economist, Wiffiarn James Ashley. I then, in my seventh and final 
chapter, discuss how Keynes is perhaps less of a maverick when considered in the context of 
the public science of economics. I demonstrate that Keynes in fact builds on the professional 
legacy of Marshall in key ways. 
Finally, a word on methodology and sources My examination of the rhetoric of 
science focuses not only on key individuals, but also on organisations, like the British Science 
Guild. By contrast, my examination of the rhetoric of economics is focused entirely on 
individuals. This seemingly inconsistent approach is in fact explained by part of my findings. 
Science and economics were at different stages of professionalisation. Economics was still in 
the process of acquiring representative professional/learned associations. These fledgling 
economic organisations were in no position to pronounce on controversial policy issues, 
because this would have undermined the image of an objective scientific profession that the 
very establishment of these bodies was meant to help to create. Similarly, for the same 
reason, one simply does not find the same kind of editorial coverage of sensitive policy 
18 Jbid-, p. 198. 
19 See the works by Coats and Maloney as detailed in the Bibliography at the end of this thesis. 
20 See particularly Maloney's Marshall. Orthodoxy and the Professionalisation of Economics, (Cambridge, 
CUP, 1985), passim. 
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issues, or even arguments for economýists to frame policy, in the newly emerging economic 
learned journals (as one does increasingly in the scientific journals). In this respect my 
approach has been largely dictated by the materials available, though exactly why this has 
been the case will, hopefully, become clear in the main body of the thesis. My sources have 
therefore included contemporary journals, pubfished writings and private as well as official 
papers. In using private papers I have attempted to get behind Turner's concept of public 
science to observe the private debates between individual scientists about the form and 
degree of influence they should publicly seek. This approack I hope, allows me to get closer 
to the true political ambitions of both natural scientists and economists. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS: EDWARDIAN PUBLIC SCIENCE AND THE 
BRITISH SCIENCE GUELD. 
Ms [Norman Lockyer's] view was that expressed in that well-known 
dictum of Swift: 'That whoever could make two ears of corn or two 
blades of grass grow upon a spot of ground where only one grew before 
would deserve better of mankind and do more essential service to his 
country than the whole race of politicians put together'. 1 
The increasing size of the British State, and the increasing complexity of the roles it 
was taking on in British society in the period ftom c. 18802, coincided with an increase in the 
scope of the ambitions of professional and professionalising groups to include influence over 
central government policy-making. The existence of such marginalised groups had been noted 
in 1902 by H. G. Wells who identified an 'emergent class of capable men'3 who were isolated 
from traditional political networks and consequently had no way of making their voice heard 
in policy-making. These groups were increasingly middle class and university trained. It was 
just the . se kind of fiustrations with existing social and political arrangements which the Webbs 
were attempting to harness (and which they themselves felt), with their efforts to train up a 
new cadre of professional experts for government service at the London School of 
Econorrics. 4 Those, like the scientists, who had already reached a certain professional status, 
(and with it a certain level of social and cultural authority) took advantage of the State's 
increased need to consult knowledgeable outsiders in unfamiliar areas of policy to press for a 
formalisation of their influence over policy-making. Scientists, like others, were attempting to 
redefine the concept of expertise to mean a body of knowledge, and a method, with a 
I T. Mary Lockyer and Winifred Lockyer, The Life and Work of Sir Norman Lock-ycr, (LondorL Macmillan, 
1928), pp. 185-6. 
2 On tWs see, for example, Roy MacLeod, (ed. ), Government and EZ. Zrtise... qpcij,, particularly MacLeod's 
introduction. 
3 Wells, Anticingtions of the Reaction of Mechanical and Scientific ProgLeg-S Mn Human Lifj aind -Dou&, (London, Harper, 1902), p. 179. Cited here from Turner, 'Public Science... ', QR. cit,. pp, 603-4. 
4 See Beatrice Webb, Our Partnership. (London, 1948), passira. See also W. H. Greenleaf, The British 
Political Tradition. Volume II: Tle Ideological Heritag (London, Routledge, 1983). passim. 
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recognised application to all areas of policy-mak-ing. This process involved the creation and 
utilisation of a new, radical public science. 
This chapter explores the objectives of the rhetoric of Edwardian scientists, 
particularly as expressed through the British Science Guild (BSG), a London based scientific 
pressure group set up by the astronomer Norman Lockyer, in 1905.1 will argue that the 
rhetoric not only echoed the traditional grievance of scientists that British science was 
deficient, but that it also served a radical new political goal: the achievement of meaningful 
influence over government policy-making. To this end it utilised a characteristic reworking of 
Edwardian fears about declining British power, and a redefinition of national problems as 
essentially scientific, to represent politics as a scientific activity best undertaken by scientific 
experts. In seeking to demonstrate this, I will focus on the rhetoric, activities and make-up of 
the BSG, which, I will argue, was the major mouthpiece for the new political rhetoric of 
science in Edwardian Britain. 
The BSG has, when it has been considered at A been given only a passing reference 
in most accounts of the relations of science and the State in Edwardian Britain. Most 
commentators have dismissed the BSG as an extension of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science (BAAS), and have thus understood its political objectives in the 
limited terms laid down by the Associatiods founders: 'to obtain a more general attention to 
the objects of science and a removal of any disadvantages of a public kind which impede its 
progress'. 5 This is a very curious misreading indeed. Lockyer made it clear that it was his 
fiustration with the BAAS's over cautious interpretation, even of these moderate political 
goals, which spurred him into forming the BSG to be a body which would lock horns with the 
State. Thus while both G. R. Searle and Roy MacLeod have noted that the Guild formed from 
Lock-yer's Nature circle and that in its rhetoric it utilised the contemporary common context 
5 One of the original aims of the BAAS as cited h, Sir Norman Lockyer in his presidential Address to the 
BAAS in 1903, pp. 439-40, 'The Influence of Brainpowcr on ffistorý', in Nature, Vol. 68. (1903), pp. 439- 
447. 
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of national efficiency fears to gain support for its political goals, they have failed to identify 
correctly the full extent of these goals. 6 It is assumed that the Guild had the very limited 
pofitical aims oý as Searle put it: 'to attract more public money to universities and other 
institutions where the bounds of science were being extended'. 7 In fact the Guild was also 
concerned with extending the bounds of science to include government policy-making. 
This failure is repeated by Peter Alter in his The Reluctant Patron. 8 Alter provides a 
synthesis of the existing scholarship on the Guild, but offers few fresh insights. He sees the 
Guild as using the language of National Efficiency to equate the needs of science with those 
of the nation, engaging in 'effective publicity work-' and making 'hefty demands for more 
expenditure on universities and research'. 9 Alter brackets the Guild with the BAAS as a 
pressure group pursuing purely professional goals, without understanding that these also 
included political ones. 
The case of Roy MacLeod is rather dfferent. He has always understood that scientists 
produced rhetoric to advance their interests with the public and politicians. He has also 
indicated that these interests have included not only more funding, pay and better prospects, 
but also 'the application of scientific method to politics. '10 However, in his recent detailed 
analysis of the Guild, he rejects Turner's view of the Guild as a body dedicated ostensibly to 
furthering public science campaigns, arguing that the Guild should not be seen *as a voice 
with a single message'. 11 He posits that Turner's analysis of the Guild 'as a pressure group 
6 See GR Searle, The Quest for National Efficieng3,. A St&v in British Politics and Political ThoughL 
1899-1914, (Word, Basil Blackwell, 1971), especially pp. 83-4. See also Roy MacLeod, 'Into the Twentieth 
Centur)ý, m. -cft, and 
'Introduction; On the Achancement of Science', in MacLeod and P. Collins (ed), The 
Parliament of Science: the British Association for the Ach-ancement of Science. 1831-1981 (Northwood, 
Science ReNiews Ltd., 198 1), pp. 17-42, especially pp. 34-5. 
7 Searle, pp. cit., p. 84. 
8 Alter, Oxit, 
9 &A p. 92 and p. 93 
10 MacLeod, p. 35, 'Introduction: On the Ach-ancement of Science', in MacLeod and P. Collins, Qp-. Ci-t, 
pp. 17-42. See also these other works by MacLeod: *Into the Twentieth Centuryý, 99.91', *Science and the 
Tresaury. Personalities and Policies, 1870-85', pp-cit. and Roy and EK MacLeod, 'The Social Relations Of 
Science and Technology 1914-193 9,0. cit. 
11 MacLeod, 'Science for Imperial Efficiency..., pp. cit.. p. 156. 
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that used the rhetoric of expertise and patriotism to serve the interests of "public scientists", 
national efficiency, and administrative reform', is an oversimplification. 12 He argues instead 
that the aims of the Guild changed over time and that its history 'reveals three phases of 
ideological reorientation': 
While its first decade saw appeals to the rhetoric of progressivist, 
imperialist, Victorian goals of scientific management, its wartime and 
immediate postwar history reveals initially successful efforts to 
'bureaucratize' science in the administrative machinery of advice. A third 
phase emerged between 1925 and 1935 when, threatened by a loss of 
momenturn, it began to lean towards the 'social responsibility" of science, 
and formed the right wing of a temporary coalition -a 'popular front', in 
Gary Werskey's phrase - with Britain's radical science movement, whose 
vision was captured in J. D. Bernal's The Social Function of Science. 13 
However, in the rest of this paper, MacLeod offers nothing in place of Turner's analysis, no 
framework within which to understand the Guild's activities. MacLeod does not specify what 
the scientists wanted; what the 'interests of "public scientists"' were. Nor does he explain 
how the rhetoric operated to acheive these aims. There is no examination of how the rhetoric 
of science (how the Guild expressed its 'message') changed with these changing conditions. 
We thus have little idea of what it was that the scientists wanted, and, I would argue, this 
makes it very difficult to asses what they eventually won from the government. In the next 
four chapters I intend to explore in detail the changing nature of the rhetoric. I will argue that 
though the political aims of science did change in response to changing conditions these were 
changes in degree, not in kind. Public Scientists continued to argue for influence over policy, 
though the nature of these arguments changed with the gradually increasing amount of 
influence they enjoyed. All of the periods in the BSG's history discerned by MacLeod can 
best be understood in terms of a public science which, though it stiU pursued funding, pay and 
prospects, was first and foremost chasing policy influence. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
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It is only Frank Turner who has suggested that the Guild was conducting a concerted 
campaign to achieve more radical political objectives. 14 Turner, keenly aware of the 
specificity of Edwardian public science, emphasised the fact that Edwardian scientists, and 
especially those represented by the Guild, were using the context of national efficiency to try 
to gain the kind of meaningful political influence that such middle-class professional groups 
had been denied. As Turner argued: 
The Devonshire Commission had suggested a council on science as wise 
public policy; the British Science Guild sought to make government by 
distinguished experts a matter of patriotism. By 1912 the Guild ... was 
clearly a conservative, social imperialist pressure group seeking to 
combine the intellectual prestige of science with the political attraction of 
efficiency and Empire. 15 
However, though Turner made it clear that scientists were set on obtaining policy 
influence, he says nothing about the kind of inflience this was to be. Was this, for instance, to 
be a general and executive power over all aspects of policy, or only those aspects directly 
related to science? Turner also neglected to specify the institutional form the scientists 
envisaged this new policy influence taking. On both these questions, Turner suggests only 
that the scientists were seeldng 'power or influence in the civic arena'. 16 
In this chapter I will want to re-evaluate the BSG in the fight of Turner's analysis, but 
I will also want to go further and to argue that the Guild was seeking to redefine politics as a 
scientific activity and thus that its ultimate objective was technocracy: the replacement of 
traditional forms of government with an unelected executive council of scientists. I will also 
argue that, as well as advocating government by a scientific council, the Guild operated as a 
working model outside the machinery of government of the kind of scientific council it 
wished to see supervising this entire machinery from above. 
14 F. M. Tumer, 2p. cit., cspecially pp. 601-3. 
15 R Lid., p. 602. 
16 B2u, 
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1.1 THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW RHETORIC 
The radical political objective of executive power over policy-mak-ing had been a 
feature of public science as early as the 1850s, with the arguments of Lord Wrottesley. 
17 He 
was active throughout the 1850s, notably as chairman of the Parliamentary Committee of the 
BAAS, in campaigning for the establishment of a Board of Science to advise the government. 
In 1857, during Ids Presidency of the Royal Society, he persuaded the Council to adopt 
twelve resolutions for the advancement of science which were forwarded to the Prime 
Minister, Palmerston. The tenth resolution stated that, 
... it appears to the President and council that much 
benefit would arise 
from the formal recognition of some Board which might advise the 
Government on aU matters connected with science, and especially on the 
Prosecution, Reduction and Pubfication of Scientific Researches, and the 
Amount of parliamentary or other Grants in aid thereof; also on the 
general principles to be adopted in reference to Pubbc Scientific 
Appointments; and on the Measures necessary for the more general 
Diffusion of a Knowledge of Physical science among the Nation at 
large ... 
18 
This Idnd of argument was again raised by the eighth report of the Devonshire 
Commission nearly twenty years later, in June 1875. However, by now the call was for a 
separate Ministry of Science with a Board of Scientific Advisers attached. This radicalisation 
of the political aims of the progressive wing of the scientific community reached its high point 
in the nineteenth century with the founding of the'new weekly journal of science, liature, in 
1869 by Norman Lockyer, who had been the Secretary to the Devonshire Commission. 
However the rhetoric which appeared in the editorial columns of Nature had an even more 
radical edge. The Nature circle, disillusioned by governments continually turning a deaf ear to 
the grievances of science, had decided to challenge the competence of traditional forms of 
17 Lord John Wrottesley, astronomer, President of the Royal Society from 1854-8, and President of the 
BAAS at the infamous Word meeting of 1860. For more details see Dmid Layton, 'Lord Wrottesley, F. R. S., 
Pioneer Statesman of Science', Notes and Records of the RoN-al Society of London, Vol. 23, (1968), pp. 230-46. 
18 From letter of Wrottesley as President of the Royal Society to Viscount Palmerston urith resolutions of the 
Council enclosed. Order of the House of Lords 18 June 1857, cited from Layton, 2p. cit.. pp. 241-2. 
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democratic government. The new rhetoric argued that only the application of the scientific 
method to politics could ensure the same degree of accuracy that was (supposedly) to be 
found in the natural sciences. As the editorials of Lock-yer and his contributors made clear, 
Statesmanship had to become scientific: 
The same laws that influence the development of the individual influence 
the real progress of the nation, and it is only by honest investigation on 
strictly scientific principles that these laws can be discovered ... Scientific 
method is peculiar to no section of phenomena... and we venture to think 
that in no department could it be applied with greater success than in that 
department which hitherto has been almost entirely under the sway of 
prejudice and blind party spirit ... 
if scientific statesmanship .... were the 
guiding principle in the conduct of public affairs, this nation would be 
more fitted than ever to survive and play the leading part in the affairs of 
the world. 19 
It proved to be a very short distance from arguing for more scientific method in 
government to arguing for government by scientists. Although Wrottesley and the Devonshire 
Commission had mooted radical political aims for science, they had envisaged only an 
advisory role for a scientific council in government; Lockyer was to take the political 
objectives of science a stage further and argue for a national scientific advisory council with 
executive power. Moreover, whereas such radical political objectives had in the past been 
restricted to the fringes of the scientific community, they were now moving into the 
mainstream. Lockyer wanted to turn the traditional relationship between science and the state 
on its head and have the scientist as 'the organist' and the politician as 'organ-blowee. 20 
1.2. THE GUILD: FOUNDATION, AIMS AND METHODS 
By 1903, Lock-yer had realised that a new initiative was needed to carry forward the 
new political objectives. He decided that the time was ripe for a new organisation specifically 
dedicated to pressing the case for more influence for scientific methods and scientists in the 
19 Lockyer, 'The Science of Statesmanship', editorial of 29 January 1890 in Nature Vol. 21, (1879-80), pp. 
295-6. 
20 lbicL 
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conduct of national affairs. In this year Lockyer was President of the BAAS, and he took 
advantage of this platform to outline his plans for the new body in his Presidential Address in 
September at Southport. He had, he stated, 
... been driven to the conclusion that our great crying need is to bring 
about an organisation of men of science and all interested in science, 
similar to those which prove so effective in other branches of human 
activity. For the last few years I have dreamt of a Chamber, Guild or 
League, call it what you will, with a wide and large membership ... 
21 
Lockyer believed that such an organisation would force governments to take notice of 
science by creating an organised 'body which formulates her demands', and thus providing, 'a 
collective voice on the larger national questions'. 22 Lockyer expressed the hope in this 
address that the BAAS might itself take on this more overtly political role, but he made it 
quite clear that if it should refuse he would form a new and more politically radical 
organisation. He warned: 'Rest assured that sooner or later such a guild will be formed 
because it is needed. It is for you to say whether it shall be, or form part oC the British 
Association. 0 When Lockyer discovered that, as he had suspected, the BAAS was prepared 
24 to campaign for science's more moderate political goals of more public money for science, 
but was not willing to become the pressure group for (and working model oO a national 
scientific council with executive powers, he set about founding a new organisation, the BSG- 
When Lockyer formed the Guild between 1903-5, he took with him from Nature 
many of its leading contributors. These included Sir Lauder Brunton the physiologist and 
editor of the medical journal, The Practitioner; the electrical engineer and Professor of 
Mechanics and Mathematics at the Royal college of Science, John Perry, the chemists Sir 
Wilfiam. Ramsay and Raphael Meldola (the latter had been Lockyer's assistant at South 
21 Lockyer, 'The Influence of Brainpower on lEstory, 2R. g±t, p. 441. 
22 ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 For instance, in 1904 Lockyer himself headed a BAAS deputation which waited on the then Prime 
Minister, Balfour, and Chancellor of the Exchcquer, Austen Chamberlain, to urge the increased state 
endowment of universities. 
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Kensington). The Guild was thus to reflect the political objectives which, as we noted earlier, 
Nature had espouseA since the 1880s. The Guild would of course continue to campaign for 
the more traditional and moderate political aim of scientists (public money), but it would do 
this by stressing the Aecess641 of scientific method in all areas of national life. Lock-yer 
stated in his announcement of the Guild's inaugural meeting in hLature, in early 1905, that 
while, 
The Royal Society and British Association were founded for the 
promotion and encouragement of natural knowledge ... the science Guild ... 
is not identical in aim with any existing society. The promotion of 
natural knowledge is outside its sphere. Its purpose is to stimulate not so 
much the acquisition of scientific knowledge, as the appreciation of its 
value and the advantue of employing the methods of scientific inquiry, 
the study of cause and effect, in affairs of every kind. Such methods are 
not less applicable to the problems which confront the statesman, the 
official, the merchant, the manufacturer, the soldier, the schoolmaster, 
than to those of the chemist or biologist ... 
25 [my emphasis) 
In so saying, Lockyer was setting out one of the crucial elements of the Guild's political 
rhetoric. Scientific expertise was applicable to every End of problem, not just scientific 
problems, and, by implication, politicians, who made policy for all areas of national He, 
should use the scientific method. It was essential to establish this before the argument could 
proceed to its logical conclusion: that scientists should have political authority over all areas 
of poficy-making. 
The Guild argued that the ideal institutional mechanism through which this authority 
should be expressed was the national scientific council. This form was first suggested by 
Lockyer himself in his Presidential Address to the BAAS in 1903. He reminded his audience 
that the Devonshire Commission had recommended such a council and noted with admiration 
that Germany already possessed one: 
It consists of representatives of the Ministry, the Universities, the 
industries and, agriculture. It is small, consisting of about a dozen 
members, consultative, and it reports direct to the Emperor. It does for 
25 'The British Science Guild, p. 586, Nature Vol. 72, (1905), pp. 585-6. 
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industrial war what military and so-called defence councils do for national 
armaments; it considers everything relating to the use of brainpower in 
peace, from the alterations in school regulations and the organisation of 
Universities, to railway rates and fiscal schemes, including the adjustment 
of duties. I am informed-that what this council advises generally-b-ecom 
law. (my emphasis] 
Lockyer envisaged a council which appeared advisory in nature but possessed, if not official 
then at least unwritten, executive powers. Its introduction into Britain, which unlike Germany 
was at least notionally democratic, would have meant the complete undermining of the power 
of elected ministers, or perhaps even a radical revision of the British governmental apparatus 
into, what would effectively have been, a technocracy. Needless to say, Lockyer viewed it as 
a matter of national importance that such a council be set up in Britain. He asked 'Without 
such a machinery as this, how can our Ministers and our Rulers be kept completely informed 
on a thousand things of vital importanceT 26 
This vision of the aims of the Guild was not Lockyer's alone but was shared by other 
leading members of the Guild. For ex=ple, the first President, the Liberal Imperialist M. P., 
and fervent supporter of science (although only as and when it suited him), Richard Burdon 
Haldane. He had repeatedly spoken out for a corps scientifique to be part of government 
before his official attachment to the Guild had begun, and he reiterated this belief in his 
Presidential address to the inaugural meeting of the Guild on October 30th 1905. Nature 
reported his speech: 
For himself he believed that things would not be right until we had a 
permanent scientific corps under a permanent committee, just as the 
Defence Committee was under the Prime Minister today. He meant a 
body that would not consist merely of officials of the ordinary kind, but 
should consist of the most eminent men of science, who would go there 
because they were honoured and put on the footing upon which they 
deserved to be placed, and were recognised as a body of men who would 
26 Both quotations above from Lockyer, 'Brainpower... ', 2p. cit.., p. 446. 
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be at the elbow of the department, and could organise the scientific work 
of the state ... 
27 
Such sentiments were not restricted to Lockyer and Haldane but were expressed by 
many leading members of the BSG. Nature reported Sir William Ramsay, for instance, as 
saying a the same inaugural meeting that: 
... in England we 
had a great deal of scientific ability-its application to the 
affairs of the State, to the Army, to the Navy, to the service of the nation 
at large, could be very much better organised than it was. The object of 
the Guild was to attempt to effect that organisation, which was so much 
required. 28 
The BSG had a tripartite strategy by which it hoped to realise its political objectives. 
The first element in this strategy was the rhetoric: the presentation, or packaging, of the 
arguments for political power for scientists as answers to perceived contemporary national 
problems. The second was the form that Lockyer finally decided the Guild should take: a 
small but very well-connected pressure group, rather than the large organisation with wide 
membership which he had first imagined. Finally, I want to argue that the very way in which 
the Gufld worked was an element in its game-plan. It behaved as a model of the Scientific 
councH its rhetoric advocated. I shall briefly want to consider each of these elements in turn. 
In arguing for its political objectives, the rhetoric of the Guild was informed by, and 
utilised, the prevailing context of concern in Edwardian Britain for national efficiency. This 
common ideological context is best described as a sense of national insecurity, which resulted 
in a public debate (expressed in political speeches, books, pamphlets and newspaper and 
journal articles) about the most effective methods of ensuring military and industrial 
supremacy in a changing domestic and international situation. This debate even extended to 
questions about the efficacy of the contemporary political efite and the traditional British form 
27 Haldane, Presidential Address to the BSG. as reported on p. 12, Nature Vol. 73, 'The British Science 
Guild!, pp. 11-13. 
28 Sir William Ramsay moving the vote of thanks to the Lord Mayor of London, lbid,. p. 13. (the inaugural 
meeting of the Guild had been held at the Mansion House). 
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of parliamentary govenunent. 29 It was, therefore, a climate in which the new political 
rhetoric of the Gufld was assured a sympathetic hearing, especially as the members were 
careful to present their arguments in the language of contemporary concerns. Six key motifs 
can be identified in the rhetoric which were all issues of great contemporary importance: the 
view of international relations as an evolutionary struggle, a kind of external social 
Darwinism; the economic, military, scientific and political backwardness of Britain; the 
argument that these problems were caused by a lack of science and scientific thinking in 
government; an attack on party poEticians, their methods of government portrayed as the root 
of national problems; a new definition of politics as a science and the inference that thus 
scientists should have political power; and finally the advocacy of a policy of educational 
reform to ensure a ready supply of scientific experts for the pobtical future. This, at least, was 
the argument as made by the scientists in its long-hand form, though all of these stages were 
not always present simultaneously. For instance, in 1903, Lockyer argued for the application 
of scientific tMnking to government by invoking the spectre of the Boer War: 
If anyone is under the impression that Britain is only suffering at present 
from the want of the scientific spirit among our industrial classes and that 
those employed in the State service possess adequate brainpower and the 
grip of the conditions of the modem world into which science so largely 
enters, let him read the report of the Royal commission on the war in 
South Africa. 30 
The report, as might be expected, was hardly glowing with praise for the conduct of 
the war. Lockyer argued that 'Brainpower' was the key to national salvation. It was the 
ultimate political panacea and offered efficient government at home and a strong industry and 
armed forces to maintain Britain's status'abroad. It was also a cipher for political power for 
scientists. As he commented at another point in his Southport address of 1903: 
The more our rulers and legislators, administrators and executive officers 
possess the scientific spirit, the more the rule of thumb is replaced in the 
State service by scientific methods, the more able shall we be, thus armed 
29 For details see Searle, gp. cit, 
30 Lockyer, Trainpower... ', gp. gt,, p. 440. 
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at all points, to compete successfully with other countries along all lines 
of national as well as of commercial actiNity. 31 
The message could not have been made clearer or more appealing; Government by scientists 
was for the benefit of the nation. 
On other occasions members of the Guild took up related themes. For instance, the 
Scottish astronomer Sir David Gi1132 took the opportunity of the Guild's Annual Banquet in 
191") to lambast the subjective, partisan nature of party politics and the exalt the scientist's 
approach to knowledge as infinitely more sensible: 
The instincts of the man of exact science are indeed opposed to those of 
the normal party politician. The man of science must be very sure of his 
grounds before he makes a statement, and must rigidly compare all 
existing facts with any theory before he declares the probability, or his 
personal conviction of its truth. above all he must be careful to avoid the 
influence of preconceived ideas ... Where should the party politician be if he based his action on such grounds? He would soon be hounded out of his 
party, or reduced to slavish submission by the party whip. 33 
The bacteriologist Ronald Ross, 34 who was also a member of the Guild, expressed similar 
anti-democratic sentiments in his more robust style. He became editor of the jounal Science 
Progress in 1913. He tumed what had hitherto been a joumal for the popularisation of recent 
scientific discoveries to an interdisciplinary and lay audienCe35 into a public forum for the 
discussion of controversial issues. He introduced editorial coverage in which he repeatedly 
31 Ibid. 
32 Sir David Gill, KCB, FRS, astronomer, (1843-1914). Gill mas educated at the University of Aberdeen. and 
was H. M. Astronomer at the Cape of Good Hope, 1879-1907. 
33 Sir David Gill, speech to the BSG Annual Banquet, 26th May 1913, as reported in Nature, Vol. 91, 
(1913), p. 358. 
34 Ronald Ross, KCB, FRS, (1857-1932). ARzrded Nobel Prize for Medcinc in 1902 for his work- in Africa 
on malaria. He was in charge of malaria problems during the War. KCB 1911, KCMG 1918. 
35 See Science Progess in the 20th Ccnturv: a Ouartcrly Journal of Scientiftc_ThougýA. No. 1, July 1906, 
Editorial Preface by N. H. Alcock, M. D. and W. G. Freeman B. Sc. F. L. S., pp. 1-3. The journal had first 
appeared in 1894 under the auspisecs of Sir Henry Burdett. Seven volumes appeared edited týy Professor J. 
Bretland Farmer, but the original publication had folded in 1898. 
32 
criticised party goverru-nent and advocated technocracy. For instance, in 1915 Ross was 
expressing the radical hope that: 
... the war will 
be followed by a revolution in England ... principally 
directed 
against the sort of people who now rule us and whose frequent neglect of 
36 the advice of experts ... has been largely responsible for the war. 
For Ross, the politicians' every 'utterance ... is worthless on any question which 
is touched by 
his pofitics'. 37 Such men were 'not intellectually or morally ... fit to rule a great Empire'. 
38 
Not only had the political aims of scientists become more radical by the Edwardian 
period, but these objectives were being sought with a rhetorical language which was 
specifically Edwardian in its ideological content: the sub-text of fears about national 
efficiency. 
As well as having a persuasive rhetoric, the Guild even advanced its own political 
aims by the way it operated. Partly of course it operated as a straightforward and very typical 
Edwardian pressure group like the National Service League or the Navy League. This 
involved circulating letters, intervening in disputes, making deputations, establishing 
committees of enquiry, publishing its views in reports, holding annual meetings and 
socialising at banquets or dinners. However, I want to argue that there was another way in 
which the Guild worked: it operated as the kind of national advisory council that its rhetoric 
was advocating, and thus demonstrated how such a council could work for the national good. 
It did this by offering advice to the government of the day, by shadowing official 
consideration of issues and producing what amounted to minority reports on key topical 
issues. Later, when its views on the necessity of scientific advice came to be officially 
recognised, it was asked directly by government departments to render advice on scientific 
matters. 
36 Sir Ronald Ross, p. 151, 'A Hoped for Revolution in Britain', editorial in Science PrOgress, Vol. 10, 
(1915-16), pp. 151-3. 
37 Ross, editorial in Science Progress , 
Vol. 9. (1914-15). p. 391, entitled. militarism and PaM, Politics'. 
38 Ross, p. 665, editorial in Science Progress. Vol-10, (1915-16) entitled, -part), Impolifics U', pp. 664-5. 
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Lockyer's original inspiration for the Guild was drawn from the German Navy League 
in two ways. Firstly, he initially visualised a large and broad membership. Secondly, he saw 
Ot3aA6a-ý'OAO - 
the Guild's aims as similar: botiLwere working to increase national power. As Lockyer said in 
September 1903: 
We in this Empire certainly need to organise science as much as in 
Germany they find the need to organise a navy. The German Navy 
League ... has a membership of 630,000, and its income is nearly 20,000 1. [pounds] a year. A British Science League of 500,000 with a sixpenny 
subscription would give us 12,000 1. [pounds] a year, quite enough to 
begin with ... 
39 
However, even by Pecember 1903, Lockyer had changed his mind as to the kind of Guild he 
wanted. After consultation with Lord Avebury (Sir John Lubbock) it was agreed that the 
minimum rate of subscription should rise to 2/6.40 A further 'entrance fee' was added to this 
making a year's subscription at ordinary membership level cost five shillings in all. Lockyer 
had decided that a small organisation recruited from among the nation's most eminent men 
would have greater influence with the political authorities. Announcing the formal formation 
of the Guild in Nature in August 1904, Lockyer stated that: 
... it -is expected ... that its members will be recruited principally from the following: The House of Lords; The House of Commons; Colonial 
Legislatures; County, District, Borough and Parish Councils; 
Municipalities; Educational Committees; Scientific and Literary 
Organisations; Commercial and Industrial Chambers and Organisations; 
the Learned Professions, Universities, Colleges, Educational Bodies and 
Representatives of-Labour. 41 
Armed with this new vision, Lock-yer approached leading politicians and notables. he 
contacted Balfour, Rosebery and Joseph Chamberlain as eminent politicians Mth a kmown 
interest in science. Only Chamberlain agreed to be a Vice President of the Guild, though even 
39 Lockver"Brainpower.. I, pn. cit., p. 441. 
40 Lockyer vms trying to persuade Avebury to join the Guild, which he finally did as Honorary Treasurer. In a 
letter to Lockyer on 2nd December 1903 (from the Norman Lockyer Papers, Exeter University Library, box 
labelled 'Letters received A-B') Avebury asked *Again is 2/6 enough as a subscription 7 Surely it could not cover 
expenses! ' 
41 From Lockyer's announcement of the formation of the BSG, p. 343, Nature vol. 70, (1904). pp. 343-4. 
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this was a purely nominal position which merely ensured the presence of an influential 
name. 42 However the members of the Guild did include a large number of nobles'43 many 
M. P. s with an interest in science, 44 a brace of military men'45 and nearly all the leading 
representatives of contemporary science. 46 But perhaps Lockyer's greatest coup was to 
secure the services of the leading Liberal Imperialist NIP, R. B. Haldane, as first President 
(1905-13). His presence gave the Guild a figurehead who commanded public 
attention. 
By early 1906, the Guild seemed in a strong position to press home its public science 
arguments. Its President had been made Secretary of State for War (and was later made Lord 
Chancellor, in 1912) and a reforming Liberal Government was in power, whose social agenda 
was very close to that of the Guild. But the Guild didn't only rely on its President's 
connections to extend the influence of scientists. 27+ also operated as a model of the kind of 
executive scientific council it wanted to see as a formal part of the machinery of government. 
Sir David Gill, speaking in 1913, described the Guild's way of working: not only did it 
respond to government requests for advice as the Royal society did, but in most cases it let 
government know when scientific advice was needed, 
... when a Bill is in course of preparation ... in which 
it is clear that scientific 
advice has been neglected or not demanded, the science Guild refers the 
matter to a competent committee of its own, and tenders advice without 
42 There is no record of Chamberlain ever having attended any of the Guild's functions. 
43 Among them Lord Balcarres. Earl Egerton of Tatton, Lord Reay, The Lord Str thcona and Mount R a 0%21 
Lord Tennison and the Lord Bishop of Ripon. 
44 Among them Sir Gilbert Parker, Sir Michael Foster, Mr. E. Roertson, Sir John Colomb. Mr. F. Vemey, 
Mr. W. Phipson Beale. Sir John GoM Sir Charles McClaren. Thomas Burt and Charles Bathurst. 
45 Among them Captain E. W. Creak-, Major-General Sir Owen Tudor Bumc, Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, 
Major-gencral Sir J. F. Maurice, Colonel Sir John Young and Major OMeara. 
46 Including R. Meldola, Sir William Ramsay, S. P. Thompson, Sir J. Burdon-Sanderson. Sir Archibald 
Geikic, Sir Joseph Hooker, E. R. Lankestcr, J. Lamor, Lord Lister, H. Roscoe, Lubbock' (Avebury), Lord 
Rayleigh, Sir P. Magnus. Sir W. Abney, Sir W. Mather, Sir G. Darwin, Sir William White, Sir David Gill. Sir 
R. Ross, Richard Gregory, and John Perry. Medical men and industrial scientists were also well represented: 
for instance, Sir Alfred Keogh, Surgeon-General and later the Director of the Army Medical Service. and the 
physiologist and pharmacologisL Sir Lauder Brunton. the industrial chemist Sir G. T. Beilby, and the onetime 
President of the Institute of Electrical Engineers, Dr. Ferranti. 
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solicitation ... as time goes on Governments Aill more and more find the importance of listening to.. advice so tendered. 47 
The Guild shadowed official consideration of key issues of national concern or produced 
critical reports of current or proposed legislation. The Guild's reports were widely circulated 
to politicians, and all parties with an interest in the topic under consideration. For instance, in 
1911 the Medical Committee considered the prevention of tuberculosis. A memorandum was 
sent to the Treasury Departmental Committee, which was also considering this subject. When 
the Treasury Committee produced its interim report in 1911, the Guild found that it 
concurred with the recommendations of the Medical Committee. Furthermore, during 1912, 
the government confirmed that the research recommended by both Treasury and BSG would 
go ahead, and voted 157,000 for its execution out of the funds generated by the recent 
National Insurance Act. 48 
In 1912, the Joint Committee of the Educational and Technical Education Committees 
called a special sitting 'Owing to the declaration by the Government of the intention to bring 
in a comprehensive scheme to reorganise the educational system of the country... '49 The 
Committee hastily set about compiling a Est of proposals for inclusion in the forthcoming 
legislation. 
In time government even came to consult the Guild on specific questions, thus 
officially recognising the usefulness of such a body. The best example of this came in late 
1914. The Board of Trade had set up a committee to enquire into the manufacture of optical 
glass in Britain. This committee in turn set up a Technical Sub-Committee chaired by Lord 
Moulton. Moulton then asked the BSG to aid him in the collection of data on the supply of 
optical glass. To this end, the Guild's existing Technical optics Committee was strengthened 
47 Sir David Gill, pp. -Cit-, p. 
359. 
48 See the British Scien-ce Guild: Sixth Annual Rem (1912), p. 10 (A complete set of bound copies of 
the Reports of the Guild until its amalgamation uith the BAAS in 1935, are held at the British Library, 
London. ) 
49 British Science Guild- Seventh Annual Repgrt, (1913), p. 6. 
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by the co-option of new expert members: F. J. Cheshire of the Patent Office, Dr. R. T. 
Glazebrook, Director of the National Physical Laboratory, and H. J. Stobart from leading 
optical glass manufacturers, Chance Brothers, among others. The ensuing report went back 
through Moulton to the Permanent Secretary of The Board of Trade. It had recommended 
that research on the properties of glass and the most efficient way of manufacturing glass, be 
undertaken at the National Physical Laboratory. Both of these suggestions were duly enacted 
by the Government. 50 
The Guild was beginning to be recognised as a useful scientific resource in the 
formulation of pol. icy. However, ideally the scientists would have preferred to have the Guild, 
or a body like it, officiaBy recognised and given an institutional position above the rest of the 
machinery of government. 
1.3 CONCLUSION 
The Edwardian scientific community had developed a new and radical political 
objective. No longer were scientists content to campaign simply for public money. The chief 
goal was now the achievement of political power via the mechanism of a scientific council 
Mth executive powers. The rhetoric in which this aim was pursued was based on a definition 
of national problems in terms of science and an assertion that scientific experts should make 
policy. 
However, what had caused the political radicalisation of scientists? In part, I argue, 
the motivations were internal to the scientific community. - Scientists themselves saw 
involvement in policy as the natural culmination of the professionalisation of their discipline. 
But, there were also external influences at work. Firstly, the intransigence of the traditional 
50 See British Science Guild: Ninth An' nual Repg U 915), p. 13. Different accounts Of tWs episode can be 
found in Roy and EX. MacLeocL 'War and Economic Development: Gcnernment and the Optical Industry 
in Britain, 1914-1918', in J. Wi nter (ed. ), War and Economic Deyclopment: Essays in Honour of D3vJ 
Loslin, (Cambridge, CUP, 1975), pp. 165-204; and MacLeo 'Science for Imperial Efficiency ...... Qp--Ci-1-- pp. d, 170-2. 
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political authorities in the face of repeated requests for funding and social recognition for 
science, and secondly, the particular social and political context of Edwardian Britain. I want 
to suggest, however, that there was also a deeper level of external causation at work here. 
Roy MacLeod has argued that the political influence of scientific experts within government 
departments was being progressively eroded from about 1870 onwards. He has described 
this as a 'dilemma of departmentalisatioe. He further argued that this process continued in 
the I triumph of law', which saw the almost complete political emasculation of the scientific 
expert and the increasing dominance of the generalist civil servant, a state of affairs which 
MacLeod saw continuing into post First World War Britain. 51 
MacLeod's analysis of the fate of scientific experts at the hands of generaEst civil 
servants, corroborates Peter Gowan's radical re-interpretation of the existing historiography 
of the development of the British civil service. 52 Gowan sees the transition from the pre- 
Northcote-Trevelyan civil service, where experts could acquire power, to a reformed civil 
service, in which power was held exclusively by Okbridge educated generalists, increasingly 
independently of the reformed parhament, as one of great importance. This argument runs 
counter to the general tenor of earlier fiterature on the development of the British State, 
which saw a corrupt civil service being replaced by a meritocratic service, where office was 
open to all on the basis of talent. In fact, as Gowan shows, it was only open to a very special 
Idnd of talent, or brand of expertise, which did not include the narrow specialism of middle 
class scientific experts. This Gowan insists was a central aim of civil service reform. 
I would suggest that the continuing enshrinement of a generalist bias in the political 
culture of the British State is an important factor in the polificisation of the scientists. This 
bias blocked what many scientists perceived as the further progress of the professionalisation 
of their discipline. The situation came to a head in the Edwardian period because of the 
heightened intensity of criticism of the State after the Boer War, and in the tense international 
51 Roy MacLeod, Introduction to Government and Exmertise Qp. cit. p. 16. =Qz=X=LW _, - 52 Peter Gowan, The Origins of the Administrative Elite', NeNv Left Review No. 162, (1987), pp. 4-34. 
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climate of these years. I am thus adding to both MacLeod's and Gowan's analyses by 
providing a case study of a particular expert group. Having been excluded from 
administrative power by generalist civil servants, the scientists claimed political power not 
within departments but above them, via a scientific national council, as the BSG argued. 
These campaigns continued into the war years, and, very soon, the public scientists 
enjoyed considerable success, as the demands of the wartime emergency resulted in the State 
allowing scientists increased access to government service. This only intensified the public 
science arguments, and imparted a new slant. The aim now was to consolidate these gains and 
have them formalised as an integral part of the machinery of government. This story is told in 
the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A NVAR OF WORDS: PUBLIC SCIENCE IN BRITAIN, 1914-16 
The Promised Land is in sight, and must be won. ' 
This chapter %krill examine the form and content of the arguments produced by the 
British scientific community during the First World War to gain influence over government 
policy-mak-ing. The bulk of the existing literature on British science in the First World War 
(Eke the corresponding literature on the Edwardian period, which was considered in the 
previous chapter) discusses the political aspirations of scientists only in the very finfited 
sense of noting public campaigns to secure better funding for science, and social status for 
scientists, on the back of a clearer public perception of the worth of scientific enterprise in 
wartime. Most accounts go on to talk about the attitude of the State to science (rather than 
of science to the State), and detail the setting up of the various State sponsored schemes for 
civilian scientific research, for instance the Department of Scientific and Industrial research 
(DSIR). 2 
Roy and Kay MacLeod have identified a more radical political rhetoric, but have 
argued that scientists' involvement in politics was not an issue until the 1920s. In the 
aftermath of war scientists were faced with the moral issue of the social uses of science as 
either creator or destroyer. Should they attempt to intervene in policy to guide the use of 
Nature Vol. 97,20 July 1916, p. 418 
See Hilary and Steven Rose, 'Science and Society. (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970); Peter Altcr, Tile Reluctant 
Patron: Science and the State in Britain, 1850-1920 , (Oxford, Berg, 1987); D. S. L. Cardwell, Ile Organisation 0 Science in Englan (London, Heineman, 1957). The Government of Science ji, Britain, J-B. Poole and Kay Andrews 
(eds. ), (London, Weideffeld and Nicolson, 1972), a collection of primary sources with minimal commentary, covers the 
same ground though its extracts do give some indications of the broader concerus of British scientists. As David 
Edgerton has recently pointed out, such accounts focus almost exclusively on so-called cililian science, when the 
expenditure of the DSIR was paltry when compared to that of the service departments. The few existing accounts of 
military/naval research largely concentrate on the new bodies through which civilian scientists entered the machinery of 
&f -R government. 
See David Edgerton, 'Liberal Militarism and the British State', New LI evicýy, No. 185, 
entif (January/February 1991), pp. 13M9. The existing accounts include: Roy MacLeod and E. KayAndrews, 'Sci Ic 
Advice in the War at Sea, 1915-1917: the Board of Invention and Researcle, Journal of ConternTxrwv Hi , Vol. 6, (1971), pp. 340; Michacl Pattison, 'Scientists, Inventors and the Military in Britain, 1915-19: Ile Munitions 
Inventions Departmcnf, Social Studies of Science, Vol. 13 (1983), pp. 521-68 -, Steve Sturdy, 'From the Trenches to the 
Hospitals at Home: Phýsiologists, Clinicians and Oxygen Therapy', in J. V. Pickstonc (ed-) Medical Innovations in 
Historical Per. MpctivC, . (Houndmills, Macmillan, 1992), pp. 104-23; Roy MacLeod, -Thc Chemists go to War: Ile 
Mobilization of Civilian Chemists and the British War Effort, 1914-18, Annals of Scicncc Vol. 50, (1993), pp. 453-81. However, some accounts do explore the development of science in the services, as %veil as looking at the wartime 
relations with civilian science. On this see, for example, L. F. Haber, The -Poisonous 
Cloud- Chemical Warfare in the 
Firsi World Wo , (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986); and Giky Hartcup, The War of Inv 60 , -sclent fie 
Dcvel=ents. 
1914-18 (London, Brasse)? s Defence Publishers, 1988) 
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science down a path more in keeping with their own (liberal) image of science ? In this 
context, some scientists chose to desert their ivory towers and associate with political 
groups such as the Guild Socialists, the Labour Party and even the Communist Party. The 
MacLeods have argued (quoting the Cambridge Magazine of 1918 ) that: 
In Britain, political action among scientists was motivated, not only 'for a 
desire for much higher remuneration ... 
decent status and social standing', but 
by a social and political vision 'of the possibilities in science, whether pure or 
applied, of man-power and organisation. ' In response to such a vision, left 
wing I scientific outsiders' demanded for scientists not only a share in the 
profits of research, but a voice in the internal management of research. ' 
However, there was no suggestion here that scientists were politicised in a similar way 
during the war, much less before it. The British Science Guild, for example is described in a 
footnote as functioning as 'a scientific "ginger group" for the promotion of scientific 
research and education'. " 
In this chapter I will focus on the scientists' attitude towards the State. I will argue 
that the scientific community produced two kinds of public science during the war. Public 
scientists perceived the extreme national test of war as the perfect opportunity finally to 
convince the public and politicians of the truth of the arguments of Edwardian public 
science: that science and scientists should play a much greater role in national life. Increased 
government demand for the services of scientists during the war, as well as the increased 
sense of community and solidarity that such war work- produced amongst scientists, meant 
that the more moderate and traditional aims of public science (more State funding for 
science, a national science policy and better pay and social standing for scientists) were also 
pursued with a new vigour. 
Furthermore, the radical political rhetoric, which was examined in the previous 
chapter, was also now given a new stimulus. This rhetoric was similar in form and content 
to the Edwardian rhetoric, but was given an added potency, and furnished with more 
imperative arguments in the crisis of war. Public scientists felt that wartime emergency 
conditions might make politicians more ready to grant concessions and open up the 
machinery of government to scientists, perhaps even to the extent of giving them a formal 
position within it. 
3 Rov and Kay MacLeod, *The Social Relations of Science and Technology 1914-1939', pp. 301-63 in C. M. Cippolla 
(ed. ) The Fontana Economic Ifiston- of Euromine Twentieth Cent_un- Vol. .5 Pt, I (Glasgow, 
COllins/FOntana, 1976); 
ý-325- They quote the Cambridge Ma2azine, 16 February 1918, pp. 445-6. MacLeods, Ibid., p. 303, footnote I 
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I want to argue, then, that as in the Edwardian period the main thrust of this rhetoric 
was technocratic: that scientists should be entrusted %rith executive power over general 
policy. The mechanism for this power was again to be some kind of formal, institutionalised, 
national scientific council. This body would sit above a other departments of government, 
and would be automatically consulted in the framing of all policy which could be broadly 
defined as containing a scientific element. This body would not simply react to government 
requests for advice, but would have the power to make independent, but binding, policy 
recommendations. I will further argue that the public scientists wanted this new body to 
have authority not only over the direction of so-called civilian industrial research, but also 
over the policy programme for mifitary and naval research and development. 
However, I vrill also indicate that , although there was a general consensus within 
the scientific community about the need for a formalisation of influence, a difference of 
opinion about the best institutional mechanism to embody this surfaced during the war 
years. The Nature/BSG circle at first continued to press for a new body of scientists to be 
incorporated at an executive level within the machinery of government. The Royal Society 
(or influential sections of its Council) favoured a subtly different line which, I argue, it felt 
to be more in tune with the State! s attitude towards outside expertise, and thus more likely 
to ensure policy influence. This was to allow the government to create its own new bodies 
for the management of science, but to ensure that these new bodies were made up of 
eminent scientists. These bodies could then be used as forums for co-ordinating more 
general policy influence, especially because informal contacts could be maintained between 
their eminent heads. In fact an informal technocracy composed of scientific chiefs could be 
created in this way. This approach, it was felt, harmonised more fully with the changing 
attitude of the State toward the influence of outside expertise on policy. The crisis of war, I 
will argue, brought great and lasting changes in this attitude, but not a complete volleface. 
The State became more willing to allow experts in general improved access; but they were 
still preferred to remain on tap, rather than on top. The beauty of the Royal Society model 
(which, as will become clear, was worked out directly with sections of the government) was 
that it allowed scientists more formalised influence, but on the State's terms. Thus it did not 
offend against the tacit principle of (at least nominally and publicly) protecting the inner 
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sanctum of the art of policy-making (%krith all its mysteries intact) as the sole preserve of 
politicians and civý servants. 
By the later war years, the majority of the scientific community had come to accept 
the Royal Society model, and it became enshrined in the DSIR and the other Research 
Councils, as well as embodied in the Haldane Report on the machinery of Government. 
2.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RHETORIC: A BRIEF SURVEY 
The war which Edwardian public science had prophesied was to be the first 
scientific war. It would require not only the development of ever more deadly weapons 
technology and the adequate supply of munitions of war, but would also demand the 
scientific organisation of all aspects of national life, The German threat had been portrayed 
as essentially scientific: technological, organisational and educational. It was thus used not 
only as the basis of arguments for greater executive direction of a national scientific policy 
by scientists, through a national scientific advisory council, but also to argue that scientists 
should ffame more general policy. To keep ahead of Germany, Britain had to outdo her in 
centrally organised and directed civil and mHitary science, and had to base all political 
decisions on scientific considerations, shorthand for considerations of national power. 
Science was not conceived narrowly but was 'a Latin word for the best way of doing what 
is to be done. ' 
A Pl 
Aner the outbreak of the predicted war the majority of the scientific community felt 
that their argument for control of policy now possessed a new and pressing relevance. In an 
unsigned editorial in February 1916 Nature noted that the war had caused an 'awakening'to 
the truth of Norman Lock-yer's prophetic 1903 address to the British Association on 'The 
Influence of Brainpower on Ilistory' (the key text of Edwardian public science which, as we 
noted in the previous chapter had spawned the British Science Guild): 
3 Sir William Osler, 'Science and War', address to the Leeds Medical School, 1915, as reported in Nature Vol. 96, 
December 16 1915, pp. 431-3; p. 431. For a discussion of the uses made of the concept of scientific method in public, 
science, mainly in the 19th century, See Richard Yeo, 'Scientific Method and the Rhetoric of Science in Britain, 1830- 
1917, pp-259-97, in The Politics and Rhetoric of Scientific Method (Historical Studies), Yeo and J. A. Schuster (eds. ), 
(Dordrecht, Reidel, 1986). 
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We have waited a long time for public enlightenment as to the 
relation of science to national affairs .... Now that the war has shown the truth of the predictions of our scientific Cassandras, there is more 
reason to believe that action will be taken to avert the consequences 
of neglect in the past and to provide the scientific community the 
conditions of advance in the future. ' 
Public scientists stressed that this was a war of chemists and engineers which would daily 
prove that their claims for policy control were not only justified but essential to victory. 
Nature observed in December 1915 that: 
Today, considerably more than a million of our fellow 
countrymen ... are pursuing their scientific studies at an open-air German university under conditions which compel their undivided 
attention. Many of them realise very forcibly that the advantages 
possessed by their enemy instructors are due entirely to scientific 
organisation. When our soldier-students return to civil fife will they insist upon scientific control of all national affairs ? In that possibility lies our strong hope. ' 
Pubfic science thus argued that Britain should have a comprehensive, centrally 
controlled science policy. Sir William Ramsay' ý wrote in Nature in October 1914 that 'This 
war in contradistinction to all previous warsjs a war in which pure and applied science 
plays a conspicuous part' and called for the mobilisation of the Fellows of the Royal, 
Physical, Chemical and Engineering Societies. 9 
Editorials and articles in Nature were also arguing that scientists themselves should 
have control of science and more general poficy, because of the importance of science to 
national power, particularly in wartime, and because the scientific method was the only 
foolproof way of making political decisions. Throughout late 1915 and early 1916 Nature 
carried many expressions of such sentiments: from criticisms of the scientific qualifications 
of civil servants and 'lawyer-politicians' 11 which rendered them unfit to govern a modem 
state, to direct attacks on the system of democratic government. Many of these criticisms 
were sparked by a hostility to the Government's organisation of schemes for promoting 
scientific and industrial research. As we will later see, many scientists perceived these as 
6 'Defects and Remedies', anonymous editorial, Nature, Vol. 96, February 10 1916, pp. 643A: 644. 
ýScientific Research and the Chemical Industr)l anonymous opening editorial, Nature, Vol. 96 (1915-16), 30 December 
1916, pp. 475-6-p. 476. 8 Sir William Ramsay (1852-1916). FRS; KCB. Scottish chemist educated at Glasgow and Tubingen. Professor of 
Chemistry at University College, London. 9 Sir William Ramsay, 'p. 22 1, 'Science and the State, unsigned' editorial in Nature Vol. 94, October 29 1914, pp. 221 - 
2. 
10 This phrase represents a common complaint against the domination of lawyers over scientists in the House of 
Commons. Rather ironical]), perhaps, lawycrswerc considered to be concerned only Arith persuasive rhetoric, and thds 
was unfavourably contrasted uith the scientist's dogged pursuit of truth via the scientific Method- The phrase is from a brief notice of Professor E. B. Poultoes Romancs Lecture on 'Science and the Great War' of December 7 1915, "hich 
appeared in Nature's 'University, and Educational Intelligence' column on December 9, (Vol. 96, p. 4 IS). 
44 
falling short of the kind of influence the), desired. They were given a small advisory role but 
were put firmly under the control of generalist bureaucrats who were able to filter scientists' 
influence on policy. Thus many arguments were aired for the scientist to be on top rather 
than on tap. These included assertions that scientific method was transferable to all policy 
problems, and that the very pursuit of scientific enquiry by the scientific method inculcated a 
higher moral sense, essential for the right direction of national affairs. For example in late 
1915 a Nature editorial complained that, 
Though science enters into every part of modem life, and scientific 
method is necessar), for success in all undertakings, the affairs of the 
count7 are in the hands of legislators who not only have little or no 
acquaintance with the fundamental facts and principles signified by 
these aspects of knowledge, but also do not understand how such 
matters can be best used to strengthen and develop the State. Our 
administrative officials are also mostly under the same disabilities, on 
account of their want of scientific training. 
Noting that the want of science in the public school curricula and the Civil Service exams 
were to blame for these deficiencies, the writer concluded that, 
the result of it all is that science is usually regarded with 
M*ýifference, often with contempt, and rarely with intelligent 
appreciation by the statesmen and members of the public services 
whose decisions and acts largely determine the country's welfare. " 
It was at this point that the radical public science which was arguing for policy 
influence shaded off into the more moderate and traditional arguments of public science. 
The achievement of a more scientifically orientated system of education and of entrance 
exams to public service were ends in themselves. Like arguments for better funding for 
science and better salaries and career prospects for scientists, they were partly meant to 
increase the economic and social status of scientists. As such they have received ample 
attention in the existing accounts of the relations of science and the State in this period. '2 
However, what has not been full), understood, and what I want to stress here, is that such 
arguments were not separate from but related to the radical claim for influence over policy. 
It was anticipated that more science in school and university curricula would bring scientists 
closer to power in three ways. Firstly, politicians and Civil Servants with a background in 
science would better appreciate the national importance of science and the need to involve 
11 Nature editorial, 'Defects and Remedies!, pn_. eit., p-643. I See the accounts referred to in footnote 1. See also for example: D. S. L. Cardývcll, -Science and World War One'pp. 
447-56, Proceedings of the RMal Society of Lond Series A, Vol. 342 (1975), especially pp. 452-3; and Ian Varcoe, 'Scientists, Government and Organised Research in Great Britain 1914-16: the Early History of the DSIR!, pp. 192-216, 
Minerva, Vol. 8 (1970). 
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scientists in decisions. Secondly, a general public so educated would demand that its public 
leaders and officials were more aware of science and scientists. Finally these moves would 
also provide more science graduates to take up influential positions in the State service and 
in political life, thus ensuring a better future position for scientists. Furthermore, better pay 
and status would attract more graduates to become scientists, as well as making scientists 
appear to be a responsible and trustworthy professional group. 
The final aspect of the rhetoric I want to highlight is that the scientists were arguing 
for influence over policy not just for the duration, but for the coming peace as well. They 
intended to use the war to force a change in the British system of governance, making it 
more technocratic. Thus the scientists claimed even in 1915 that new scientific methods of 
policy-making were also essential to maintaining Britain's commercial and industrial 
supremacy against a militarily defeated, but still economically threatening, Germany. 
Professor J. A. Fleming" stressed this theme in October 1915. After first criticising the 
special defect(s)' of the democratic form of Sovernment as an over-estimation of the value 
of skill 'in oratory and debate', he continued that the scientific method must be used in the 
future because, 
It must be remembered that, after this war is over in a military sense, 
we shall immediately commence another war of a different kind, in 
which the weapons will not be bullets and shells, but our national 
powers of invention, scientific research, commercial organisation, 
manufacturin 'g capabilities, and education, and 
these will be pitted 
against those of a highly organised Germany determined to win back 
in commerce... that which has been lost in war .... We 
have said good- 
bye now and forever to those easy-going amateur British methods... 
Fleming imagined, for instance, that the scientific learned societies should, after the 
war, take a large role in the direction of industrial research, Eke that of supervisor to 
student, or 'like the general staff of an army towards the subordinate generals and corps 
commanders'. "' 
This section has given an overview of the form and content of the public science of 
the war years. The rest of this chapter wM concentrate on the central aim of the radical part 
13 Sir John Ambrose Fleming (1849-1945). Lancaster born electrical engineer. Educated at University College, London; 
Royal School of Mines ; and St. John! s College, Cambridge. Pender Professor of Electrical Engineering in the 
University of London. Interested in mirelcss telegraphy and inventor of the oscillatory valve as detector and the 
CN'mometer to measure wavc lengths. FRS. I, ( JA- Fleming, 'Science in the War and After the War, an Introductory lecture at University College London, 6 
.L 
October 1915, as reported in Na uLe, pp. 180.5,14 October 1915, Vol. 96, p. 184-5. 
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of the rhetoric: the establishment of a formal]), recognised Science Council. Ajthough the 
related arguments of education, pay and prospects at one level feed into this, as I have 
indicated, the war years were perceived by scientists as a special opportunity to gain the 
central aim. Thus there were many more examples of scientists arguing for a central 
scientific bureau with power to make policy even than in the Edwardian period. However, I 
will refer to the wider rhetoric when this becomes particularly relevant to the central 
political aim., It should also be noted here that towards the end of the war, for reasons I will 
explore in the next chapter, these related themes became increasingly important as the 
scientists perceived that a different rhetorical strategy was required to achieve the central 
aim. 
2.2 THE EXTRESSION OF THE IDEA OF THE NATIONAL SCIENCE COUNCIL, 
FROM 1914 TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DSIR IN DECEMBER 1916 
In an editorial in Nature in late October 1914, Sir William Ramsay called for an 
organisation to put every scientist to work devising means of defeating Germany. Ramsay 
argued that The Royal Society should take a lead in organising science for war. It should 
set up committees on a voluntary basis, and co-opt members of other scientific societies 
onto them. " By early 1915, with the disturbing revelations of a munitions crisis, " the 
scientific community began a concerted campaign to secure meaningful input into policy 
decisions. The Royal Society had apparently been unofficially informed of imminent 
Government plans for the establishment of a formal body of scientists to advise on scientific 
and industrial research. It also appears that the Society gave a positive response to these 
plans to Christopher Addison, Parliamentary Secretary to Joseph Pease, President of the 
Board of Education. " But still, on 6 May the Royal and Chemical Societies, together with 
the Society of the Chemical Industry, the Institute of Chemistry, and the Society of Public 
Analysts, sent a deputation to meet the Presidents of the Boards of Education and Trade 
15 1 Science and the State unsigned editorial (by William Ramsay), pp. 221-2, Nature, Vol. 94, October 29 1914, p. 22 1. 16 Crucial in alerting the public and the Government to the sbell crisis, and perhaps speeding the establishment of the 
Ministry of Munitions, was the report of the Times War Correspondent, Licut. -Coloncl C. A Cour% 
Rcpington, which 
appeared on 14 May 1915. In it he claimed 'that the want of an unlimited supply of high explosive shells was a fatal 
bar to our success! See his The First World War Personal Experiences. Vol. 1, (London, Constable, 1920), especially 
p. 34-40. 
Addison wrote in his diary on 3 May that the Roval Society were 'Wghly delighted %Nith the news!. From Addison, Four and a-half years, (London, 1934), p. 74. Cited ýcre from Roy MacLeod, 'Tbc origins of the DSIR: Reflections on 
Ideas and Men, 1915-16', p. 30, Public Administrai sm, Vol. 48 (1970), pp. 23-48. 
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(Runciman). The scientists urged the importance of immediately setting up a permanent 
Standing Committee to act as an intelligence department. It would form a link- between 
universities, colleges and industry, and should also serve as a scientific advisory body to the 
Government. " On 13 May Pease announced in the House of Commons the intention of the 
Government to appoint an Advisory Council on Industrial Research. Pease stated that: 1 
want a Committee of experts who will themselves be able to consult other expert 
committees working in different directions .... [and] ... associated with 
leaders of industry'. 19 
The new body was to advise on the best disbursement of funds for conducting research into 
industrial problems like glass, hard porcelain and technical optics, which were perceived to 
be of key importance in the war and after. " 
While welcoming this development, the scientists did not trust the judgement of the 
Cabinet in carrying the scheme through, particularly after the disappointments surrounding 
the recent handling of the establishment of British Dyes LimitJP Ramsay made more 
detailed suggestions about the organisation of a 'Chemical Council of State' in his leader in 
Nature of 20 May. In proposals which he claimed to have formulated around March 1915, 
he argued for a body of about twenty four members: one third technical chemists, one third 
scientific investigators and one third analytical and consulting chemists. Its duties would be 
to compile a register detailing the nature of every British chemical works; to provide an 
interface between universities and industry; and 'To advise the Government on questions 
involving a skilled knowledge of chemistry and its applications'., -, The Council would 
resemble a permanent Royal Commission, and would report at least annually to the 
Government. The Council would not be formally attached to any Government department, 
but would be associated with the Boards of Trade, Agriculture and Fisheries, Local 
Government and Education, and the Government laboratories. To ensure a non-political 
appearance it would be directly responsible only to the Crown. It would thus be an 
independent but formally recognised advisory body which departments should consult on all 
scientific matters. Ramsay wanted the choice of personnel to be supervised by the President 
18 See Me Government and Chemical ResearcV, anonymous article in Na=, vol. 95,13 May 1915, pp-295-6. 19 Pease's remarks are cited from 'An Advisor), Council on Industrial RcscarcW, p. 322. Na Vol. 95,20 May 1915, 
pp. 321-327. The article reproduced much of the Commons debate referring to the ASCIR from Hansard. Parliamenign 
Debates, Sth Series, Vol. Ix-xi, No. 52. 
kLid, p. 323. 
William Ramsay, 'Science and the State', leading article, Nature Vol. 95,20 May1915, pp. 309-1 1. 
Jbid., p. 310. 
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of the Royal Society (Crookes2') and a small committee of four eminent chemists 
(themselves to be members of the Advisory Council), who would then select twenty suitable 
names. 24 Ramsay stressed the need for such expert input into the scheme, writing that: 'It is 
earnestly to be hoped that members of the Government vorill agree to adopt some such 
scheme .... 
[and)... will, in this case at least, trust the expert'. -' 
This editorial tapped in to the key contemporary debate in the scientific community. 
There was generally a consensus about the need for the central organisation of scientific 
policy by the scientific community, but exactly how was this to be acmeved institutionally? 
The debate centred on whether the Royal Society itself should become the officially 
recognised (though quasi-autonomous) centre for the direction of science policy, or whether 
the German example should be followed, and the new body for the organisation of science 
should be a new government body (though doubtless composed of the same eminent 
scientists who made up the Society's Council), and thus part of the State apparatus. This 
debate was complicated by the traditional reluctance of the Society to become involved in 
any form of politics, lest it corrupt its objective public image. The writer of an anonymous 
letter to Nature of 20 May clearly articulated the concerns. He, 
... understood that the Royal Society, though it is, for some purposes, a representative body, does not regard itself as the proper body to 
take the initiative in approaching the Goveniment for the support of a 
new scientific project. 
He noted that while there was a system for getting new funds for research it was traditional, 
'haphazard' and above all informal. There was no officially recognised organisation of 
science policy, it was all a matter of informal contacts between eminent men and 
government* 
We are ... by no means devoid of organisation; but what we 
have is 
almost venerably historic and very elaborate; but it is long and 
tortuous and sadly inefficient ... for obvious reasons. 
The writer called upon the Royal Society to recognise that since the State was the only 
possible source of sufficient funds to conduct the kind of science needed by a modem 
23 Sir William Crookes, OK FRS, (1832-1919): old style aristocratic chemist mbo did not hold an official university 
post, and was not university trained. Discovered Thallium in 1861', repulsion resulting from radiation (1873 1 
radiometer (1875); illumination of lines of molecular pressure (1878); radiant matter (1879); radiant matter 
spectroscopy (1881); genesis of elements (1897); spinthariscope (1903). Member of all the important professional 
associations (and of the Society for Psychical Research from 1897). Published books on the chemistry of food and 
dyeing among other subjects. Worked in laboratory at the Royal institution from 1981 to his death. 24 Ibid, p. 310-11. 
2" BIiA, p. 311. 
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society, the organisation of science policy needed to be modernised and formalised in co- 
operation, Mth that State. At present, it was argued, science was sustained by private effort 
and token government grants, which conferred 'public responsibility, but no official prestige 
and no official purpose'. The scientific societies adopted the attitude that government 
support discouraged private effort, purely becuase the existing situation left them in loose 
control of science. For its part, the State was reluctant to spend money on science, and thus 
only too glad to be advised that government funding was counter-productive. The key 
objective of public science must be the end of this cosy and complacent situation: 
Among the changes which %rill follow the war, whatever the issue 
may be, the reorganisation of scientific effort must find a place. All 
the after-dinner speeches about the parsimony of the Treasury, and 
all the complaints in Science Prog-ress and at the meetings of the 
British Science Guild, punctuated by what has been brought to light 
since the war began, mean at least that. 
There must be a formalisation of the methods of arriving at science policy, the only question 
was the means: would the Royal Society take on an official role or was this to be left, as in 
Germany, to the State in the form of a new government body of scientists: 
... only we must have a way which is recognisable and recopmised. Behind the Government, whether in association with a special 
Minister or not, there must be a powerful advisory committee with facilities for initiation as well as discrimination, [i. e. of and between 
what science was to be done) a sort of Privy Council for Science 
with public responsibilities, to whom the public as well as the 
Government can appeal .... Before that can be established the 
Royal 
Society must settle what its function is to be .... [my emphasis] 
The writer was himself not convinced that the Society was the ideal body: its full 
membership at 450 was too large to be effective, and its Council at 21 was too small and 
I too much selected for the purposes of personal discrimination, too transitory, too full of 
work of other kinds, too much unpaid, and not sufficiently representative of the subjects 
with which a national organisation must deal'. The writer ended by issuing a challenge to the 
Society to issue a scheme for the scientific control of science policy: 
The point is obviously a difficulty; but in the long last it can only be 
settled in one way, and the sooner the Royal Society takes the field 
with a proposal for an initiating and discriminating advisory body 
other than its own Council the sooner will it be possible to take a definite step in the direction of the national organisation of scientific 
effort. " 
26 All quotations from anonymous letter to Nature, published in 20 May edition, pp. 315.7, Vol. 95, CIR Is) - 
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The Natur /BSG centred public scientists kept up the pressure for a powerful, 
formally recognised channel of scientific policy advice throughout June and July of 1915. 
Some of this dwelt on the theme of the role of the Royal Society, but now even this, like the 
wider criticism of the organisation of scientific resources, was much influenced by the 
continuing reverberations of the shell crisis, and dealt specifically with the organisation of 
scientific research for the immediate prosecution of the war by the fighting services. 
The Royal Society had already established a War Committee on 5 November 1914, 
and between then and 12 May 1915 four sub-committees were set up dealing with 
telephony, wireless telegraphy, and general physics; chemistry; engineering; and war trades, 
respectively. On 24 June 1915 the Council constituted itself an executive Committee, the 
'Royal Society (War) Committee, with sectional committees on chemistry, engineering, 
physics, physiology, and grain pests. 27 This latter change was in response to continued 
criticism. Richard Gregorys friend, Professor Henry E. Armstrong, the chemist and pioneer 
of scientific education, ' had suggested as early as 20 January 1915 that the Society should 
group all of its Fellows by subjects in 'Grand Committees' and set to work on war 
problems. When this had not been done by June, he wrote to the Time arguing that 'in 
21 
view of our scientific conservatism... it is difficult to find much fault even %rith our rulers'. 
He stressed that the strongest possible body of technical opinion should be behind the War 
Office and the Ministry of Munitions in the form of a 'committee of concentrated scientific 
intellect to deal with war problems', which 'must be in expert hands to be of service'. He 
argued that the government was not competent to select memebers for this new body, this 
could only be entrusted to the Royal Society. It was, he insisted, 
the only competent advisory body under the circumstances - it is our 
scientific House of Peers, and if it cannot either itself fiirnish sufficient 
competent men or provide them from the junior ranks of science, the sooner it is declared defunct the better. 
27 Details taken from brief discussion of the %%w-time organisation of the Royal Society in M. Teich, 'Scientists and Food Policy in Britain and Germany', (originally conference paper 1991 [? ] , forthconung, 
1994, as part of edited 
collection). 
28 Gregor), had apparent]), met Armstrong at the BAAS Liverpool meeting in 1896, and the two were promoters of the 
establislunent of a new section to deal N%ith science in education. See W. H. G. Arm)uge- si-r Richard Gregga: His Life 
and Work (London, Macmillan, 1957), p. 32. 29 Armstrong, letter to Laies, 21 June 1915, p. 9, 'The Organization of Science. 
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Armstrong had not been asked to help in any official capacity, and this partly fuelled his 
anger. But his wider point was that the existing informal methods of organizing Britain's 
scientific resources -a few eminent Fellows selected to serve on ad hoc committees - were 
not adequate. He asserted that: 
No half-dozen or so persons, at the present time, have the fight to assume 
that they can do all that is required in any branch of science; no small number 
have the right to push their coHeagues aside and say we alone will serve the 
country. 
He again urged that, 
unless the Royal Society be organized as a whole forthwith in the service of 
the State, as well as provided with an efficient active executive in full 
sympathy with the situation, we shall deservedly sink into insimificance, 
because the peers of science will have shown themselves to be collectively 
impotent and without due sense of their public responsibilities. " 
Armstrong broadened his attack on the Royal Society and its reluctance to become 
involved in any official capacity in the central organisation of either industrial or warlike 
research and advice to government in an address to a mixed audience of chemists and 
industrialists at the Annual General Meeting of the members of the Society of the Chemical 
Industry on 15 July 1915. One of his major complaints was that the inaction of the Royal 
Society had led to the fragmentation of the voice of science. The various learned societies 
had been forced to pursue independent initiatives to push the claims of science to a voice in 
national affairs. Government inertia to incorporate outside scientific experts had thus been 
strengthened. " He argued that public ignorance of science and goverrunent resistance to 
scientific advice was largely the fault of a disorganised scientific community: 
The fault is lafgely in the body scientific: we do not push our own interests sufficiently; I much fear that the one service that will remain 
unorganised to the end is our own body - the body scientific. Seemingly we are too hopelessly individualistic to organise ourselves. 
The Royal Society, which should be the supreme authority in science, declined the task early in the year and it is not likely that those who know us not, our masters the politicians, will seek to bring us 
together, even for their own ends, as they have no understanding of 
the use to which we might be put in their service.... " 
Armstrong argued that two forms of organisation were needed: internal and external. 
Internally, science needed to become more professional. If science wanted to enjoy the easy 
30 All quotes above, Ibid, 31 Armstrong c scL FCVTW4)'re 3L W04AZOOR-MY JSELMr roa TjrLL. 2EVEREJUCE). 
32 Henry E. Armstrong, p. 75, 'The Development and Control of Industry 1)), public influences, Address to the AGM of 
the members of the Society of the Chemical IndustrY, Manchester, 15 July 1915. As reported in Ch=ical News, Vol 
CXII (1915), 13 August I ý1 5 edition, pp. 75-9. 
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access to political power that was the one of the hallmarks of a respected and trusted 
profession, it must more rigorovsly take on the other organisational attributes of 
professionafism. With status would come respect, and with respect, authority. The 
continuing lack of respect for scientists on the part of the public and politicians was the 
reason why, for instance, two of the Royal Society's own War Committees (Physics and 
Chemistry) had not been given anything important to do. However, the other committee 
(Engineering), had rendered important service to the Government. Armstrong asked, 
'Aly the difference? Is it not that engineers, like Brutus, are not only 
honourable, but honoured men, in the sense that they are a 
professional body, better said perhaps, a body of professionals - 
accustomed to work, together, having learnt that it often pays men to 
work together? 'Union is strength'is their motto. " 
Armstrong believed that the only way to win influence was to become a properly organised 
professional group. This process involved three key elements. The first was to take on some 
of the functions of a trade union (as happened with lawyers and medical men) and work 
only for payment. The second - was to dispel the image of the cloistered academic, by 
involving the universities more close]Y%ith practical industrial problems. This would make 
industry and government more willing to approach scientists. The third was to make the 
educational curricula reflect both the pure (academic) and applied (industrial) aspects of 
science. This would make the scientists of the future more appealing as advisers, especially 
to a future ruling elite themselves now more receptive to the importance of science. 
Only when the scientificý profession had thus perfected its internal organisation, 
could it be& to achieve influence in national affairs. But to achieve this, better organisation 
of the external relations of science was also needed. As Armstrong pleaded, 
are orizanised to claim the bght to gruide Government. But unless the 
representatives of science subordinate their individualism, sink- their 
differences and form a complete coalition of their forces, no public impression wHI be made. 34 (original emphasis) 
It was in this latter context that Armstrong criticised the fragmented way in which science 
presented its services to the government. Instead of the multitude of learned societies and 
33 p. 76. For similar criticsms of the professionalism of science see also, C. Scott Carrett, 'Government and Chernistn", Science Progre-as, Vol. X (1915-16), No. 39, Janwry 1916, pp. 469-74. : 34 Armstrong, M. cit.. ' p. 78. 
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new bodies each claiming an advisory role, the Royal Society should be the single, officially 
recognised interface between science and government: 
It rests with the Royal Society ... to give the impulse and start reform, by reforming itself, waking up from its academic slumbers and 
playiný the active part that it is possible for it to play if it only realise 
what it can do as a live institution. It is our scientific House of 
Peers .... In consequence of the development of the special societies, the Royal Society is no longer of consequence as a scientific society, 
in the ordinary sense. Unless the forces at its disposal are used 
effectively, it will cease to be of service .... The Fellows will 
fail in 
their duty to the Empire, unless the Society grasp the power which is 
potential in its hands and claim to be supreme as a deliberative and 
advisory authority in the interests of science. The voices of scientific 
workers in our country should be heard as that of one man, through 
the Royal Society - we should then count for something in the National Councils; it should co-ordinate our scientific forces and link 
them up with our educational as well as with our industrial system - 
we should then play our due part in the State. " 
However, in Armstrong's opinion, the Society must also be democratised, not run by and 
for a small clique: 
... at present it is little short of entirely in the hands of a ring of all 
but 
ermanent, autocratic officials and the Fellows have but little part in 
its proceedings, as the Council in no way represents the desires and 
ideas of the Fellows. -' 
This kind of criticism of the Royal Society was echoed by Professor Fleming in October, in 
a lecture reprinted in Nature. " Ronald Ross complained in January 1916 that scientists' lack 
of a unified programme undem-dned their efforts to remedy the neglect of science: 'Men of 
science are themselves mostly to blame for this state of things. They show no solid front 
and have no courage in enforcing their demands'. " He also castigated the Royal Society and 
the learned societies as corrupt in Science Progress editorials. 19 
Meanwhile, another of Gregorýs personal fhends and a BSG member, H. G. Wells, 
further pressed the case for more involvement of the scientific man and method in the 
conduct of the war. In a letter to the Times of II June, Wells demanded: 
... some supplementary directive force, some council 
in which the 
creative factors in our national fife and particularly our scientific men 
and our younger scientific solKrs and sailors, have a fuller 
33 b Lid, p. 7 9. 
36 ibid. 
37 See note 12. 
38 Ross, letter to Nat= 'The Organisation of Science'. m. cit..., p. 536. 39 See for instance 'Notes'in Science ProgeLs Vol. MI (1917-18), pp. 12M. 
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representation and a stronger influence than they have in our present Government. It is not the sort of work for which a great legal and 
political career fits a man .... A great politician has no more special aptitude for making modem war than he has for diagnosing diseases 
or planning an electric railway system. It is a technical business. We 
want an acting sub-Govemment of scientific and technically 
competent men for this 1ýghly specialised task. " 
On 17 June, an unsigned leading editorial in Nature quoted this letter approvingly, and 
added its own further call for the formal incorporation of scientists into the direction of the 
war: 
There are hundreds of men of science in the country whose energies and 
expert knowledge are not being effectively used. We should possess a 
scientific corps, with men investigating at the front as well as at home, instead of one or two committees advising officials as to possible means of 
offence or defence .... We 
know that up to a certain point the scientific 
resources of the country have been drawn upon, but beyond the fact that one 
man is working at explosives, another at the Royal Aircraft Factory, and a 
third is testing for the Admiralty, we want to feel that these are only details 
of a wider scheme so perfect in its organisation that the full effect of our forty-five mil. lions of people is brought to bear upon the enemy. "' 
Wells' ideas also prompted a barrage of supportive letters from leading scientists &om all 
over the country offering practical suggestions for the make-up of the proposed war 
research body. '2 Wells himself added further thoughts, in a letter of 22 June, on the 
operations of a 'science and invention bureau': 
Essentially I see it as a small department collateral rather than subordinate to 
the War Office and Admiralty .... the business of the bureau will be ... to stand between these great administrative departments and the flood of crude and imperfect suggestions that beats upon them so distractingly ... it will examine, test, and develop these, and present such as are found suitable in a finished form ready for use to the fighting department. The bureau would, I think-, do its work best if it were a responsible official bureau, because then it would have comparatively free access to official information; it woulcl know more 
exactly what was being done and what needed to be done. "' (my emphasis) 
Wells further suggested that the bureau would compile indices of scientific personnel and 
their sPecialisms, and suitable laboratories. A central directorate would farm out suitable 
44 projects to this 'galaxý of scientific expertise. 
The above arguments of public scientists contained three strands of criticism of the 
organisation of science: that the Royal Society was not taking the lead in central 
40 H. G. Wells, letter to the ILmes, 11 June 1915. Cited hem from pp. 61.3, Poole and Andrews, M. cit., p. 63. 41 'The Mobilisation of Science', anonymous leading editorial, pp. 419-20, &ajftir;, Vc)l. 95,17 June 1915, p. 419. 42 As well as Armstrong's letter of 21 June noted above, these included letters to the JiMe from Philip Magnus (12 2 
June, p. 71 Professor J. Fleming (15 June, p. 9); E. H. Griffiths of University College, Cardiff (16 June, p. 9); F. CTeedy (19 June, p. 9); Patrick Geddes of Universitý- College, Dundee (24 June)-. HeM, E. Roscoe (5 August); and firom 
Armstrong again (9 August). 43 Wells, letter to the Iimc& 22 June, 1915, p. 9. 44 Ibid. 
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organization and advice which its status as the most prestigious scientific organization 
warranted; that there was therefore no effective national science policy; and that even the 
crucial area of war research was totally disorganised. Together all three amounted to the 
same basic complaint: scientists were not being allowed enough input into the prosecution 
of what they perceived as an essentially scientific war. On I July, Sir William Ramsay united 
these three strands of criticsirn in his address to the ninth Annual Meeting of the BSG on 
'The National Organisation of Science'. He proposed a new officially recognised body, 
based on the nucleus of the Royal Society, which would both organise war research for the 
services and civilian industrial research, and would have a strong, formal voice in advising 
government and the framing of general science policy. He stressed that this new scheme was 
anchored in a tradition of arguments for greater control of policy by scientists stretching 
back to the 1870s and the Devonshire Commission's call for a State Science Council. This 
scheme was a new incarnation of the idea of the formalised National Scientific Advisory 
Council, with some executive authority attached to its conclusions, which had been the 
central theme of Edwardian public science. It was a mechanism for scientists not only to 
advise, but to frame policy. Its provenance was made clear before Ramsay even spoke at the 
Ninth Annual Meeting, when the Guild's President, Sir William Mather", spoke of Norman 
Lockyer as a 'prophet'. 
Rarnsay's new scheme had been formulated at his request by Lord Sydenharn. He 
was a fellow Guild member, with an engineering background, who, as one-time secretary of 
the Committee of Imperial Defence, possessed a clear understanding of the machinery of 
government. '" Ramsay posited that, 
. Ahe prime necessity at the present moment is a central body of scientific men, to whom the various Government Departments should 
be compelled to apply for advice and assistance, And more; it should be -within the province of such a central organisation of science to 
propose new means of circumventing the enemy; it should have 
access to special information, and should be in close touch with a Departments of State, by having State officials as assessors at the 
meetings of the committees. [my emphasis] "' 
4 5, The Right Hon. Sir William Mather, member of the Priv%, Council. Bom in 1838 he was a Salford Imnmastcr and 
member of the Manchester LiterM- and Philosophical Sýciety and of the Institutions Of Civil and Mechanical Engineers. 
46 Formerly Sir George Clarke, SecTctary of the Committee of Imperial Defence 1904.7; President of the British Science Guild 1917-1920. Originally an army engineer, he had worked on fortifications and gunnery at the War Office 
ri a bay and on naval projects at Wool,., %ich. An economic historian, he %%zs Governor Orvicto a ndBom - 47 Ramsay, 'The National Organisation of Science', address to Ninth Annual Meeting of the British Science Guild, Journal "fe British Science Guild, NO. 1, September 1915, p. 13. 
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Small, confidential committees were no use, Ramsay stressed. This approach had itself 
blocked the 'formation of a strong, central body of organised science' since 'those who are 
serving on the committees feel that they would be guilty of a breach of trust' if they were to 
take part in such a move. "' Ramsay suggested that the Government should follow the 
French lead and appoint large co-ordinated scientific committees under a central 
organisation. The central director would be a scientist, and aU reports would go directly to 
Parhament. However, Ramsay perceived that such a degree of organisation, and of 
formalisation of the channels of scientific advice, was anathema to the traditional British 
methods of government and administration: 
Just imagine the state of mind of the permanent officials of our 
Government Departments, were such a scheme forced upon them! It 
would disturb the even tenor of their way; they would be obliged to do something, instead of carefully classifying all proposals made to 
them, and putting each into its appropriate pigeonhole. But they have 
not yet realised that we are engaged in a war in which ancient 
practices may have to be superseded. "' 
Ramsay's scheme saw the existing war organization of the Royal Society as the 
nucleus for the new body. He argued that it was,, necessary to regularise the position and to 
extend the sphere of influence of such bodies. He stressed that this organisation needed to 
be formafly recognised by Government as the national organising body for science, and the 
official channel of scientific advice. The aim was for: 
The Royal Society to be formally constituted as an advisory body in 
regard to scientific questions arising out of the war, and requiring to be dealt with by 11is Majesty's Government. ' 
The Society would establish a general Advisory Committee to which Government 
Departments would be 'directed'to apply for advice on : new weapons technologies; any 
other 'needs of war which call for scientific treatment or investigation'; and improved or 
new methods of manufacturing. Responsibility for selecting the sub-committees would be 
with the Royal Society Advisory Committee. These sub-committees would include members 
of other scientific societies, other experts, and representatives nominated by Departments of 
State, who would act as liaison officers with Government. Furthermore, the Advisory 
Committee , should also be empowered to make suggestions to the Head of any 
48 ibid. 
49 b, 
_ýd p. 
14. 
50 Both, Rarnsay, 'National organisation... ', p. 15. 
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Department of State in regard to questions of applied science'. The Treasury, or the 
Department concerned, was then 'Supposed to provide any funds which the Royal Society 
might deem necessary for special experiments. " 
Sydenham had envisaged his scheme being a temporary arrangement for the duration 
of the war. Ramsay concluded his address hoping that it might mark a permanent 
formalisation of the relationslýp of experts and government. I-fis reasons for arguing thus 
demonstrate the mifitant nationalist tone of the rhetoric of wartime public science, a 
leftoverfrom Edwardian themes: 
But is it too much to hope that if and when peace comes, the 
organisation would not be allowed to lapse? This will not be the last 
war; we have learned, in the crucible of fire, that we must be 
prepared. Nor is what we term 'war' what is most to be dreaded. It is 
the insidious advance by fair means and foul means of our enemies 
the Germans to obtain a monopoly of aH fields of human endeavour'2 
At the BSG meetin& Mather proposed a vote of thanks and agreed wholeheartedly with 
Ramsay's revised scheme. Seconding this, the former Royal Society President, Sir Archibald 
Geik-ie, commented that, 
If there is to be some central committee dealing vvith scientific 
matters, I am sure there could be no more efficient centre than the 
council of the Royal Society. " 
A resolution on Ramsay's plan was suggested by Ronald Ross, and the vote was passed 
unanimously. 
An outline of t1iis scheme was sent to the Prime Minister (Asquith), in a letter from 
the British Science Guild President, Sir William Mather, on 3 July. Here he stressed that the 
Chairman of the putative Royal Society Advisory Committee should enjoy direct contact 
with any Government department, informing them of conclusions or advice on any 
scientific question. Mather re-emphasised the point that the new body must be recognised as 
the formal and authoritative voice of science in policy-questions: 
such communications must be considered by the responsible Head of 
the Department concerned as coming from a body charged by Government Arith special functions, and regarded as speaking %rith 
authority. -" 
4; 1 
d. 
s: Jbi d-, p. 15-16. 
A 53 * Report of Ninth Annual Meetine, p. 3, in Journal of the British Science Guil . 
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However, it appears that the controlling faction of the Royal Society Council was 
not prepared for the Society to take on the central control of general science policy. They 
were willing to advise the government via their war committees, but preferred that the 
organising body for science should be a new government body, though made up of eminent 
fellows. However, though the Royal Society did not want to be the new controlling body, it 
still wanted an official relationship with it. Negotiations had been in progress during June 
between Sir Amherst Selby-Bigge, Permanent Secretary to the Board of Education and 
Arthur Schuster, Secretary of the Royal Society". Selby-Bigge had gathered from these 
informal contacts that, 'it would go a long way to keep the Royal Society in good temper, if 
they were given initiatory functions'. 56 Thus when the final draft of the Government's 
scheme was published as a White Paper on 23 July under Arthur Henderson, who had 
succeeded Pease as President of the Board of Education when the Asquith Government was 
replaced by the Coalition in June, it contained a special clause codifying the relations of the 
Royal Society with the new Advisory Council on Scientific and Industrial Research 
(ACSIR): 
It is proposed to ask the Royal Society and the principal scientific 
and professional associations, societies and institutes to undertake 
the function of initiating proposals for the consideration of the 
Advisory Council, and a regular procedure for inviting and collecting 
proposals will be established. " 
The functions of the ACSIR were now delineated in more detail than in Pease's 
oriazinal May announcement. A Committee of the Privy Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research was established with responsibility for at new expenditure on research. The 
Committee was to be made up of The Lord President (chairman), the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, The Secretary for Scotland, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, and the Presidents 
of the Boards of Education and Trade, plus any other Ministers and members of the Privy 
Council as the Committee might find necessary. The first such members were Lord Haldane, 
and Pease and Arthur H. D. Acland (both former Presidents of the Board of Education). ` 
Since the Lord President was, at this time, also a member of the Lords, the President of the 
55 Sir Arthur Schuster (1851-1934), FRS, physicist. Worked largely on optics. Hon. Prof. of Physics at Manchester. 
One of the two Secretaries of the Royal Society since 1912 (Mith W. ý. HardNP from 1915). 1 56 Quoted from Varcoe, M. cit., p. 206. 51 1 Government Scheme for the Organisation of Scientific and Industrial ResearcW, Cd. 8005. reprinted in Nature, Vol. 
95, pp. 604-5. 
"8 Ibid., p-604- In May1916 the Colonial Secrcmr)- was added. In September 1916 Arthur Henderson, and in February 
1917 the Marqucwf Crewewere also added. 
59 
Board of Education was to answer to the Commons on expenditure. He was vice-chairman 
of the Commýittee and his department was also to provide offices and administrative 
support. The small ACSIR was attached to this Committee, It was to be' composed mainly 
of eminent scientific men and men actually engaged in industries dependent upon scientific 
research'. " Its primary functions were to advise the Comn*tee of Council on proposals for 
... irutiating specific researches .... for establishing or developing special institutions or departments of existing institutions for the scientific 
study of problems affecting particular industries and trades .... the establishment and award of research studentships and fellowships. ' 
The ACSIR was also to advise the departments concemed with education, on methods to 
increase the supply of competent scientific researchers and, importantly, was also 
empowered to initiate research proposals itself Its recommendations would represent 
'progressive instalments of a considered programme and policy'. 61 As Peter Alter has noted, 
quoting R. L. Morant: 
This comprehensive transfer of authority was based on the 'modem 
experience' that 'a properly composed body ... can 
be allowed a 
sufficiently free hand by Parfiament to be given the right to disburse' 
the grant-in-aid, Parliament being content with no more than a 
Ministerial mouthpiece'. - 
The first members of the ACSIR represented a perhaps unsurprisingly conservative 
choice by Selby-Bigge (the Secretary to the Committee of the Privy Council) and Frank 
Heath "' (Secretary of the ACSIR) at the Board of Education in consultation with Sir 
William Crookes, the Royal Society President. They were: the physicists Lord Rayleigh and 
Professor J. A. McClelland; the chemists Raphael Meldola, Sir George Beilby and Sir 
Richard Threlfall; and the engineers Professor Bertram Hopkinson and Mr. William 
Duddell. All were Fellows of the Royal Society. ' The average age was sixty. "' The 
59 Cd. 8005,0. cit. p. 604. 
60 Ibid. 
61 hLd., p. 605. 
62 Alter, m. -cit., p. 
208. R. L. Morant to Selby-Bigge, 21 June 1915, E& 24/1576, PRO. 63 Henry Frank Heath (1869-1946), academic and scientific administrator. professor of EnpJish, Bedford College, 
1890-96; Academic Registrar of London University, 1901-03; Director of Special Inquiries and Reports, Board of 
Education, 1903-16; in charge of Universities Branch, 1910-16; M=bcr of the Treasury Advisory Committec on University and University College Grants, 1909-11; First S=ctary, ACSIP, 1915-27. KCB, 1917. (DNB) 64 Rayleigh was the most distinguished contemporary mathematician and physicist: co-discovcrer uith Ramsay Of 
argon; from 1873-84 Cavendish Professor of Experimental Physics at Cambridge. From 1884-1895, Secretai), of the 
Royal Society. He became President of the Executive Committee of the National physical Laboratory in 1898, of the Royal Society in 1905 and Chancellor of Cambridge University in 1908. Bcilby, a graduate Of Edinburgh University, 
was an industrial chemist and Chairman of the Royal Technical College, Glasgou", Duddell a consulting engineer, a 
Past President of the Institution of Electrical Engineers, and a member of the Admiralty Board of Invention and Research, McClelland held the Chair of E-xWrimental Physics at University College, Dublin; Hopkinson was Professor 
of Applied Mechanics at Cambridge; Meldola, %%us at Finsbury Technical College, had been President of the Chemical 
Society in 1907, and%"as cx r an manufacturing chen-dst. Tcrt in the chemistr,. % of dyes; Thrclfall was an criginee d 
60 
administrative chairman of the ACSIR was Sir William McCormick, then chairman of the 
Treasury Advisory Committee on University and University College Grants. ' The ACSIR 
had 125,000 to spend in the first year and 140,000 in the second. It first met on 17 August 
1915. 
The Government scheme was at first perceived as something of a triumph by those 
public scientists of the BSGNatur circle, since it seemed that the precedent had now been 
set that scientists could independently control areas of policy related to science. In fact the 
public scientists allowed themselves a moment of self-congratulation. Nature proclaimed 
that the ACSIR represented the realisation of what Haldane as BSG President in 1905 had 
called a scientific corps: eminent scientists, unfettered by bureaucrats, making science 
policy: 
The British Science Guild may justly claim some credit for securing 
the State assistance for industrial and scientific research now 
provided for by the Government. For the ten years of its existence it 
has persistently pointed out that our competitors have brought aH the 
products of science into the contest they have waged against us; and 
it has urged the adoption of similar methods in our national affairs 
and manufactures .... A public movement was required to 
direct the 
attention of the public in general, and the Govemment and political 
Ven particular, to the value of the great resources of science in idesvielopment 
of the kingdom; and this movement took shape in 
the British Science Guild .... We regard the 
Govemment scheme as a 
measure of acknowledgement of the principles of State responsibility 
and guidance advocated by the Guild ... 
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Even the Govemment seemed to acknowledge that the pressure of public science 
arguments had in some ways informed the setting up of the nem, scheme. The first report of 
the Committee of Council noted that: 
... the action of the government in setting up the new machinery 
for 
the encouragement of research was accompanied, if not instigated by, 
vigorous discussion and debate in the public press and the learned 
sociefies. 1 
However, the establishment of the ACSIR had not satisfied all the demands of 
BSG/hLaturý public science. The various schemes for the central control of science policy 
65 Ile engineer and founder of a marine steam turbine manufacturing firm, Sir Charles A. Parsons mus appointed on 
the retiremernt of Hopkinson and Professor J. F. Thorpe, Professor of Organic Chemistry at Imperial College, on the 
death of Meldola. 
66 William S)miinton (later Sir William) McCormick' (1869-1930), scholar and administrator. Professor of English 
Literature at University College, Dundee, 1890; f= Secretary of the Carnegie Trust for Scotland, 1901', Chairman Of 
University Grants Committee from 1919. Knighted 1911, FRS, 1928 (DNB) 
1 'The Promotion of Research by the State, pp. 619-20, Nature, Vol. 95,5 August 1915, p. 620. 68 Report of the Committee of the Privy Council for S cientific and Industrial Resca5hIOLtII0LL90Ak, Cd. 8336, 
1916, p. 19. 
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which had come from the scientific community were meant to encompass not only industrial 
research, but also military and naval research, as we noted earlier. In a total war when, as 
the scientists had been arguing for thirty years, the whole of the economic resources of the 
country needed to be mobilised as part of the war effort, it is difficult, and perhaps in any 
case erroneous, to attempt to separate so-called civil and military science. The Department 
of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) which was to succeed the Committee of the 
Privy Council in 1916, investigated problems, through its various Research Associations 
and Boards, and the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) which it took over in 1918, which 
had a bearing on Britain's overall fighting capacity. "' However, the ACSIR was nominally 
set up to investigate problems of civil industrial research, with the emphasis on post-war 
competition with Germany, as well as wartime uses. The White Paper had explicitly stated 
this: 
The present scheme is designed to establish a permanent organisation for the promotion of industrial and scientific research. It is in no-way 
intended that it should replace or interfere with the arrangements 
which have been or may be made by the War Office or Admiralty qr 
Ministry of Munitions to obtain scientific advice and investigation in 
connection with the provision of munitions of war. It is, of course, 
obvious that at the present moment it is essential that the War Office, 
the Admiralty, and the Ministry of Munitions should continue to 
make their own direct arrangements with scientific men and institutions with the least possible delay. " cny ernFkrc; s)- 
This clear statement that the new organisation was not part of the specificaffly 
wartime machinery, and was not explicitly designed to cater to war needs, seems to have 
been inserted at the suggestion of Sir Robert Morant, to whom Selby-Bigge had referred an 
earlier draft of the scheme. Morant perhaps had in mind that if war uses of science were 
explicitly included there would be much disapproval from the service departments, which 
jealously guarded the autonomy of their own reseach and development arrangements. " 
Thus while Nature welcomed the developments in the organisation of industrial 
research, it was not long before it was renewing complaints that there was no similar central 
69 For details see MacLeods, 'The Social Relations of Science and Technolog. % p2. citL, p. 315; On the mork- of the NPL see, for instance, Eric Hutchinson, 'Government Laboratories and the Muence of Organized Scientists!, Science ýp. Liýe , Vol. I (197 1), pp. 331-56, especially, pp. 3324. Cd. 8005, M cit., p. 604. 
Morant wrote that if such a disclaimer was not inserted, 'your scheme %%ill be taken as 8PPI)ing in part at least to these war needs, and it seems clear that, for those Purposes, *vour scheme would be met with a storm of disapproval', Morant to Selby-Bigge, 21 June 1915, Ed. 24/1576, PRO. 6ited here from MacLeod, 'T'he Origins of the DSIR... '. 
msit. p. 34. 
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organisation of rnýilitary and naval research. There were, of course, the sectional committees 
of the Royal Society, which (as vAll be further explored in a follovAng chapter) now had 
representatives of relevant government departments sitting as members, thus forming an 
interface with government. In addition, on 8 July the Chemical Society had taken steps of its 
own to form a consultative council with representatives from the Biochemical Society, the 
Faraday Society, the Institute of Chemistry, the Institute of Metals, the Institution of Mining 
and Metallurgy, the Pharmaceutical Society, the Physical Society, the Royal Agricultural 
Society, the Society of Dyers and Colourists, the Society of Public Analysts, and the 
Society of the Chemical Industry. This body was to vet the numerous suggestions for 
warlike inventions sent in by scientists. There was also a General Committee formed: 
... to deliberate on all questions of general policy with reference, not merely. to questions directly relating - to the war, but also all matters on which it is desirable to have t5e ) on of a booy thoroughly 
representative of every department of chpeimrýical science. - 
0 
The Physical Society had also established a committee to consider suggestions and 
inventions, and like the Royal and Chemical Societies, it had begun to compile a list of 
members' specialisms. " 
However, there were no definite relations between these bodies, and no unifying 
organisation. Nature commented that, 
Unless there is close cooperation between the conunittees of the 
various scientific societies it is difficult to see how overlapping will 
be prevented or how combined expert knowledge can be 
concentrated upon physical, chemical and engineering problems 
requiring early and practical solution. " 
The writer of this article'was hopeful that the recently announced Munitions Invention 
Department which Lloyd George was establishing at the Ministry of Munitions, and which 
was to take over all Army related projects from the Admiralty, would prove to be a step, , in 
the direction of the establishment of the proposed central cornmittee or bureau to direct 
scientific and inventive energy into channels of effective work-'. " The writer hoped that such 
12 1 Science Committees and War Problems', unsigned article (possibly by the editor, Dr. IloAmrd S. Wilson, or 
ý ossiblv by Richard Gregory), in Journal of the British cience Guild. No. 3, June 1916, pp-8-10; 10. 3". See Science and Munitions of War, unsigned article-, -Na=, Vol. 95,22 Jul), 1915, pp. 5624. 14 P2jd., p. 562 - 75 bLid, p. 563. 
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a new official body would, ideally, ultimately coordinate the work of the Royal Society and 
the learned societies. He argued that, 
When such an organisation has been established, it should not be in 
separate connection with the Admiralty, War Office, Ministry of 
Munitions, and Board of Trade, but with a bureau to which scientific 
suggestions or inventions would be addressed, with the sure and 
certain knowledge that they would be submitted to expert trial and 
judgement. " 
The writer was not clear whether the Admiralty Board of Invention and Research 
(established under the Chairmanship of the ex-First Sea Lord, Admiral Lord Fisher on 5 
July) was to be this central body, or wbether, 'further committees are to be established by 
other Government departments concerned with scientific problems of the war and 
munitions'. " What he was clear about was that, 
Good organisation demands concentration of effort upon common 
problems; and that end will not be reached by separate departments 
and separate scientific societies appointing their own committees and 
panels of consultants for independent work and advice. Co- 
ordination might be attained by the constitution of a grand committee 
on which each department and each scientific society concerning 
itself with national work would be represented, or a sort of official 
exchange might be established to which a suggestions or needs 
would be communicated, either to be dealt with by a small scientific 
staff attached to it or distributed to expert advisers for judgement. 
Only by linking up the various departments with one another and 
with scientific societies somewhat in this fashion can overlapping be 
avoided and the fullest advantage be secured most expeditiously from 
the services which men of science are prepared to place at the 
country's disposal. " 
It is a mark of how seriously scientists saw the war as an opportunity to formalise their 
relations with government that the author of this article went on to argue for payment for 
the kind of organised advice he had suggested. 19 
AC 
,. it turned out, inter-service and inter-departmental rivalries prevented the 
fonnation of any central organising body on war research. The BIR sifted suggested 
inventions for the Navy, and the MID for land warfare, while both pursued their own 
separate contacts with government departments and vAth the Allies. " In fact, even the MID 
16 
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80 The Central Committee of the Board of Invention and Research consisted of Lord (Admiral Sir John) Fisher, Sir J. J. Thomson, Sir CA Parsons and Dr. George T. Beilby. This corrunittee uas supported by a panel of physicists, chemists 
and engineers including William Bragg, the cr)'stallographer; Bertram Hopkinson, professor of Mechanical Engineering 
at Cambridge; Sir Oliver Lodge; and Ernest Rutherford, On Us see MacLeod and Andrem's, 'Scientific Advice in the 
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did not control research into explosives, chemical weapons and aspects of trench warfare. 
These were in the hands of other sections of the Ministry of Munitions. On the creation of 
the Ministry, the High Explosives Committee, which had been established at the Board of 
Trade in late 1914 and was chaired by Lord Moulton, " was transferred to the new Ministry 
and enlarged into an Explosives Department! ` This body remained under Moulton's control 
and conducted explosives research via an advisory panel of scientists under R. C. Fanner, 
late of the Ordnance Board at the Woolwich Arsenal. " Research into offensive chemical 
warfare, mortars, grenades, bombs and other problems of trench warfare was controlled by 
the Nfinistry's Trench Warfare Department. " This was created in June 1915 by Christopher 
Addison, on the instructions of Kitchener, and put under the charge of Alexander Roger, a 
War Office civil servant with an accountancy background. He was aided by a Commercial 
Advisory and a Scientific Advisory Committee. Most of the scientists were already members 
of the Royal Society War Committee, but Professors H. B. Baker and J. F. Thorpe of 
Imperial College, the fuel expert Sir Boverton Redwood and the physiologist W. B. Hardy 
were also included. "' As Michael Pattison has argued: 
The organization of inventions research in Britain which emerged [in 
1915] ... was extremely complex and fragmented. In total, nine government departments held direct responsibility for the 
investigation of inventions. Concern was expressed in some quarters 
about the lack of formal co-ordination between the various scientific 
departments servicing the military, particularly when compared with 
the highly centralized organizations which emerged in France, 
Gertnany, Italy and the United States. " 
War at Sea..., pp. cit. The Munitions Invention Department had E. W Moir as Comptmller, assisted by the scientific 
experts: Col. Goold Adams, Homce Darwin, Mr. Duckham, W. Duddell, Dr. S. Z. de FerTanti, R. Glazebrook, Sir R. 
Padfield, J. S. Haldane, Col. N. B. Heffernan, Sir A. Kennedy, F. W. Lanchester, Dr. A. P. Laurie, Prof Vivian B. 
Lewes, M. Longridge, W. I-L Maw, Sir Hiram Maxim, Capt. Moore, Sir IL Norman, F. G. Ogilvie, Maj. Gen. G. K. 
Scott-Moncrid, W. Stokes, J. S%Ninburne, Sir J-J. Tbomson, AN Walter and CIA. Wilson. From 'Science 
Committees and War Problems, Joumal of the 'tish Science Guild- No. 3, June 1916, p. 9. See also Pattison 9L. git. 81 Ile Conunittec was to consider methods of securing adequate supplies of high explosives. See N. B. Dcarle, 
Dictionan, of Official War Time QManisations (London, OUp, 1928), p. 260, The committee may have been appointed 
by Haldane as part of the work of his Chemical Products Committee: a mixed body of civil servants, industrialists and 
chemists (Beilby, Meldola and Perkin) to advise on the best mcans of sexuring supplies of chemical products and 
dyestuffs, previously imported from enemy countries. Tbe Committee appointed vahous sub-committecs including 
Moulton's Dve-Stuffs Committee which recommended State support for the due industry and resulted in the setting up 
of British Dyes LtxL See Dearle, W. cit -50 and Hartcup, 2RS. it., p. 44.5. Moulton was a Lord of Appeal and p. 249 
explosives patent lawyer. He had been a senior %NTanrJcr at Cambridge and his research on electricity had won him a 
Fellowship of the Royal Society. He had also been a Liberal MY, and was chairman of the Medical Research 
Committee. 
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Concern from inside the machinery of government came particularly from Sir Henry 
Norman, M. P. then the MID's attache to the French Ministry of Inventions. He complained 
to the Cabinet that there was much duplication of work through lack of contacts and co- 
ordination. Just like the public scientists he commented that: 'We have in abundance 
knowledge and sk-ill unsurpassed anywhere. All we lack is the centralization of knowledge 
and directive control'. '" Yet, again like the scientists, his criticisms in this area went 
unheeded. 
This failure to organise centrally warlike research perhaps tells us something very 
interesting about the general relationship of the British State with outside expertise in this 
period. Public, as well as scientific, pressure had forced the government to do something 
about industrial research, but the resulting scheme, as MacLeod has demonstrated, was a 
modification of a plan which had been taking shape in the corridors of Whitehall for many 
years. " Here, political will was added to outside pressure. The case of warlike research was 
very different. The necessary secrecy made the services and departments of govemment 
concerned even more resistant than usual to pooling their organisation. If the organisation 
of industrial research represented, as Morant had put it, the 'modem experience', then the 
informal relationships between the various bodies charged with warlike research represented 
a more traditional approach to the use of experts in government. The main linkages between 
the various bodies was the fact that many of the scientists were influential members of the 
Royal Society, and often of its Council in the form of the War Committee. We have already 
noted that elements of the Royal Society were resistant to formalisation, and keen to 
preserve the old informal links with government. Thus the non-organisation of warfike 
research must have suited both parties, (the more traditionally independent elements of both 
the State -in the form of the service related departments-and the Royal Society), rather well. 
Efforts were made after the war to co-ordinate research for the services, but these 
foundered in the late 1920s largely because of inter-service rivalries. " 
97 - Jbid. 
88 See MacLeod, 'The Origins of the DSIR..., 2n_. cit. 89 In 1920 an attempt ues made to unify research for the services under the DSIR. 111ree Coordinating Boards (one for 
Physics, Chemistry and Engineering) were added to the existing Radio Research Board, and Heath successfully 
recruited Henry Tizard to be in overall control as DSIR Assistant Secretary. The impetus for this move seems to have 
been the Cabinefs desire to save mone%. After completing work- on electromagnetic 'death rays', the use of selenium 
cells in detecting x-rays, air-craft silencing and metal fatigue, the Boards %, ere dissolved in 1929. Only the Radio Research Board, '%bich had done important pioneering work- on the development of radar, sunived. The major 
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By October 1915 the public scientists had also begun to have grave misgivings about 
what they had viewed as their one success, the organisation of industrial research itself. 
Concern centred on the role of the Advisory Council, and its administrative direction by the 
Board of Education. This dissatisfaction led to their rhetoric becomýing markedly anti- 
democratic. Democracy was presented as meaning government by lawyer-politicians elected 
for their persuasive oratory, rather than men who knew how to govern the nation efficiently. 
Such leaders could not be trusted with any area of policy-mak-ing, all of which needed a 
logical scientific approach. Scientists now began to stress the special applicability of the 
scientific method to all policy-making. In so doing they under-scored their claims for 
control of science policy. But to them science policy had never been narrowly defined but 
had meant policy with a scientific content. This ultimate aim now became clearer with 
arguments about the fOures of democracy and the 'transferability' of scientific method to 
social problems. " 
Fleming's over-riding concern in his lecture at University College London on 6 
October was to argue that failure to acknowledge the importance of science as a resource in 
national affairs was, more serious than a mere national trait or idiosyncrasy'. Rather it was 
a function of democratic or representative goverrunent. The democratic politician was a 
fluent orator, skilled in managing public assemblies, but cared little for the facts, whereas 
the scientist's whole object was 'the discovery of the truth, and not its obscuration'. "' 
Richard Gregory took up this theme more vehemently on 21 October in the first of his own 
editorials in Nature, entitled 'Science and the State'. ' The bone of contention was the role 
of the Advisory Council in a Board of Education run by generaEsts. For instance, the 
Secretary of the Committee of the Privy Council (which controlled the monies for new 
problems seem to have been the difficulty of coordinating work in an ever. widening field of applied defence research 
(both in terms of the subject area and the number of institutions), the politically controversial nature of funding for 
defence research, and, perhaps most importantly, the practical difficulties of overcoming the reluctance Of the services 
to pool knowledge and perhaps also to submit to civilian central direction. Verylittle has been written on the Boards or 
how the), fit into the wider picture of the State's (or scientists') changing vie%; ' of the Organisation of research, but for 
brief discussions see R. W. Clark-, Tizard, (London, Methuen, 1965), pp. 55-81; HartcuP, W-c-it-, P- 194; and RX Jones, 
'Scientists and Statesmen: the Example of Henn- Tizard'. Minerva, Vol. IV, (1966), pp. 202-14. 90 See Yeo, op. cit (note 4), especially pp. 282-i. 91 Fleming, pp-. cit., (note 12), p. 18 1. 92 Richard Gregory, 'Science in National Affairs!, unsigned leading editorial, Nature, Vol. 96,21 October 1915, pp. 195- but also from 7; The information that this was indeed by Gregor). comes not only from the 0.1c and sutject Matta, 
hi NM until 1919, when he replaced -- p 
Arm)lagc, 22. cit, - 68. Gregon, did not officially take over the editors p of e Lockya (as he had succeeded him as formal director of the BSG in 1918). But he had been taking an increasingly large 
sharý of the editorial Tole, as the agcing Lockyer's assistant, for some years. 
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research), Sir Amherst Selby-Bigge, was described as knowing 'no more of practical 
science and technology than a schoolboy', and Frank Heath, the Secretary of the ACSIR, 
had interests 'similarly in other fields than those of science'. " More damningly still, 
Gregory condemned the ethos of the whole of British government and administration: 
The belief that the expert -whether scientific or industrial- has to be 
controlled or guided by permanent officials having no special 
knowledge of the particular subject in hand is typical of our executive 
system. While such a state of things exists, most of the advantages of 
enlisting men of science for national services must remain unfulfilled. 
The various scientific committees which have been appointed 
recently have... been able to give valuable aid ... but ... would be 
far 
more effective if the chiefs of the departments with which they are 
associated possessed a practical knowledge of scientific work and 
methods. Without such experience the executive is at the mercy of 
every assertive paradoxer and cannot discriminate between 
impractical devices and the judgement of science upon them .... [we 
must have] scientific men among the permanent officials... " 
A double-argument was used for the utilisation of scientific method in the conduct of 
national affairs. Firstly science was factual, and not interested only in rhetoric (! ), unlike the 
politician: 
INUle success in science is measured solely by discovery of facts or 
relationships, in politics ... it is secured by fluent speech and 
facile 
pen .... Power, as regards government of the affairs of the nation, does not come from knowledge, but from dialectics: it is the lawyer 
who rules, with mind obsessed by the virtues of precedent and 
expediency, and to him men of science ... are but 
hewers, of wood and 
drawers of water. Under a democratic constitution it is perhaps too much to expect that Parliament Arill pay much attention to scientific men or methods... " 
Secondly ethical claims were made for the very process of scientific study itself 
Science is not only able to increase the comfort of life and add to 
material welfare. Uut also to inspire the highest ethical thought and 
action; and a prominent place should be. Dven to it in all stages of 
educational work as much on account of-its ennobling influence as because it is a creator of riches. ' 
93 Gregory, pS. EiL p. 195. 
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Gregor)- was to use very similar language in his book Discov )f Science, 
published by Macmillan (N-a-ture. s publisher) in July or August of 1916. Here he, %Tote 'We seek to justift- the claim of 
science to be an ennobling influence as N%-cll as a creator of riches, and therefore as much importance is attached to 
motive and method as to discovery and industrial development, however marvellous or valuable these may be .... 
For 
science is not to be measured by practical service alone, though it may contribute to material prosperity: it is. -^ intellectual outlook, a standard of truth and a gospel of light. ' He claimed that the study of science taught 'regard for 
veracity, patience, logical thought, responsibility, discipline and original work-. 1 Cited from AmYta9c, M& It, pp. 69-70. 
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The point here was clear: scientists should be in positions of authority able to frame policy 
because scientific method not only gave greater accuracy by inductively addressing the 
facts, but it also inculcated a higher moral outlook. Scientists made efficient and moral 
leaders. Here we clearly see the extent of the scientists' ambitions: they wanted authority in 
all aspects of national affairs, not just in questions relating to a narrowly defined idea of 
science policy. As Gregory concluded his first editorial: 
V Tqý PO era ic _pnnc q u1i, vox 
Dei, may be a sound demo ti i ; iple for 
oUtica platforms, but it stands for nothing in science. I he men who 
ave advanced the human race throughout the ages are they who have stood for individuality as ýgainst the voice of the crowd. We 
need such leaders now, men who will guide the people instead of 
waiting for a mandate from them beTore embirking upon any 
enterprise; and we need above all, that. the chidofficials of departments of State shoufd have had a traimng in scientific methods before being entrusted with the control of national affairs. While indifference to these things is the distinguishing characteristic of our 
statesmen and administrative officers, it is useless. to expect that the 
nation's business will be conducted efficiently or its scientific forces be organised on the large scale which modem conditions demand. " 
Ramsay continued this theme in December 1915, arguing in Natur that: 'serious 
political changes are imperative in this country. The practical men must obtain control; they 
must be assisted by the highest scientific advice procurable'. " 
This kind of technocratic, anti-democratic argument was also appearing in the pages 
of Science -Progyress. 
Here it was perhaps even more vehemently expressed by the 
redoubtable editor, Ronald Ross. The July 1915 issue had contained an article by Ross'"ith 
the incontrovertible title of 'A Hoped for Revolution in Britain': 
We suspect that the war will be followed by a revolution in England, 
and one which will be directed principalIr against the sort of people 
who now rule us and whose frequent neg ect of the advice of experts 
and of the evident facts of the case has been Iggely responsible for the war .... The captain of a ship who persists in a certain course 
in 
sgeite of the advice of his pilot and consequent] runs his vessel upon t t rocks is deprived of his certificate anY dismissed ftom his 
appointment; but politicians who run their country and the world 
uFon the rocks of war are still allowed to govern, to advise, talk 
p atitudes, and to draw their salaries! We want new captains f6r our 
political navy. ' 
In April 1916 Ross wrote in an editorial note that 
97 Ibid. , p. 197. 98 Ramsay, 'The Scientific Organisation of Industries!, Nature Vol. 96,30 Do-mbeT 1915, pp. 480-1; 481. Original 
italics. 
99 1A Hoped for Revolution in Britain', editorial article by Ross, in 'Notes, section of Science Proae. Ls , No. 37, July 1915, pp. 15 1 -3; 152-3. 
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The principal complaint against party politics is that they have destroyed ... [the ideal of m6fitocratic government] by substituting an oligarchic wire-pulled machine for govemment by the best people. Bri-tain is ruled today by carefully organiseo, subsidised, aid, and, 2 
we believe wholly vicious part), caucuses which return to 
? 
arliament 
persons oý their own order and thus exclude the best brains in the 
country. Our argument is iliat a man who consents to belong to a 
politicil party tFereby abdicates his ri ht of free judgement, and at 
the same time shows that he is not intellectually or moray a man fit to rule a great Empire. "' 
Ross had returned to similar themes in July 1916 in an editorial article entitled 'Our Duty': 
... why then do we not use ... intelli-gqnce for our own government? Cannot men who made the great shi s that move upon the waters 
and in the air the great engines that la our on the land, and the great instruments that enable thi'mind to measure the heavens - can we not use these powers to prevent such disasters as Nýe are now suffering ftorn by constructing an equally efficient engine of government-t Truly, we can. But ohly by one method. By using the calculation, 
judgement, forethoughi and invention which men of science and 
inventors have employed in the cases mentioned. To do this .... Let us cast behind us our sects our party ofitics, our dogmas and our lies, 
and fling our broken idols on the ru9bish heap. 'O' 
Neither was this kind of argument confined to the columns of Natur and Science 
Progress. It was becoming an increasingly common feature of the public pronouncements of 
scientists in general. For instance, Edward Bagnall Poulton, the Hope Professor of Zoology 
at Oxford, and President of the Linnean Society, propounded similar assertions in his 
Romanes Lecture at the Oxford University Museum *on 7 December 1915. He put all the 
failures of the war down to the neglect of science and the predominance in government 'of 
the spirit that is most antagonistic to science - the spirit of the advocate': 
What a grave responsibiliq, has been incurred by the Government in deciding ... vital issues without scientific evidence, and in clinjUg to their mistake in spite of the efforts of those Who know. TQto thousands of lives and an ever-increasing volume of human Tmse,, ry 
are a terrible punishment for the neglect of science .... What we really need to end the war is knowledge and firm action based on it. As it is, with its slipshod ways of con'ducting war and neglect of scientific 
authority, our, 0own 
Government has done very much to help Germany out... -' 
100 Ronald Ross, 'Parý- Impolitice, Science Progress, No. 40, April 1916, pp-664-5; 665. See also 'The Organisation 
of Science I letter to Nature from Ross, 3 January 1916, in Vol. 96 13 January 1916, pp. 536-7; and Me World's 
Misrulers' and 'The Reform of Democracy, in Science PE2ges--; Vol. 12, No. 46 (October 1917), pp. 295-301 and 301- 
309 respectively. 101 Ross, 'Our buty'. Science Progress, Vol. 11, No. 41 July 1916, pp. 133-6; 136. 102 E. B Poulton,. Science and the 6-ýýt War. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1915), p. 4, and pp.. 22-3 and 31. See also his 
Third Galton lecture to the Eugenics Education Socicty, 16 February 1916, entitled 'Science and Governiricnf, reported 
in Nature Vol. 96,24 February 1916, pp. 717-8: 'Thý next general election , Aill reveal a revolution 
in the political 
thought of the country, and the urgent necessity for the society mill be to fight alongside the other sciences and the great 
business interests or the country, ensuring that scientific men and business men shall have weight 
in our future form or 
Govemment'(p. 717). 
70 
However, although the radical political rhetoric had by now become the dominant 
voice of the scientific community, siren voices did cry out against it. The physiologist W. M. 
Bayliss" wrote to Natur on 23 October criticising the above quoted technocratic, anti- 
democratic editorial of 21 October: 
Whatever may be our views as to a democratic constitution, it must 
be remembered that it exists, and nothing but obstruction is likely to 
result from throwing stones at it. It is to be feared that what feeling 
of opposition to science is present in the democratic mind is largely 
due to the arrogance apt to be shown by men of science. Skill and 
success in a particular branch of science alone do not warrant the 
demand that their possessor shall be regarded as capable of 
Fxpressing opinions of value on any and all questions of public 
importance. 
However, Bayliss' disagreement was over tactics for gaining influence not over the radical 
political aim itself 
May I suggest that a more conciliatory attitude than that too often 
assumed wth respect to what seem to be well-meant efforts on the 
part of Government Departments would be more to our interest and hii the benefit of the nation? There is no doubt a very great deal yet to be done in connection with the position W science in the State. But we may do much in assisting those who are inclined to look'"rith favour on our desires and dem ds although it may be that too jn4ny 
of the positions of authority fifled by men lack-Ing in appreciation 
of the meaning and aims of science. 'We have an opportunity of 
showing our value to the nation, and, if we use it welL greater duties 
and responsibilities will follow. "' 
Gregory, as editor, took the unusual step of printing a reply to this letter, underneath 
it in the same issue. Here, he argued that he was not willing to concede the principle that 
only non-scientists could be in control of scientific departments or committees, and ended 
by re-stating that: 
Science has too long been content to occupy a subordinate position in the national executive; the main object of our article was to assert its claims to a higher place. 101 
103 William Maddock Bayliss (1860-1924) B. Sc- 1882 University College London. F. R. S. 1903. Knighted 1922. 
Professor of General Physiology, University College, London, 1912-24. '()4 Letter from Professor William Maddock Bayliss to Nature 23 October 1915, published as 'Science in National 
Affairs', NatuTe Vol. 96,4 November 1915, p. 260-1. W. M. Bayliss FRS, (1860-1924): bom Wolverhampton, son Of 
wealthy iron manufacturer. Studied science at University College London under Ray Lankestcr and Burdon Sanderson, 
obtaming his B. Sc. in 1883 -Aith a scholarship in Zoology. Obtained a fu-st in physiologv at Word in 1888. Returned 
to UCL and work-ed mith E. H. Starling, eventually being elected Professor of General Physiology there in 1912. He was 
an active Liberal, and member of the Royal societ)'Council , 191.1, -l 5. See w. j. O'Connor, 
British Physiologists. 1885- 
1914: a Biographical Dictionai3-%(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1991), pp. 135-9. ) 
Gregor),, 'Replv of the Editoe, R Lid., p. 261. 
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Interestingly, Bayliss was a member of the Council of the Royal Society. In his letter 
he may have been putting forward the view of the Society that given the traditional 
reluctance of government to delegate authority in any formal way to outside experts, the 
informal methods of the Society might be more productive of influence. 
By the end of 1915, the Royal Society model for the organization of science 
and scientific control of policy-mak-ing was firmly in place. Control was not to be given to a 
voluntary collective body of scientists, which would be somehow attached to the machinery 
of government. There would be no national science council as the public scientists has 
envisaged. Instead a variant of the German method of State organized science had been 
adopted. This way, the Royal Society publicly retained its autonomy and the objective 
nature of scientific knowledge was in no danger of being compromised. At the same time 
the Society exercised effective control of science policy through those of its eminent 
Fellows who made up the ACSIR (whose membership was still subject to the approval of 
the Royal Society President) and the various war research bodies for civilian scientists. The 
Society did not want an official poficy-mak-ing role. It preferred a public advisory role, but 
With real, though informally channelled, power behind the scenes. With this model now 
ensconced, all the hLature/BSG circle could do was to suggest refinements to it which 
upgraded the role of the scientist in policy. Thus in his 1915 Presidential Address on 30 
November, Sir William Crookes" revived the well-worn theme of the separate Ministry for 
Science, with a greater input for scientists. Crookes suggested that a Minister of Science, 
with Cabinet rank-, should be appointed. But scientists would not be subordinated to 
generalists. The new Minister should have a board of advisers, and should himself be an 
eminent scientist: 'Power of organisation and general business abilities should be regarded 
as essential seconda; ý! qualifications'. The Advisory Council and all scientific committees 
should be under the new Ministry. " This strategy was continued when, on 2 February 1916 
a memorandum entitled 'The Neglect of Science: A Cause of Failures in Wa? and signed by 
thirty six university scientists and medical men (among them Armstrong, Crookes, Fleming, 
106 Sir William Crookes (1832-1919). Knighted 1897. O. M. (IM). Scientific journalist and professional expert, 
Crook-es never held a permarient academic position, though he pursued his chemical work- part-time in his own laboratory, and ums elected President of the Royal Socict, %- in 1913. See Alter 2p. cit pp. 234-5 and MM SupplementarY Volume 1912-2 1, pp. 136-7. 10-! 
oc N,, ature 1. Deccmbcr Crookes' speech %%w reported in 'Anniversar), Meeting of the Royal S ict. N Vo 96,2 1915, 
pp-373-5; 375. 
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Griffiths, Poulton, Rayleigh, Ross, E. H. Starling, William Tilden, T. B. Wood), was 
published in the Time . It called for more science in education and the Civil Service 
examinations as a way of ensuring that science was properly valued in the community and 
that scientific methods were utilised in government in the future. Eventually, the Board of 
Trade was to be replaced by a 'Ministry of Science, Commerce and Industry, in full touch 
with the scientific knowledge of the moment'. " 
The new strategy was supported by Nature in an editorial on 10 FebruarY. '09 
However, it was felt that there was no need for a new public science organisation to 
coordinate pressure on goverment. The British Science Guild offered itself as a rallying 
point: 
The British Science Guild was founded to urge all responsible 
authorities to give science its rightful place in national affairs, and it 
has persistently put forward these claims for the past ten years or 
so. 110 
Instead of any new body Nature called on science to, 
... exert its activities through the British Science Guild, instead of acting independently of the guild, and thus presenting a Ivided front 
to the forces to be overcome .... science should speak- 
iArith a collective 
authority, and demonstrate by the conduct of its own affairs that it is 
capable of organised action and clear leading. "' 
Speaking at the tenth annual meeting of the Guild on 17 May, the President , Sir 
William Mather re-emphasised this theme: 
There are at least a dozen different programmes before the public dealing with the mobilisation of Science, and the co-ordination of 
scientific effort. It is possible for the British Science Guild, I think, 
while tak-ipg note of all these efforts, to play a useful part in helpin to bring them all together and to evolve a great national Council Science, Industry and Education, to which the nation may look in 
peace and war for that guidance, the lack ?, f which has been so 
greatly felt during recent years in our country. ' 2 
108 'The Neglect of Scifnce: A Cause of Failures in Wae, ILmi s, 2 February 1916, p. 10. Lc 
er gain pointing 109 This was aAX1r9Pum fnxrk a Committee of the Association of Public School Scienc Mast s, a 
out the general ignorance of science amongst politicians, civil servants and the public. It recommended more science in 
the Civil Service and Army examinations; the replacement of the Board of Trade uith a Ministry of Science, Commerce 
and Industry 'in touch uith the scientific knowledge of the momenV; that scientists be included on the Privy Council 
and play a large role in the service of the State. All this, it %%zs characteristically claimed, mw essential to the survival 
of Britain as a 'Great Powee. The Memorandum Aas published in many daily papers. See Nature, Vol. 96,3 February 
1916, p. 640. 
110 1 Defects and R=edies', unsigned leading editorial p. 644, Nature Vol. 96,10 February 1916, pp-6414- 111 lbid, p. 644. 
112 Mather- OPening remarks to tenth annual meeting of the BSG, Jo=al of th British Science Guil , No. 3, June 1916, p. 48. 
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But, as we noted, influence had already largely passed away from the Natur /BSG 
circle with its model of the national science council, towards the Royal Society. On 22 
March the Royal Society formed a Conjoint Board of Scientific Societies. This sought to 
take over many of the activities of the BSG, and backed by the prestigious name of the 
Society it could accomplish the kind of organisation which the Guild had failed to do. It 
sought to coordinate the advice of academic scientists to govenunent. "I From this point on 
the Guild became increasingly uncertain of its rnýission, and spent much of the 1920s in 
ultimately vain attempts to redefine itself and its role. 
By November 1916, The Guild was arguing with the same voice as the Royal 
Society. It published a report (drawn up by its Science and the State and Technical 
Education Committees, and a special conference on the position of the Guild) making a plea 
for the establishment of a statuto1y Board or Ministry of Science and Industry. It was to 
have a permanent staff of scientists, and sweeping powers. The new Ministry would be the 
I executive centre' of the committees formed by the Royal Society, the Chemical Society and 
various trade and educational associations. It would also organise industrial research, and 
say what scientific research was to be undertaken with Goverranent money, establishing 
paid advisory committees of 'men of wide scientific knowledge assisted by expert 
investigators and technologists', who would also be paid. In addition, the new Ministry was 
to 'arrange measures for the mobilisation of the scientific, industrial and educational 
activities of the nation so as to ensure ready response to national needs and emergencies', 
and 'generafly serve as a national bureau of scientific and industrial intelligence'. The report 
concluded by stating that 'such a Board would naturaUy administer the scheme of the Privy 
Council Committee, as well as take over certain functions of existing Departments and 
Boards'. "' The Memorandum was sent directly to the Reconstruction Committee. 
Final. ly, on I December the Committee of the Privy Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research was formally constituted as a separate Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research-The Department continued to be advised by the ACSIR, and the two 
113 See 'The Royal Society: Organisation of Scientific Effort', Chmical Nc%%I, Vol CX[Il (1916), 31 March 1916, pp. 
152-3. 
114 'Memorandum on the Relations which should emst in Future bcmeen the State and Science, in which the Formation of a National Statutory Board of Science and Industry is suggested', Journal of the-British Science Guild , No. 4, November 1916, pp. 3-1 1. All quotations are from p. 4. 
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still operated under the loose supervision of the Lord President and the Privy Council 
Committee on Scientific and Industrial Research. The Lord President operated as a Cabinet 
level representative. This novel position gave the new Department and ACSIR flexibility 
and autonomy, since its nominal head, the Lord President, had no ministerial agenda from 
which to set research priorities. "' The new Department was to have its own estimates, and 
increased financial provision. The B SG expressed the hope that: 
The new Department represents the beginnipg of the Board of Science and Industry, the establishment oTwhich was suggested in 
the Memorandum to the reconstruction Committee .... and if 
is to be 
hoped that its functions will eventually comprise all the lines of work- 
suggested in that Memorandum. ' 1' 
2.33 CONCLUSION 
Public science had thus been able to achieve many of the aims it had been pursuing 
since the Edwardian period during the First World War. A new department of government 
dedicated largely to civil industrial science had been established, and a key advisory role for 
scientists had been formalised within the new institutional structure. The ACSIR was 
supposed to be able to control science policy by setting the research agenda. However, 
problems remained. The new department was not headed by a scientist: Heath was secretary 
and had administrative control. Secondly no official organisation had yet been established 
with central control over research for the fighting services. There were other areas, too, 
where no official organisation had been established. Here scientists had to rely on existing 
informal contacts, and continue to press for more formalisation. One of these areas was 
food research, and I will examine the struggles for formalisation here in a case-study in a 
following chapter. 
But by the end of 1916, the pattern of scientific advice had at least been set. No one 
scientific organisation was to be given a formalised influence over science policy, rather 
scientists had been incorporated into the machinery of government. There would be no 
National Science Council organised by scientists and sitting above existing government 
departments. Perhaps this had been an unrealistic and politically naive aim all along. Rather 
113 See Philip Gununett, Scientist. --; in Whitehall, (Manchester, MUP 1980), pp. 24-5. The institutional an*ang=ents 
enshrined what bec=e known as the Haldane Principle of research council autonorny, which was set out in Haldames 
Machinen, of Govertunent Report in 1918. 
116 Elevýnth Annual R= of the Executive of the British Science Guild , June 1917, p-2- 75 
scientists were to exercise authority via a nominally advisory role within government, but 
were actually to have the power to say what research was done. This was a big step, but it 
meant that while scientists had gained some power, it was on the government's terms. The 
Royal Society model of informal influence had been institutionalised in the new Department. 
it was not until after the war that the full (possibly negative) implications of this model 
became apparent to scientists. All was well if scientists were in control of the new bodies, 
but if non.;. scientists came to control them, then scientists, in attepting to gain influence, 
might end up losing professional control of the very definition of science itself. 
The public science arguments for influence over policy of the First World War, like 
those of the Edwardian period, were rooted in a militant nationalist and social-imperialist 
conception of national power. I want to suggest that in the latter stages of the war, this kind 
of rhetoric began to lose direction, with the impending disappearance of the -German 
military threat. It attempted to continue, substituting a threat of German economic 
dominance, and also sometimes shifting to the threat from organised labour: the enemy 
within. However, after the experiences of State control during the war, and the greater 
public tolerance for such perceived socialistic, interventionist measures, it began to look 
outmoded. Further-more there was widespread public mistrust of science as the provider of 
technologies of destruction. The more reactionary scientists and their supporters tried to 
deflect this association by formulaic criticism of the moral bankruptcy of German science, 
but their basic message was still one of military and industrial preparedness for future 
conflict. Years of admiration for German organisational methods in science and government 
cannot have helped them. At this point a new political rhetoric of science began to emerge. 
As in earlier periods, it used the language of the new social and cultural common context. In 
direct contrast to the pass6 rhetoric of external social Darwinism and militarism, this new 
rhetoric stressed the importance of science to the further progress of peaceful civilisation. 
It stressed a liberal conception of science as the provider of freedom and wealth, and 
portrayed scientists themselves as special but poorly paid workers. This was a rhetoric of 
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reconstruction and reconciliation, not of rearmament and recrimination. The new rhetoric 
became the dominant public voice of the scientific community in the years after 1917. 
However, underlying the common rhetoric were two distinct political agendas held by two 
groupings which became increasingly polarised as the 'twenties progressed. One still wanted 
to exert power within the existing society, the other believed that scientists could only hold 
power in a radically changed society. 
The follwAring chapter will show how, after the war, public science attempted to deal 
with the threats to its wartime gains discussed above: the control of research, and perhaps 
most importantly the image of science. I will attempt to outline the emergence of this new 
public science and will examine how it was used by scientists from different ideological 
positions. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PEACE TALKS: THE PUBLIC SCIENCE OF THE BRITISH SCIENTIFIC 
CONMIUNITY, 1917-c. 1925 
The interests of Science are the interests of the community, 
and the interests of the community are the interests of 
Science. ' 
3.1 CHARACTMSTICS OF THE RBETORICAN OVERVEEW 
Public Science had achieved many of its goals in the crisis of war. Looking back in 
1933, the mathematical physicist and socialist, Hyman Levy-' described the Govemment's 
perception of the national importance of science at the outbreak, of the war in 1914 urith 
some irony: 
... when it became clear that the assistance of technicians was essential. to the successful prosecution of the fighting, when in fact it became 
evident that the potent and indeed the determining factors were likely 
to be to be associated with the extent to which the belligerent armies 
were armed and supplemented by inventions of scientifically 
destructive weapons, scientists were enrolled in army categories as 
mechanics and labourers? 
He noted that "the surprise with which we now regard the status thus allotted to what is 
now, recognized as a very fertile source of industrial practice and of philosophical 
speculation is itself an index of the change that has taken place in the interim'. ' Evidence of 
this change, he argued, was the proliferation of government scientific institutions, employing 
more and more scientists. ' 
The war was indeed a watershed in the attitude of the British goverment to science, 
and one which to a large extent survived the de-control and retrenchment of the immediate 
Sir Richard Gregory in *Scientific Men as Citizens'. address to meeting of the Cambridge Branch of the National 
Union of Scientific Workers, 16 Nov. 192 1, Nature Vol. ] 08, p. 41 2 Hyman Lev), (1889-1975), Scottish born mathematical physicist, educated at Edinburgh, Gottingen and Oxford, 
aeroýynamic research department, National Physical laboratory, 1916-20, leading member of NUSW, Professor of 
Mathematics, Imperial College, London, 1923-54. See Gary Wersk-ev. Visible Collcgc, (London, Free Association 1988; 
originally Allen Lane, 1978), pp. 44-52. 3 H. Le%3-, p. 225, 'Science, in Hearrishaw, FIC. (ed. ), 
at Kina's Collue. Universitv of London, during the Session, 191,2-13, (London, Ernest Berm, 1933), pp. 204-30. 
]bid. 
! ýid, p. 226. 
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post-war years. The change had two important aspects. The first was a realisation of the 
importance of science to the security and economic prosperity (themselves interlinked) of 
the nation. This resulted in new government initiatives on science, and new money. The 
second, and related, aspect was the new channels of access that the new attitude and the 
new initiatives provided. During the war a new, more (but not by any means completely) 
centralised system for the organisation of scientific research had evolved which enabled 
scientists to participate in decisions about both industrial and, to a lesser extent, military 
research. The most obvious and major new commitment was the attempt to centralise 
government scientific research for civil industry in the DSIR. The Department set up an 
increasing number of research - stations: the Fire Research Board (1917); the Food 
Investigation Board (1918); the Industrial Fatigue Board and the Tin and Tungsten Board 
(1919); and the Forest products, Building, and Radio Research Boards (1919-20). In 1918 
the Department took over the Nafional Physical Laboratory from the Royal Society, which 
continued to control appointments to the Laboratory's Executive Committee, " and in 1919 
the Geological Survey was taken over from the Board of Education. Furthermore, the DSIR 
launched in 1917 a new initiative for promoting industrial research and technology. This 
was the idea of the Co-operative Trade Research Associations. These were joint ventures of 
government and areas of industry with funding split between the two: the State matching 
contributions from industry pound-for pound. The aim was for the State to stimulate 
industrial research and the application of new technologies by fostering a pooling of 
information and joint research activities. Governrnent money came via the Imperial Trust for 
the Encouragement of Scientific and Industrial Research, with capital of S. 1,000,000 for five 
years, voted in August 1916, to be controUed by the DSIR. By 1920 there were eight 
Research Associations with an annual cost of E198,000. By 19.21 there were twenty one 
representing, among others the photographic, scientific instrument, engine manufacturing, 
iron, glass, fuel, and radio industries. ' All this represented a'dramatic wartime conversion of 
the British government to belief in the worth of scientific research in war and peace, and a 
major financial commitment. At the same time there had been a proliferation of government 
6 See Eric Hutchinson, 'Scientists and Civil Servants: the struggle over the National Physical Laboratory in 1918, 
Min Vol. 7 (1967), pp. 373-98. 
' On the DSIR in this period see Alter 2p. cit. pp. 201-13, Rose and Rose M. cit, pp. 40-, and MacLeods 2p-c--it. pp. 312- 
17 
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scientific bodies involving outside civilian experts interacting '%krith the armed services. For 
instance the Board of Invention and Research at the Admiralty (established July 1915), the 
Munitions Invention Department at the Ministry of Munitions for the Army (August 1915), 
and the Air Inventions Committee (finally set up in September 1917, but planned as early as 
May 1916 by the Air Board). ' Scientists had also increasingly served on various ad hoc 
government committees, and had entered the civil service on a temporary basis as scientific 
advisers. ' Individual university-based scientists had also worked on a myriad of war-related 
research projects. " As we noted in the previous chapter, there was also an ultimately ill- 
fated attempt to co-ordinate research for the services under the DSIR in 1920. More 
evidence of this mood of realisation of the importance of science came in 1918 '%kith the 
stress laid on govemment research in Haldane's Report of the Machinery of Government 
Committee, and the report of the Thomson Committee on the position of Natural Science in 
the Educational System of Great Britain, which argued for more science in the curriculum. " 
It is worth noting, however, that although in many areas public science had achieved 
notable successes, the pattern for the organization of government research that had been 
established with the DSIR/ACSIR in 1916 was continued. There was to be no National 
8 The AIC had twelve members, mostly drawn form other government organizations doing warlike research. These 
included, Horace Darwin (chairman, and member of BIR), the physiologist A. V. Hill (who, with Darwin was also 
conducting anti-airmft research at the MID), L. Bairstow, Richard Glazebrook (BIR member), Joseph Petavel (who 
were all also members of the Aeronautical Advisory Committee), Dugald Clerk (who had been directing naval 
engineering research), and Sir Alexander Kennedy (Professor of Mechanical Engineering at Imperial College, and MID 
member). See Pattison, msji-L p. 522, and Hartcup, M. -cit, p. 
28. There were also other bodies in aircraft. research with 
substantial scientific representation: for example, the Aeronautical Research Committee, which replaced the 
Aeronautics Advisory Committee (AAC) in 1920. The AAC, established in 1909, had appointed numerous technical 
sub-committees during thc'"w which had done valuable work on, for example, propulsion, structures and materials 
prooblems. See Dearle, pm-. cit, P. 
42. 
For instance in the Ministry of Food 
10 The Universities were used extensively as a network of research institutions ky various governmcnt bodies 
conducting war-related research. However communications and co-ordination of research were often hampered býl the 
need for secrecy and inter-&, partmental and inter-service rivalries. See for example, 'Science for War: the Work of the 
Modem Universities, A Visit to the North!, article in the juLnes, 9 February 1916; and 'Science and War. Research 
Work at Birmingham University, Chemical News, 28 February 1919, p. 104. For a comprehensive overview see 
Michael Sanderson, Ile Universities and British Industn,. 1850-1970, chapter eight. For example, from June 1915, 
Frederick Soddy worked in the Chemistry Department at Aberdeen at the request of the Royal Society Chemistry 
Sectional Committee on the synthesis of diethylarninoethanol and acetal. These substances were required in the 
preparation of local anaesthetics such as novocain utich, ", cre in short supply, haling previously been obtained from 
Germany. As a radiochanist, Soddy also worked on Prqjects involving the use of radium (for example to illuminate 
instrument panels), for the Royal Aircraft Factory, the Optical Department of the Ministry of Munitions and the 
Compass Department of the Admiralty. From January 1916, hcwzs also involved in the development of an alkali boiler 
to power submarines for the BIR, though this Mniually proved abortive due to the difficult relationship between the 
Admiralty and the BIPL He also worked for the Explosives Department of the Ministn, of Munitions on the extraction of 
ethylene (for use in the manufacture of mustard gas) from coal and coke oven gases using cold charcoal. See Kenneth R. 
Page, 'Frederick Soddr. the Aberdeen Interlude, A University Review, no. 162, (Autumn 1979), pp. 12748, 
especially pp. 130-5 and 139-41. 
Both i918: C. d. 9230 and 9011 respectively. 
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Science Council (or Ministry of Research as Haldane's report had suggested), but a network 
of autonomous research councils, under the Privy Council, and various bodies attached to 
these. Rather than give scientists collectively any centralised influence over policy, what 
influence they did gain (largely by being given control of research agendas) was piecemeal. 
The State relied on a network of key trusted individuals to co-ordinate research across these 
divisions by informal contacts (for example Tizard at the Co-ordinating Boards, Hardy at 
the Food Investigation Board, Fletcher at the Medical Research Council). This seems Eke an 
attempt to reach a compromise between the demands of public science and the reluctance of 
the State to give scientists executive power. In the short term it may have worked 
reasonably welL but it relied too heavily on the special personal qualities and network of 
professional fiiendships of the key men to be of lasting effectiveness. " 
Scientists, then, enjoyed greater influence over science policy after the war than 
before it. Their peacetime activities and rhetoric were geared to maintaining and advancing 
this position. Richard Gregory argued in 1918 that Britain should learn the lesson of the war 
and never again forget that industrial well-being rested on the efforts labour and pure and 
applied science: 
Necessity has forced the Cincinnatus of Science from the plough ... it is to be hoped that he will not be permitted to return again to his 
modest field but will lead our industrial forces to victory. " 
Superficially this seemed like a call for science to be fully utilised by the State in the 
economic competition which would follow the war, and perhaps for the retention of the 
central organization of research for these purposes. However, buried in the classical allusion 
was again the call for wider policy-influence for scientists: Cincinnatus was a legendary 
Roman hero, who was called from his farm to be dictator. He laid down his office and 
returned to his plough after delivering his country from the Aequians, but Gregory clearly 
intended that Scientists should retain and increase their power in the State. " 
"' See P-V. Jones, 'Scientists and Statesmen..., Mcit-, and Eric Hutchinson, 'A Fruitful Cooperation between 
Government and Academic Science: Food research in the United Kingdom!, Minerva, Vol. 10, (1972), PP- 19-50. 
13 Gregory, Me Recovery of Key Industries, preface to descriptive catalogue of the British Scientific Products 
Exhibition, 1918 (British Libran, original destroved c. 1940 so quoted here from Armytage M--cit-, p. 79 34 See Brewers Dictionary of Phra-ve and Fable, (Cassel, London, 1987), p. 236 
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While this theme does sometimes reappear self-consciously in post-war public 
science, the rhetoric had also changed with the times. This was an era of new large-scale 
government funding for science. Research was organized, as we have noted, around a 
network of government research councils. Within this framework-, scientists were supposed 
to have control of the research agendas, and thus ultimately of science policy. However, 
there was much concern, as there had been when this sytern was established during the war, 
that the administrative heads of the new organizations were, more often than not, non- 
scientists, and that the State could control science policy through these men and through the 
purse strings. In such a climate of concern the central focus of public science quite naturally 
fell on the control of research and science policy, rather than on general policy. The over- 
riding concern was to establish the primacy of pure over applied research. This, indeed, was 
the stated purpose of the col. lection of essays commissioned from leading Cambridge science 
graduates by the Master of Downing CoUege, A. C. Seward, and published in 1917. This 
bore as its opening quotation T. H. Huxley's dictum that "' What people cO Apphed Science 
is nothing but the application of Plure Science to a particular class of problems"'. " In his 
introduction Lord Moulton expressed the fear widespread in the scientific community that 
the State's awakening to the national need to support science would lead to a narrow focus 
on appEed problems. Moulton wrote that the coUection: 
... admits that it is motivated by a fear lest the universal feeling that England has been remiss in the cultivation of large branches of Industrial science in 
the past and the widespread determination to remedy this in the future may 
lead to a neglect - absolute or comparative - of Pure Science after the War is 
over and that the pursuit of Pure Science may suffer by reason of the 
concentration of national effort in the direction of more utilitarian 
applications of Scientific Research. "' 
This distinction was a cipher for a reassertion of professional competence to assess which 
researches should be done, which meant the direction of science policy itself. The fear was 
that with new State funding and overall control only applied research would be done. This 
would effectively mean that the State's priorities would be served by science, and that the 
State would come to define the very nature of scientific activity. This concern was explicitly 
15 A. C. Seuard, Smence and the Nation: Essays by C ble 
Lord Moulton.. KCB. FRS. (Cambridge, CUP, 1917). 
Lord Moulton, 'Introducticd, in Ibid., p. Niii. 
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voiced on many occasions. For instance, Sir William Tilden, Professor Emeritus of 
Chemistry at Imperial College, wrote in 1917 that, 
There is frequent reference to State assistance in research. This is a difficult 
question. While there would be practical unanimity in the feeling that State 
assistance should be given in the form of money, there would probably be 
much difference of opinion as to the way in which it should be applied. 
State-aided or controlled institutions are apt to fall under the wheels of 
routine, and epoch-making discoveries are not likely to proceed from such 
establishments ...... 
A reassertion of the worth of pure research by scientists was therefore a reassertion of the 
scientists' unique professional ability to define what was meant by science. The very 
terminology used by scientists - pure research was also called basic or fundamental - reflects 
this, and was itself a form of public science. It was meant to impress politicians and the 
public that this was an area of crucial national importance for the future development of 
science (including future applications, as yet undreamt oý, which only those who knew 
could formulate. As Tilden noted: 
. At cannot be too often repeated that pure science - that is, the correct observation of fact and the establishment of 'lav- stands ever in practical 
importance before applied science, which is invention. But this is a hard 
saying, and there are still too many people who believe that the true and only 
business of science is to find out useful things .... It 
is, however, only 
necessary to consider any application of science to useful purposes to 
perceive that such application became possible only at the end of a long 
series of observations, experiments and arguments which occupied the 
labours of several generations of men. Each step forward is usually the result 
of some apparently trivial scrap of new knowledge acquired without regard 
to the question whether it is likely ever to be turned to any practical purpose. 
Real progress comes from the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. " 
(original emphasis) 
Safeguarding scientists' control over the nature and scope of scientific activity was of crucial 
importance in the campaign of public science for influence over policy for scientists. 
Scientists had to retain control of what science was, because their definition of science 
(central to which was the scientific method, the pure form of which was supposedly found 
in basic research) was central to their claims for power. 
Such questions of professional status and control were also viewed as essential 
contributions to the upgrading of the public image of science, which was a first step to 
gaining wider political power. This trend was exacerbated by the new sense of community 
Sir William Tilden, Chemical Discoven, and Invention in the Twentieth Cen=., (London, Routledge, 1917), p. 469. 
Ibid., pp. 469-70. 
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and professionalism engendered by war service. Years later, Levy remembered the effects of 
the war on the scientific community: 
The war of 1914-18 was the occasion for the birth of the scientific 
profession. In the teeth of entrenched opposition scientific men 
forced recognition in the various fields of war activity .... Science in the fundamental sense gained little. What was created of permanent 
value was a new sense of solidarity among the younger scientific 
workers. Herded together in the labs, in daily discussion on the 
problems of work, war and peace, by the end of 1917 they had 
thrown up ! hree distinct groups at different centres striving to form a 
representative organisation to protect their economic interests, and - 
significantly enough - to ensure that science and scientific method 
were accorded their due place in working out the welfare of the 
community. " 
As Levy noted, this experience shifted the emphasis of scientific concern to the formation of 
professional groups to maintain and advance the new socio-economic status of scientists. 
This desire culminated in the formation of new professional associations and in emergence 
of a trade union style organisation: the National Union of Scientific Workers. These 
developments were aimed primarily at protecting the economic interests and social status of 
scientists, but were also intended as part of the overall upgrading of the image of the 
scientist to that of a trusted professional with an accepted role in policy. 
As we shall later, see, sections of the NUSW did also make direct attempts to gain 
influence over policy. However, during the twenties political involvement became a 
controversial and divisive issue both within the NUSW and in the wider scientific 
community, for two main reasons. Firstly, the use of science in war was a double-edged 
sword. It had alerted the public and the government to the importance of science in national 
fife, and had given scientists fresh hopes of influence. However, science in the twenties 
enjoyed an ambiguous reputation as both potential saviour and destroyer of civilisation. 
Science had been seen to be not only concerned with technological industrial improvements 
but also with the development of ever more deadly weapons technology, and especially the 
horrors of poison gas, which offended against the archaic liberal myth of chivalric warfare. 
Scientists tried to deflect this perception by publicly stressing the defensive nature of British 
military technology, and contrasting this with the immoral offensive German use of science 
in war. However, this was not simply a public relations problem. Some scientists also felt 
19 H), man Levy, Modem Science: a Study of Physical Science in the World Today (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1939), 
P. 95. 
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deeply troubled by being confronted with the implications of their pre-war and wartime 
militaristic rhetoric (which, as we saw in chapters one and two, seemed to condone the use 
of science to develop such weapons), and particularly with the implications of their own war 
work for the whole question of the use of science in war. 'O As Levy commented in 1939: 
If the scientific profession was born during the period of warfare, it was 
cradled and nursed during a period of scientific and social dissfflusionment. It 
has grown up in an atmosphere of scientific negation. In the creation of 
pýison-gas, high explosive shells, thermite bombs, it has been a helpless 
witness and an unwilling participant in the perversion of chemical 
knowledge. In the new destructive possibilities of aircraft it has seen its 
dreams turn to nightmare. 21 
This passage repeats the same tactics of distancing science from its perverted use in war, 
that (as will be seen) began to be used from about 1917. To improve the public image of 
science (and thus the possibilities for power for scientists either within the existing, or a new 
social organisation), and to salve the consciences of individual scientists, science was 
presented as essentially liberal. 
Secondly, the economic slump of 1920-21 had a serious impact on science with 
research funding faffing victim to the attentions of the Geddes Commitee on Public 
Expenditure. This crisis, combined with science's perceived image problem, sharpened the 
focus of public science on professional issues, and on consolidating scientists' position in 
policy-making. The upshot'was a mood of apathy among British scientists towards 
involvement in thewider issues of policy-making. For the majority of scientists, retreat into 
the laboratory and concern only with professional issues, meant not having to face the 
implications of the relationship of science and war, and. not having to deal with the image 
problem. There may also have been a sense of actively distancing science from politics, until 
the public image of science had been resuscitated. This bears comparison with the 
professional/political strategy of MarshaR for economics which will be examined in chapter 
five, although in the case of the scientists, it does not seem to have been so orchestrated. 
The shift in the themes and strategies of public science in the period 1917-c. 1925 
can be related to the periodisation of public science by Frank Turner which was the starting 
20 Crucial in suggesting lines of enquiry in this section has been DaNid Edgerton's pioneering article 'British Scientific 
lntellectuals and the Relations of Science, Technolog%, and W, P an ez on eds ona ar' in aid Fomlan and J. M. S ch -R Nati I 
Mili= Establislunents and the Advancement Of Science and Technolom,: Stu is='. 
(Forthcoming Dordrecht, Kluwcr, 1994). 1 am grateful to the author for an advance copy. 21 H)man Levy, Modem Science..., 2n.. cit. p. 95. 
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point of this part of the thesis. As was noted, Turner characterised public science in the 
period after 1870 as playing on the 'values of collectivism, nationalism, military 
preparedness, patriotism, political elitism and social imperialism'. Science was 'portrayed as 
a means to create and educate better citizens for state service and stable politics, and to 
ensure the military security and economic efficiency of the nationý. 21 In the period of Peace 
and Reconstruction there was a shift in the themes of the rhetoric, corresponding to the new 
social, cultural and political climate. Now two streams of public science emerged. In 
characterising these streams it is useful to employ the typology coined by Gary Werskey in 
his analysis of scientific political rhetoric in the thirties. He talked of 'Reformists' and 
'Radicals': the former wanting power and professional status within the existing society; the 
latter wanting revolutionary socialist social change and scientific technocracy. 2' I want to 
employ these terms to look at the roots of the positions taken up in the thirties, according to 
Werskey. I also want to characterise this as a transitional period between the post 1870 
public science, identified by Turner, and Werskey's scientists of the thirties. Thus, in the 
twenties, the Reformist stream stressed the peaceful applications of science, and the benefits 
of co-operation between science, capital, government and labour to ensure continued British 
success in the traditional capitalist economic system. The Reformist stream also attempted 
to rehabilitate the public image of science, after its association with destruction, by arguing 
that it was not science but corrupt politicians and public morals which were responsible for 
the perversion of scientific discovery into war uses. By arguing thus, public science sought 
to allow scientists to have their cake and eat it. On the one hand they were not responsible 
for political uses of science. But on the other they were justified in seeking political 
influence, for only the application of scientific method or spirit to politics would correct the 
perversion of science, and save the existing constitution, and indeed, civilisation. This 
Reformist stream was, as the typology suggests, merely a variant on Edwardian and 
wartime public science. It was an attempt to express old concerns in the language of a new 
era. Thus it was essentially social-imperialist, was voiced by the traditional elite of science, 
and was aimed at preserving the social and economic status quo. While the themes of 
22 Turner, Qn. clit.., p. 592 23 See Gary Wersley, 'British Scientists and outsider Politics, 1931-1945, Scien ! Studies, Vol. 1 (1971), pp. 67-83. 
See also his 'Nature and Politics between the wan, h1aime, Vol. 224 (Nov. 1 1969), pp. 462-72; 'The Visible College A 
Study of lxft-Wing Scientists in Britain, im-i939, unpublished PILD. thesis, Harvard University, 1973; The Visible 
College, M. cit,,, and hisIbe Perennial Dilemma of Science Policy, Nature Vol.. 233,22 October 1971, pp. 529-32, 
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Reformist rhetoric were meant to consolidate science's new position, there were few 
attempts in the post-war peripod to suggest new institutional mechanisms through which 
scientists could more effectively wield power. It was as if The Reformists had gone as far as 
they could. In spite of their, at times, anti-democratic rhetoric, they wanted power within 
the e)dsting society. Thus, by the mid-twenties, both Nature and the BSG seemed to be 
losing their way, uncertain of what more they could demand, and thus unsure of their role in 
the social relations of science. 
However, a new Radical stream of public science also now made its appearance. 
This was more socialist and sought a revolutionary change in the social hierarchy and the 
economic basis of society. This stream emanated from the younger scientific workers that 
Levy talked of as being so influenced by their communal wartime experiences. It was not 
the voice of the elite of science trying to gain power in the traditional social and political set 
up, but the voice of marginalised scientific workers wanting to re-order society on neo- 
-socialist, scientific fines, with themselves as directing technocrats. This stream stressed the 
necessity for radical social change, arguing that it was not the short-comings of existing 
leaders, but of the capitalist and democratic system itself which perverted science into 
hostile uses, and thus prevented its fullest exploitation for relieving social and economic 
problems. This stream also emphasised the liberal, international, pacific nature of science 
and the need for science to care for the whole community. However, these themes, held in 
commonwith the Reformists, since a public scientists perceived the need for consolidation, 
were here used to advance much more radical political aims. The Radicals had not yet 
acheived all they wanted, and beheved that the only way that scientists could hold 
meaningful influence over policy was in a revolutionised society and constitution. 
However, it is important to point out at the outset that, since we are observing the 
roots of the 'thirties positions in this period, the distinction between the two streams is not 
as clear cut as in the 'thirties. Reformists sometimes appear radical and vice versa. 
In the rest of this chapter, then, I will examine how public science sought to 
consolidate the increased status and access to influence over policy that scientists had 
gained during, the war. I will first concentrate on strategies for overcorning science's 
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fundamental image problem. I will then look at tactics for consolidating the new 
professional position of science, and also focus on the debate about the control of research. 
Finally, I will briefly examine the different strategies and rhetoric of the two streams of 
public science - Reformist and Radical - which characterise this period. 
3.2 CONSOLIDATING TBE WARTIME GAINS 
3.2.1 SHIVA OR BRAHMA? THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF SCIENCE AT THE END OF THE WAR AND THE 
RESPONSE OF SCIENTISTS 
After the war there was a certain amount of optimism expressed (largely by 
members of the scientific community) about science and the possibilities for progress that it 
afforded. Scientific popularisers; like I. W. N. Sullivan lauded the scientist as the modem 
hero and science as the guarantor of moral as well as material progress: 
... in relation to man, his present state and possible future, science alone ... speaks with the accent of authority. The great constructions of science are grandiose without being chimerical; they are beautiful 
but not deceiving. Indeed, one sometimes has the feeling that it is 
only in science, nowadays, that one still meets with the spirit of 
adventure, the sense of boundless and glorious possibilities, with an 
exultant hope. 
Scientists were 'romantic and daring! and the current age was because of them 'at the 
morning of a glorious renaissance. Interest in science and its objectivity would cause a 
change in popular values: 
The impossible will no longer be attempted, but the region of the 
possible will be seen. to be vastly greater. Man will see in what 
directions he can shape his destiny, and he will be able to enter on the 
task with rational hope. All his courage and endurance wiU have a 
chance of victorious achievement; he will know that he is not 
engaged in a forlorn hope; the world will become young again.: ' 
Sullivan was friendly with leading members of the NUSW and another famous member the 
physiologist, biologist and biochemist, J. B. S. Haldane, also painted a picture of almost 
limitless scientific progress. In his Daedalus or the Future of Science of 1924, he predicted 
startling innovations in human biology, including ectogenesis. 
24 M. N. Sullivan, *The Hope of Science, pp. 169-74 in Aspects of Science (London, Jonathan Cape, originally 1923, 
reprinted 1927). Quotations from pages 171-2-. 174. 
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However, the prevailing national mood at the war's end seems to have been one of 
public mistrust of science. In May 1917 Natur complained bitterly about an article in the 
Daily Mail which had resuscitated a well-known quotation from George Gissing's Private 
Papers of He= --R-ycroft 
in order to associate science with the horrors of the present war: 
I hate ahd fear 'science' because of my conviction that, for long to 
come, if not for ever, it will be the remorseless enemy of mankind. I 
see it destroying all simplicity and gentleness of life, all the beauty of 
the world; I see it restoring barbarism under the mask of civilisation; 
I see it darkening mens minds and hardening their hearts; I see it bringing a time of vast conflicts, which wiU pale into insignificance I the thousand wars of old', and, as Rely as not, will whelm all the laborious advances of mankind in blood-drenched chaos. 2' 
Science had a two-fold image problem. Firstly it was associated with German barbarism and 
perceived moral bankruptcy. This association had ironically been partly forged by the 
scientists themselves: Edwardian and wartime public science had paraded the spectre of 
Germany as the scientific nation par excellence in order to attract government attention to 
the importance of science. Secondly science was associated with the new weapons of war, 
and especially poison gas: These two images merged to create the idea that science itself 
.6 caused moral degeneration. Such attitudes seem to have been a 'popular prejudice" and 
found further expression in an interesting pamphlet by Avary H. Forbes entitled Salvation by 
Science! or Devilization in War and Peace, published in 1917. Forbes, a barrister and author 
of the 1897 work Is Science GqiLty,,? argued that science had debased the German moral 
character and that British society was in danger of suffering the same fate by its use of 
science in war and peace. He memorably described the reputation science had earned for 
itself in the war, particularly through the use of poison gas, in the words of an army 
chaplain at the front: 'It is not war, it is murder by chemistry'. Forbes invoked the image of 
Frankenstein's monster to describe science, and argued that science had degraded mind and 
character by habituating men to the scientific savagery of modem war. Forbes believed that 
this would not be the last war but merely a prelude to a worse one in which science would 
play an even greater part: 
It will probably begin by the spreading of the virus of malignant 
disease - consumption, cancer, small-pox, cholera etc. - amongst the 
nation to be attacked; and when the people are stricken and 
is Nature Vol. 99 'Notes, 17 Wy 1917, p. 230. See also Vol. 102, December 5 1918, p. 268 26 Nature Vol. 99.22--at, 
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demoralised in this way, the army will march in and complete the 
conquest. 2' 
This dismal picture also included another criticism of science: it would cause massive 
unemployment and other social problems in peace. In a eerily predictive passage, Forbes 
contrasted 'Two Pictures', arguing that the obverse of scientific progress was unavoidable 
social malaise: 
Look on this picture: An age of steam locomotion- steamers, 
railways, motors, air-ships; steam agriculture- ploughing, threshing, 
winnowing ... steam spinning- weaving, netting, dyeing, washing, printing, and thousands of other industries; an age of machine 
digging, sowing, mowing, reaping, and steam-work of almost every 
kind; an age of electric railways, electric tramways, electric motors, 
electric cycles, electric fighting and heating, and cooking, 
telegraphing, and chemical analysis; an age of patent medicines, of 
new specifics, of vivisection, of research endowment, of scientific 
lectures, scientific exhibitions, and of compulsory education. 
Now look at this picture: An age of slums, poverty, unemployed, 
sweating, starvation wages, break-neck struggle for existence, 
suicidal competition; an age of long hours, leisureless labour, Sunday 
work, nerve strain, epidemic break-downs, new diseases, 
multiplication of asylums and appalling *increase of lunacy; an age of 
cheap imitations, veneered articles, shoddy clothes, jerry building, 
adulteration of almost every manufactured article, trade frauds, 
commercial fies and misrepresentations and scientific crimes; an age 
of strikes and dead-locks between capital and labour, accompanied 
by an ever-increasing spirit of exasperation, hostility and violence. 
If the reader can see no causative connection between these two 
pictures, how does he explain their synchronism? 
No, the times we live in are not times of development and 
civilization, but of what may be expressed by a word compounded of 
these two, namely, 'Devilization. ' (original emphasis) 
Scientists were only too acutely aware of the seriousness of this image problem. 
Nature observed in 1922 that the public saw science as materialistic and amoral: 
In their view science is associated with the transformation of 
beautiful countrysides into the slums of industrial centres, with high 
explosive shells and clouds of poison gas to supersede the slings and 
arrows of earlier days. 21 
As early as 1915 the banner of the British Association for the Advancement of Science 
meeting at Manchester had shown the figure of Science hiding her face in shame, 
surrounded by the guns of war. Her guilt was further emphasised by the foregrounded 
`7 'Salvation by Science... ', (London, Marshall Brothem- 1917), pages 15; 27; 29 ý8 lbid., pp53-4 
129 Nature Vol. 109, unsigned leading editorial, 'Ile Influence of Sciencd, unsigned leader, pp. 801-3; p-80 I. 
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image of a snake: Science had allowed mankind to eat from her Tree of Knowledge and was 
stained with original sin. That year's Presidential Address, given by Arthur Schuster, 
rehearsed in a moderate form, the argument that would later be used by public scientists to 
justify Science's involvement with war, and to rehabilitate the image of science. The war had 
been a perversion of the aims of science and of her internationalism. But scientists were 
justified in aiding the prosecution of the war, for it was a conflict against German 
nationalism, which threatened to disrupt the international scientific community. The war was 
a Just War, a war for civilisation, in which it was the duty of scientists to take part: 
Happy were the times when it could be said with truth that the strife 
of politics counted as nothing before the silent display of the heavens. 
Mightier issues are at stake today: in the struggle which convulses 
the world, all intellectual pursuits are vitally affected, and Science 
gladly gives the power she wields to the service of the State. 
Sorrowfully she covers her face because that power, acquired 
through the peaceful efforts of the sons of all nations, was never 
meant for death and destruction: gladly she helps, - because a war wantonly provoked threatens civilization and only through victory 
shall we achieve a peace in which once more Science can hold up her 
head, proud of her strength to preserve the intellectual freedom 
which is worth more than material prosperity, to defeat the spirit of 
evil that destroyed the sense of brotherhood among nations, and to 
spread the love of truth. ' 
However, public scientists feared that the public, which had long been presented 
with Germany as the epitome of a scientific nation, would simply equate science with 
perceived German Barbarism. Thus the first step in rehabilitating the public image of science 
was to attempt to separate science from its German associations. In early 1917 the British 
Science Guild President, Lord Sydenharn, who (as was noted in chapter two) had 
formulated a scheme for a national science council in 1915, expressed the stock sentiments 
about Germany. It was not science but, 
The exultation of the State as a separate entity - the incarnation of force that could do no wrong and that must be blindly trusted and 
obeyed - destroyed the moral sense of the German people, and they 
now stand revealed as senselessly brutal barbarians. Their National 
organisation proved pernicious, because it created an overweening belief in the superiority of Germans .... While there 
is much that we 
may well learn from German methods, and especially from German 
30 A. Schuster, p. 134, 'British Association for the Advancement of Science, Manchester 1915. Inaugural Address of 
the Presidenf, in Chemical News Vol. CXIL 10 September 1915, pp. 127-134. See also Giuliano Pancaldi, 'Scientific 
Internationalism and the British Associatiotf, pp. 145-169, in Roy MacLeod and Peter Collins (eds), The Parliament 0 
Science Tlie British Association for the Advancement of Science. 1831-1991, (Northwood, Science Reviews, 1981). 
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thoroughness and hard work, we have been provided , krith a terrible 
warning of what to avoid. " 
In its first leader after the signing of the Armistice, Nature, was quick to reinforce 
this view that it was not science that was essentially evil, but only science in the service of a 
morally corrupt Germany: 
The execrable deeds of the German land, sea, and air forces cannot 
be excused by reference to any sound principle of human progress. 
The spirit represented by such acts as the murder of innocent and 
unoffending non-combatants, heartless cruelty to women and 
children, and destruction of priceless buildings, is unworthy of 
twentieth century civilisation .... Science and scientific principles must not be held responsible for these outward and visible signs of moral 
degeneration. Chlorine was used as a bleaching-powder for a 
hundred years before the Germans adopted it as a poison gas .... The search for truth, and the discovery of new substances and forces in 
Nature, must not be impeded because unworthy use may be made of 
the results. What has to be done is to advance moral and ethical ideas 
to higher levels, so that new knowledge shall benefit the human race 
instead of being used to destroy it. Unless this is accepted, there win 
be an end -of civilisation, for it is possible to conceive of a time when 
the forces at man's disposal will be so strong that a hostile army or an 
enemy's city may be destroyed almost at the touch of a button. 
The same editorial continued: 
The popular mind has associated science and specialised education 
with German truculence and perfidy, and has even supposed that 
these conditions are necessarily related to each other. The characters 
exhibited by Germany in the conduct of the war are not, however, the 
result of overcultivation of science, but of a disastrous deficiency in 
moral and ethical training .... We have nothing to 
fear ftom maldng 
science the main axle of the educational coach instead of a fifth 
wheel, provided only that the right position is given to character 
training as well. 
This was a potentially dangerous, self-defeating argument, as it seemed to imply that science 
could only be applied for moral purposes by leaders who had been traditionally educated in 
the classics. As Nature argued: 'Our system of education was inefficient, but it produced a 
nation of young heroes. 2 However, this leader concluded with what was to become the 
stock defence of science, and an argument for greater involvement of science in government 
policy. If the nation was to use science morally and effectively in peacetime, 
... it must look to knowledge for its support, and not let itself 
be 
cajoled by the platitudes and promises of party politicians. Democracy has hitherto permitted itself to be swayed by eloquence, 
and has elected to be governed by men of words rather than by men 
31 Sydenham, p. 66, 'National Reconstruction', Presidential Address to BSG, April 30,1917,11 th Annual RMM of the 
P 5, G, (June 1917), pp-65-73. 
3 'War and Peace, unsigned leader, NatuTe, V01-102, Pp-201-2. All quotes from p. 201 
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of knowledge and action. The consequence is that men are entrusted 
with power, not because of any fitness they have shown for the 
offices they occupy, but because of their political influence or 
friendships. Scientific and technical experts have been used, but only 
as hewers of wood and drawers of water, while administrative 
control has usually been in the hands of officials with no special 
qualifications for their directorships. " 
Scientists were presented as the ultimate safeguard against the misuse of science. Whether it 
was immoral Germans, or British politicians, who were using science for corrupt and 
perverted ends, the antidote was scientists in positions of political power. Only scientists 
could ensure that science was utilised for its true, peaceful purpose. 
As ever, Ronald Ross's Science Progress had already expressed this indictment of 
traditional politicians even more forcefully: 
Most people have concluded by now that the war ... was due to the mis-government of the world by essentially wrong types of persons, 
who rule in the interests of themselves rather than of humanity or of 
their nation. The problem of the future is how to replace these 
persons by higher types .... 
So long as we continue to believe that 
persons who have never seen or done anything are as good as men of 
the widest experience and achievement , so 
long shall the world 
suffer from wars, massacres, injustice, destitution, insanitation and 
crime. Let us hope that this war will abofish not only German 
militarism but the whole lying and canting democratic hypothesis of 
equality. The best men at the top is the only sound rule; and it 
remains to find how to put them there. ' 
Essentially , this was an old theme - the anti-democratic strand of Edwardian and wartime 
public science - put to new use. It now served to deflect blame for the use of science in war 
to the'rulers not the scientists. This then allowed scientists to continue to claim political 
power. In fact, it was their duty so to do, for, according to their arguments only scientific 
government could stop the potentially cataclysmic perversion of science. Gregory expressed 
the refined form of this argument in 192 1: 
Mankind hasP indeed, proved itself unworthy of the gifts which 
science has placed at its disposal, with the result that squalid 
surroundings and squandered fife are the characteristics of modem 
western civilisation, instead of social conditions and ethical ideals 
superior to those of any other epoch. Responsibility for this does not lie with scientific discoverers, but with statesmen and democracy. Like the gifts of God, those of science can be made either a blessing 
or a curse, to glorify the human race or to destroy it; and upon 
33 ndd, p. 202. See also Gregory, 'Science in the TEstory of Civilisatim', Transa 
- 
; ocietv, 
1920, reported in Journal of the BSQ, No. II (June 1920), p. 17, and his 1923 address to the Scientific and Technical 
Circle of the Institute of Journalists, as reported in JLaD= Vol. 112 (1923), pp. 803A. See also The World Misrulers' 
and The Rcfom of Democracy, two unsigned articles (probably by Ronald Ross), in Science progress, Vol. )M (1917- 
18), pp. 295-301 and 301-09. 34 Science ProgLess, VoDa, No. 42 (October 1916), 'This and That in 'Notes, p. 321-2 kv the editor, Ronald Ross - 
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civilised man himself rests the decision as to the course to follow. 
Mrith science as an ally, and the citadels of ignorance and self as the 
objective, he can transform the world, but if he neglects the guidance 
which knowledge can give, and prefers to be led by the phrases of 
rhetoricians this planet will become a place of dust and ashes. " 
The implication here was not only that politicians were immoral, and that they knew nothing 
about science, but also that to be a scientist was to possess more efficient political ability, 
and a higher moral sense. We have met this idea that science inculcates morality before, and 
after the war it re-emerged as another means of strengthening the public image of science. 
Public science had thus turned the popular association of science with destruction into an 
argument for power for scientists. This was a way of overcoming what E. A. Burroughs, 
Bishop of Ripon, was to call, at the 1927 Annual Meeting of the BAAS, the 'ethical gap' 
between society and science. He argued that the advance of science had outstripped the 
development of Man's 'moral and spiritual' ability to deal , Nisely '%krith its discoveries. His, 
half ironic, solution was to propose a 'scientific holiday' -a ten-year moratorium on new 
research - to enable Man to catch up. ' But, public science claimed that if scientists were in 
control the gap was bridged. " 
In all this, the scientists were attempting to link- science to a new conception 
of the national interest, one more in keeping with the concerns of post-war British society. 
31 Richard Gregory, 'The Message of Science!, Presidential Address to Corresponding Societies of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science, 8 September 1921, abridged version printed in Nature Vol. 108, pp. 533- 
7. Quote from p. 533. 
36 Times, 5 September 1927, p. 15, 'The British Association, Bishop of Ripons Address: Science and Religioif. See 
Peter Collins, 'The British Association as Public Apologist for Science, 1919-1946', pp. 211-36, in MacLeod and 
Collins, on cit., p. 215. For further discusssion of the 'ethical pp! (or, as he terms it, 'cultural lag! ) and its use by public 
scientists particularly in the relations of science and war during the 1930s, see Edgerton, 'British Scientific 
Intellectuals... ', especially pp. 17-21 (numbering from advance copy). 37 It is worth noting that there was also a campaign to rouse industrialists and businessmen to political action, and to 
press their claims for influence over policy during the war. This =faced in the scientific journals as it was often allied 
to calls for power for scientists. Here, the two groups were presented as men who knew. and the scientific method was 
often equated with the common sense of business decision-making methods. These were compared favourably to the 
biased decisions of party politicians. These two strands of science and business came together in the Institute of 
Industry and Commerce, a mixed body of scientists and industrialists founded in 19 IS to urge the State to take a lead in 
encouraging industrial research. The Institutes activities included a series of lectures and pamphlets on this theme. 
Importantly, in February 1915 the name %vas changed to the Institute of Industry and Science. See 'Institute of Industry 
and Commerce' Chemical News, Vol Oa (1915), 15 January 1915, p. 31; 'Institute of Industry and Science, Chcniical 
, Vol CXL 26 Februar) News - 1915, p. 107; 'British Imperialism. German Kultur Defined!, lecture to Institute 
by its 
Vice-President and Chairman, J. Taylor Peddie, published in Chemical Ne-as, Vol. CXI, 5 March 1915, pp. 109-10; 
and Ian Varcoe, 'Scientists, Government and Organised Research... ', pp. cit., pp. Igs-201. Much of the rhetoric of this 
body was very similar to that of public science (for instance calls for a. joint national council of Industry and Science to 
be composed of scientists and industrialists). Sometimes, as this chapter shows, such conflated rhetoric does blur the 
scientists' political demands. But businessmen did themselves produce a rhetoric both in the wartime and Edwardian 
periods, calling for business influence over policy, This business public science has recicved little attention by 
historians and deserves further study, particularly from the outbreak of war into the 1920s. See my M. Sc. thesis, 
'Knowledge is Power? A New View of Some Aspects of the Relations of Science and Government in Edwardian 
Britafif, (Manchester University, 1989), particularly chapter three-. and John Turner (ed. ), Businessmen and Politics- 
Studies of Business Activity in British Politics, 1900-1945, (London, Hcincmarm, 1984). 
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Out was the kind of nationalist, militarist rhetoric so common in Edwardian public science; 
in came the peaceful, liberal values of social and economic reconstruction, and social 
harmony. Nature summed up the new image of science and the new national image to which 
it was to be rhetoricafly associated in December 1918: 
Science has nothing whatever to do with conquest, with commercial 
exploitation, or with upholding the divine right of dynasties. The end 
of all scientific investigation is to discover the truth about all things, 
including man, his instincts and impulses, his organisation in society. 
Were economists and politicians imbued with the scientific spirit it 
would be of incalculable benefits to the effective organisation of 
society. Science ... [maintains] that the habit of mind developed by scientific studies is at least as important [as religion or the 
humanities] as an ethical agency. With the completion of the war it 
will be in a large measure the mission of science to rebuild a shattered 
civilisation; it will restore industries, house the homeless, feed the 
hungry, and cure the sick-, and, not least, must aid in healing the 
deep-seated Hls of society, the consequences of past social 
misconduct. If men will use for destruction the discoveries of science, 
it is not the scientific worker who is to blarne. ' 
I have argued that public scientists perceived science's problem to be one of public 
image, and so far we have only looked at the evidence of scientific publications. These were 
important as public scientists were also trying to reassure the scientific community that 
science had a relevant and benificent mission in post-war society, and to impress on it the 
need and possibility of its involvement in social and political activities. Moreover, Nature 
appears to have been read not only by scientists but by the wider public with an interest in 
science. Tellingly, Arnold Bennett wrote in 1930 that: 'I regard Nature as perhaps the most 
important weekly printed in English, far more important than any political week-ly'. " 
However, public scientists in this period did also undertake a deliberate campaign to 
confirm the desired image of science in the mind of the wider public. Scientists were careful 
to cultivate the new image of science as essentially peaceful. Where possible, the civilian 
nature of science was emphasised over its war uses. Thus, for example, Alexander 
Findlay's" popular exposition of 'what the science of chemistry ... has accomplished 
for the 
material well-being and uplifting of mankind' in his Chemist[y in the Service of Mg% made 
no mention of poison gas, and devoted only seven out of two hundred and seventy two 
38 Nature Vol. 102.5 December 1918, 'Notes', p. 268. 39 Arnold Bermett in the Evenina Stan 20 November 1930, quoted by Richard Gregory in Nature Vol. 126, 
Q 929), p. 854. Cited here from Werskey, 'Nature and Politics..., pp. cit, p. 462. 40 Fellow of the hLstitute of Chemistry, Professor of Chemistry University of Wales, Director of the Edward Davies 
Chemical Laboratories, University College of Wales, Abenlsm)ih. 
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pages to discussing the war uses of chemistry, in terms of the rnilitary uses of explosives. 
Even here Findlay emphasised the corresponding peace uses of explosives: 
But it is not merely for the purpose of strengthening man's arm in war 
that explosives have found an application; they have also, by 
rendering possible such great engineerýng works as the Suez Canal 
and the Panama Canal and the boring of tunnels through the 
mountains of the earth, through their use in mining, and in many 
other ways, played an important part in the peaceful progress of 
civilisation. "I 
Findlay intended his work as a contribution to the improvement of the public image of 
science and to maintaining in peacetime the importance in national life that it was enjoying 
during the war. If this was to happen, 'The mental outlook and the attitude of the people as 
a whole towards science must be changed, and the scientific habit, and a spirit of trust in 
science must be cultivated'. The reason why this enterprise was so important was that the 
author was a public scientist who believed, 'Science stands for efficiency in all the activities 
2f life, and the neglect of science spells waste and industrial decay'. 2 
Similar in tone was the 1917 work Chemical Discovery and Invention in the 
Twentieth Century, by Wflfiam Tflden, which we noted above as an apology for pure 
research. Here, again, quite incredibly, the only mention of the detailed uses of chemistry in 
war came in the chapter on explosives. Out of a total of eighteen pages only three were 
given over to explosives in war, and although there was some discussion of types of shells, 
explosives and detonators, the chapter beganMth a famihar apologetic: 
But though at the time of writing this book the greater part of Europe is devastated and millions of men are exposed to destruction by the wholesale 
use of explosives in war, it must not be forgotten that these agents have been 
among ýhe most powerful auxiliaries in the arts of peace. It is only necessary 
to consider how many roads, railways, tunnels and water works have been 
rendered possible by the use of dynamite and other blasting materials to 
perceive that explosives have a civilising mission of their own, and probably 
next to steam have done more to facilitate inter-communication between 
different countries than any other of the works of man's invention. " 
Many other such works extolling the essentially peaceful nature of science were 
produced from about 1917 into the 1920s. 1 One in particular is worth noting as a final, 
41 Alexander Findlay, ChemigrVin the Service of M (London, Longmans, Green, 1916, new impression 1918), p. 77 4' b-Lid, Preface, 1916, p. xi. Original emphasis. 4; William Tilden, pp. cit, p. 374. 44 See for example, William Tilden, 'Chemistry in Relation to National Affairs, ChgMiMLEM, Vol. CXV (1917), 25 
January 1917, pp. 37-9; and W. J. Pope, 'Chemistry and the Nation', Chemical Ne,. Ns, Vol CXVI (1917-18), 26 October 1917, pp. 199-202. 
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supreme example of the kind of arguments deployed. W. J. Pope, Professor of Chemistry at 
Cambridge, contributed an essay on 'The National Importance of Chemistry' to Seward's 
1917 collection Science and the Nation. Pope was very active on the lecture circuit with this 
kind of topic at this time, but here he excelled himself. Once again, there was little on the 
war uses of chemistry, and more on its peaceful applications. What consideration there was 
of war uses was justified in a paragraph which conflated many of the public science 
arguments we have already seen. Pope argued that scientists were not responsible for the 
uses of their inventions or discoveries; paraded anti-German sentiments; posited the clearly 
spurious argument that it -Aras not scientists but non-scientific administrative heads of 
government departments who were really responsible for the development of evil weaponry; 
and finally argued that too much classical learning was very definitely a contributing factor. 
All in aU, he presented a breathtakingly disingenuous account of the relations of scientists 
and war: 
The unhappy events of the last two years have given rise to a widespread 
belief that the science of Chemistry is largely responsible for the accentuation 
of the horrors associated with war. This belief is a mistaken one and arises 
from a failure to comprehend the part played by Chemistry in developing the 
resources and promoting the prosperity of any great modem nation. A 
flourishing chemical industry is a perpetual source of wealth to a country and 
the prime fount of countless ameHorations of the conditions of fife .... But, in accordance with a natural law, so potent an agent for good becomes a 
powerful weapon in war, and the unfhir use of the weapon cannot be charged 
against the specialist who devised the tool for some peaceful purpose. Signs 
are, indeed, not wanting which indicate that science has little to do with the 
control of German policy and methods. It is impossible to believe, for 
instance, that any scientific man ever suggested the Flammewerfer could 
possess any efficiency as a military weapon; it is, however, easy to visualise 
the chemical engineer producing such an archaic implement at the bidding of 
a non-scientific chief German primary and secondary education is more 
intensely classical and literary than is Brritish; its products naturafly tend 
towards such an inherently false and proportionless outlook on life, affairs, 
and things as has been repeatedly exhibited to us by an unscrupulous enemy 
during the past two years. 45 
However, some capital could still conceivably be made out of the war work of 
science, and thus on rare occasions, Nature did carefully note 'The Nation's Debt to 
Science"' in this respect. Even then, though, Natu hedged its bets and emphasised the 
45 W. J. Pope, Me National Importance of ChemistrNo, pp. 1-23 in A. C. Seward, pX-. cjt,, pp. 24. The British flame 
thrower, used after the Germans first introduced the weapon against the French in June 1915, %%ss developed by an 
engineer officer, Captain F. C. Vincent. It was improved by Captain WR Livens. a twcnty-f vy old Special Ie ear 
Company commander with an engineering degree from Cambridge. Livens also developed the Livens gas projector 
during 1915 and early 1916. See Hartcup, Qp c _ 
ýit, p. 68 and p. 100-1 46 Nature, unsigned leader, Vol. 103,24 April 1919, pp. 141-2 
97 
defensive nature of British science, responding to barbarous German science. For example, 
in December 1918, in discussing a proposal in a letter to the Times from eight eminent 
members of the medical profession to prohibit future uses of gas in war, Nature, after 
proposing the prohibition of war itself, went on to note that although warfare had become 
more scientific, yet: 
Science has not merely striven to destroy enemy life; it has striven, and with 
equal success, to save British and Alfied lives. The British pattern of gas 
respirator is the triumphant product of much exceedingly careful work, and 
has probably saved more lives than any other contrivance or procedure 
adopted dunng the war. "' 
Similarly, R-B. Pilcher, Registrar of the Institute of Chemistry, writing in Chemical News in 
1917, detailed some of the general contributions of chemists to the war effort, and even 
cited commendations from French and Haig which praised the work of chemists in 
retaliatory gas attacks, as well as their work in gas defence. However, he ended his piece 
thus: 
To sum the matter up, chemists have met the situation with a spirit of true 
patnotism and have been promptly organised for the service required of 
them. It is not too much to hope that, as the discoveries of science have been 
applied to the destruction of humanity, they may be devoted more and more 
to the furtherance of the arts of peace, to the uplifting of civilisation and the 
pacification of the world. "' 
This article, itslef a reprint from the original in the Proceedings of the Institute of CheMistry, 
also formed the last chapter to Pilcher's 1919 work on The Profession of Chernist1y. " This 
was a general introduction for the intending student to the nature, scope, training and 
carreer prospects in chen-dstry. It was a product of the desire amongst the scientific 
community for increased professionalisation at the end of the war to consolidate the socio- 
economic status which scientists perceived they had gained in wartime. This work was 
repubhshed in 1927 by the Institute to serve as an I authoritative guide' for the public on 
chemistry and a chemical career. The book had been revised by the author with editorial 
guidance from the Institute's Publications Committee. The new 'Intoduction' stated that this 
had been done 'in order that it might find a place among the official publications of the 
47 Nature, 'Notes, Vol. 102,5 December 1918, p. 268. See also the leader cited in note 27 which gives equal emphasis 
to defensive measures. 
48 R. B. Pilchcr, 'Chemists in War, Chemical NeNys. Vol CXV (1917), 2 March 1917, pp. 97-8. 49 See Proceedings of the Institute of Chemistry, Part 1 (1917); R-B Pilcher, (London, 
Constable and Co., 1919), pp. 190-6. This latter version had been 'modifled Ajth slight additions'by the author. The 
sense and tone remained the same. 
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Institute'. Only one chapter had been ornitted from the text of the original edition: the 
chapter on the role of chemists in the war. ' 
One of the most important planks in this public campaign were the two British 
Scientific Products Exhibitions organised by Richard Gregory and the BSG. Gregory had 
taken over the formal direction of the BSG, as well as the editorship of Nature, ftom 
Norman Lockyer in 1918, although he had been the defacto head of both for many years. 
One of his first actions was to organise an exhibition of the ftuits of scientific research. 
Manufacturers and government departments were contacted and contributed exhibits to 
'another version of 1851"' held at King's College, London, between 12 August and 17 
September 1918. The exhibits took up the first two floors of the college, attracted more 
than 30,000 visitors, and were accompanied by a series of thirty popular lectures on various 
aspects of applied science. " Proposing the toast to the Science Guild at the official dinner 
of the Exhibition, the Marquess of Crewe made it clear that the event was part of a public 
relations drive: 
... the war had brought home to everyone the. value of scientific method and knowledge, not only as a weapon in war, but also in 
industry and education. It was true that the enemy had tasted of the 
fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, but it was not necessary that this 
should have the to)dc effect it had in Germany - that fi7uit had turned 
to poison because of the spirit in which it was eaten. Our task must 
be to disassociate science from this disastrous spirit,, to show that the 
(my emphasis) 
So successful did the BSG adjudge the exhibition to be that it was moved north to 
Manchester College of Technology for two weeks from 27 December 1918. ' A second 
exhibition was held in the Central Hall, Westminster from 3 July to 5 August 1919. Once 
again there were public lectures. " The image of science must have received a boost when 
on 22 July the King and Queen attended. 56 The Marquess of Crewe explained the need for 
the second exhibition. The first had taken place before final victory and had emphasised 
50 Pilcher, The Profession of Chemi8M Revised Edition (Prepared under the supervision of the Publications 
es Cornn-ýittee of the Institute, (London, Institute of Chemistry, 1927). Quotations are form 11atroductiod v Prof sor 
Arthur Smithells, FRS, President of the Institute, pp. v-vi. 51 W. RG. Armytage, Sir Richard Gregory 11is Life and Wg&- (London, Macmillan, 1957), P. 79. 52 Details taken from D-iýd, and Journal of the BSG. No. 8 (April 1919), pp. 19-23. 53 Marquess of Crewe, proposing the toast to the BSG, British Scientific Products E)d'uibition Dinner, 15 January 1919. 
p. 29. 
55 
Nature, Vol. 102,12 December 1918, 'Notes', p. 288. 
36 
Army tage, Oxit, p. 84 
Nature Vol. 103,24 July 1919, p. 408 
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industries in the service of war (for example, articles and substances now made in Britain 
which had been got from Germany before hostilities): 
The present exhibition of the other hand, is meant to show the 
triumphs of British industry in the arts of peace, and to bring home to 
the general public the importance of the relations between science 
and industry, and also between education and research. " 
Nature also supported other scientific exhibitions by giving them notice in her columns: for 
instance an exhibition of new British and 'key' industries organised by the Industrial Section 
of the Tariff Reform League in October 1918, and a Scientific Novelties Exhibition at King's 
College, London, in December 1923 and January 1924.1' Nature also, of course, strongly 
supported the British Empire Exhibition of 1924 at Wembley, hoping that it would show 
what science had accomplished and would be a 'Temple of Science'. 19 
Concern, writh science's pubbc image prompted Nature to launch a renewed attack on 
the aims and purposes of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. In 
September 1920, Nature editorialised that: 
There is, we believe, a feeling among many members of the 
Association that efforts should be made to increase its usefulness by 
bringing it into closer contact with thoughtful members of all classes 
of tRe community .... The public does not understand the Association and the Association makes little endeavour to show the bearing of 
scientific methods and principles upon most subjects of vital 
importance in national polity and industrial affairs. ' 
This sparked a vigorous debate about the reform of the Association in the letters columns of 
Nature. 61 Most correspondents lamented the increasing specialisation of science which 
meant most papers were full of technical jargon, and quite impenetrable to the general 
public. More general lectures at meetings to attract in a larger number of the local 
community were favoured. Soddy summed up the sentiments of the letter writers, when he 
commented that, 
Unless the British Association becomes democratic and acts as a real 
bond of union between scientific men and the thinking public, rather 
57 Nature, Vol.. 103, 'The British Scientific Products Exhibiti& unsigned article, 10 July 1919. 38 See Nature Vol. 102, p. I 10 and 113, p. 92 respectively. 
59 Nature, Vol. I 10, pp. 797-8, unsigned leader, 'Science and the Empire', p. 798. 60 Nature, Vol. 106 (1920-1), unsigned editorial, Me British Association and National Life', pp. 69-72. Quote from p. 
69. For a brief discussion of the BAAS in the 1920S see Peter Collins, 'The British Association, as Public Apologist for 
Science, 191946, pp. 211-36 in The Parliament of Science..., M cit 61 See Nature, Vol. 106, pp. 107-1 3) and 144-7 
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than as a periodic platform for personages, it does not seem to fulfil 
any function worth continuing. "- 
The publicity campaigm also included repeated calls for the increased representation 
of science in school curricula. 
The BSG considered positive publicity for science so important in this period that it 
re-defined itself partly as a publicity service for science. By 1920 the Executive of the Guild 
had begun to feel that given the victories on science policy and funding of the war years, the 
Guild should take stock of its position and define a new strategy for retaining these 
advances, and obtaining more, including a meaningful voice for science in policy issues. "' In 
early 1921 the Guild initiated 'A New Campaign Against Ignorance'. ' The object was to 
encourage local scientific societies to affiliate to the Guild, and to found local branches of 
the Guild to diffuse the message of the value of science throughout the provinces. At the 
1921 annual general meeting, Lord Bledisloe, " one of the Vice-Presidents, initiated a 
publicity policy' and a 'new campaign of 1922'. ' L. C. Bernacchi was appointed special 
director of an appeal to raise funds to extend the work of the Guild. " Among the proposed 
ideas to publicise science were a strong provincial organisation; national lecture 
programmes; a British Science Prize (the national equivalent of the Nobel); a new role for 
the Guild as information bureau for businessmen ; an expansion of the Journal and a series 
of popular science pubEcations. " By 1924 the Guild had enjoyed some success in this area. 
Four publicity leaflets had been published and distributed to newspapers and periodicals. 
They were: 'Helium and its Uses' by J. C. McLennan; 'Thcrmionic Valves and their Uses', by J. A. Fleming, 
'The Discover3, of Manganese Steel and its importance in Modem Engineering'by Sir Robert Hadfield; and 
one on the 'Fixation of Nitrogen'. The first two had also been published in the handbook of the 
exhibits in pure scie nce arranged by a Royal Society Committee at the British Empire 
Exhibition at Wembley. A 'Science News Service' bad been established directed by G. D. 
Knox, who'took popular summaries of topical scientific discoveries written by scientists and 
6-' Soddy, letter to Nature Vol. 106,23 September 1920, p. 112. 63 See Journal of the BSG No. 11, (June 1920), The Annual RepoTtof the Executive Committee', p. 7 64 Address to Brighton and Portsmouth Rotary Clubs by J. J. Robinson, April 14ý and 19,1921, Journal of the BSG, No. 13 (June 1921), pp. 62-70. 0 Charles Bathurst, M-P, formerly at the MinistrY Of Food. A long-sening Guild member. 66 Journal of the BSG No. 15, (May 1922), editoiial, p. 2. ` Member of Scotfs 1901-4 expedition to South Pole, joined the Navy in the %%w and moved from command of patrol 
ships in North sea and Mediterranean to Anti-submarine diNrision of the Admiralty. A Liberal: contested Widnes and Chatham in 1910, President of Gillingham Liberal Association. Biographical details from lbil, P. II 68 See report of BSG I Sth AGM, 6 April 1922, JOumal -O-Lthe BSG, Ibid., pp. 31-2. 101 
sold them to the newspapers. So far articles had appeared in The Moming Post, The 
Liverpool Dail3L Postf The Manchester Guardian, The Newcastle Daily Journal, and The 
York-shire Post. Science had also been put on the radio by the GUHd: Sir William Bragg had 
given a general talk on the BBC on the work of the Guild, combined with an appeal for 
funds on 29 January 1923, and Bernacchi had also arranged a series of monthly talks on 
scientific topics, the first on 5 March 1923 by Gregory on 'Distant Stars and Island 
Universes'. All speakers had agreed to appear without fee. The Guild could also report that 
its long-planned conference on 'Science and Labour' was to be held as part of the British 
Empire Exhibition in May, and was to be opened by the Prime Mýnister, Ramsay 
MacDonald. "' 
At the end of 1922, Nature, appealing for support for the Guild's New Campaign, 
noted the other point of all this publicity work. It was to improve the public image of 
science so that a cleansed science could take up its rightful place in the counsels of the 
nation: 
It is obvious that valuable national and Imperial service can be 
performed by a body which has sufficient funds to undertake active 
propaganda work for the extension of an understanding of the 
influence of scientific research and its results. The only organisation 
which is attempting to do this is the British Science Guild, founded in 
1905 to convince the people, by means of publications and meetings, 
of the necessity of applying the methods of science to all branches of 
human endeavour and thus to further the progress and increase the 
welfare of the Empire*'O 
The ultimate goal of this campaign to resuscitate the public image of science 
was, then, still influence over national policy. But public scientists felt that the most 
effective first step in consolidating their wartime gains was to diassociate science 
from war. Until the public image had been successfully rehabilitated, and it was felt 
that the public was again ready to trust the scientists with policy, calls for policy 
influence were muted. In a later chapter we shall see Alfred Marshall pursuing a 
similar long game strategy for policy influence for economists. 
3.2.2 CONSOLIDATING THE PROFESSIONAL IMAGE OF SCIENCE 
69 All details of activities above taken from BSG nnual Report, 1923-4, pp. 1-4 70 'Science and the Empire', p. 798, unsigned leader, Nature, 16 December 1922, Vol. I 10, pp. 797-8. 
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The corollary of ameliorating the public image of science to consolidate 
wartime gains was to ensure that the reputation of scientists as professionals was 
fixed at least at the new level. This had two purposes. Firstly a straightformard 
desire to protect and enhance the pay and prospects of scientists, and the social 
prestige of their new status, which had come from increased career opportunities in 
the new research organizations. Secondly, this new professional status was also 
perceived as a key to unlock the door of increased poficy influence. Scientists 
wanted to present themselves as trusted responsible individuals, who possessed a 
defined body of knowledge with recognised social applications. The way to do this 
was to enhance their professional structures. The shared wartime experiences of 
scientists had themselves, as we noted earber, engendered a new sense of 
community, solidarity and generally a new awareness of science as a profession, 
amongst scientists. The war had also witnessed an increase in the power of the trade 
unions. After the war, there was a natural desire amongst the scientific community 
to protect their new-found social and economic status. This narrow focus on 
professional issues became more pronounced with the drastic cuts in science 
spending of the early twenties. The budget of the DSIR was cut from 1556,868 to 
1330j287, and the government grant to the universities was reduced by 13005,000.1' 
Such retrenchment policies had an immediate impact on the employment prospects 
of scientists. The Institute of Chemistry noted an increase in the number of 
unemployed chemists from 0.7% of its membership to 5.3% between 1920 and 
1923.72 At the same time conditions of service for employed scientists were less than 
perfect. In the Civil Service, where many scientists had been inducted during the war 
on a temporary basis, there were disparities in pay and grading with administrative 
civil servants which largely continued into the 1930s. Scientists in the universities 
were squeezed between the twin problems of the funding cuts and growing student 
numbers caused by demobilised students: the population of British universities grew 
by 56% between 1914 and 1924 to around 42,000. " Thus the late war period saw 
the formation of new representative bodies and increased membership for existing 
Details from MacLeods, me Social Relations of Science...,, pR. p. Lt. p. 333. 7 From Proceedings of the Institute of Chen-dgm, 1923, Part 1, p. 29. cited here from MacLeods, Ibid., p. 326. 73 See RLid, pp. 3334. 
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ones, in all the areas in which scientists had made an impact during the war. These 
bodies enjoyed rising membership during the early 'twenties. The Institution of 
Professional Civil Servants was formed in 1919 to provide a mirror organisation to 
the civil service staff associations which represented clerical and administrative staff. 
By 1921 the IPCS had 3,000 members and this rose to 10,000 by the end of the 
1920s. In the universities the Association of University Teachers grew out of the 
Junior Staffs Associations in December 1917 and soon had over a thousand 
members. Chemists in industry, who had played perhaps the most conspicuous part 
in scientific war work, had been agitating for an effective and truly representative 
national organisation since mid 1915. " Matters came to a head in September 1917 
with the beginnings of a new organization, the British Association of Chemists 
(BAC). The new body was begun by industrial chemists from the Midlands who 
found that although they had done important war work, yet they were not allowed 
membership of the foremost national chemical association, the Royal Institute of 
Chemistry (RIC), because of its strict qualifications requirement. " The BAC was 
formally inaugurated at a national meeting held at the Manchester School of 
Technology on 10 November. "' It aims were to obtain admission to the RIC for 
practising chernistsiArithout university degrees and to raise the professional status of 
the industrial chemist. The RIC agreed to amend its entry requirements, but the 
BAC registered as a trade union and continued in existence to press further the 
professional case of industrial chemists. By 1920 it too had around 1,000 
members. " 
In 1917 an Institute of Physics was also formed. This was a more 
strightforwardly traditional professional organisation and was based on the RIC. It 
14 
See Henry E. Armstrong, Me Development and Control of Industry by Public Influences'. M. 0- C. T. Kingzett, 
Fellow of the Institute of Chemistry, 'A Plea for A Real Institute of Chemistry,, and 'Chemical Societies and Empire 
Interes&, The Chemical Trade Journal and Chemical Engineer. Vol. 58,8 April 1916, pp. 319-20 and Vol. 63,31 
August 1918, pp. 159-60, respectively. 75 See "Me British Association of Chemists, report of meeting of Midlands chemists at Birmingham University on 26 
September 1918, Chemical News, Vol. CXVII (1918), 11 October 1918, pp. 325-7. 76 See 'British Association of Chemists: Inaugural Meeting!, 'Me Chemical radejo al d Chemical Engineer- Vol. 
61,17 November 1917, pp. 413-5. 77 See Macleods, "Me Contradictions of Professionalism: Scientists, Trade Unionism and the First World War, pp. I- 
32, Social Studies of Science, Vol. 9, Part 1, (1979), pp. 8-9. See also editorial, 'Current Topics: Organisation of 
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was incorporated in November 1920 and its first President was Sir Richard 
Glazebrook, the Director of the National Physical Laboratory. " 
These organisations were largely concerned with professional questions of 
social and economic status. With the -exception of some small elements of the BAC, 
the intention was not to form bodies to exert an influence over policy. The goal was 
to win for marginalised groups of scientists a professional status on a par with the 
traditional efite scientific groupings. In direct contrast to this, a minority of scientists 
opted for a self-consciously trade union style organisation: the National Union of 
Scientific Workers. The name reflected its more militant intentions to exercise 
influence over poEcy through trade union style methods, its more left-wing 
ideological basis, and the fact that its prospective constituency was the junior grades 
of scientists at government research institutions and the universities. Its early history 
was however marked by tension within its membership about the nature and scope 
of its political aims and the related question of whether it should be a professional 
body or a trade union. " 
A national union of scientific workers had been suggested as early as July 
1914 by Ronald Ross in the editorial columns of his Science Progress. " Ross had 
long been a campaigner for better pay and prospects for scientists and this 
suggestion f6flowed his campaign to eliminate the 'sweating' of scientists and a 
survey of, their working conditions undertaken by Science Progress ' The 
organisation did not however get off the ground until developments in Cambridge in 
May 1917. Following the publication of Seward's col. lection Science and the Nation, 
which stressed the primary importance of pure research, a irroup, of researchers 
under Harold Jeffreys agreed to circulate a letter to university and government 
laboratory scientists proposing the formation of a Scientific Workers Research 
Association (SWRA). This circular stated that the body 'would aim at performing a 
78 See MacLeods, Ibid., p. 9. 
ý9 The whole of this section on the NUSW is necessarily heavily dependent on the work- of Kay and RON , MacLeod. See 
Kay MacLeod, 'Politics, Professionalisation and the Organisation of Scientists: the Association of Scientific Workers, 
1917-1942' (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Sussex University, 1976); Roy and Kay MacLeod, 'Contradictions Of 
Professionalism... ', M).. cit -, and also their'Social Relations of Science... ', 2p. cit. 80 See Ross, 'Proposed Union of Scientific Workers', &-ience Proffess, Vol. 9 No. 33 (July1914), pp. 164-5. 
81 See for example, 'Sweating the Scientist' editorial by Ross, Science Proam, Vol. 8 (1913-14). pp. 599-608; on his 
inquiry into the pay and prospects question see 'The imoluments of ScientifIc Workers', a questionnaire Which began 
appearing from late 1913 (see for instance, Scienc ý- Progess, Vol. 8, p. 598). 
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somewhat similar function in regard to research in pure science' as the DSIR 
performed for applied industrial research, though it would be a co-ordinating body 
only and would not itself undertake research. " After an encouraging response to 
this circular another meeting was arranged in London at the end of 1917 and 
scientists from Cambridee, the London colleges, the NPL, Woolwich ArsenA and 
the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough attended. At this meeting the 
original proposal was rejected in favour of a more radical one by Norman Campbell 
of the NPL to create a National Union of Scientific Workers, largely with the 
support of more radical, left-, Aing scientists from the NPL and Woolwich. A 
provisional executive was appointed and the first manifesto was circulated to 
universities and government laboratories in January 1918. This Manifesto asserted 
that the union would concentrate on representing the economic interests of its 
members, 
... not because scientific workers have no other or. more important interests, but because it is by dealing with economic questions that 
the action of such a union as is contemplated is likely to be the most 
successful-the first ste .p 
in obtaining a pro er recognition of the vital importapce of science in all departments of nation@ life must consist in ýectknng conditions for scientific work which will attract the best brains in the countrv. and command respect in a community which 
tends to regard weaJtfi as a measure of worth. " 
In so saying, the Manifesto pinpointed what was common to all the schemes of professional 
and economic organisation that we have examined above. Economic and social status, 
though important in its own right, was also regarded as another key to help unlock the door 
of policy influence. As such it was a part of the wider campaign of public science to 
consolidate the wartime gains of science. 
However, the NUSW leadership and some of its membership, desired a much more 
open campaign to influence policy. These desires were infori-ned by their left-wing ideology. 
Many of the leaders were socialists and believed that only in a socialist Britain would 
scientists be able to achieve their deserved influence in national affairs. "' But in the social 
82 The original circular letter was reprinted in Nature. 'A Scientific Research Associatioe, Vol. 102,28 November 
1918, pp. 254-5. It seems that the title of the organisation had now been changed to omit the word 'Workers' with its 
trade union connotations. 
83 Association of Scientific Workers Archives, Mss. Franklin Kidd (10/01/18) probably by J. W. Evans, geologist and 
early active member or NUSW and lecturer in Petrology at Birk-beck, College 1906-20 and at imperial College, 1912-27, 
President 1919-20. Quoted from Roy and Kay MacLeod, ne Contradictions of Professionalism: Scientists, Trade 
Unionism and the First World War, Social Studies of Science, Vol. 9 No. 1 (1979), pp. 1-32-, P. 12 94 'Me first Treasurer, Norman Campbell, and Hyman Levy (member of the Executive 1922-3) were socialists. "Me 
Fisheries Inspector and technical adviser Lyster Jameson (member of the 1919-20 Executive), and the Cambridge 
botanist and editor of Labour Monthh-, Clemens Dutt OAto was one of the firsl signatories of the original SWRA 
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and political climate of the early twenties, such an underlying agenda caused great tensions 
within the union. Many of its members wanted nothing to do with such an ideological 
agenda or direct political action. " It was partly such unease at the real nature of the 
organisation which kept its membership throughout the 1920s disappointingly low and led, 
in 1927, to a change of name and an abandonment of trade union status. The NUSW 
became the Association of Scientific Workers, and until the 1930s, when it became an 
important vehicle for socialist scientists like J. D. Bernal, it adopted a more moderate and 
straightforwardly professional functiorL 
3.2.3 CONSOLIDAnNG THE CONTROL OF RESEARCH IN THE HANDS OF SCIENTISTS 
The other perceived major threat to the position that science had achieved 
during the war was the problem of lay administrative control of research. This 
constituted a threat in three related ways. Firstly lay control threatened to negate the 
direction of science policy by scient ists, through the control of research agendas 
and funding. Secondly it was a threat to the professional status of scientists: if 
science was to be defined by the State's generalist bureaucrats, then scientists had 
lost control even of the area of their own specialist professional competence. This 
posed a much more fundamental third problem. If the content of science was defined 
by the State, public scientists feared that only applied research would be done. This 
threatened the continued existence of the scientific method itself, which was believed 
circular, and who remained a NUSW member until 1926), were Guild Socialists. Jameson arranged for union meetings 
to be advertised in the Guildsman. The industrial research chemist Alfred Bacharach was a member and Secretary of 
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Provisional Executive, became a radical socialist during the war, and contributed to The Guildsman. For Biographical 
details we MacLeods, 'Contradictions or Professionalism ... 1,2g. cit, 
NUSW, Annual Rgp2rts and RgR2rts of AGM o 
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Rectorial contest of 1921, losing to the Unionist candidate, Sir Robert Home. See 'Me Lord Rector, magazine of the 
Aberdeen Univeristy Labour Club, No. 1(19 October 1921) andNo. 2 ((November 1921). Safety F the organ of the 
University Unionist Association, sent him up in a poem as 'the Bolshie scientisVMe Labour Party call their King', and 
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to reside primarily in pure research, precisely because there were no a pri . ori 
conclusions about results. Although the scientif: method was and is largely a 
mythical construction of the scientific community to serve its own profesional and 
political ends, it was precisely for this reason that public scientists could not allow it 
to be publicly compromised. As we have noted throughout, this method, and the 
assumption of its transferability to policy problems, was the very basis of scientists' 
claims to influence policy. This is why the debate about the control of research was 
so crucially important. It may seem like a diminution of the earlier calls for influence 
over general policy, but it was in fact a feature of the success of public science, and 
an attempt to deal with the concomitant problems of that success. 
But there was another reason why the control of research was so important 
which further explains the moderation of public science's claims for policy influence, 
and instead this concentration on professional issues. M. D. King has argued that 
between the wars, scientists faced a 'professional dilemma'. "' The existence of a 
national science policy meant that scientists became increasingly involved in 
administration. King argues that scientists were now faced for the first time with a 
tension between their new status and their professional identity. To protect their 
status they needed influence, at least over science policy. But this influence would 
threaten their professional identity as objective scientists. I would add to King's 
argument that this was again a threat to the credibility of the scientific method, and 
thus, ultimately, to the legitimacy of their claims for policy influence. The result was 
a further hardening of the resolve of scientists in general, and particularly of public 
scientists,, to, focus on more narrow professional concerns. Wider influence over 
general policy would too clearly call into question their professional identity, and it 
became, along with too obvious pofitical affiliation, a highly controversial and 
potentially divisive issue, Even in the debate about the control of research, scientists 
were, in fact, caught in a cleft- stick. They had to have control to protect their 
professional status, their access to channels of policy influence, and the very 
86 
, ocial Sciences Surym M. D. King 'Science and the Professional Dilcmrna, pp. 34-73 in I Goifld (ed. ), Penggin 126_8, (Harmondsworth, 1968) 
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ideological basis of these claims: the scientific method. But control brought 
immersion in administrative tasks and political decisions, wl&h were themselves a 
threat to the objectivity of science, the basis of their claim to power. 
The debate about lay control of science policy had two levels. First there was 
the issue of whether generalist politicians and civil servants were fit persons to make 
broad science policy. This resulted in familiar criticisms of the shortcomings of party 
politicians, and calls for reform of the educational curriculum and the structure of 
the Civil Service to incorporate expertise in science. The focus was on ensuring that 
government policy for science contained adequate provision for pure as well as 
applied research. This new focus was essentially a question of professional 
autonomy. For the scientists, applied research was a cipher for the subordination of 
scientific to lay authority. Pure research was a cipher for the control of research by 
scientists. Criticisms of lay control of research priorities were centred on, as one 
would expect, the activities of the DSK the main source of govenunent funded, 
mainly civilian research. On the more micro level, there was criticism in the lay 
administration of applied research in government departments, of which the passing 
of the National Physical Laboratory from the control of the Royal Society to that of 
the DSIR in 1920 was an example. The proposed solutions to the problems of both 
policy and administration were a civil service with more scientists in it; control of 
government scientific departments byý scientists, and some kind of advisory scientific 
body, representative of the wider scientific community, not just the elite societies, to 
help direct research. Calls for scientific influence over more general policy issues 
continued in the back-ground but were no longer the chief public concerns of either 
the Reformist or the Radical branches of public science. 
Richard Gregory combined these criticisms of policy and administration as 
early as 1919 in an essay in Nature on 'The Promotion of Research'. " After charting 
the rise of government science policy in terms of funding, he noted that the tendency 
of governments was to foster applied science, and argued that pure research 'on the 
borderlands of science' had led to the discoveries which had been of most 
87 Gregory, 'The Promotion of Research' , one of a number of essays on current themes for Nature! s 
Fiftieth Jubilee 
Issue, 6 November 1919, Vol. 104, pp. 259-61. 
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commercial and industrial use. Scientists, he argued, should not only be provided 
, Arith 'full facilities', but should also be granted: 
freedom to follow what seem to them the most promising 
paths of investigation. A scientific research laboratory cannot 
be conducted on the lines of a business house in which each 
department has to justify its existence by profitable returns. It 
must be independent of its patron, whether this be 
represented by a State department or by a governing body of 
commercial men. 
Gregory continued, borrowing an exaggerated illustration from President Maclaurin 
of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which still resonates today: 
The superintendent of buildings and grounds, or other 
competent authority, calls upon Mr. Newton. 
Superintendent: Your theory of gravitation is hanging fire 
unduly. The director insists upon a finished report, filed in his 
office by 9 a. m. Monday next; summarised on one page; 
typewritten, and the main points underlined. Also a careful 
estimate of the cost per student-hour. 
Newton- But there is one difficulty which has been puzzling 
me for fourteen years, and I am not quite... 
Superintendent: (with snap and vigour). Guess you had 
better overcome that difficulty by Monday morning or quit. " 
The scientific community's fears about lay administrative control of research 
crystallised in early 1920 around the appointment of the non-scientific American 
R-L. Frink as director of the Glass Research Association of the DSIR. The first shot 
seems to have been fired in a letter to Natu from the chemist, Morris William 
Travers. " He attacked Frink for having only practical experience of the glass 
industry and no experience of scientific research, and argued that he was thus 
unqualified for his new post. Travers' more general point was about science's loss of 
control of research in the modem state to lay bureaucrats. He argued that it was 
time scientists were more aware of developments and made some response: 
It has not been sufficiently clearly realised that scientific and industrial research is passing out of the control of the 
recognised scientific and technical societies and institutions 
and of the universities into the hands of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, and, in accordance with 
98 All quotations above from Ibid. p. 261, 
89 1872-1961, chemist and biographer of Sir WiRiam Ramsay (1956). 
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government policy, the secretary of this Department [Frank 
Heath) is an administrator without practical knowledge of 
science, industry, or research. The associations which are 
formed under the aegis of the Department are governed by 
councils upon which organised science is unrepresented .... As the Department controls funds for research which are vastly 
greater than those at the disposal of the Royal Society and all 
the other societies and universities put together, the outlook 
for science is a poor one unless scientific men are prepared to 
take united action with the view of securing a proper share in 
the control of research. 9" 
During the early months of 1920, the debate about the control of research 
widened. Government plans to re-org . anise the organisation of scientific research in 
India sparked a long running controversy in the editorial and letters columns of 
Nature. It was feared that the report of the Indian Industrial Commission, presided 
over by Sir Thomas Holland, formerly Director of the Geological Survey of India, 
would be accepted as the basis for future policy. This strongly advocated 
centralisation of research under a new Imperial Department of Industries of the 
Government of India, with the different sciences formed into water-tight units under 
an administrative head. Nature supported the old de-centralised system of research 
in which 'the man is everything' and asserted that: 
For original scientific investigators little or no official control 
is needed, and they should not be constantly called upon to 
furnish interim reports and programmes of work to an official 
chief, or to obtain his formal sanction before undertaldng an 
investigation or publishing the results of their work. Such 
formalities waste valuable time, lead to constant ffiction, and 
are contrary to the spirit which should reign in aH centres of 
creative scientific research. 91 
In a letter replying to this editorial Frederick Soddy put his finger on the reason why 
Indian scientific research was such a burning issue to the British scientific 
community- - 
The proposals to centralise under the control of a few official departmental 
heads the body of actual scientific investigators in India, thus creating a few 
highly paid administrative posts for senior men and effectually Bling all 
initiative, enthusiasm, and liberty of action on the part of those actually 
carrying on the investigations, is perfectly in accord with what has happened in this country since, mi evil day, the Government assumed the control of 
scientific and industrial research. 
90 M. W. Travers, letter to ! Lature, 'the Control Of Scientific and Industrial ResearcY, pp. 597-8, Nature, Vol. 104,5 
February 1920. Quotation from p. 598. 91 Nature unsigned leading editorial, Me Organisation of Scientific Work- in India', pp. 6534, Vol. 104,19 Februwy 
1920. Quotation from p. 634. 
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Both the DSIR and the Indian proposals, Soddy feared, meant that research was to 
be controlled by know-nothing bureaucrats. This was the original problem which 
scientists had hoped the establishment of the DSIR would correct: 
The men who do the work-are to be deRrived even of what 
little satisfaction and independence genuine scientific work 
for its own sake affords, and are to be put under the men 
against whose incompetence and lack of knowledge the 
whole uproar originaDy arose .... under men who brought an Empire, as rich in scientific talent and genius as any, 
perilously low. [i. e. during the early part of the war). "2 
Soddy spoke with the voice of the Radical section of public scientists: he 
was a leading member of the NUSXV. Mixed in with the fear of lay control was a 
desire for radical trade union-style action by scientists to protect the scientific 
worker not only from lay control but from exclusion from influence on 'national life' 
by the traditional scientific elite. Soddy criticised the effete traditional scientific 
societies for their inaction and urged 'combined energetic action' from 'the rank, and 
file of research workers throughout the Empire'. There was here an undertone of 
guild socialism: the control of industry by its workers. The NUSW sent protesting 
letters to the Glass Research Association and to the DSIR over the Frink 
appointment, and sent two, unsuccessful, deputations, one to Balfour as Lord 
President of the Privy CounciL still the nominal head of the DSK and one to Heath. 
The former refused even to see them. 
It was one of the Union's stated aims to ensure that all government scientific 
and technical departments were under the direct control of scientists. Its official 
repose to the Frink case was expressed in a letter to Nature from its Secretary, 
Major A. G. Church. The union stood against recent trends to bring businessmen into 
government, and for expert control of science policy: 
It is thý opinion of the National Union of Scientific Workers 
that it is the subordination of the scientific worker to the "business man" which has been chiefly responsible in the past for the tardy development of scientific industry in this 
country. It feels that this appointment negatives the aims 
outlined by the Department, and that the whole industry will 
suffer from the consequent neglect of the scientific aspects of 
glass research work and from the unwillingness of scientific 
workers to submit to such chrection. 93 
9-' Soddy, letter to Nature 'Organisation of Scientific Work-% Vol. 104,26 February 1920, p-691. 93 Letter to-Na! ELe from A. G. Church, *Scientific Direction of IndustrW Research!, pp. 40-1, Vol. 105,11 March 1920, 
p. 41. 
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At an NUSW public meeting on 28 April chaired by H. G. Wells, Soddy 
attacked both the running of the Research Associations and the DSIR. The money 
allocated by the DSIR to the Research Associations was in the form of a capital 
grant, over which Parliament had no jurisdiction. It was used to fund secretive 
bodies which served neither the public nor science, but only the private monopolies 
of a, capitalist industry. Soddy demanded that representatives both of trained 
scientific workers and of organised labour should be included in the councils and 
executive committees of the research associations. He also urged that the Advisory 
Council of the DSIR- should contain NUSW representatives, rather than other 
scientific members, and that it should become the controlling body of the 
Department. ' This debate was continued at the annual general meeting of the union 
in November. Soddy repeated his proposals and a member of the Executive, Alan 
Arnold Griffith, suggested that the Advisory Council be reconstituted as a new 
body, 'one half of which is nominated by the Government ... and the other 
half elected 
by the Trade Unions representative of Scientific workers'. He added that no 
resolution of the new Council should be valid unless it got a majority 'on each side 
of the council'. The details of this scheme were left to be drawn up more fully by the 
union' s Research Committee. "' However such moves seem to have caused division 
within the ranks of the NUSW. Some members disliked a strategy which was so 
openly politically motivated and associated with the politics of labour, and the 
proposal seems to have been quietly dropped. 96 
MeanwhBe the Reformist public scientists had made their own contribution 
to the debate about the control of research. An anonymous leading editorial in May 
had suggested that the Royal Society's Conjoint Board of Scientific Societies be 
used as a 'Haison officer' between the DSIR and the scientific societies, and should 
share decisions about what research was to be done with the ACSIR. This was a less 
radical and more emollient suggestion than the NUSWs, but it was meant to answer 
the same perceived problem. It was a way of giving the wider scientific community 
94 Report of NUSW meeting at Birkbeck- College, London, 28 April 1920. Soddy spoke on 'The Public Support of 
Scientific Resear&. Nature, Vol. 105,6 May 1920, pp. 309-10. 95 See NUSW Annual Rc= (Including Rg= of of Couricil), AGM held on 13 November 1920, p. 54. 96 See Kay MacLeod, 'Politics, Professionalisation and the Organisation of Scientists..., pp. cit. pp. 180-1. 
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(and not just the eminent Fellows of the Royal Society who made up the ACSIR) 
more control over science policy. It was emollient because it worked within the 
terms of the Royal Society model for the organisation of science, which was 
identified in the previous chapter. Thus though it asked the DSIR to make the Board 
part of its administrative machinery, it was to serve in a 'consultative capacity, 
without ... any executive 
functions'. ' Another contribution from Nature was a 
suggestion for Civil Service reform to give more power to scientists. An editorial 
probably written by Gregory himself, complained that while in industry and 
commerce the technical expert was respected, in government departments the 
technical staffs had too little or authority, while the clerical staff had too much of 
both. The expert in government had: 
been relegated to a position in which his every purpose is rendered 
more or less ineffectual ... 
[and] 
.... in which the exercise of 
his 
legitimate activities is barely tolerated by those occupying the clerical 
or controlling positions. " 
The e4l6al stressed that it was time that, 
... the modem technical expert ... be assigned his place of precedence there, and at the same time ... have the scope of his authority and the dignity of his status definitely determined and unequivocably declared. " 
The editorial ended calling again for the reform of the civil service. It criticised the 
privileged class' of those in the top administrative grade, and demanded that they 
should serve their time in departments at a lower executive level, leaming their 
trade, before being promoted into the administrative grade and control of that 
department. Such a reform would have led to more members of the technical staff 
being in administrative control of technical departments. Thus the argument here 
was not only about status, but also about access to policy influence. 
This point was confirmed in two letters to Nature in April which were 
prompted by this editorial. The writer of the first argued that experts in the Civil 
Service, who were there primarily to advise the government on the basis of their 
expertise, should not be insulated from the Minister by more senior Civil Servants 
91 See 'The Federation of Science, unsigned leader, Nature, Vol. 105,13 May 1920, pp. 317-8. 98 See the first page of the leading editorial 'Knowledge and Power, Nature, ýVol. 105,25 March 1920, pp. 93-5. 99 Ibid. 
114 
who were generalist. Rather there should be a separate organisation for policy 
advice, and administration of that policy: 
Somehow or other an advisory side for formulating policy ought to 
be organised on different lines from those of the administrative side 
which carries out the policy. But if there is a separate organisation on 
the technical side it ought to have direct access to the Minister finally 
responsible, and not be fenced off from him by a secretariat trained 
on different lines. There are sure to be misunderstandings and 
ultimate despair if all the work of a professional technical staff has to 
pass upwards and downwards through the refracting and distorting 
medium of an inexpert secretariat. The scheme of organisation must 
be in sectors reaching continuously from the Ministerial centre to the 
circle of recruitment. The technical staff itself will want the assistance 
of 'civil servants' content to follow out the policy which is indicated. 
The mischief begins when the Civil Service forms a complete belt in 
the inner regions of the organisation. In that case an inexpert 
Minister is completely surrounded by inexpert advisers, and then 
power is cut off from knowledge. " 
The second letter, from J. W. Evans, a member of the NIJSW, heartily agreed with 
the original editorial stating that: 
It rightly emphasises the need that the ultimate administrative 
authority should be vested in men with technical knowledge and 
experience, and not in Civil Service officials appointed originally ... on the basis of purely fiterary attainments. 'O' 
This letter continued, arguing that the only way that this end could be achieved was 
by ensuring that scientists enjoyed pay and prospects commensurate with the 
importance of their work. The only way that this importance would be realised was 
via a 'propaganda' campaign to educate the public. Such a campaign, as we have 
seen, was indeed being undertaken specifically for this ultimate purpose of ensuring 
that scientists wielded authority in matters of policy. 
3.2 REFORNUSTS AND RADICALS: POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES AND TIHE 
MEANS TO POWER. 
The themes of public science after the war and in the 'twenties discussed in detail 
above, were common to the whole community of public science, and were informed by the 
common context of contemporary concerns. However, as already indicated, by the end of 
the war two groupings were beginning to emerge within the scientific community: 
Reformists and Radicals. These, as yet loose, groupings are identifiable not through any 
differences in their rhetorical thernes, but only in the political agendas which their rhetoric 
100 'Knowledge and Power, letter to Nature from T. O. 1% vol. 105,8 April 1920, p. 165. 101 Letter to Nature from J-W. Evans, Ibid. 
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supported. Reformists sought a gradual accumulation of power within the existing political 
system; Radicals sought a socialist revolution and new technocratic forms of government. 
Most of the old ýLature/BSG camp were Reformists, and the Radicals were epitomised by 
the nucleus of the NUSW and individuals closely linked to it like Soddy and Levy. NNhile the 
arguments of the Reformists began to run out of steam during the mid to late 'twenties 
(having seen most of their gradualist demands satisfied by the retention of the new wartime 
system for the organisation of science), the Radicals were just finding their voice. -It was as 
i& with their more radical demands, they still had something to say; something to campaign 
for. Thus the BSG, as was noted, became increasingly unsure of the relevance of its 
continuing mission. This was reflected in a drop-off in its membership and in avaHable 
funds, inspite of several attempts to re-invent itself in the'twenties. "2 
In September 1920, Soddy railed against the reluctance of the BAAS to take the 
lead in questions of the social relations of science, as Lockyer had done in 1903. Soddy here 
took the view that science was generally perceived to be the only force which could save 
society from war and economic depression. He argued that , the vast 
body of the general 
public, disillusioned by the war, looks to ... [scientific men] to provide a way of escape 
from 
the evils that threaten our civilisatiorf. " The BAAS, he complained, gave the public no 
sense that the scientific community realised, 'the position science now holds in the 
communitý, and was making 'no attempt ... to take the position already conceded 
by the 
general public to the spirit and service of science as almost the only disinterested and 
effective agency in a cannibalistic and corrupt society'. 11 Soddy was clear that rather than 
just being an opportunity to advance the claims of a few new research proposals for public 
money, and to see a new city, the function of the Association should be the %public 
application of science': 
Tlis scientific synthesis and the direction of the unique mental attitude, induced only by the actual discovery of new knowledge, to the conduct of 
public affairs are the real and peculiar functions of the Association if it is to 
regain its national position. 'O' 
I W2 See the Guil(Ts Journal for this period. A useful account is also contained in MacLrod, 'Science for hnperial 
Efficiency... ', M&Jý. t. pp. 176-82. 1 03 Frede'nick Soddy, p. I 11, letter to Nature Vol. 106,23 September 1920, p. 111-2. 104 Thid. 
105 aid., p. 112. 
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Soddy was also clear about the scope of the power scientists should enjoy. The new 
organisation of science was not enough. Here non-scientists were in control: 'The public, if 
not scientific men, know that scientific government is inconceivable without scientific men 
at the head of affairs. " As Soddy went on to say: 
It is not too much to say that whole fields of government in the real sense, 
which is not the conventional sense of party politics, now fall wholly within 
the ascertained realm of science. A remark of Mr. H. G. Wells from his 
Outline of History concermng ethnologists, geographers, and sociologists 
may be generalised. All the monstrous turmoil and waste, the w8derful 
attitudes, deeds and schemes of the 'great men' deemed famous ýy the 
unscientific historian, might very well be avoided if Europe had the sense to 
instruct a small body of ordinarily honest scientific men to take over the 
work. " 
The comparison with Lock-yer here is informative. The Radicals were now beginning 
to define a new public science, just as he had done in 1903. A new period of public science 
was commencing, though this time the inspiration was more socialist than social-imperialist. 
This development was made even more exphcit in a letter to Nature from the NUSW 
executive endorsing Soddy's criticisms -of the BAAS, in mid-November. The letter 
summoned up the ghost of T. H. Huxley, arguing that such a clear public science cause as he 
had championed was again needed now. It is interesting to observe that here, talking 
amongst themselves in the letter columns of Nature the scientists (unlike most recent 
historians) understood clearly that science, as a social activity, had long produced a rhetoric 
aimed at winning it. social and cultural authority. If science was to win for itself a place in 
the public estimation such as it had enjoyed in the last century under Huxley, it had to have 
a challenging new theme suited to the changed contemporary concems. The BAAS and 
other bodies representing organised science had to: 
... come out with a new message which, Eke that of Huxley and his contemporaries, chaDenges old-established points of view .... While Huxley's message forced people to revise their old-established ideas and prejýdices as 
to man in his relations to his natural environment, the pubfic is now npe for a 
lead from science in the direction of a fundamental revision of that part of its 
outlook on life which concerns the relations of man to the social and 
economic environment which he has created. " 
Radical public scientists wanted the formahsed and centralised political power to control 
and direct the social uses of science along a liberal, pacific path. They also felt that only 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Letter to Nature from leading members of the NUSW executive (J. W. Evans, President; H. Lyster Jameson, 
member of executive; and A. G. Church, Secretary), Vol. 106,18 November 1920, p. 373. 
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scientists could devise the new mechanisms of governance necessary. As members of the 
NUSW executive spelt out in a letter to Nature, at the end of July 1921: 
How can scientific workers coflectively obtain such control of the product of 
their work - new knowledge - as to secure that it shall be used for the development of a better order of society out of the existing chaos? Science - knowledge - alone can create thýis new order and save Europe from relapsing into barbarism. " 
Soddy himself was soon to go even further in providing a justification for scientific 
technocracy. While other Radicals argued that the scientific method was the only remaining 
guarantee of both certainty and morality, Soddy argued that the content2- as well as the 
method of science made it uniquely qualified to make policy. In a series of lectures 
criticising the prevailing economic system as wasteful of the potential material benefits to 
society which science could generate by perverting science into mutual destructon, he 
equated wealthwith energy, and concluded that the same scientific laws governed both. "' 
However, during the 'twenties, the Radicals stopped short of publicly demanding the 
kind of scientific technocracy they clearly desired. As was noted above, such a radical 
political aim was mistrusted, and thus divisive, in the context of widespread scientific apathy 
and conservatism, partly caused, as we observed, by a narrower, introspective focus on 
consolidating wartime gains. It was not until the changed circumstances of the 'thirties, 
when socialism was recieving a better press, that Soddy, for instance, felt free openly to 
demand government by scientists. In 1935 he argued that it was time for the public to 
acknowledge that science was the real master in modem society, and to: '... insist on being 
109 'Science and Civilisation!, letter to Nature from NUSW executive (this time signed by J. Henderson Smith, 
Chairman of the executive and Church), Vol. 107,28 July 192 1, p. 684. 110 Two lectures were given to the Students'Union of Biik-beck- College and the London School of Economics on 10 and 
17 November 1921. These were published as, Cartesian Economics: the Bearing of Phvsical Science ujLon Stat 
Stewardshil2, (London, Hendcrsons, 1922). Ile arguments were then developed in a lecture at Guild House on 29 
November 1923 entitled, and published as, The Inversion_of Science: and a Scheme of Scientific Reformatio , (London, Hendersons, 1924). See also the report of these in NagjL e, Vol. 112,8 December 1923, p. 839. There is currently no 
good biography of Soddy (although one is in the final stages of preparation from Linda MerTicks of Sussex University). 
The following are of use: Soddy, Science and Life: Aberdeen Addresseq. (London, John Murray, 1920); A. Fleck, 
'Frederick SoddV Biographical Memoirs of Fellon's of the Roval Society Vol. 3, (1957), pp. 203-16; Muriel Howorth, 
Pioneer Researcb-on the Atom- the Life Story of Frederick SoddNý (London, New World Publications, 1958); M. I. 
Freedman, 'Frederick Soddy and the Practical Significance of Radioactive Mattee, British Journal for the Histgr_%, o 
Science, Vol. 12 (1979), pp. 257-60; T. J. Trcrm, 'The Central Role of Energy in Soddy's Holistic and Critical Approach 
to Nuclear Science, Economics and Social Responsibility', hLid, pp. 261-76; A. D. Cruickshank-, *Soddy at Ox-forix, Kid,. 
pp. 277-88; Kenneth R. Page, 'Frederick Soddy: the Aberdeen Interlude, pS, -. 
6t., (1979); George B. Kauffman (ed), 
Frederick Soddy (19-77-19ift (Dordrecht, Re; del, 1986); M. Davies, 'Frederick Soddy: the Scientist as Prophet', 
Annals of Science, Vol. 49, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 351-67. 
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ruled not by the reflection of a reflection [traditional politicians], but direct by those who 
are concerned with the creation of its wealth rather than of its debts'. "' 
The Reformists were also calling for a new message to inspire public science in the 
early 'twenties. Such calls played on the same rhetorical themes as those of the Radicals, but 
supported a much less extreme political goal. Gregory was the leading exponent of the 
Reformist rhetoric in the early 'twenties. He shared the Radicals' distrust of the existing 
democratic constitution, believing with them that it would pervert the course of scientific 
discovery and make the world 'a place of dust and ashes'. "2 However, though Gregory 
called for scientific men to 'exert direct influence in the State', '" he did not want them to 
become any more concerned with politics than they already were. Instead he called for a 
new breed of pubUc scientist to broadcast the importance of science to the nation. He 
argued that: 'Science needs champions and advocates in addition to actual makers of new 
knowledge and exponents of it'. "' He called for lesser members of local scientific societies 
to become these new 'Sir Galahads' or 'knights of science', and to turn the societies into a 
national network of pressure groups publicly urging the national importance of science. This 
strategy was echoed in the new campaign of the BSG in 1921-2, which, as has already been 
noted above, sought to extend the Guild into the provinces. "' However, Gregory himself 
seems to have been confused as to the exact role of these new champions of science. In a 
leading editorial in Nature, in December 1922, which was also an advertisement for the 
Guild's new campaign, he repeated his call for scientific champions. However, he now made 
it clear that these were not to be scientists (who should not 'seek to get into the limelight or 
take part in the turmoil of politics, being, 'much better employed in the laboratory than in 
Parliament) but non-scientists: 
What are wanted ... are advocates of science and scientific method - men and women who know the disinterested spint in which purely scientific enquiries 
are carried on and desire to introduce into social and political discussions the 
same impartial attitude towards evidence and fearless judgement upon it. "" 
111 Soddy, p. 24, Toreword' to ne Frustration of Science, (1935). Cited here as reproduced in G. B. Kauffman (ed), 
Frederick_Soddy (1877-1956), p2 cit, pp. 234. 11 , Gregory, p. 533, 'The Message of Science!, abridged version of Presidential Address delivered to the Conference of 
Delegates of CorTesponding Societies of the BAAS at Edinburgh, 8 September, as reproduced in Nature Vol. 108,22 
December 1921, pp. 533-7. 
113 Gregory, in an address to the Cambridge branch of the NUSW on 16 November entitled 'Scientific Men as 
Citizens'. See the report in Nature, Di 
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GTegory, *TlkeMessagcofScicnee, 92S. Lt, p. 534. 
See the Guilds Lo-to--al, Nos. 14 (October 192 1), and IS (May 1922) passim. 116 Gregory, p. 798, leading editorial 'Science and the Empire,, HatjLe, Vol. I 10.16 December 1922, pp. 797-8. 
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All the mission of these new champions amounted to was a publicity campaign for 
science. It was in this spirit that Gregory welcomed the election of Church, the NUSW 
Secretary, as Member of Parliament for Leyton in 1923. He was: 'exactly the type which we 
want to have, a man of affairs who would represent scientific workers, with knowledge 
himself of scientific worle. "' 
TheReformists, then, seemed uncertain of exactly what they wanted in the early 
'twenties. A possible explanation for their confusion is suggested by Werskey in his work on 
the'thirties. In this period the Reformists were very concerned about the control of research 
by the State, particularly in the light of the use of science by the German State. What we 
may be observing in the early 'twenties are the roots of this position. All public scientists, 
both Reformist and Radical, were concerned that scientists should control research, both to 
protect science as a profession and to keep open the new channels to policy-making (gained 
during the war), but also to protect society from the misuse of science. But how best to 
achieve this goal? By the early 'twenties the Reformists, who were not motivated by a 
revolutionary political agenda, believed it was unwise to get any closer to the State, lest this 
hand the State further opportunities for controlling science. In essence, the Reformists, with 
their moderate ideological motivation, were caught in M. D. King's professional dilemma. 
The Radicals, on the other hand, - motivated by a more extreme and -socialist ideological 
position, wanted a scientific technocracy for exactly the same reasons. Only scientists could 
protect science and thus guide society along the right path. 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
Public science spent much of the post-war period dealing with the consequences of 
the war. Firstly there were the implications of the Royal Society model for influence over 
policy-making, now genarally accepted by scientists and the State as their new relationship. 
If State bodies were to organise science then there was the possibility of State interference 
in the content and nature of science. Thus one of the main themes in public science became 
the control of research. Similarly a product of the war was the popular association of 
science with destructive ends. This perception of public concern was strengthened by the 
unease that many scientists themselves felt at their role in the war. Thus another theme was 
117 Gregory in an address to the NUSW in 1923, cited from Armytage, 2R. cit., p. 96. 
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rehabilitating the public image of science: associating it with the new popular desire for the 
arts of Peace. Wartime experiences had also had a further influence: they had inculcated a 
sense of solidarity in the scientific community. This expressed itself in the establishment of 
new professional and trades union bodies to protect and advance wartime gains in the area 
of pay and prospects. 
These wartime legacies preoccupied public science in the 'twenties and it might seem 
that the question of policy influence was edged into the background. However, I argue that 
these new concerns were all fundamentally linked to this central aim. The wartime gains of 
science had to be first consolidated by deflecting these possible problems, before any further 
headway could be made in terms of policy influence. Furthermore these post-war problems 
(combined with the political atmosphere of retrenchment and cautious reaction) tended to 
engender a sense of political apathy in the scientific community as a whole. In this climate it 
was difficult to press for increased influence, even if there had not been other concerns. 
However, as well as the common rhetoric of consolidation of wartime gains in 
policy influence, the post-war years were also marked by the beginnings of a bifurcation of 
the rhetoric of public science along ideological lines on the question of the most effective 
way to protect scientists' new position. Reformists wanted to follow the implications of the 
Royal society model of using existing (or easily integratable new) institutional mechanisms 
to protect and add to the power they enjoyed. In this sense they had acquired a new 
awareness of what kind of power was politically possible, given the culture of the British 
State towards outside expertise. Radicals shared the same fears and much of the same 
rhetoric, but were prepared to continue campaigns for a scientific technocracy as the best 
way to protect both science and society. They were still as politically naive about what was 
possible as Edwardian scientists had been. Thus by the early'twenties the Radicals appear to 
be'the inheritors of Lockyers vision of an executive national council of science, although 
their public science arguments now supported a very different ideological version of the 
national good. It was this new socialist version, informed by wartime experiences, which 
was to dominate public science until after the Second World War, although the roots of 
Polyani's reaction to it can also be identified in the fears of the Reformists. "' 
its On later developments see. Werskey, Visible C se and Rose, Science and Socie! x 2p. cit. -, QU. e,,, e, w. cit.., passim; 
Ro 
especially pp. 54-7; and Roy and Kay MacLeM, 'The Social Relations of science and Technology 1914-1939, 
especially pp. 341-54. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FOOD FOR THOUGHT?: PUBLIC SCIENCE AND THE RELATIONS 
BETWEEN THE ROYAL SOCIETY FOOD CONMTTEES AND 
GOVERNNIENT DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR' 
The previous three chapters have charted in detail the evolution of public science 
arguments within the natural scientific community from the Edwardian period into the mid 
twenties. They have demonstrated that such arguments changed over time as they were 
informed, and sought to utilise, changing public concerns. Such arguments were also 
modified, as was-illustrated, to take account of the gradually increasing degree of influence 
accorded to outside scientific expertise in the policy process, and the means by which this 
was accomplished. We noted that what became the dominant Royal Society model of 
influence pushed for formalisation as far as was acceptable to the Society, and politically 
possible given the attitude of the State towards policy-influence for outside experts. After 
this point informal channels were resorted to to obtain even more influence. But how did the 
desire for input into policy, expressed in those public science arguments, influence individual 
scientists in their (increasingly frequent) dealings with the State? This chapter is intended to 
answer this question and presents a case study of scientists' (and one economist's) use of 
public science in context. In it I will examine chronologically the course of the relationship 
between the various incarnations'of the Food Committee of the Royal Society and central 
government during the First World War. 
The War suggests itself as the key moment in my period to examiine the relations 
between outside experts and government because, as was noted above, it provided scientists 
orms a with many new channels of access to government. The area of food policy f 
particularly neglected area in these, under-researched, relations between experts and 
government in wartime Britain. 2 Although various studies have examined food policy, and 
some have examined the role of the Royal Society committees, none has explored what the 
1 As well as, of course, acknowledging the help of my supervisors in -, vfiting this chapter, I would also like to 
thank David Smith, Wellcome Lecturer in the lEstory of Medicine, Aberdeen University, whose comments on 
an early draft were particularly useful. 
See Chapter Two, footnote 2 for a list of some of the most recent literature in this area, and its shortcomings. 
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aims of the scientists themselves were in becoming involved in government policy. 3 
Furthermore, it is particularly worth studying as no institutional mechanisms for a 
government controlled domestic food policy existed before the war. As Beveridge later 
pointed out the 'War Book' contained only one measure on food: a requirement on 
Employment Exchange managers to communicate information on the prices of a range of 
basic goods to the Board of Trade. 4 This lack of institutional precedent, and (thus) of vested 
departmental interests, added to the fact that the concerns of food policy were easily 
presentable as essentially based on scientific considerations, made this an area in which 
scientists could legitimately hope to manoeuvre themselves into positions of influence over 
policy. Accordingly, in this chapter I will demonstrate that in relations with the Board of 
Trade, the Ministry of Food and the War Cabinet (through Lloyd George's Secretariat) the 
group of eminent scientists involved continually pressed for a formalisation of the relationship 
of their committee with government. 
But it was not just scientists who were involved in such moves. The Food committees 
of the Royal Society, as well as including many of the foremost contemporary physiologists 
and some agriculturalists, also included an eminent economist: William James Ashley. Ashley 
was then Professor of Commerce at Birmingham, but was primarily an economic historian. 
Educated at Oxford in history, he had been greatly influenced by Arnold Toynbee, and 
though not a socialist, he retained a lifelong commitment to social reform and the perfection 
of State institutions by which to achieve it. For Ashley, the professional economist defined 
himself by his actions in the public domain, and he saw the war as the opportunity to achieve 
meaningffil influence. As such Ashley presents a contrast with the dominant Marshallian 
School of British economics,, which, as will be explored in detail in chapter five, was coming 
to define the role of the professional economist (at least in the short term) as one actively 
distanced from public entanglements with policy issues. Ashley, like the scientists, openly 
propounded a positive public science, and in his activities with the food committees he will be 
The existing secondary fiterature on experts and government food policy largely consists of L. Margarct 
Barnett, British Food Poligy During the First World W. (Boston, George Allen and Unwin, 1985Y, M. Teich, 
'Scientists and Food Policy in Britain and Germany, 1992, to be included in a forthcoming collection, (I am 
indebted to the author for an advance copy); and J. G. Stark, 'British Food policy and Diet in World War One', 
(London School of Economics, Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, 1984). There is also Jose Harris' 'Bureaucrats and 
,o on 
Georg Alen Businessmen in British Food Control, 1916-19', in K Burk (ed. ) War and thej-, tate (L nd ,eI 
and Unwin, 1982). Butý as the title suggests, this assumes there are only two types of players jockeying for 
influence over food policy. 4 W. H. Beveridge, British Food Control (London, OUp, 1928), p. 5. 
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seen to argue with the scientists for fonnalised influence over policy. This, then, is a further 
reason for concentrating on the food committees: they show that it was not only scientists, 
but also a certain type of economist, who were pressing for formalisation. As such this case- 
study also forms a bridge between the two expert groups considered in this thesis. 
As David Smith has recently indicated, members of the food committees were aware 
that the war-time emergency could mean an enhanced long-term role for them in 
government. 5 I would want to add that they, in common with the other scientists we 
examined in the previous chapter, wanted to take advantage of the wartime premium on 
scientific knowledge to formalise their role in the policy-making process itself The leading 
members strove to get their food committee officially recognised as the scientific advisory 
body to government on all food questions, with formalised linkages and channels of, not only 
advice, but real scientific input into policy. William Bate Hardy, the Biological Secretary of 
the Royal Society, who co-ordinated the work of the various food committees, gave clear 
indication of this aim when he wrote to a member of the committee in 1916. He was keen to 
ensure that although reports might have multiple authors, the various sections did not 
disagree, lest this diffuse the impact of expert advice, giving politicians and civil servants 
reason to ignore it, and diminishing the authority of the scientist: 
The Royal Society comes in as a body of specialists to fLx the 
fundamental scientific data. They may be in doubt ... but 
for the benefit 
of the politician and permanent official, they should have either drawn 
up one set of analyses, which in their opinion, was the best, or have 
given reasons for permitting both to appear. It is so important 
6 
that the 
prestige of the scientiflc man should not suffer at this juncture. 
In attempting to gain formalised policy influence, the leading members of the food 
committees deployed classic public science arguments. As ever, the basic premiss was that 
scientific method was transferable to social and economic problems. So much so in fact that 
all problems of government policy were essentially scientific, and thus amenable to solution 
only by scientists. Thus -government was criticised for viewing food as an essentially 
economic problem, to do with supply and distribution, instead of as a scientific problem to do 
with basic dietary requirements. It was argued that food policy should be based on scientific 
tr ti an erence o the S David Smith, 'Nutrition Science and the Two World Wars', paper presented to Nu i On Cff 
Scottish Society for the History of Medicine, Strathclyde University, 2-3 April 1993.1 an grateful to the author 
for permission to cite this work, and to use the following quotation. 
, p. 1 
Hardy to D. N. Paton, 10 August 1916, RSA Ms. 505. Cited in ji: d 
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principles drawn from a statistical estimation of the calories required to maintain workers at 
optimum levels of output. In describing in 1919 what he perceived as the gradual rise to 
policy influence of the Food (War) Committee, the physiologist and second chairman of the 
Committee, E. H. Starling rehearsed the characteristic public science position that 'England 
hates the expert As early as December 1914 8, the Germans had learned to heed scientific 
advice: 
But it is not surprising that in this country, imbued in its government 
departments with a contempt for science and the expert ... at the beginning of the war the possibility of a food shortage and the 
necessity of taking scientific measures to cope with it hardly entered 
into the consciousness of our administrators. 9 
This contempt for the scientific attitude had meant that it was not until the war that the 
country had awoken, 
to the fact that the feeding of the nation as a mass was a physiological 
question, (as opposed to an economic one] and that any efforts in this 
direction would be ineffectual or even disastrous unless they were 
based on physiological principles. " 
Thus the food committees' reports and memoranda show an overwhelming concern 
to recommend general policy. Rather than merely giving advice on the scientific pros and 
cons of different policies, and leaving the choice deferentially to the generalist pofitician, the 
conunittees wanted to make food policy. 
I will further illustrate that as weU as such direct attempts to influence high 
policy through these bodies, and to be formally recognised as the source of scientific food 
policy, the Royal Society Food Committees also drew on a much wider network of informal 
government contacts and channels to get their policy recommendations implemented. 
After a brief examination of the founding of the food committees, I will concentrate 
on illustrating public science arguments at work in the stormy relationship between the Food 
7 This is a truncation of the Victorian educationalist, Nfichael E. Sadler's comment that 'England, at heart, 
hates the expert; Germany rejoices in hinL, from "Me Unrest in Secondary Education in Germany and 
Elsewhere' in SRgial Rg2rts on Educational Subjects. V01.9, (1902), p. 5o. Cited in G. Harries-lenkins, Ile 
Army in Victorian Society. (London, Routlcdge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 155. 
" Starting was here referring to the Eltzbacher Report, of which more later, which was published in December 
1914, interestingly by an independent group Of German scientists. 9 
10 
Starling, gpcit pp. 5-6. 
1 Lid, p. 3. 
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(War) Committee (FWC) and the first Food Controller, Lord Devonport. I wiU then look 
more briefly at the perceived more satisfactory relations with the second incumbent, Lord 
Rhondda. The focus will necessarily be on the rhetoric of public science, but before 
concluding, I wHI attempt to give an indication of the actual degree of influence over food 
policy achieved in a separate section. 
4.1 ESTABLISHMENT AND EARLY FlISTORY OF THiE FOOD COMMr=S 
As we noted in chapter two, the Council of the Royal Society had appointed a War 
Committee to oversee wartime scientific advice to government on 5 November 1914. 
Between then and May 1915, four sub-committees were established, but none dealt 
specifically with food problems. However, when in June 1915 the Council abolished the War 
Committee and established itself as the Royal Society (War) Committee with new sectional 
committees under it, one of these was concerned with Physiology. " This Sectional 
Committee on Physiology, also known as the Physiology (War) Committee (PWC), 
established sub-committees on the German and United Kingdom food supplies, but its 
attention was split between food and the physiological aspects of chen-dcal warfare, with the 
concentration on the latter. 
The gas work of the PWC was soon integrated into the existing machinery Of 
government, partly perhaps because of its perceived special urgency, partly because the 
institutional framework for integration already existed in the Medical Research Committee 
(MRC), established in 1913. There was also the involvement of Alfted Keogh, the Director 
of the Army Medical Service, who was a member of the British Science Guild. He had 
originally urged the establishment of the PWC to work on gas warfare problems out of the 
original Chemistry sub-committee of 1914. Keogh acted as a channel of influence with 
government, and in January 1918 he appointed almost all of the PWC to a new Chemical 
Warfare Medical Committee set up under the MRC. This was to coordinate research into gas 
poisoning and its treatment. The new Committee's first publication was a reprint of the 
PWC's pamphlet of September 1917, Notes on the Effect of Pulmonary Irritant Gases, and 
11 See M. Tcich, 2p-cit.., pp. 6-7. 
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Keogh himself issued a memorandum to Medical Officers in April 1918 largely based on 
thiS. 12 
further factor holding up integration in food research was the attitude of the 
government, and particularly in this area, of the Board of Trade. The supply of food was, in 
the early years of the war, considered as part of the general workings of the economy, rather 
than as a special scientific area in which the State should become involved, with expert 
guidance. Government policy was to leave the market, as far as possible, to regulate itself 
This so-called 'business as usual', non-interventionist approach was believed, particularly by 
Runciman at the Board of Trade 13 , to be the most effective way of ensuring the civilian food 
supply, as well as maintaining the availability of revenue and credit facilities for the 
government to pay for the war. In any case, the war was not expected to last very long. As 
E. M. H. Lloyd, who as Assistant Secretary at the Ministry of Food played a large part in 
devising the machinery of control over meat, milk and fats during 1917-18, commented in 
1924: 
In the absence of any plan of industrial mobilization for war, this was 
the only possible policy to pursue. A prosperous state of trade, regular 
employment at good wages and high profits for the Revenue to tax 
and the Treasury to borrow, were regarded with good reason as 
essential conditions for the successful prosecution of the war. 14 
Perhaps partly in response to the prevailing lack of goverment interest in the 
scientific aspects of the problem of food, and the accompanying absence of any institutional 
mechanisms for formulating a scientific food policy, by December 1916 members of the PWC 
had persuaded the Society's Counci. l that food warranted separate investigation, and the new 
Food (War) Committee was appointed on 16 December 1916.15 
11. See Steve Sturdy, '---OxygenTherapy', pp--cit:., p. 107, and p. 114. 13 On Runciman's hands-off position and subsequent conversion to intervention, see Beveridge, 22sait 
chapters 2-3, passim. The establishment of the executive Royal Commission on Sugar Supplies on 20 August 
1914, to handle purchase, sale, distribution, and control of sugar in Britain, was an exception to this general 
policy, though, as Beveridge points out, its activities were actively distanced from Runciman's non- 
interventionist Board of Trade, the more natural institutional home for such a body. However, Beveridge states 
that a 'Cabinet committee' an Food Supplies, set up at the outbreak of war, did not issue any reports. and soon 
merged back into the Cabinet. He may have meant a Ministerial conunittee since Cabinet committees can be 
made up of officials. 14 E. M. H. Lloyd, E: ZMMents in State Control at the War Office and the Ministry- of F (oxford, 
. 
ýtjsL. EconojWE. and Strateizig Clarendon/Carnegie Endowment, 1924), p. 261. See also David French. & 
Qanning. 1905-15, (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1982). 
'ý See Food (War) Committee, Minutes. Voll 1916-17, Royal Society Archives (RSA), W 503/Cmb-72, p. 1; 
Royal Society (War) Committee, Sectional Committee on Physiology, First Interim Report, Jan. 23 19 18, p. 1, 
RSA, Ms. 505; Teich, gp. cit. p. 7. 
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The first Food sub-Committee of the PWC was formed independently of any request 
ftorn government in July 1915 to draw up a report on the food supply of the German Empire. 
It consisted of Professor A. D. Waller, director of the Physiological Laboratory at the 
University of London and chairman of the committee, F. G. Hopkins, Professor of 
Biochemistry at Cambridge and T. B. Wood, Professor of Agriculture at Cambridge. 16 Ashley 
was invited to join the sub-committee at the end of July 1915. Waller approached Ashley 
after having seen a copy of his paper to the Royal Society of Arts of 24 February 1915 on the 
economic position of Germany. 17 The debate about the German food supply had recently 
been stimulated by the publication in Germany in December 1914 of a report edited by 
Professor Paul Eltzbacher (acting Rektor of the Commercial Hochschule in Berlin) and a 
committee of scientists (including physiologists, political economists and statisticians) which 
had concluded that Germany could be self-sufficient in food in spite of the blockade. " The 
report received wide coverage in Britain: it was summarised in The Lancet on 20 February 
1915, and was translated into English in its entirety later in 1915 under the title, Germgny's 
Food: Can it Last. '9 In the light of this, Waller, for one, became increasingly concerned to 
stiffen the Government's blockade policy, particularly since he had observed from the Board 
of Trade Returns that wheat , malt and cocoa were 
being readily exported to neutral 
countries, and thence to the enemy. "60 He had been especially worried by reports received by 
the Royal Society that plans were afoot to contraband cotton but liberate food from 
blockade 
. 
21 He wanted the Royal Society to submit a report stressing the necessity of a tight 
food blockade. Ashley contributed a memorandum on German food supply in which he 
concluded that Germany's ability to feed her population was not due to government measures 
but to her continuing supply of foodstuffs via neutral countries, some of which may have 
originated in Britain-22 This formed the second part and appendix to the First Report of the 
16 See Waller to Ashley, 25 July, 1915, W. J. Ashley official Papers (AOP), British Library, Add. Mss- 
42244A, ff 6-7. 
17 See Anne Ashley, 
goR. cit, p. 
151 and Ashley Note on my First Period of Active Service on the Royal Society 
Food (War) Committee, July 191 5-July 1916. AOP, Add. Mss. 42244A, ff 1-2. The invite came informally from 
Waller in a letter of 25 July 1915, AOP, 22. ciL ff 8-9, and formally from the Secretary of the Royal Society on 
26 July, DLid , 
CIO. 
11 14 August 19 15, 18 See Phvsiology (War) Committee. First Rgp2rt on the Food Supply of the -ma _m 
ire 
p. 1; E. IL Starling, M. ciL pp. 5-6; Teich, o "-ci pp. 7-12-, andAvnerOtTer, 
IntcrMtation, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989). passim. With economics and substitutions, c report 
estimated that about 90% of pre-war calorific value of food and 87% of the protein value was still available to 
the Germans. See Offer, p. 25. 
19 See Teich, lid, p. 12. 
^0 See Waller to Ashley, 23 July 1915, AOP, 22. cit. 
1-1 Waller to Ashley, 6 August 1915, AOP, o2 cit 
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Physiology (War) Committee on the food supply of the German Empire, printed by the Royal 
Society for official circulation only, on 14 August, the first part being written by Waller. The 
report cast doubt on the optimistic predictions of the Eltzbacher report, arguing that 
Germany could only feed herself by supplementing her domestic production with 
considerable imports. This was a strong argument for tightening the blockade. 23 
Fears that the blockade was being subverted were common in government circles 
concerned with implementing blockade policy; Britain had already begun negotiations with 
neutral continental powers to extend the terms of the blockade beyond what was sanctioned 
by pre-war international agreements. From March 1915 Britain moved towards an 
unrestricted blockade by negotiating agreements with the northern neutrals, from whence 
overseas products had been reaching the Germans, often via Britain. However, many 
24 foodstuffs were still not subject to blockade. Nevertheless, the committee still had to pitch 
its line very carefully. It wanted to influence policy in favour of a stringent blockade and in 
order to do this had to take a tactful fine with the Board of Trade, which was opposed to any 
tightening of the blockade. The Board was, as was noted, in favour of a non-interventionist 
stance and also represented business interests which aimed at cornering former German 
markets. 25 Given the lack of any existing machinery for advice in the area of food, the 
committee had to create its own channels, and keep them open. Waller summed up the 
committee's strategy of influence in a letter to Ashley in August: 
.1 think the line that we should take now would be to "gently" comment 
upon the contribution to German food supply from British sources. 
I realise ... that there is strong pressure in favour of keeping up exports, 
even of food and potential ammunition and that the Board of Trade 
has been badly [unidentifiable word] by the Merchant. I want the 
Royal Society to take the other side of the picture into view and to 
represent it to the Board of Trade without adopting a critical attitude. 
And I want us to keep out of the newspapers. 26 
= Ashley, 'Physiology (War) Committee of the Royal Society. Food Supply of the German Empire. August 11 
1915. Memorandum by Prof. Ashley', ACP. 
23 First Roort of the Physiology (War) Committee of the Ro-val Socie e ood Supoly of the M-m-n" 
EMire 14 August 1915, AOP. See also E. H. Starting's The Oliver Sh v L- Lns 
A Study in Applied Physiology. (London, Longmans Grt, -en, 1919), p. 7. 
"4 See Gerd Hardach, The First World War (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1987, originally 1977), Chapter 2, 
especially, pp. 11-27. 
ILid , p. 19. :6 Walter to Ashley, 30 August 1915,2p_c_it, 
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Already the scientists of the Royal Society were thinking in terms of how best to gain 
influence over food policy. 
At this point the Royal Society had established contact only with the Board of Trade 
on food questions. It was their first connection to food policy (the report on German food 
supplies was undertaken independently by the Society). Waller was thus understandably keen 
to take a cautious fine to preserve the as yet tenuous influence of the Society. As he wrote to 
Ashley: 
As to the Board of Trade I should be very sorry to take up a critical 
attitude as I don't think we can get on without them. It is so far the 
only department to which anything has gone from the Royal Society 
on the food matter. 27 
Waller was convinced that a constructive blockade policy would not be pursued 
without the influence of the Physiology (War) Conunittee's experts: he ended one letter to 
Ashley by observing that the ignorance of our politicians [on 'Commerce questions'] 
appears to me to be unfathomable. Can you understand itT 
In early February 1916, the second report aon strongly supported food blockade, 
arguing that existing measures had had an effect and that further provisions could result in a 
fatal weakening of Germany. Particular emphasis was laid on the importance of the shortage 
of fats and oils in Germany, and the necessity for blocking imports of these as stringently as 
possible. " Ashley contributed the majority of the first nine sections, with Waller providing 
the tenth and final one. This time reports were submitted not only to the Board of Trade, but 
also to the Admiralty, the Board of Agriculture, and the Foreign Office. 30 As well as the 
support for blockade, the report also argued that the German experience indicated the need 
for a national food policy for Britain. In addition to being essential for the compilation of the 
reports on the German food supply, the widely disseminated Eltzbacher report, with its 
analysis in terms of required calorific and protein values of food also served as a starting 
point for a scientific survey of the British food situation. 
'7 Waller to Ashley, 10 August 1915, AOP, 2Rcit- 
2s Waller to Ashley 30 August 1915, gp-clt, 
29 Second Remrt of the Physiology (War) Co-mmittee of thcý Roval Sociely. IIIC IDOd u ly o the Geman 
Eml2ire 10 February 1916, AOP, 2p-c-it. ; See also Starling, 2p. cit. pp. 7-8. 
3U First interim Rep(g. Jan. 23 See Roval Society (War) Committee. Sectional Conunittee on -Physiology. 1918, p. 1, RSA, Ms. 505. 
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During February and early March 1916, the comrnittee developed closer relations 
with the Government. Waller wrote to Ashley that the government had requested a meeting 
with the PWC on 9 March and that it 'appears to want to learn a little elementary physiology 
and economics'. 31 Ashley described how later: 'In March the Board of Trade (whether of its 
own motives or prompted I know not) asked the Royal Society to prepare a report on the 
Food Supply of the United Kingdom'. At a small meeting of the existing food sub- 
committee of the Physiology (War) Committee at Cambridge, Ashley argued that the they 
must have access to all the information held by the Boards of Trade and Agriculture, and that 
other scientific experts should be co-opted onto the committee. Accordingly, a new sub- 
committee of the Physiology (War) Committee was established, in late March or early April, 
and A. W. Flux from the Board of Trade and T. H. Middleton from Agriculture, and 
Professors Thompson of Dublin and Noel Paton from Glasgow, were invited to join. 32 A-D. 
Hall of the Development Commission 33 also joined sometime before the submission of the 
final report. 34 However, it is indicative of the uncertain status that the Royal Society food 
committees occupied in their advisory capacity to government that although these 
developments were occurring from March, the official invitation to submit a report does not 
seem to have come from Runciman to Hardy possibly until early June 1916 . 
35 Hardy`s letter 
and memorandum to a Board of Trade official of 29 March indicates that the request for a 
report 'on the food supplies needed by the home population in certain eventualities' may have 
originated from a Cabinet committee. The e,, dsting food sub-committee of the Physiology 
(War) Committee decided (probably at the Cambridge meeting described above by Ashley), 
that a special investigation was needed . 
36 Hardy followed this up with an informal visit to 
Runciman. He wrote to Ashley on the 31 March that he had that morning: 
31 Waller to Ashley 6 Much 1916, AOP, 21?. cit, 32 Ashley 'Note on my First Period of Active Savice... ', AOP, 2pS. _it. 
See also Food (War) Committee, 
Minutes, Vol. L 1916-17, Royal Society Archives (RSA), 503/Cmb. 72, p. 1. 33 Alfred Daniel Hall: (1864-1942), educationalist, administrator, and scientific research worker. He was asked 
to join the Development Commission by Lloyd George in 19 10 (where he organised agricultural education), and 
subsequently became Director of the Rothamstead Experimental station. He became Permanent Secretary at the 
Board of Agriculture in 1917 at the invitation of the Presidentý R. E. Prothero (later Lord Ernle). He was a 
member of Milner's Food Production Committee, and continued at the (now) Ministry of Agriculture from 
1920-7 in the post of Chief Scientific Adviser. He later became a member of the Economic Advisory Council 
(DNB). He was an active member of the FWC from when he joined in early 1916 throughout 1917, though his 
bureaucratic commitments at the Board eventually meant he had to retire from the FWC, and send one E. S. 
Beaven to act as his proxy. (See FWC Minutes) 
Mi _L 
34 See signatories of The Food Sumly of the United Kingdom: A R02rt drawn-unInt-a gorn iLee of! Le Roy-al 
Society at the RNuest of the President of the 3oard of Trade. 9 December 1916, cd-8421/1917. 
'" Hardy to Waller, (copy), AOP, Ibid. 
m Hardy to E. R. Eddison, 29 March 1916, RSA Ms. 505. 
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... 
had a conversation with the president of the Board of Trade about 
the need for a report upon the available food supplies, and I have 
arranged with Mr. Flux of that Department to meet the sub-committee 
sometime next week. Mr. NEddleton of the Board of Agriculture also 
hopes to be present. 37 
Certainly, as Ashley noted, the sub-comn-&tee must have begun work after these 
informal contacts, rather than waiting for an official request, because the first part of the 
report was ready for the consideration of the Royal Society by 17 June 1916 . 
38 The second 
and third parts of the report were published separately by the Society (and widely 
disseminated), on 29 July 1916. The final fidl report (uniting all three parts) was collated by 
9 December 1916. It was sent to the Board of Trade which then distributed it to other 
interested departmentS, 39 and was published as a VVFhite Paper. "' The first part of the report 
presented data on the United Kingdom's food supply from 1909-13. It argued that the 
problem of food was both statistical and physiological: it was necessary both to know 
statistically what foods were available, and in what quantities, and whether these foods were 
physiologically adequate (in terms of their nutritive value) to support men, women and 
children, at a calculated minimum calorie intake. " The second part of the report summarised 
the position in 1916, concluding that, given equitable distribution, there was already enough 
food. The third part gave suggestions for economising on the use of the available food 
SUPPIY. 42 
'Allashley believed that the three reports were influential in shapin. 9 policy. He later 
commented that: 
The Reports on Germany were circulated to certain Government 
offices and had some influence, I believe, on the Blockade policy. The 
Report on the U. K. served as the statistical basis of the subsequent 
food policy. " 
37 Hardy to Ashley, 31 March 1916, Tbid. 
38 Rg2! 2rt of the Physiology (War) Committee of the Roval Society on the Food Supply of the U--K- dated June 
17 1916. Printed by the Roval Society, AOP, M. cit. . 161. 39 
fr 150 
40 
See Eddison to Hardy, 10 November 1916, RSA, Ms. 505. 
41 
ne Food StMRlY or the United Kingdom... 
41.1 
See Starling, 22. cit,, pp. 8-9. 
41 
Jýid, pp. 9-12. 
Ashley, 'Note on my First Period of Active Service... 
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Beveridge later implied that the Board of Trade's commissioning of the report on the United 
Kingdom was part of the movement to control in food: though the Board was still not 
convinced of the necessity of intervention in early 1916 it commissioned, 'a thorough and 
scientific survey of the situation'. ' The Board's action also demonstrated that the PWCs 
efforts to establish a channel of communication with the government by sending unsolicited 
reports had paid off, and that the goverrunent had at least accepted the validity of a scientific 
analysis of the food problem. The report on the food supply of the United Kingdom was the 
first attempt to assess national needs in terms of individual calorific requirements, rather than 
of overall volume. Whatever its direct influence on government thinIcing, and this wiH be 
examined later, it was an attempt to scientise the food problem. If government could be 
convinced of this kind of approach, it would necessitate the involvement of physiologists 
(and econornists/statisticians) in the policy process . 
2. THE MMSTRY OF FOOD AND DEVONPORT As FOOD CONTROLLER 
A number of developments occurred between June and November 1916 which 
pressured the Government into assuming some control of the food situation. By June 1916 
retail food prices were 59% up on the level of July 1914, and this caused much public 
constemation. '5 A stop-gap measure to deflect public criticism of inaction was to appoint in 
June a Board of Trade Departmental Committee on Food Prices to examine the causes of 
inflation and suggest possible remedies. 6 Ashley served on this and temporarily resigned 
from the PWC due to pressure of work and fear of compromising his confidentiality by 
discussing issues at both forums. 47 However, pressure for government action continued to 
mount. In August the much publicised second PWC report stressed that even a small 
reduction in the food supply could be borne 'only on the condition that steps were taken to 
ensure the equitable distribution of the available food throughout the population'. Expanding 
on this the report argued that: 
While the supply of food has, up to the present, been adequate for the 
support of the population, the rise in prices has accentuated the 
inequalities of distribution, which reduce the daily ration of many 
below the level of efficiency. Any curtailment of supplies, even to a 
44 Beveridge, M-. cit., p. 16. 
45 Beveridge, m. git p. 19. 
46 Lid., pp. 19-20. 
47 See Ashley to Hardy, 9 August 1916, RSA Ms. 505. However, Ashley continued to cOffesPOnd with Hardy 
on food matters, and to receive agendas and minutes of the PWC and later of the Food War COnunitt, *, -- 
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limited extent, would result in the poorer classes obtaining less than is 
needful for safety should distribution remain unorganised. " 
On 22 September came a minority report of the Food Prices Committee which called for the 
State to become the sole purchaser of imported meat and bacon, and to fix prices for home 
produced meat, milk and bacon. On 10 October bread was taken under State control with 
the setting up of the Royal Commission on Wheat Supplies. Like the Sugar Commission this 
was an executive body and it became responsible for all the imports of wheat into the 
country. 49 But Parliamentary pressure for food to be centrally organised on a war-footing 
also began to mount. This culminated in the debate in the House of Commons on 15 and 16 
November on a motion proposed by the historical economist turned M. P., W. A. S. Hewins, 
that the Government should organise the national food supply. Beveridge saw this as the 
moment when Runciman, in replying, formally abandoned the 'business as usual' voluntary 
method in food. The Defence of the Realm Acts were extended to give the Board of Trade 
power over prices, distribution and manufacture and other areas of food supply, and the 
Government's intention to appoint a Food Controller to co-ordinate the efforts of the various 
departments concerned was announced. 50 The Controller was eventually appointed as the 
head of a new Ministry of Food. Lord Devonport 51 was appointed Controller on 10 
December and the new Ministry formally came into being on 22 December. 52 
The Royal Society at first saw the establishment of the Ministry of Food and the 
appointment of Devonport as an opportunity for closer involvement of outside scientists in 
the making of food policy, as well as the possibility of centrally co-ordinated and funded 
human nutrition research. Thus, from the outset, they pressed for a formalisation of their 
links with the new Ministry in terms of organisation, funding and influence. In November 
1916, the PWC drew up a 'Proposal to Constitute a Board of Research to deal with Food 
Problems' to initiate and superintend experiments in food economy. The new body would 
48 Cd 9421,212AL- Cited here from Starling, 22-c±, p. 10 (both quotations) 49 Beveridge, 22, c-it. p. 22. So Ibid. pp. 24-5. 
51 Devonport was the owner of a retail grocery chain and partner in a big London tea importers, Kearley and 
Tonge. His Parliamentary Secretary was Captain Charles Bathurst, a former gold medallist at the Royal 
Cirencester Agricultural College, and member of the British Science Guild. He represented agricultural 
interests in the Ministry, and was keen on applying scientific methods and discoveries. TU Permanent 
Secretary was Sir Henry Rcw, an experienced civil servant with close fanning connections, and a statistician. 
Beveridge was head of the Labour Department of the Board of Trade contingent at the new Ministry. 52 See N. B. Dearle, An Economic Chronicle of the great War for t ritain and Trel (London, OUP, 
1929). 
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report to the PWC and would need to be in close touch with other relevant areas of 
government. The hope was expressed that just as earlier Royal Society committees had been 
the precursors to more formalised relations between experts and govemment, so the same 
thing could happen in the area of food: 
In the early days of the war the Engineering, Physics and Chemistry 
War Committees of the Royal Society investigated many urgent 
problems submitted by the Admiralty and the War Office. These 
committees paved the way for the Board of Invention and Research. In 
the same way it might be advisable, informally, to test the need for and 
utility of a Food Board of Research, by using temporarily a committee 
of the Royal Society for the purpose. The present Food Committee 
would form the nucleus of such a body. " 
No doubt to coincide with the establishment of the new Ministry and to impart an 
added authority to the Royal Society's work on food, in December 1916 the Food Sub- 
Committee was itself reconstituted as a full sectional committee: the Food (War) Committee 
(FWC). 54 At the first meeting a memorandum to the new Food Controller was unanimously 
agreed. This stressed that the Ministry of Food should appoint a man of science to its higher 
staff, 'a man thoroughly cognisant of the physiological and agricultural aspects of food 
supplies, who must be placed in such a position that all proposals of the Department come 
before him at an early stage. ' The idea was to get a formal means of communication with the 
executive through which confidential information about 'commerce, importation, stocks and 
organisation' could flow from the ministry to the FWC, and through which informed advice 
could flow back, and be heeded. To avoid unnecessary friction, the FWC were careful to 
state explicitly here that they were not seeking, technically, to usurp the policy-making 
powers of the executive by this appointment. But they were attempting to establish a formal 
procedure whereby scientific influence could shape policy ideas before they became set in 
stone: 
The Committee are not proposing that he should be given executive 
powers, but that he should be in a position to advise and criticise any 
suggested measures of food economy at their inception before any 
attempt has been made to reduce them to regulations. Flis expert 
knowledge would be far more effective at this stage than if its 
53 See Physiology (War) Committee Food Sub-Committee, 'A Proposal to Constitute a Board of Research to 
deal with Food Problerr&, 30 November 1916, RSA. Bound copy of Physiology (War) Committee Sub- 
committee Food and Food (War) Committee Reports, supplement to Boxes 527-30. see also L. Margaret 
Barren, 22. cit, especially pp. 96-7. 54 See Royal Society War Executive Committee Minute Book, meeting of the Executive, 15 December 1916, 
RSA, Ms. 463 (Cmb 37). 
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operation were deferred and confined to suggestions for the revision 
of a programme already drafted. Still less effective would be the 
possible criticisms or revision by the Committee of proposals put into 
shape by the Department. 
Tff- 
However it is clear that their goal was to frame policy (in all but name) along 
scientific lines. This is apparent from their use here of the argument familiar from Edwardian 
public science that only a scientific man could tell when scientific input was needed. 
Furthermore, the memorandum ended by rehearsing that other familiar argument of public 
science, that since food policy was a scientific problem, scientists should have proper 
influence over it: 
The Committee believe that only in this way, by the presence of a 
scientific man inside the Department, can the assistance of scientific 
men be properly made to bear on these problems of food control, 
production and utilization, all of which are problems essentially 
scientific in character. 5' 
There could be no clearer statement of the aims of the leading members of the FWC, 
and particularly of Hardy, than his comments in a letter to Waller at the beginning of March 
1917. Waller had written suggesting the Committee involve themselves with the question of 
the diet of German P. O. W. s. Hardy replied that this was 'rather of the nature of a political 
cry' and anyway was 'a minor matter'. He was keen to avoid any whiff of political 
controversy, especially over such a trivial problem , which might 
in any way detract from the 
Committee's wider objective. As he wrote: 'We are out for bigger things. namely the control 
of the ggeneral poligy to be 12ursued with respect to the economy and 6 ght use of fbod'. " 
The Ministry took the suggestion of the appointment of a Scientific Adviser on board 
and asked for a name. 57 The FWC suggested T. B. Wood and he was appointed on 16 
January 1917.58 Flushed with this success, Hardy, now wrote to relevant government 
S5 See A. Kempe (first Chairman of FWC) to Lord Devonport, 18 December 1916, RSA, Ms. 530 and FWC 
Minutes, 18 December 1916, RS A (CMB 72). 
56 Hardy to Waller, 5 March 1917, RSA Ms. 530. See also Hardy to D. Noel Paton, 10 March 1917, Ibid. Ille 
Committee had decided not to send the Food Controller a report on the diet of schoolchildren. Hardy explained 
why. "Me Committee is trying to influence larger questions of policX we have already sent in memos. dealing 
[R c ety re ar as can with those (matters] and another still larger one is going through the oyal So iIP ss. SO f we 
gauge Lord Devonport's temperament it is unsafe to importunate and the school question being merely part of 
the whole, we [the treasurer of the Society, and Chairman of the FWC, Kempe and Hardy] felt that it had better 
be held up for the present 
37 See Beveridge to Kernpe, 27 December 1916, Ibid, 
58 See Beveridge Papers, (LSE), Misc. Vol 92, Beveridge Special Collection on Food Control, (BPF), Vol. XIL 
'Organisation, Powers and Personnel of the Ministry, specifically the item -Schedule of Officers Employed in 
the Ministry of Food. Corrected up to 7 June 1917% see also Hardy to Rew 3 January 1917, Ibid. 
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Departments flaunting what he perceived as its new and fon-nalised semi-official position, and 
using this to press for access to otherwise confidential information. " 
The pattern of the Committee's work established itself, though only temporarily, 
through January to early March 1917. Reports on such subjects as saccharin, sugar, retail 
prices, stowage space, glucose, the soya bean and the rationing of breadstuffs were prepared 
and submitted to the Ministry of Food. 'O The Committee also initiated its series of reports 
signfflcantly entitled "National Food Policy'. This was a wide-ranging series of direct policy 
recommendations which ran from December 18 1916 to March 11 1918, and amounted to 
eleven separate reports . 
6' The keynote of these reports was the insistence on maintaining an 
unrestricted supply of bread. 62 The Committee had set itself firmly against bread rationing 
arguing that it was the staple food of the working classes and that its restriction would cause 
serious morale and even public order problems. As the 'National Food Policy' report on 'The 
Primary Importance of Breadstuffs' stressed in March 1917, bread must not be rationed: 
The Committee wish, therefore, to insist with all the weight that their 
knowledge may carry, that the firsi necessity of the case is to maintain 
the supply of bread at its highest possible point, and that its 
consumption should be unrestricted .... While among the middle classes bread supplies less than one third of the energy of the total food they 
consume, with the poorer families of the working classes bread alone 
has to furnish more than half of the energy of their dietary .... the fundamental basis of the national food policy, particularly having 
regard to the needs of the workers, should be the maintenance of 
unrestricted bread supply at the expense of meat and other foods. " 
Ashley was persuaded to re-join in February, partly because someone to draft 
memoranda was needed. 64 Ashley returned to the committee for the 9 February 1917 
meeting. He was formally re-appointed at the meeting of 2-3 March, when he, Flux and 
59 See Hardy to Sir Kenneth Anderson (Ministry of Shipping), 10 January 1917, Ibid. The letter begins, Ille 
Food (War) Committee is now established in an advisory capacity to the Food Ministry and T. B. Wood of 
Cambridge is our representative actually in the Ministry. ' It then goes on to request information on the 
allocation of cargo space for different foods in ships. See also Hardy to Commander Leverton Harris, 29 
December 1916 about blockade policy which is similarly couched. 60 See RSA bound copy of PWC and FWC reports, 22 cit frontispiece, 'List of Reports by the Food (War) 
Committee of the Royal Society. ' 61 lid- 
62 See Stark, M. cit, _pp. 
1334. 
63 FWC Report 28b Ile National Food Policy. Memorandum to Lord Devonvolrt: 111C Primar'V TInT)Ortance I 
Bread, 2 February 1917, AOP, 42244B. See also Report 16 -Me Rationing ofBreadstuffs (3 March 1917), RSA 
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A. W. J. McFadden were appointed as a sub-committee to draw up a memorandum on 
rationing with special reference to the FWC's opposition to the rationing of bread. This 
theme was to dominate Ashley's second period of service. " Ashley picturesquely described 
the drafting of his sub-committee's report on rationing: 
We had an afternoon meeting in Flu)es rooms at the Board of 
Trade ... and then adjourned for dinner ... and then resumed at nine. 
As 
we came out with the Report finished, the clocks of Whitehall were 
sounding Mdnight. The Report was typed and I think considered by 
the Committee next day and printed at once for the Government. 66 
The Report was in fact read by Flux at the FWC meeting of 9 March, Hardy commenting that 
it was 'remarkably able .... was 
discussed with great care ... and 
little more than verbal 
alterations were made'. 67 The Report was then adopted at the 16 March meeting, and was 
circulated to the Government as report 28d of the special series on National Food Policy, 
'The Primary Importance of Bread'. 68 The Report stressed the Royal Society's position that 
the supply of bread should be maintained at current levels, if necessary sacrificing other 
imports to secure this, and that no restrictions should be made on its consumption. The 
report argued that it was impossible to ration bread 'without the gravest danger to the health 
and efficiency of the poorer element of the population'. 69 
Ashleýs next contribution appears to have been a memorandum on the organisation 
of rationing written on 28 March, and discussed, along with Paton's memorandum on bread 
and meat rations, at the 13 April meeting. 70 However, it was Patoifs memorandum which 
formed the subsequent Report 28f, 'A Limited Measure of Food Distribution'. 71 
The good relations between the FWC and the Ministry, which had seemed in prospect 
during the early months of Devonport's period in office, soon evaporated however. The 
months from March through to the end of May 1917 saw the FWC increasingly despairing of 
6S See Food (War) Committee, Minutes, Vol. L 191&17, Royal Society Archives (RSA), 503/Cmb. 72, p. 20-2 (9 
Feb. meeting) and pp. 26-34 (2-3 March meeting). 66 
Ashley, 'Note on Second Period of Active Service... ', 22 cit 67 See Food (War) Committee Minutes 22. cit., pp. 35-6 (9 March meetingy, Hardy to Paton, 10 March 1917, 
RSA, Box 530. 
69 See Food (War) Committee Minutes, 22. cit, pp. 37-44 (16 March meeting); For this Report, and list of all 
reports see Bound copy 22s. Lt 69 Food (War) Committee, Report 28d4 'The Primary Importance of Brea4r, 16 March 1917, quoted here from 
AOP, Add. Mss. 42,244B, ff. 58-60. 
70 Ashley, 'Notes on the memorandum of the Physiology Committee sub-committee presented 23 March 1917, 
AOP, 42,244B. IT. 66-8; F. Saxton to Ashley, 10 April 1917, ACIP, n Lid'. 05. 
71 Dated 13 April 1917. See Food (War) Committee Minutes, W-c-it pp. 54.8, (13 April meeting). 
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Devonport's receptivity to scientific advice, or at least his willingness to give the scientists 
the kind of power they wanted. Sensing that perhaps the FWC had not gained the kind of 
official position in the food policy process it desired in its fink with the Ministry, the' 
committee began to embark on an exploration of new channels to policy influence. The 
committee found the Ministry implementing policies with which it could not agree. Perhaps 
the most objectionable of these to the FWC was the encouragement of Voluntary Rationing, 
and the additional reduction of one pound a week less bread, which the Committee argued 
would simply hit the poorest who could not afford substitutes to bread. At the same time it 
was clear that the Ministry had not given up entertaining bread rationing. Members of the 
FWC began to grow impatient. In early March, Noel Paton, who had already suggested that 
the only solution to the problem of the Ministry's deafness to scientific advice was for it to be 
forced to constitute "inside itself 'a small scientific comn-dttee, 72 wrote to Hardy. It was 
obvious that the Ministry was not listening and that, 'The position of our Committee and of 
Wood and Thompson is simply absurd, and, unless our relations with the Food Department 
can be improved, I think we might as well come to an end'. 73 However, Hardy was not be so 
easily beaten. Having been flustrated in attempts to gain major influence over food policy via 
the Food Ministry, he was sounding out a new, more direct route of attack on the very 
citadel of policy-making: the War Cabinet itself Copies of FWC Report 28d, The National 
Food Policy. The PrimM Importance of Bread , had already 
been sent on 16 March directly 
to the War Cabinet, via the Assistant Secretary, Thomas Jones. 74 Hardy was confident that 
this channel would prove fruitful, and that the FWC would thus be able to block the rationing 
of bread. On 17 March Professor W. G. S. Adams, head of Lloyd George's Secretariat, also 
wrote to the Royal Society requesting further copies of the latest report. The same day Hardy 
wrote encouragingly to another Committee member, Ashley, telling him of the promising 
results of the new method of approach: 
I don't think we shall fail of our object. A ... message 
has just come 
from 10 Downing Street to say that the Memorandum is of great 
importance and asking for more copies so that each member of the 
War Cabinet may have copies on Monday. The memorandum is to be 
given first place, I gather, on the War Cabinet's agenda. " 
7, See Paton to Hardy, 8 March 1917, RSA, Ms. 530, 
73 Paton to Hardy, 13 Much 1917, rbid. 
74 See Jones to Freda Saxton (clerical secretary of the Royal Society), 17 March 1917, in which he requests 
Awther copies of FWC Report 28d, The National Food Policy. The Primarv 
RSA. Ms. 530. 
'T - Hardy to Ashley, 17 March 1917, AOP, 42244B, 2p. ciL 
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ALS! hley, however, was still not happy. He re-emphasised to Hardy the point made 
being made in the draft of the most recent report, 76 that such ad hoc influence was hardly 
satisfactory. He stressed that there needed to be some central authority covering all aspects 
of food policy, rather than the patchwork of Departments, Committees and Commissions: 
I gravely doubt whether there exists any co-ordinating committee or 
authority, with a conspectus of the whole-situatio before it .... If the Royal Society Committee were an ordinary Government Food 
Committee, it ought to represent to the Government the necessity of 
some such co-ordinating centre, which shall know all there is to know. 
Otherwise we are steering for chaos. 77 
Hardy replied confidently asserting that the FWC was, defacto , this co-ordinating centre: 
It is exactly the absence of a co-ordinating body that is the raison 
d'Etre of the Royal Society Committee. I have long wanted to suggest 
an increased need for co-ordination; the lack of it in the Ministry of 
Food is astonishing. At present co-ordination is effected by mutual 
representation. For instance, Rew sits on the Wheat Commission; but 
the choice of persons being merely a matter of official rank is 
lamentable, Rew's 'policy' being merely laisser faire optimism. The 
Royal Society Committee, having the ear of every important body 
including the Cabinet (but excepting the Mnistry of Food), and, from 
its composition, bringing to the same council board many types of 
minds, is, in effect, the general advisory committee and, so far as there 
is a common national policy, those who know admit it to be the work 
of the Committee. Even where individuals have exercised special 
influence they have been members of the Committee, educated by its 
discussions. " 
Clearly Hardy thought his new channel of direct influence was working well, even if a 
somewhat piqued tone at not being officially recognised (especially by the Food Ministry) can 
still be discerned. Optimism continued to run higuh, for a time. On the 17 and 24 March, 
Adams drew up statements for the War Cabinet based on the Royal Society's argument that 
the bread supply must meet the demand. 9 Hardy was careful to cultivate this new connection 
carefully. He wrote directly to Adams on 2 April saying: 
I should be glad of an opportunity for a talk with you concerning Food 
Policy. The group of economists , physiologists, agriculturalists and Civil Servants, which has been working at the subject now for two 
76 
17 
Report 28f in the National food Policy series, A Limited Measure of Food Distribution. 
" 
Ashley to Hardy, 28 March 1917, RSA, Ms. 530, original emphasis. 
's Hardy to Ashley, 29 March 1917, Ibid. 
'9 W. G. S- Adams, Papers sent to Prime Minister for Cabinet discussion of food situation, March 1917,17 
March 1917, F/232. Lloyd George Papers; Adams to Prime Minister, 24 March 1917, F/15/2/5, Lloyd George 
papers; War Cabinet Minutes, 15 March 1917, Appendix 2: W. G. S. Adams, The food question, CAB 23nJ38. 
Cited by Barnett, 2p_qLt, p. 109 
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years, is seriously concerned at the outlook ..... Physiological and 
economic considerations seem to be entirely absent from the Food 
Ministry. It may sound an exaggeration; but I can assure you that 
neither the fact itself that food is fuel, and that the quality of fuel 
supplied fixes the output of work, has been grasped, much less its 
implications. What slender lodgement such considerations as these 
have in the Department is vanishing, for Professor Wood is going to 
the Board of Agriculture, and Professor Thompson is sending in his 
resignation. " 
This letter resulted in a meeting between the two scientists on 4 April. This apparently went 
well. Hardy wrote triumphantly to Ashley: 
The fate of the last memo. will be of interest to you. It is minuted, for 
consideration by the War Cabinet, and it is being abstracted and 
commented on for the special benefit of the Prime Minister. 
The situation now is quite clear to me and the Committee is the 
recognised advisory body, recognised that is by all except the Food 
Controller. The responsibility is really very great. We can have any 
information we like, there is no doubt of that, but we shall have to 
indicate what information it is we want, just as any ordinary 
Government Committee would have to do .... The Committee must get 
ahead faster and I am considering a week of meetings. " 
However, though pleased with the results of the new approach so far, Hardy was 
aware that he was now relying uncomfortably heavily on Adams as a channel of influence. 
Hardy wrote to A. D. Hall the following day: 
The upshot of an hour's conversation with Adams is that our last 
Memorandum is minuted for the Cabinet next week; it is to be blue- 
pencilled for the Prime Minister's special consideration; and that the 
relations of Food Committee to the Cabinet are to be considered. 
Pressure also is to be brought to bear on the Ministry of Food to 
accept guidance .... 
Of course, all hinges on the good faith of Adams, is 
he genuine in his protestation of belief in the need for policy, and of 
acceptance of our poflcy9 Or is he administering soothing SYMP? 92 
Acutely aware of this possible problem. Hardy had also suggested to the Labour Party that 
they form a committee to meet with the FWC and be briefed on scientific food policy. 83 He 
also felt that the FWC needed a spokesman in the Cabinet, and agreed with Hall's idea of 
approaching Milner. 84 This later move however eventually came to nothing, but is an 
80 Hardy to Adams, 2 April 1917, RSA, Ms. 530. 
81 Hardy to Ashley, 5 April 1917, RSA, Ms. 530. 
82 Ibid. 'See also Hardy to Sir A. Kempe, Chairman of the FWC, 4 April 19 17, RSA, Ms. 530. 
83 See Hardy to Hall, 5 April 1917, Ibid. On the Labour Committee swe also F. Saxton to Ashley, 4 April 1917, 
AOP, 42244B. 
84 Hardv to Hall, 5 April 1917, pn. cit, 
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excellent indicator of Hardy's grand plans for the FWC, and his new fascination with such 
networking as a modus operandi " Shortly afterwards the Cabinet decided to prioritise the 
import of foodstuffs, including wheat, and Hardy claimed a major victory for the scientists 
and a confirmation that the new method of approach had secured them a privileged position 
in policy-making. He wrote again to Ashley on II April: 
I am sending ... two letters from Adams ... they are 
interesting as 
marking the steady way in which the Committee is gaining influence. 
Rew's letter is an immense advance. It is not so long since he told 
Wood that he could not see how scientific considerations came into 
the food question at all! Adams told me that Devonport himself was 
becoming much more amenable to reason; indeed, the public 
utterances of the Department, and especially of Bathurst, show more 
and more a movement in the right direction as fast as is consistent with 
saving their faces. " 
Hardy's new method of approach seemed to be achieving results. The FWC had direct access 
to the Cabinet via the sympathetic Adams, and was coming to be considered the Cabinet's 
official food advisory committee. Even the hitherto recalcitrant Ministry of Food seemed to 
be learning the error of its ways and becoming more responsive to the policy 
recommendations of the FWC, perhaps mindfid of its new links with the higher corridors of 
power. However, this was not to last. Hardy had ended his letter to Hall of 5 April with the 
prophetic words: 'The next fortnight will enable us to judge the degree of influence we can 
hope to exert'. 7 On 16 April the Wheat, Barley and Oats (Prices) Order was issued by the 
Ministry, fixing maximum prices for these crops. Neither the FWC nor the Ministry's own 
Scientific Adviser were consulted. The FWC's consistent attitude towards price fixing was 
that without complete State control of supplies it would be disastrous, as prices would 
immediately rise to the maximum, hitting the poor hardest. Hardy complained bitterly to 
Adams, and lamented the fact that the FWC Report on Maximum Prices had arrived too late 
to Adams for him to do any good. 88 Hardy continued to send reports to 10 Downing Street'9 
but it was becoming clear that the problem was with the Food Ministry. 
as There was some correspondence betweea Hall and Milner in late April, and Hall sent him two FWC 
Reports. Milner agreed that Meatless Days were a bad idea, but did not want any ftather contacts at present. 
See Hugh Thornton ( Milner's Private Secretary) to Hall, 26 April 1917 and Hall to Hardy 27 April, both in 
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On the 19 April Hardy had received a very angry letter from Rew at the Ministry. 
Hardy's new approach of direct communication with the War Cabinet had raised a lot of 
bureaucratic hackles. It was not correct procedure and tended to diminish the status of the 
Food Ministry. Rew's letter merits substantial quotation, not only as an amusing insight into 
the contemporary bureaucratic mind, but as evidence of the political naivet6 of the scientists. 
Here the outsider attempting to network inside the machinery of government is put firmly in 
his place: 
I have this morning received copies of three memoranda dated the 
13th instant which have been drawn up by your Committee and sent, I 
understand, to the Prime NEnister. May I venture to ren-ýnd you that 
the Food Controller is by Act of Parliament the Nfinister responsible 
for the maintenance of food supplies, and that it might be convenient if 
any recommendations which your Committee desire to make to the 
Government should be communicated in the first instance to him? It 
might indeed tend to prevent misconception if you would be good 
enough to consult us as to the administrative position in regard to the 
regulation of food supplies and I can hardly say that I shaH at all times 
be very glad to give you the fullest information on any point in which 
you are interested. 
Rew went on to stress that contrary to recent FWC reports, notably that on A Linýted 
Measure of Food Distribution (13 April), there was indeed one body in control of all aspects 
of food policy, one body which oversaw the collection and presentation of all relevant data 
before a decision was reached, and that body was the Food Nfinistry. Rew ended on a 
particularly offensive note, implying that on the question of price control the Committee was 
out of its depth: 
On the question of maximum prices, I can assure you that all the 
objections and difficulties are appreciated here, but the policy adopted 
involves a good many complex considerations in each case which it 
would take too long to explain. 9' 
Hardy replied with barely disguised anger and irony: it was all very well to say that the FWC 
would be furnished with the fullest information, but what was the use of this when the 
Nfinistry had never used its Scientific Adviser as a channel for involving the FWC 
In no single instance was this channel of communication with the 
Committee used, except with respect to minor technical points, and I 
believe it is not too much to say that, save for one case when his 
90 Sir Henry Rew to Hardy, 19 April 1917, FWC Minutes, 24 April 1917 Meeting, in Vol- 1,1916-17, RSA. 
Cmb. 72. 
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advice was asked and ignored, Professor Wood, although Scientific 
Adviser to the Ministry, was not accorded an opportunity of 
expressing his views upon questions of policy involving scientific 
considerations. 
During the whole of 1917, so far, the Ministry had only even acknowledged one letter (that 
of 10 February), 'since then no communication to Lord Devonport or to yourself has 
received even so much notice'. 91 But by this time relations between the FWC and the 
Ministry had reached a critical impasse. On 20 April the FWC had agreed to ask Wood to 
'draw up a Memo. criticising the policy of the Food Ministry'. This was submitted at the 
same 24 April meeting at which Rew's offensive first letter was read aloud. The minutes for 
that meeting record no comment on Rew's letter, but that Wood's memorandum was 
unanimously adopted for publication. 92 This Memorandum was sent directly to the War 
Cabinet and the Food Ministry. It consisted of a scathing attack on the methods and policies 
of the Ministry, and in particular its lack of attention to the critical scientific aspects of food 
problems: 
The public announcements of the Ministry from the first appeared to 
show a neglect of relevant scientific principles. Elementary and 
fundamental physiological and economic considerations were ignored, 
and the Committee, to avoid the charge that a body of experts had 
remained silent in face of measures which they knew could result only 
in harm, decided, though with reluctance, to go beyond questions of a 
technical character and to address themselves to broad policy. 
Memoranda were prepared and copies sent to the Ministry of Food 
and to other Government Departments. So far as the Ministry of Food 
is concerned, they appear to have failed in their object. The 
Committee are forced to this conclusion by their observation of the 
policy adopted, which appears to be concentrated on hasty attempts to 
reduce consumption imperfectly co-ordinated with measures for 
extending the bread supply; and to be applied almost exclusively to the 
comparatively small number of the weU-to-do, rather than to the 
miffions of workers for whom bread is the main source of working 
power. 93 
The rest of the Memorandum went on to 'make an emphatic protest against those parts of 
the Food Controller's policy which ... are paving the way 
for disaster'. The 'main point at 
issue' was that Devonport, 'in framing his policy, has ignored the fundamental fact that the 
efficiency of the manual worker depends as directly upon his supply of food as does the 
may 1917 Meeting. 2p. ciL Both the fIrst long, and the 91 Hardy to Rew, 24 April 1917, FWC Minutes, I 
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mfleage of a motor car upon its petrol'. The Food Ministry had over-emphasised the need to 
decrease consumption with its Voluntary Rationing and Meatless Days policy. Such a policy 
failed to realise that there was a basal level of necessary consumption if work was to be done 
efficiently. Moreover applying this policy indiscriminately to both meat and bread had only 
served to increase the demand for precious bread, as the poor could not afford meat. The 
Memorandum also criticised the Food Controfler for his delay in diverting the supplies of 
barley exclusively to bread-making (though, as we shaU see, this was War Cabinet 
procrastination), and price-fixing without adequate State control of production and 
distribution. 9' 
Replying on 26 April, Rew wrote to the War Cabinet and refuted each point 
specifically. In his opening paragraph he put his finger on the central problem in the relations 
between the FWC and the Food Ministry: 
The main point of the attack made by the Food (War) Committee of 
the Royal Society on the Ministry of Food, appears to be that they 
have not been regarded as the dictators of the National Food Policy-95 
In a dig at his audience, he also made the point that 'In concentrating their attack upon the 
Food Controller the Committee overlook, or are unaware of, the fact that in its main fines, 
and to a considerable extent in its details, the policy adopted is that of the War Cabinet'. Rew 
ended by reasserting the right of the Government, and only the Government, to make policy: 
Generally this report can only be described as cavilling without being 
helpful. It mainly deals not with those matters on which the Members 
of the Committee are eminent authorities, but with questions of policy 
which the Government must decide in the light of their full knowledge 
of the facts as to present and prospective supplies of various kinds of 
foodstuffi, both for this country and the Allies, and of the bearing of 
food regulations on other aspects of their general policy. The advice 
which the Committee have offered from time to fime has been 
considered with due respect by the Ministry of Food, and if it has not 
always been implicitly or immediately followed, for reasons which may 
not be always apparent, it has nevertheless been of great assistance in 
dealing with the complex questions which are involved in any attempt 
at Food Control. 96 
94 Ibid, 
. 7.14cm im 
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After this exchange, Rew attempted a conciliatory meeting in late April/early May. At this 
meeting, Hardy again tried to establish ground rules for the relationship between Committee 
and Nfinistry. He noted in the FWC minutes that: 
It was agreed 
a. ) that advice can be given only in return for complete confidence; it 
can be based only on fuU information; 
b. ) that the chief scientific officer should be in a position to report 
directly to the responsible NIinister; 
c. ) that the scientific staff should be consulted before action is taken; 
d. ) that the scientific staff in the Ministry should at least include an 
economist and a physiologist. 97 
However, relations did not improve. Paton wrote to Hardy at the end of April 
demanding that the position of the Committee with regard to the Food Ministry should be 
the, 'urgent business' of the next meeting: 'This is becoming ridiculous. We are supposed to 
be an advisory committee, but our advice is not asked and when it is given it is 
disregarded'. 9' He attached a note for discussion on the position of the Conunittee. This 
makes it clear that confusion still reigned in the minds of Committee members as to the exact 
status and degree of influence of the Committee. Paton was not certain whether the FWC had 
ever been a Committee of the Privy Council, whether it had ever been officially appointed as 
an advisory committee to the new Food Ministry at the beginning of 1917, or whether the 
FWC had merely assumed that this was the case as it had been asked to nominate a Scientific 
Adviser to the Food Ministry. Paton thought the time had come for an end to amorphous 
informal relations, and to establish once and for all an official relationship. He proposed three 
courses of action: either dissolve the FWC entirely; 'secure for it such an official position as 
will guarantee that its recommendations are considered'; or act as an outside watchdog, 
continually sniping at the Ministry. " In this latter context Paton soon also pressed 
for the 
publication of the Memorandum of the 24 April to show to the public that 'Scientific advice 
has been given and disregarded'. 100 Hardy was still attempting to do exactly what Paton 
has 
suggested, and establish an official relationship, or at least a recognised advisory procedure. 
97 FWC Minutes, I May 1917 Meeting, RSA, Crab 72. 
98 Paton to Hardy, 29 April 1917, RSA, Ms. 530 
99 Paton, enclosure with bid. 'Note'. 
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101 But things had by now got so hot that Flux, who was at the Board of Trade, felt he had to 
resign temporarily from the Committee, particularly while publication of the Memorandum 
damning the Food Ministry was still in the air. His resignation letter spoke of 'The change in 
relations of your Food (War) Committee to the Food Controller, from that of a friendly 
adviser, to that of a more or less hostile critic. He regretted that: 
The customary inter-Departmental courtesies must bar me from 
taking a share in such an open and frank challenge of official policy as 
the Committee now feels to be its duty, and while the Committee 
deems such action necessary, it will not be possible for me to act as a 
representative on the Committee of this Department. 102 
Thompson too had considered resigning as Scientific Adviser, but Rew had persuaded him to 
stay his hand. Thompson now wrote to Hardy complaining bitterly of his own treatment 
inside the Ministry: 
.... he (Devonport] has never seen me on any subject, nor 
have I ever 
spoken to him. The thing is so marked that I have come to regard it as 
a fixed purpose on his part not to have aLiy personal communication 
with his Scientific Adviser or advisers. 103 
Hardy was now faced on all sides by resignations, and by Paton urging direct and 
public action to criticise the Ministry. He had the unenviable task of trying to steer a 
moderate middle course while still pressing for a formalisation of the relations between FWC 
and Ministry, a battle he had fought for so long by various means without resorting to open 
warfare, which was anathema to the constitution of the Royal Society. As its Biological 
Secretary he could hardly resort to it, even under such provocation. He had also proved 
himself politically resourceful, if a trifle naive, in the kind of avenues of influence he had 
explored. He must have known that to go public now would be the last thing to endear the 
Royal Society to Government, and would have spelt an end to any possibility of influencing 
policy. However, Hardy had one thing on his side. He sensed, probably through various 
contacts inside the Government, that a change of Food Controller was imminent. He had 
hinted as much in trying to calm Paton in his letter to him of 8 May: 'The general position 
with respect to the Ministry of Food is still obscure. There is no doubt that changes wUl take 
place; the policy of the Ministry is to undergo alteration and there may be drastic changes 
in 
101 See Hardy to Rew, 3 May 1917, reproduced in full in FWC Minutes, W-s-it. II may Meeting- 102 Flu: x to Hardy, I May 1917, Ibid. 103 Thompson to Hardy, II May 1917, RSA, Ms. 530. Original emphasis. 
147 
its personnel as well'. 104 By 21 May he was even more candid. Again to Paton, he argued 
that whoever was the Food Controller, the Royal Society must not engage in a public fight, 
but added that, 
The Prime Minister had an interview with Devonport and Rew and I 
understand, spoke his mind very strongly on the subject. The public 
signs of a change of policy are obvious and I do not think one could 
expect more than has been done unless there is a change of Minister. 
105 
Devonport did indeed resign on I June 1917"", and after some delay (during which 
Ashley was one of those considered for the position of new Controller 107 )Lord Rhondda, an 
ex-businessman then President of the Local Government Board, was persuaded to take on 
the onerous position on 15 June. Hardy wasted no time in meeting with the new Controller 
on behalf of the FWC, and found him from the first more willing to listen to them. Hardy 
wrote to Ashley on 23 June 1917: 
I had some conversation with Lord Rhondda yesterday, which may be 
summarised by saying that he feels himself lost in face of the problem 
confronting him, and yet driven by the pressure of public opinion to 
act. He looks to the Committee to give him the lead. He finds the 
machinery of the Department disorganised, and his first work will be 
to try to get it into shape .... I shall ask the Committee to 
devote itself 
to thinking out what can best be said that wUl be most helpful to a man 
who confessedly has the whole business to team. "' 
Rhondda told Hardy that he wished to spend some time working out a price-fixing policy, 
and Hardy's comments on this to Ashley encapsulate the aims of the 'scientists' as we have 
examined them here: 'If we can carry him so far, we may then induce him to do what the 
Germans had to do, namely constitute a committee of experts to consider the question'. '09 
Ashley and the rest of the FWC met Rhondda on 25 June. Ashley stressed to the new Food 
Controller the need for co-ordination and consultation between relevant departments. He also 
seems to have suggested the idea of a Food Council, on which he was later to serve. 110 
104 Hardy to Paton, 8 may 1917, [bid. My emphasis. 
Jos Hardy to Paton, 21 Niay 1917, Ibid. My emphasis. 106 Beveridge, W& Lt p. 49. 
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During the meeting Hardy brought up his suggestion that an expert committee should be set 
up by the Nfinistry to calculate the related values of different foods as a basis for price-fixing. 
He suggested the members should be Ashley, Nfiddleton from the Board of Agriculture, 
Wood, MacCrosty and Flux from the Board of Trade, and Rew. "' But Rhondda asked the 
Food (War) Committee to do all the calculations for him. 112 The finished memorandum was 
to be submitted to Ashley, 'for economic criticism'. 113 
Ashley felt that the FWC had in the future 'a big role to play in definite physiological 
questions', 114 and relations with the Food Ministry do appear to have eased after Rhondda's 
appointment. The Food (War) Committee Minutes reveal a greater willingness to consult the 
Committee on matters ranging from the official publication of food articles by one Dr. 
Spriggs (the Committee felt they were out-of-date and advised against), to a request from 
Rhondda to 'submit a detailed plan for following closely the food stock of the country'. 1'5 
4.3. INFLUENCE ON POLICY: BRFADSTUFFS AND BREWING 
Before concluding this chapter, I want to offer some thoughts on the degree of 
influence that the FWC achieved. This will obviously necessitate a break in what has been a 
chronological structure. 
It has been already noted that the FWC consistently advocated what bec=e known 
as the 'breadstuffs policy' to be the guiding principle of all food strategy. This theme was 
present in the early Report on the Food Supply of the United Kingdo and continued to be 
stressed in the series of memoranda on national food policy. Beveridge later described this 
policy as, 
in its most general terms, that, whatever else was allowed to be in 
short supply, whether for human or animal consumption, there should 
be a sufficiency of breadstuffs to meet in full all demands for them 
without rationing. 
See Hardy to Rhondda, 23 June 1917, RSA, Box 5 30. 
See Hardy to Hall, 27 June 1917, lbid. 
113 Hardy to Middleton, 28 June 1917, RSA, Box 530. 
14 Ashley to Hardy, 26 June 1917, pop-c-it. 1 See Food (War) Committee Minutes, 2p. cit.. ' pp. 102-18 (13-27 July meetings). 
149 
Beveridge speaks of these ideas as becoming the basis of government policy under the first 
two Food Controllers, ' 16 and describes the breadstuffs policy as becoming 'the dominant 
note in British Food Control. He added that: 'It may first be seen taking shape in the 
published report (on U. K. food supply] of the Food (War) Committee'. 117 As a civil servant, 
in writing the history of British food control Beveridge not only chose to ignore any impact 
of the later reports which consistently recommended this policy, but even went so far as to 
state of the breadstuffs policy that: 
neither ... (in the report on the U. K. ] nor, to my knowledge, anywhere 
else during the war, was it promulgated in express terms or orderly 
sequence. The underlying principle has to be gathered from its 
different practical applications - maintenance of fuH cereal supplies, 
lengthened extraction of wheat, dilution with other grains and their 
restriction to human food, efforts to reduce flocks and herds, and 
restriction of imports of feeding stuffs. "' 
Both the underlying principle, and all these practical applications, and more, were, 
however, contained in the reports of the Food Committee from 1916 onwards. But how 
much influence did they have, especially considering Beveridge's damnation of them with 
faint praise? Certainly an examinafion of the contemporary organisational structure of the 
Ministry of Food also seems to indicate that the Ministry viewed food, as we saw Starling 
later argue, more in terms of the economics of supply, demand and distribution than of 
science. The official Scientific Adviser (Wood and later Thompson) attached to the 
Intelligence and Statistical Section of the Secretary's department did not loom large in the 
massive organisational structure. 119 However, all this means is that influence was not as 
formalised as the scientists themselves wanted. We must therefore look more closely, and at 
informal contacts and channels, to discern evidence of scientific influence over policy. 
A good illustration of this point may drawn from the debate about policy on the 
restriction of brewing and distilling in the Ministry in late 1916 and early 1917. The use as 
food of the materials such as barley used in brewing and distilling had been suggested in the 
third part of the FWCs report on the U-K food supply on 29 October 1916.12c' Brewing was 
initially limited by the Output of Beer Restriction Act of 3 August 1916, though this was a 
116 W. H. Beveridge, British Food Control (London, OUP, 1928), pp. 16-17. 1 17 D ýid, p. 8 3. 
ns lbid *' pp. 83-4. 119 See Beveridge Papers, Misc. Vol 92, Collection on Food Control, Vol. XIL 22-c-it. PassinL 
See Beveridge, M. _cit., p. 
17 and Stark, 22. Lt... P. 130. 
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measure conceived to save on tonnage of imports rather than to increase the food supply. "' 
During late 1916 and early 1917, the Ministry was keen to reduce brewing further. The 
stimulus was the forthcoming reports of the FWC which argued for the use of brewing 
materials directly as human food. The idea was to use barley, and other grains used in 
brewing, not as animal feed but to dilute flour further. This policy, the FWC argued, would 
most efficiently exploit the maximum levels of protein and energy in the grains. What is most 
interesting is the channels of influence between the FWC and the Ministry. The crucial 
contact, rather than the Scientific Adviser himself (Wood) was A. W. Flux, a statistician on 
the staff of the Board of Trade ( and, significantly, as was noted above, a member of the 
FWC since early 1916). His unique position gave him access to the deliberations of the 
FWC, even before the final draft of their report on brewing and distilling had been ratified. '22 
Flux wrote two memos on 14 December 1916 to Beveridge in the Food Ministry. They both 
suggested, on the basis of the forthcoming FWC report (Flux's draft copy of which was 
attached) that it would be useful to reduce brewing and to use the materials directly for 
human food: barley could be used for bread-making by the dilution of wheaten flour: 
The question of economy by reduction of brewing turns on the 
destination of the materials .... The Royal 
Society are satisfied, as I 
believe-others also who have experimented are satisfied, that barley 
meal may quite well be mixed with wheat % to 15 per cent in the 
manufacture of bread without inconvenience. ' 
The annexed FWC draft argued with scientific persuasion that barley should be used 
not for brewing, nor livestock feed, but for diluting flour as: 
The beer together with the by-products of the brewery contains 
between 27% and 58% of the energy and less than 27% of the protein 
of the original material, whereas if these materials were not brewed 
but utilised in the theoretically best possible manner, about 71% of the 
energy and 68% of the protein would be recovered as human food. 
This very high recovery is possible only if the use of the barley and 
other materials as food for five-stock is equally prohibited. If, as would 
otherwise be the case, they were converted into meat, only 15% of the 
energy and 17% of the protein would be realised as human food. 
124 
"" Beveridge, 2p. cit,. p. 18 
122 This report was the Appendix to the third part of Tbe-Food-SlIp eI n*t 0 and 
it appeared 
at the end of 1916. Flu: x's draft copy is in BPF, Vol. IL 'Brewing Restrictions, Dec. 1916 - 
July 1917'. 
123 Memo by AWF [Flim], to NIF, 14 December 1916, 'Brewing and Distilling - Effect. of Possible 
Restriction'. 
item 2. BPF, Vol. U 
IN th nited Kingdom-. ' RM2rt of the Physiology (War) Committee of the Royal Society on the Food SHMly of eU 
Part TIL 4- a Consideration of the Economy in Food which migbt be et 'bitim of 
Brewin draft 
copy approved by Food Sub-Committee on 9 December 1916, and signed by Hardy, BPF, B29, 
item 5. 
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The adoption of such a policy, Flux argued, would reduce tonnage requirements, and enlarge 
food stocks, especially if adopted in conjunction with another suggestion from the FWC: 
reducing the number of meat-yielding animals. Their food could be diverted to human use, 
again in bread-making, and their slaughter would mean more meat for human 
consumption. 125 In his account of British Food Contro, Beveridge overlooked the fact that 
he had received such advice from the FWC via Flux. He wrote only that: 
A fifth heading (in the third part of the report on the U. K. food supply 
which suggested food economies] - diversion of certain quantities of 
material used for stock feeding to human food - was named by the 
Committee, though not developed in the published report. 126 
The FWC's analysis and recommendations, as communicated via Flux, also found their way 
into two other important memoranda. The first came from H. G. Paul of the Food NIinistry. 
His 'Provisional Proposals in regard to Beer and Spirits discussed the various uses of home- 
grown barley and noted that, 
... m this connection the conclusions of the Royal 
Society's Committee 
on Food Supplies (sic] are of great importance. The Committee 
summarises the comparison between the various possible uses of 
brewers' materials (and here the above quote from the draft report is 
reproduced] .... If this view 
is accepted it will be necessary to follow up 
the restriction of brewing by the issue of Orders limiting the uses to 
which the surplus barley may be put. 127 
We pan clearly see the influence of the FWC on brewing policy in the 
Memorandum prepared from the above information at the request of Devonport, by 
A, 
Beveridge. "' This proposed to reduce brewing to 50% of 1915 output (43% of pre-War) 
releasing 400,000 tons of barley, 26,000 tons of grits (maize) and 55,000 tons of sugar. This, 
the memorandum argued, would save tonnage and leave home-grown barley for diluting 
bread. Beveridge took as his conclusion the recommendations of the FWC, and even 
enclosed the extract of their report reproduced above, proving scientifically the most efficient 
use of brewing materials as human food: 'It will make unquestionably better use of the food 
1: 5 See the 'very private' Memorandum to form the basis of a ruture p2rt considered and adopted at a 
meeting of the Food Sub-Committee held in the rooms of the Roval 3ociety on Satnrday December 9 1916 
which was also enclosed with Flu: x's memo. of 14 December. In his British -E20--C-0n-qyI 
Beveridge Overlooks 
the fact that he received this, saying oniv that 'A fifth heading [in third part of he report on the U. K. food 
supply which suggested food economies] - diversion of certain quantities'. 126- Beveridge, British Food Control, p. 17. 1227 H. G. Paul, 'Provisional Proposals in Regard to Beer and Spirits', BPF, Q2S. it,, item I- 123 Beveridge. 'Restriction of Brewing', Memorandum prepared for Lord Devonport at his request, presented 
to Devonport I January 1917, BPF , njiýh item 14. 
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value of the barley th@n is done in brewing (see extract from Report of the Royal Society 
Committee)'. "9 Beveridge had also added an 'Appendix of Possible Objections and 
Answers' for his chief. If the cry went up that beer itself was a food, preserving much of the 
nutritive value of its constituent materials, Beveridge advised the deployment of the scientific 
proof above: 
On this point the conclusion of the Food Committee of the Royal 
Society, in their report just presented, is of great value. [here he cites 
that paragraph again] .... If therefore the barley is not 
kept mainly for 
human consumption a measure for restricting brewing will 
undoubtedly be attacked with some force as wasteful of food. If the 
barley can be used mainly for mbdng with wheat flour, the scientific 
argument is conclusive against brewing. 130 
Devonport based his policy on this memorandum and wrote to the Chancellor (Bonar 
Law) on 5 January 1917, notifying him of his intention to further limit brewing to 50% of 
1915 levels and to prohibit beer exports. The Food Controller wanted to 'make an 
announcement early next week' 131 of these forthcoming changes, but, as Barnett has 
demonstrated, the decision was delayed by a War Cabinet embroiled with the brewing 
lobby. 132 
Devonport was allowed to announce the new restrictions on 29 March, and they 
came into force on I April. The control of the uses of cereals was soon achieved by orders of 
20 April 1917 by which the State began to take over the flour mills, and directly restrict the 
use of wheat and rye to seed and bread-making. The structure of control was completed 
under Rhondda with orders taking over the remaining mills and limiting the use of barley and 
dredge corn of 15 August and 17 November 1917. As Beveridge later noted: 'Sound wheat, 
rye and barley, unless used for seed, could not go anywhere except into the hands of the 
Government through the controlled flour mills'. Rhondda even went so far as to use price 
fixing to stop deliberate damaging of grain and subsequent sale for profit as animal feed. The 
price of such grain was fixed at seven shillings below its sound counterpart. 133 It seems then 
that the reports of the FWC, on this aspect of the breadstuffs policy at least, had considerable 
influence. 
"-9 Ibid. 
130 :7-. Ibid. 
131 Devonport to Bonar Law (copy), 5 January 1917, with item 14, Ibid. 1322 See Barnett, p2. cit., p. 106. 
Details in this paragraph taken from Beveridge, British Food Control, P. 34 and pp. 106-7. 
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However, the critical factor which made the Government turn its attention to food 
policy was undoubtedly the intensification of the German submarine campaign ftom the 
Autumn of 1916 134 and the consequent heavy losses of food cargoes, as well as the rising 
price of food. Another factor in leaving bread un-rationed was clearly the fear that restriction 
would lead to social unrest, as the Labour leader, Arthur Henderson had warned. "' His 
advice, coinciding with that of the FWC, may have focused the rninds of the Cabinet and the 
Food Controller on devising a more scientific policy for food. What can be said generally 
about the influence of the FWC, and what Starting did say with hindsight in 1919, was that 
once the Gover=ent became more food-minded, at least much of the statistical work had 
been done by the Royal Society and was ready to be incorporated into policy: 
The great value of science to a country is that it gives prescience; and 
our Government might have fared ill in their attempt to provide for the 
population as a whole, if the contingency of a food shortage had not 
been foreseen by the chief organ of science in this country - viz. - the 
Royal Society - so that a whole array of facts was at the disposal of 
the Government as soon as they were convinced of the necessity of 
taldng up this new war burden. 136 
4.4 EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION 
The FWC now enjoyed until the end of the War a much more satisfactory working 
relationship with the Ministry of Food, and had less need of other avenues of influence, 
though it still continued to send its reports to a variety of Government Departments and the 
War Cabinet. Starling, who took over the Chairmanship of the Committee, wrote in 1919 
that: 
It was not, however, till the appointment of Lord Rhondda as Food 
ControHer in June 1917 that scientific principles obtained their proper 
place in the determination of policy .... 
From this time on the Royal 
Society Committee acted practicay as a scienfific consultative 
committee in all matters of food supply; the close co-operation 
between the Food Ministry and the Committee being secured by the 
appointment of Sir William Thompson as Scientific Adviser to the 
Nfinistry. 137 
This is obviously itself partly rhetorical: although the FWC had a better relationship with 
Rhondda's food administration, it was never officially recognised as part of the governmental 
134 See David Lloyd George, War Memoirs (Popular Edition, 2 Vols., London, Odhams' 1938), P-670. 
, 33 See Ibid., p. 115 9. This point is made by Barnett, M. gL p. 111. 136 Starling, 2p-ciL, pp. 6-7. 
137 Starling, 2p-c-it, pp. 12-13. 
154 
machinery. Negotiations for a more formalised rsition continued right up till the end of the 
I. S ck4 1, --C. 4 C-" - war. The difference with Rhondda was one of personal style, rather than of structural 
differences in the machinery of food control. He was more wUling to delegate responsibility 
to his civil servants (hence Beveridge's praise for him), and to take advice from the FWC 
(hence Starflng's). However, no official relationship was ever arrived at, and thus no 
precedents for formalisation were set for expert influence over policy in the post-War years. 
At the end of the war the FWC made efforts to continue its work and formalise its advisory 
position within the machinery of government, either as a new national institute of human 
nutrition research, or as a part of the Medical Research Committee (later Council). These 
came to nothing, although some of the FWC's work was continued by Hardy at the new 
Food Investigation Board of the DSIK 138 After the war, Hardy was one of the key trusted 
individuals who, as was argued at the start of chapter three, served to co-ordinate the 
research activities of the various government sponsored scientific centres, in the absence of 
any central co-ordinating machinery for all aspects of civilian research. 
However, what is most important from the above for present purposes, is that the 
scientists, as their public rhetoric argued, struggled for a formalisation of the relations of 
outside expertise and government, which would install them as an officially recognised and 
important part of the machinery of government, with a strong voice in the making of policy. 
It is too early too conclude whether the FWC were adhering to the Royal Society model for 
influence described in chapters two and three, or rebeUing against it. As was stated at the 
outset of this chapter, very little work has been done on the role of the Royal Society in the 
war in the area of food, and almost none in any other area (with the possible exception of gas 
research). What can be said is that the leading members of the FWC (mainly Hardy, Paton 
and Ashley), primarily wanted the committee itself, rather than any new Government body, to 
become the formalised centre of food policy. The FWC formalised its relations as far as it 
possibly could in this direction, but when it could go no further, it developed other, more 
informal channels of advice to get its message acrross, and enable the maximum influence to 
be brought to bear on food. This does to some extent conform to the RoyalSociety model. 
138 See Eric Hutchinson, 'A Fruitful Cooperation between Government and Academic Science: Food Research 
in the United Kingdom', Minav-a, Vol. 10, (1972), pp. 19-50; Sally Horrocks, consuming Science-, 
Science, 
Technology and Food in Britain, 1870-1939', Ph. D. thesis, University of Manchester, 1993, chapter six (I am 
grateful to the author for an advance copy of this chapter). 
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This also had formalisation as the goal, but when formalisation could proceed no further, it 
favoured continuing by more informal methods. Certainly the post-War history of the FWC 
followed this path. The FIB, with Hardy at its head, was one of the new bodies, as was 
argued earlier, which together formed, through their eminent chiefs, a scientific power-base 
within the machinery of government. Informal contacts between the heads of these new 
bodies could result in large areas of policy being effectively controlled by scientists. But, the 
strategy was a risky one since it refied on key personnel to hold off the influence of the 
generafist State. This was not an acceptable long-term policy. 
AS was noted above, it was not only scientists, but also an economist who were 
arguing for formalisation. In the next three chapters I will examine more closely the public 
science of British economists and show that Ashley, with his positive public science was in a 
minority position. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ALFRED MARSHALL AND THE RELATIONS OF ECONOMISTS AND 
POLICY-MAKING IN LATE NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH 
CENTURY BRITAIN 
The previous chapter illustrated the public science of scientists in action. Scientists 
were observed actively pressing for a formalisation of their executive policy-making 
powers. But not just scientists: W. J. Ashley was also seen to use the same type of public 
science arguments to argue for a formalisation of scientific and economic input into policy. 
Following on from this, I want to argue in this chapter that the formalisation of influence 
over policy was a characteristic feature of the professionalisation of economics, as well as 
of science. Ashley's position will be explored in detail in chapter six, but first it is important 
to establish how this contrasted with the dominant attitude in British economics in this 
period towards involvement in policy-making. 
I will argue that in the years immediately after taking up his Chair at Cambridge in 
1885, Alfred Marshall set about a campaign to professionalise economics in Britain, and 
that central to this process was a strategy to obtain influence over policy-making. However, 
unlike the scientists, this strategy was not geared to winning immediate influence, but 
influence in the longer term. Marshall knew that economics was not at the same level of 
professionalisation as science, it did not yet even have a methodological consensus. 
Marshall's strategy for professionalisation involved imitating the professionalisation of 
science in the nineteenth century. The (rigorously scientific) methodology, nature, and scope 
of the discipline had to be established and agreed, and economics had to become a 
university-based discipline with a clearly defined area of expertise. The visible trappings of 
professional status had to be gained: a discrete examination system, professional body and 
academic journal. Finally a new framework or general theory, within which all types of 
economist were willing to work had to be formulated and accepted. Only when professional 
status had thus been built up, openly using the model of the scientific profession, could 
economics,, according to Marshall, hope to acquire the social and cultural authority that 
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science was perceived to have acquired in the years of populist scientific naturalism. ' Only 
when this kind of authority had been earned could economists openly attempt to formalise 
their position in the policy process, as we observed scientists doing. Until such time 
Marshall's strategy insisted that economists standardise a negative form of public science. 
Thus almost every public utterance of Marshall somewhere contained a familiar rubric 
which stressed the inability of economics to give definite policy recommendations and the 
lack of any desire to do so. Rather than arguing technocratically, that their scientific method 
could give a certainty to policy decisions, Marshall desired that economists should claim to 
want to preserve a distance between their science and politics (in the short term) to maintain 
the scientific accuracy of their subject. However, this strategy did not bar economists from 
giving policy advice, as long as they did it through private informal channels. Overall, this 
strategy fitted in well with the cautious attitude of the British State to outside expertise in 
this period: they should be on tap but should not be seen to be on top. 
Some work has, of course already been done in this direction. This e7dsting 
literature has already begun to answer Margaret Schabas' call (which I noted in my 
introduction), for a new history of economic thought, employing more of the approaches 
already common in the history of science (a tradition which I have, of course, heavily leaned 
towards in my treatment of scientists here). Thus A. W. Coats and John Maloney have 
argued that Marshall's activities should be interpreted as an attempt to professionalise 
economiCS. 2 Maloney has added a theoretical dimension to his analysis, claiming that 
Marshall saw the development of welfare economics as the theoretical corollary of his 
unification of economics, and as the development of-. a science of economic policy. The 
equation of economic welfare with total welfare, present in Marshall, but theoretically 
completed by his Cambridge successor, Pigou, created a broad framework or 'research 
programme 3 within which a diversity of economists could work, and provided an interface 
1 On science see, for example, F. M. Turner, 'Rainfall, Plagues, and the prince of Wales: a Chapter in the Conflict 
of Religion and Science', Journal of British Studies Vol. 13, (1973-4), pp. 46-65; The Victorian Conflict between 
. 356-376; 
db cS ce. ct Science and Religion: a Professional Dimension', jLij, Vol. 69, (1978), pp an Tu li cien . . ', M_iýt. 
Coats has written numerous articles over many years on various aspects of the professionalisation of economics, 
and its political involvements. The most useful articles are cited throughout this chapter, but a more complete 
list 
appears in my Bibliography. Recently Coats has had the ru-st part of his collected articles published as On the 
History of Economic Iliought. (London, Routledge, 1992). Two further volumes (one with the focus on 
methodology and one on sociology) arc imminent; Maloney, Marsha i2nalisation o 
Economics, (Cambridge, CUP, 1985) and 'Marshall, Cunningham and the Emerging Economics Professiod, 
Economic History Review. Vol. 29, (1976), pp. 44()-S 1. 
3 Maloney, Marshall. Orthod2n. ... P 91. cit., pp. 18 1 -5. 
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between theory and practice, giving economics the theoretical justification to make policy 
recommendations. Alon Kadish has charted in detail Marshall's manoeuvrings towards the 
various visible trappings of professionalisation, and has set this in the context of the 
contraction of economics to exclude economic history. ' Gerard Koot has painstakingly 
examined the heterogeneous community of the economic historians and has noted the 
political agendas of its members, but not how these were to be translated into 
practice. 5 Very recently, Kadish, along with Keith Tribe, has brought together a useful 
selection of scholarship exploring how economics established itself as a part of the curricula 
of British universities. 6 Collini, Winch and Burrow have concentrated on indicating the 
imperialistic nature of Marshalls subsuming of the various strands of economics under a 
new economic edifice. They suggest that Marshall's ultimate aim was for economics to 
expand to become the social science with public authority on social questions. However, 
they stress the word social and argue that Marshall had no ambitions to gain influence 
through the more obvious channels of political power. Instead he sought a slow build up of 
influence over the longer term, by educating the politically important members of the polity 
like businessmen, trades union leaders, and civil servants. 7 
I want to add to these existing interpretations by arguing, as I have above, that part 
and parcel of Marshall's professional strategy was the long-term goal of open, formalised 
policy influence: the same kind of influence for which the scientists have been observed 
campaigning. I hope to add to the growing debate by exploring the mechanisms for 
achieving policy influence used by economistsý and, utilising the concept of public science, 
to examine the rhetorical strategies pursued to persuade the British political elite of 
politicians and civil servants that economists should be considered a valuable resource in 
the framing of policy. 
4 Kadish, Historians- Economist3 and Economic History, (London, Routledge, 1989); See also his TIN 2ftrd 
Fconon-dsts in the Late Nineteenth Centurv (Oxford4 Clarendon Press, 1982). 
5 Koot, English 
-Historical 
Economics. 1870-1926: the Rise of --conornic Hist- q"d 
Neomercantilism 
(Cambridge, CUP, 1987). 
Kadish and Tribe (eds. ), The Market for Political Economy: the Advent of Economics -in 
British University 
Culture. 1850-1905 (London, Routledge, 1993). This volume presents the fruit of the British contribution to an 
international project on the development and institutionalisation of economics. 
ISIQ01-SMOR Collini, Winch and Burrow, That Noble Science of politics: A '), tudv in Nin C ti Y- 
Intellectual Histoiy 
(Cambridge, CUP, 1983). 
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5.1 THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND NIARSHALL'S ATTEMPT TO REFORGE A UNIFIED 
DISCIPLINE 
The years 1869-80 are generally agreed by historians of economics to have 
witnessed a crisis in classical political economy. Looking back in 1888, Foxwens (then 
Professor of Political Economy at University College, London), identified three major 
challenges to the nature and scope of economics: 'theoretic criticism, historical method and 
humanistic feelings'. 9 
The theoretical attack came largely from the marginalists. W. S. Jevons'O had led a 
so-called marginal revolution with the publication of his Theory of Political Econom in 
1871, attacking the classical theory of value. He asserted that rather than being based on a 
combination of production costs and eýdsting demand, assessments of value should be based 
on a mathematical estimation of the marginal utility of a commodity. 
Ifistorical economists like Cliffe Leslie" and William Cunningham 12 attacked what 
they perceived as the deductive methodology of economics. They argued that economic 
doctrine was historically specific: the product of a particular time, place and set of 
economic conditions. Thus classical economics was not justified in claiming universal 
applicability for its laws. Their ultimate aim was to substitute an alternative body of theory 
based on the inductive analysis of historical economic trends, although this goal was never 
realised. As Gerard Koot has noted: 'English historical economics was a historicist critique 
rather than a historicist effort of building a new system of economic theory'. 
" 
8 Herbert Somerton Foxwell (1849-1936): historical econon-dst and, with Cunningham, its flag bearer at 
Cambridge. He became increasingly opposed to Marshall's version of economics. Educated at St. John's College 
Cambridge, and Fellow of College, 1974-1936. Professor of Political Economy at University College, London, 
1881-1928. 
9 H. S. Foxwell, 'The Economic Movement inEnglancr, Quarterly Journal of conornics. Vol. lI, (l888), p. 87. Cited 
here from p. 144, Coats, *The Historicist Reaction in English Political Economy 1870-90', Econorrdca Vol. 21 
(May 1954), pp. 143-53. 
10 William Stanley Jevons (1835-82): Educated Universitv College, London. Professor of Logic and of PoliticaL 
Mental and Moral Philosophy, Owens College, Manchester, 1866-80. 
11 Thomas Edward Cliffe Leslie, (1827-82). Educated trinity College Dublin. Professor of Jurisprudence and 
Political Economy, Queen's College, Belfast, 1853-82. 
12 The Venerable William Cunningham, (1849-1919). Educated at Edinburgh Academy, Edinburgh University and 
, tension 
Lecturer 1874-8; Lecturer in Caius College Cambridge. Ordained 1874; Cambridge University Ex History 
1884-91-, Tooke Professor of Statistics, King's College, London 1891.7; Chaplain, Trinity College, Cambridge, 
1880-9 1; Vicar of Great St. Mary's 1887-1908; Archdeacon of Ely 1907-19. 
13 G. M. Koot, English Historical Economics, 1870- 1 926. The Rise o* conornic *sto and - mercaribilis-M 
(Cambridge, CUP, 1987), p. 2. See also, Coats, 'The Historicist Reaction in English Political Economy 1870-9U, 
2R-clift, 
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The other strand of criticism was more amorphous, but was no less serious. 
However unfairly, the classical economic writers like Ricardo, Mill and Smith had become 
associated in the public mind with a utilitarian analysis of economic behaviour, based on the 
selfish activities of 'econon-dc man' in a free market. 14 The perceived tenor of this analysis 
became increasingly out of kilter with the growing middle class awareness of, and sensitivity 
to, the revelations of the squalid conditions of the working classes, brought increasingly into 
focus by the social surveys of Booth and Rowntree, and by the writings of countless other 
lesser social investigators, from the 1870s onwards. 15 Such fears were exacerbated by 
perceptions of Britain's relative economic and social decline in an increasingly tense and 
competitive international situation. 16Not only did classical political economy seem unable 
to address the question of want amidst plenty, but it seemed unable even to guarantee 
prosperity at all. Economists themselves were largely drawn from the middle classes 17 , and 
were thus alive to such contemporary sensitivities (W. A. S. Hewins", Clare Collet and 
Beatrice Webb were all involved in Booth's survey of the London poor). Furthermore, 
while classical economics was associated with laissez faire, the period after 1870 saw an 
increasing trend towards state intervention. Thus the debate within economics was part of a 
wider ideological shift in British society. 
The crisis of economics Was heightened by the deaths of Miff in 1873 and Cairnes'9 
in 1875,, and by the attempted exclusion of economists from Section F of the BAAS by 
14 See Koot M. Cit., pp. 10-14, passinr, Donald Winch, Economics and Polic (London, Fontana, 1972), chapter 
one, pass= 
15 A selection of such contemporary accounts are brought together in Peter Keating (ed), Into Unk-nown-EnRland. 
1866-1913: Selections from the Social E3RIorers (Glasgow, Fontana/Collins, 1981, originally 1976). 
16 See G. R. Searle, Ilie Quest for National Efficiency. (London, Blackwell, 1971y, See also for example, E. J. 
, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969y, and Bruce Collins and 
Keith Robbins (ed), Hobsbawm, Industry and EMRLtre 
British Culture and Economic Decline. (London, Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1990). 
17 See the data gathered by A. W. and S. E. Coats on the educationalloccupational background of members of the 
British Economic Association in this period, in their paper, 'The Changing social composition of the Royal 
Economic Society 1990-1960 and the Professionalisation of British Economics', British Journal of Sociology Vol. 
24 (June 1973), pp. 165-187. In 1891 the top three occupations were Businessman (30.9% including banking and 
insuranceý, University teacher (18.2,21.8 including other teachingý, and Civil Servant (10.9). Business also 
accounted for the occupation of 25% of the members fathers. See also their article 'The Social Composition of the 
Royal Economic Society and the Beginnings of the British Economics "profession*, 1890-1915', British Journal 0 
Sociology, Vol. 21 (May 1970), pp. 75-85. 
c 00 an em eI Ox rd; WiWwn Albert Samuel Hewins (1865-193 1): Educated Wolverhampton ShIdP brok Col ege, . fo 
Director of London School of Economics 1895-1903, and then head of chamberlain's Tariff Commission; 
Conservative M. P. 1912-18; Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies 1917-19. 
19 John Elliot Cairnes: (1823-75): Educated Trinity College, Dublin. WhatelY Professor of Political Economy, 
Trinity College 1856-6 1; Professor of Political Economy and Jurisprudence, University College, Galway, 185 
9-65; 
Professor of Political Economy, University College, London 1866-75. 
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10 Francis Galton in 1877, on the grounds that it was unscientific. ' Jevons must have voiced 
the feelings of many economists when as President of Section F in 1870 he commented 
(perhaps thinking of the lukewarm reception his pioneering mathematical paper of 
1862, 'Notice of a General Mathematical Theory of Political Economy', had received from 
Section F members, most of whom, rather ironically considering the later events of 1877, 
probably did not sufficiently understand it 21 ): 
There is no one who occupies a less enviable position than the political 
economist. Cultivating the frontier regions between certain knowledge 
and conjecture, his efforts and advice are scorned and rejected on aff 
hands. If he arrives at a sure law of human nature, and points out the evils 
which arise from its neglect, he is fallen upon by the large classes of 
people who think their own common sense sufficient; he is charged with 
being too abstract in his speculations, with overlooking the windings of 
the human heart, and with undervaluing the affections. However humane 
his motives, he is lucky if he escapes being set down on all sides as a 
heartless misanthrope. 2 
Jevons rehearsed his audience's concerns that political economy had not yet reached the 
status of a science. He also reminded them that this was the ultimate goal and that the 
disapproval of physical scientists for political economy was unwarranted: 
... they [physical scientists] forget the absurd theories, the incredible 
errors, the long enduring debates out of which their own knowledge has 
emerged, and look with scom upon our economic science, our statistics, 
or our still more vague body of knowledge called social science, because 
we are still struggling to overcome difficulties far greater than ever they 
encountered. 23 
Internally fragmented by theoretical and methodological disputes and held in low 
public and professional esteem, political economy was at a low ebb. But Jevons had pointed 
to the solution: in order to reconstitute itself as a credible separate discipline and profession 
with a recognised area of social and cultural authority, political economy had to imitate the 
professional trajectory of the natural sciences. 
'0 On this see R. L. Smyth, 'The History of Section F of the British Association 1835-1970. pp. 156-175 in N. 
Kaldor, (ed) Conflicts in 22ficy Obiectives. _EMM. 
Presented to Section F (Eco iomics) at the 1970 Annual Meetin 
of the BAAS (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1970), especially pp. 162-3. 21 On the reception accorded Jevons in 1862 see Sm)th, pX. cit., p. 159. 22 W. S. Jevons, 'Economic Policy', address to Section F, Liverpool, Septemj>--r 1870, reproduced as PP. 25-40 in 
R. L. Smyth (ed. ) Essays in Economic Method: - gel ted Paj? M read to Secti i for the 
Advancement of Science. 1860-1913- (London, Gerald Duckworth, 1962). Quotation from p. 26. 23 Jevons, lbid. 
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It was against this background that Alfred Marshall, after having been at Oxford and 
Bristol, took up the Chair of Political Economy at Cambridge in 1885 and began the clearly 
necessary work of re-forging British economics as a university-based scientific profession. 
The criticisms largely dictated Marshall's agenda for reform. Marshall attempted to 
synthesise a new neo-classical, economics which would contain elements from all the critics 
of classical economics, but without compromising its basic doctrines or methodology. He 
incorporated marginal analysis into his theory; added a historical and mathematical 
dimension to his analysis; infused his economics with an ethical mission to retain but 
improve laissez-faire capitalism; and stressed the scientific nature of economics. 
This reformation of economics was not a gentle compromise, but an attempt to 
regroup the disparate strands under the firm leadership of a new Cambridge school. 
Marshall was vexed by the suggestion: 
... that I try to compromise between or reconcile different schools of 
thought... Truth is the only thing worth having; not peace. I have never 
compromised on any doctrine of any kind. 24 
Collini, Winch and Burrow have argued that Marshall was pursuing an imperialistic vision 
of a new economics, which would subsume elements of all critical positions under a new 
deductive regime. As they have posited: 
When MarshaU appeared to be making defensive concessions to rival 
disciplines and methodological perspectives, he was often diluting the 
claims to knowledge made by their devotees, engaging in a covert 
process of anneicing e)dsting territory to economics, and suggesting ways 
in which economics, as he re-defined it, provided unique access to 
undiscovered lands. 25 
This assertion was certainly true of Marshall's private behaviour. In his private letters he 
seems to have been very clear that one of the first steps towards establishing economics as 
an independent academic discipline was to engage in 'boundary work"' to exclude certain 
types of economic thinker. His conception of economics was as 'the scientific study of 
economic facts and contemporary changes, of course, not neglectful of their historical 
24 Marshall to J. B. Clark, 24 March 1908, Marshan p: lpers. Cited from Maloney, Marshall. Orthodoxv. - 2R. cit 
p. 52. 
25 Collini, Winch and Burrow, 2p,. cit. p. 314. 
For an explanation of this term see, T'homas. F. Gier%u, 'Boundary Work- and the Demarcation of Scicnce from 
Non-Scicnce: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists', pp. 791-795. American Socioloixical 
Revi 
, 
Vol. 48, (1983). 
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antecedents'. 27 The economist should concentrate on 'keeping the head cool and clear in 
tracing and analysing the combined action of many combined causes '. 2' Businessmen and 
politicians, lay economists, were immediately excluded from the elite. Thus on the cover of 
an unused draft of his Presidential Address to Section F in 1890, Marshall distinguished 
between the 'Academic Insider in economics' and the 'Outsidee. In the unused draft itself he 
speaks of these outsiders, 'those who having a real interest in economics are yet too much 
occupied with other affairs to be able to study it technically', as 'troublesome' because they: 
... take propositions that were intended to be limited and treat them as 
unlimited. They take sentences out of processes reasoning with 
preference to particular cases and make them into dogmas ... 
29 
For Marshall the insider was the academic economist; an as yet unknown species which he 
planned to create. 
This attitude led to further exclusions. Despite his own intellectual background in 
philosophy and psychology, as well as in mathematics, " he had nothing but contempt for 
those who took economics as part of the Moral Science Tripos. He thought that economics 
had nothing in common with the abstract nature of philosophy. Describing the academic 
Jenkyn Jones in a letter to J. N. Keynes3l in 1897, he wrote, 'he knows economics as a 
branch of philosophy i. e. he knows nothing about it! "2 
Also marginalised were the historical economists whose approach though 'infinitely 
more important than philosophical economics because infinitely more real' was still 'not 
economics proper'. Marshall thought they had no real grasp of mathematical statistics or 
advanced economic theory. 33 
27 Marshall to J. N. Keynes 30 August 189 1, cited from Maloney, gp. citýý, p. 43. 
28 From Marshall's inaugural lecture as Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge in 1885, reprinted in A. C. 
Pigou (ed. ) Memorials of Alfred Marshall. (London, Macmillan, 1925), p. 171. flereafter this collection will be 
referred to as Memorials. 
2" Unused draft of Presidential Address 1890, with comments on cover possibly written at a later date, Marshall 
Papers. Cited here from Maloney, Marshall. QrtWoxv... 22--cit-,, p. 41. This draft went un-used perhaps precisely 
because Marshall was concerned to re-define economics but could not (yet) affird to alienate 'outsiders', since, at 
this time there was no new generation of university-t-ained economists: most of the economics community were 
outsiders' according to Marshall's vision. 
'0 For details of Marshall's education and early influences see David Reisman, Alfred Marshall'i Mission, 
(Houndmills, Macmillan, 1990), particularly chapter 2; and J. M. Keynes, 'Alfred Marshall, 1842-1924', pp.. 1-66 
in Memorials. 
31 John Neville Keynes (1852-1949): Educated London University and Pembroke College, Cambridge. Lecturer in 
Moral Science, Cambridge 1894- 1.911; Universitv Regisn-ary 1910-25. 
32 Marshall to J. N. Keynes 16 August 1897, cited by Maloney Mars III Ortho-dox 2p. cit,. 
33 .9 
g-- __ 
p. 43. 
Marshall to Keynes, 30 August 1891'. and May 1889 cited by Maloney, Tbid. 
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5.1.1 NLARSHALL AND FESTORICAL ECONOMICS: 
Marshall incorporated historical analysis into his magnum opus Principles of 
Economics. first published in 1890, while damning the work of the historicists with faint 
praise, and insisting on the primacy of theoretical causal analysis of historical data. 34 
Marshall pointed out the limited use of the historical approach to his economics in 
his Inaugural lecture as Cambridge Professor in 1885. He relegated the historical approach 
to the position of servant to economic science. Mocking those who would have economists 
'discard all theories, and .. seek the solution of our economic difficulties in the direct 
teaching of facts!, he objected that: 'the facts by themselves are silent. Observation 
discovers nothing directly of the actions of causes, but only of sequences in time'. 35 In 
order to interpret bare facts, economists cannot 'dispense with the use of the economic 
organon: but rather make use of its aid at every step'. Reason must make sense of facts to 
ascertain the interplay of causal factors. The implication was clear: theoretical models of 
measurable motives favoured by neo-classical economics were universally applicable as 
tools to explain past economic practices. The study of economic history 'has done good 
service' (and we should note the use of the past tense) but 'econon-dc science ... will do a 
great deal more in applying contemporary observations ... to explain the economic past ... very 
much as the telescope breaks up a nebula'. 36 Marshall concluded that historical economics 
was but a small part of the work of the professional economist: 
Greedy then as the economist must be for facts, he must not be content 
with mere facts. Boundless as must be his gratitude to the great thinkers 
of the histodcal school, he must be suspicious of any direct light that the 
past is said to throw on problems of the present. He must stand fast by 
the more laborious plan of interrogating facts in order to learn the manner 
of action of causes singly and in combination, applying this knowledge to 
build up the organon of economic theory, and then making use of the aid 
of the organon in dealing with the economic side of social problems. He 
will thus work in the fight of facts, but the light will not be thrown 
directly, it will be reflected and concentrated by science. 37 
Marshall also revealed here the ultimate aim of his imperialistic reformation of 
economics: it was to create a discipline with so much intellectual and scientific authority, 
34 See Robin C. O. Matthews and Barry Supple, *The Ordeal of Economic Freedom: Marshall on Economic 
11istory', pp. 189-213, Quaderni di Storia dell'Economia Politica, Vol. IX, (199 1), nos. 2-3. 
35 Marshall, p. 166, Ilie Present Position of Economics!, reprinted in Memorials, PP. 152-174. m DLjd,. pp. 165-6 and p. 169. 37 Ibid., p. 171. 
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that it would be publicly recognised as capable of commenting on social problems. We will 
return to this underlying theme later. 
Following this analysis of the place of historical economics, the original version 
(1890) of Book I of Marshall's Principles contained chapters on 'The Growth of Free 
Industry and Enterprise' and 'The Growth of Economic Science. This prompted a bitter 
attack from the historical economist Cunningham" (formerly a 11istory lecturer at 
Cambridge, now Tooke Professor of Statistics, King's College, London, but still part of the 
Cambridge community as Vicar of Great St. Mary's). Cunningham thought he could see 
exactly what Marshall was about: 
... the ordinary economist... professes 
himself extremely interested in 
11istory, and like a French King... expresses a wish to do anything he can 
for it ... Economists do not leave it alone; they do not pursue 
it seriously, 
but try to incorporate some of its results into that curious amalgam, the 
main body of economic tradition; and the result is the perversion of 
economic history. 39 
But he was powerless to stop Marshall: when Aushall. replied, the editor of the Economic 
Journal, Edgeworth, refused to allow Cunningham any more space in that organ to continue 
the dispute, and he had to make do with the less prestigious pages of the Pall Mall Gazette. 
The dispute between Marshall and Cunningham was partly personal. It dated back 
to Marshall's ruling at Cambridge in the 1880s that Cunningham must lecture on formal 
political economy at least one term a year, rather than his usual practice of introducing 
theory only as and when the need arose. 40 Even in these beginnings, however, it is clear that 
it had a wider importance as a dispute about the nature of economics. The denouement 
came in 1905 when, prompted by Marshall, the Cambridge Economics Board issued a 
statement posted in Trinity College (to which Cunningham had recently been appointed 
Director of Economic Studies) that students should not seek guidance from Cunningham as 
he 'has publicly declared himself to be out of sympathy with the study of Economics as it is 
pursued by this Board' . 
4' Furthermore, in following editions Marshall removed the 
`8 See Cunningham "nie Perversion of Economic FfistorV, Econ lic journal, Vol. 11, (1892), pp. 493-5, and 
Marshall's 'Reply, in the same volume. 
39 Cunningham, p2-. ci-t,. p. 49 1. 
See Maloney, 'Marshall, Cunningham... % ce. cLi. 
Marshall Papers, 7/2 1, Loose Typed Sheet. 
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historical portions of his Principles, to Appendices. We may take this action as a final 
metaphor for his opinions on the value of historical economics, along with his confidence to 
I N. Keynes in 1889 that 'men of the historical type', were 'intelligent, more or less 
earnest, but not very profound'. As he commented in the same letter: 'I want however to 
keep my hold on the historical men: they are Kittle-Kattle; and yet important'. 42 
Marshallian hegemony over economics therefore, at least privately, enshrined a 
vision of a new scientific discipline which was ruthlessly exclusive of all but a 
homogeneous few conforming academic insiders. However, publicly, Marshall was much 
more willing to accept a heterogeneous profession and was conciliatory towards those 
economic thinkers, academic and non-academic, with differing views on the nature and 
scope of economics. Though he wished to build up an exclusive profession, he could not do 
so openly without risking a renewal of the methodological debate which simmered just 
below the surface of economics. In any case most political economists were lay people in 
Marshall's terms, since economics as a separate university discipline simply did not yet 
exist. In public, therefore, though not an active compromiser, Marshall certainly did not go 
out of his way to provoke discord. He was keen to defuse the methodological debate with 
the historical economists. His public position was conciliatory: 
Science, when obtaining new Laws, is said to be inductive; when 
reasoning from them and finding how they are connected with one 
another, it is said to be Deductive; its third task, that of verification, has 
just been described. There has been a controversy as to whether 
Economics is an Inductive or a Deductive Science. It is both: Its 
Inductions continually suggest new Deductions; its Deductions 
continually suggest new Inductions. 43 
Moreover he discouraged public controversy and shied away from public criticism of his 
contemporaries, even when they had criticised his work. Leslie Stephen's biographer 
described how Stephen despised him 'for being all things to all men' and 'never saying a 
word against anybody however they much deserve it'. ' Marshall himself admitted that his 
ars 12 Marshall to Keynes, May 1889, Marshall Papers. Cited h from Maloney M. hall. OrthodoN. y... 2p. cit., p. 43. 
43 A. Marshall and Mary Paley Marshall, Economics of In4ustry, (London, 1879), p. 3, cited here 
from Koot, 
P. 30. 
44 Noel Annan, Leslie Stephen. His nought and Character in Relation-to-b-i-s-ThMe, (London, 1951), pp. 136-8. 
Cited here from Coats, p. 710, 'Sociological Aspects of British Economics c. 1880-1930', Journal of 
Political 
EconoMy. Vol. 75, (1967), pp. 706-29. 
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public aim was to emphasise what united economists, rather than what divided them, to 
offset public opinion. To Foxwell he wrote, 
The one thing that [Henry George] says which is important, I think, is 
that economists are -to outward appearances at least- at loggerheads with 
one another. I would rather put in one brick 
- 
just where it should be in the 
slowly rising economic edifice than plant a hundred brickbats with the 
utmost dexterity between the eyes of Mr. George. (my emphasiS)41 
Another element of MarshaH's synthesis, again responding to the criticism we noted 
above, and attempting to unify the diverse elements of the discipline, was his stressing of 
the clear ethical purpose and position of the subject. 
S. 1.2 MARsHAn AND Enucs 
Marshall claimed that the prime motivation behind his entire economic enterprise 
was the improvement of the lot of the poor under capitalism. While I would not want to 
question the sincerity of his altruism, I do want to argue that the presentation of this aim as 
fundamental to his new economic edifice, made it appear particularly responsive to what 
Foxwell called humanitarian criticism. Marshall succeeded in stealing the thunder of the 
ethical criticisms of classical economics, while maintaining a commitment to a capitalistic 
system of society, only slightly moderated by government intervention. Thus another strand 
of economics was incorporated into his economic edifice with little compromise on 
doctrine. 
Under the combined contemporary influences of Darwinian ideas of social 
progress, ' increased middle class concern for the condition of the masses, and the 
perceived threat to the status quo from the rise of Socialist ideas and class-based politics, 
47 
Marshall, like many other intellectuals of his generation on the political right and left, 
sought a new third way between Gladstonian Liberalism and the new Socialism. For 
Marshall this meant tempering Liberalism with a secularised version of Christian ethics. Part 
of Marshall was, as Maynard Keynes later noted, a secular 'preacher and pastoe. This gave 
Marshall to Foxwell, 22 June 1883, cited by Maloney, Marshall. Orth2Lo-xv-. --. -Or--clit--, P. 
5 1. 
. -WIs p. 
9, for the influence of Darwin on Marshall during his See J. M. Keynes, Allred Marshalr, in -! 
ým2ri 
undergraduate career at Cambridge. 
47 Marshall had great respect for. and was influenced by the ideas of Socialist writcrs (See for example 'The 
Present Position Of Economics, pp. 155-6: 'The Social Possibilities of Economic Chivalry', pp. 334, both reprinted 
in Memorials, where Marshall claims to be a form of Socialist himself). He departed from Socialism over the 
extent of State control and because he felt it lacked 'a principle of progressive improverneriC (from his valedictory 
address at Bristol, in 188 1. partly reprinted in Keynes, gg. cit p. 16-17). 
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his Economics the character of an ethical mission. He repeatedly stressed that the aim of his 
Economics was to improve the lot of the poor within the emsting capitalist, free market 
economic system. As he said on leaving the Principalship of Bristol College in 1881: 'The 
work I have set before myself is this : how to get rid of the evils of competition while 
retaining its advantages'. 48 Perhaps the clearest statement of the ethical mission which 
informed his work came in a story about his early life he told to Maynard Keynes: 
About the time that I first resolved to make as thorough a study as I 
could of Political Economy ... I saw in a 3hop-window a small oil painting 
of a marf s face with a strikingly gaunt and wistful expression, as of one 
'down and out', and I bought it for a few shillings. I set it up above the 
chimney piece in my room in college and thenceforward called it my 
patron saint, and devoted myself to trying how to fit men like that for 
heaven. Meanwhile I got a good deal interested in the semi-mathematical 
side of pure Economics, and was afraid of becoming a mere thinker. But 49 
a glance at my patron saint seemed to call me back to the right path. 
In his political, economic and ethical views Marshall was thus a late Victorian liberal 
intellectual. " A liberal because he firmly believed that technological advance and prosperity 
were still guaranteed only by the operation of private enterprise in a free market; a late 
Victorian liberal because he rejected the three intellectual pillars of mid-century political 
economy. Marshall had followed J. S. Mill in adopting a less harsh, less materialistic, form of 
Utilitarianism. He also rejected the extreme Laissez-Faire doctrines of mid-century 
Manchester School popularisers. They had 'twisted' the meaning of Laissez-Faire. It did not 
mean 'Let Government keep up its police, but in other matters fold its hands and go to 
sleep'. 31 Rather it should mean 'Let everyone work with all his might; and most of all let 
the Government arouse itself to do that work which is vital, and which none but the 
Government can do efficiently'. 52 Marshall believed that Government jLd have a positive, if 
limited, role in society; the duty'to inspect and to arbitrate', but not to control. 53 
Marshall, valedictory Bristol address, Th: id. p. 16. 
'9 Cited by Keynes in 22--c-it, pp. 37-8. This picture now hangs in the Head Libraries office at the Marshall 
Library, Cambridge. 
q'O See 1. Viner, Warshall's Economics in Relation to the Man and his Times, Ile American Historical Review 
Vol. 31, (June 1941), pp. 223-35. Reprinted in Alfred Marshall: Critical sses, -.; =m=enti, edited 
by John Cunningham 
Wood, (London, Croom Helm, 1982), VOI. L Section 2, No. 14, pp. 241-255. See also X W. Coats, 'Marshall and 
Ethics', in Alfred Marshall in Retro-wt. (London, Edward Arnold, 1990), pp. 153-177. 
51 Alfred Marshall, p. 334, 'Social Possibilities of Economic Chivalry (1907Y, pp. 323-346. This is a 
different version of an article of same name appearing in the Economic Jot-irr@L Much 1907. 
52 R Lid, p. 336. 
53 JLid, p. 337. 
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He further rejected the reduction of human nature to selfish motivations, which was 
perceived to have been the basis of the work of the older generation of classical 
economists. 34 Marshall believed in the possibility of social progress, not through collective 
but through individual action to reform and improve human nature. He was confident of 
'the perfectibility of man'. 55 
5.2 STRATEGIES OF PROFESSIONALISATION: THE BRITISH EcoNoNffc ASSOCIATION; THE 
EcoNoNuc Lo-uRNAL, - THE TRipos; AND TiiE SCIENTISATION OF ECONONECS. 
With such an ethical agenda, we might expect Marshall to have pressed immediately 
for influence over policy to translate his concern into legislation. But this would be to forget 
that as well as constructing a unified economics, Marshall was also concerned to re-forge 
economics as a respected profession with a generally accepted constituency in policy issues. 
Not until economics commanded social and cultural authority again could open involvement 
in policy be risked, lest such exposure produce controversy and emphasise schism, and thus 
damage the slowly rising 'economic edifice'. Thus during the 1880s and 1890s Marshall 
was more concerned with putting 'bricks' into this 'economic edifice' by advancing his 
strategies for professionalisation. These were: firstly to give to economics those trappings 
which have come to signify the professionalisation process for historians and sociologists: a 
formal body, a learned journal and a formal examination system; and secondly to stress the 
scientific nature of economics. 
The first of these objectives was obtained with the foundation of the British 
Economic Association (BEA) in 1890 (it became the Royal Economic Society with the 
granting of its Royal Charter in 1902), and the accompanying publication, the Economic 
Journal which first appeared in 1891. Marshall had put forward the original suggestion to 
form 'an Association for the advancement of economic knowledge by the issue of a 
journal ... and by such means as the Association may 
from time to time agree to adopt'. 5' 
The inaugural meeting of November 21 1890 agreed to form such a body. From the very 
beginning, it is clear that Marshall was deterýnined that the new body would stress the unity 
s' See Marshall, Ilie Present Position of Economics, (1885), his Inaugural lecture for the Cambridge 
Professorship, Memorials, pp. 152-74. See especially pp. 153-5. See also Marshall, Ilie Old Generation of 
Economists and the NeV, (1897), in Memorials. pp. 295-31 1. 
Marshall, 'The Present Position of Economics!, p. 155. 
Marshall, 'The British Economic Associatiotf, Economic Journal, Vol. 1, (March 189 1), p. 4. 
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of economics. Thus there were no plans to hold general discussions of economic questions: 
'For such discussions, unless conducted by a very strong Association, might do harm i. 57 
Similarly, there were no formal membership qualifications. This reflected the fact that there 
were few academic posts specifically dedicated to economics in 1890, and that an 
organisation whose membership included high proffle pofiticians and civil servants, would 
stand more chance of influencing public opinion. However, this open-door policy was also 
part of Marshall's imperialistic vision of a united economics, and this was necessarily a 
broad church. This policy was reflected in the Association's Journal. Marshall disparaged 
the rival Oxford-based Economic Review as having been 'started for the purpose of dealing 
with problems in which ethical and religious questions took the first place, but which had a 
kernel of economic difficulty in the background'. " But he was quick to counter this 
possibly divisive low estimation of the value of historical analysis by insisting that the 
Journal would, nevertheless, include 'all schools and parties'. 59 He stressed that the 
Association was not setting up a new orthodoxy, since there was no such thing as an 
orthodox science. He hoped that all writers and reviewers in the Journal- would treat each 
other fairly and amicably and: 
Working in this spirit, he hoped they would be able to promote economic 
knowledge by fair and fi-ank discussions, while avoiding that waste of 
effort in bitter and ungenerous controversy which had long impeded 
progress. 6" 
In fact A. W. Coats has noted that the BEA was so heterogeneous that the early numbers 
of the Journal: '.. contained a variety of statements from individualistic, socialistic and 
Ruskinian standpoints, and comparatively few strictly technical or theoretical articles were 
printed'. " 
The nature and scope of the new economics was enshrined in the Cambridge 
Economics Tripos: the guarantor of the future of the Marshallian imperial synthesis. 
Lid , p. 8. 58 lbid., p. 4. 
59 Ibid,, p. 7. 
60 Ibid., p. 5. 
61 Coats, 'The Origins and Early Development of the Roval Economic SocieW, pp. 349-71, Economic Journal, 
Vol. 78, (1968), p. 362. For further analysis of the content oi the Journal and how, in its early Years, this reflected 
Marshall's own position on the nature and scope of economics, see, Keith Tribe 'The Economic Journal and British 
economics, 1891-1940', pp. 33-58, HistM of the H11man Sciences, Vol. 5 Mo. 4 (1992). See also all of the articles 
in J. D. Hey and D. Winch (eds), A Centurv of Economics: One Hundred ! ars of the Royal Economic Society an 
the Fconoýqic Journal (Oxl'brd, Basil Blackwell, 199o). 
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In a letter to J. N. Keynes in 1902, Nfarshal. 1 confessed that he was afraid lest 'the 
analytiCalt. 62 empirical treatment of economics is completely to oust the scientific and 
Marshall was concerned to have intellectual heirs to continue the new orthodoxy he was 
building up: 
Put yourself in my position, I am an old man ... Economics 
is drifting under 
the control of people like Sidney Webb and Arthur Chamberlain. (i. e. 
historical and political - especially socialist] And all the while ... the 
curriculum to which I am officially attached has not provided me with 
one single high class man devoting himself to economics during the 
sixteen years of my Professorship. 63 [original emphasis] 
When Marshall took up the Cambridge Professorship in 1885, political economy 
played only a small part in a traditional curriculum dominated by classics and theology. 
When it was taught, as part of the Ifistorical and Moral Sciences Tripos (though during the 
1890s the Historical Tripos was reformed so that students could avoid doing any formal 
economic theory), it was taught by academics with little background or interest in 
economics, and had only a minimal place in the examination system. On taking up his post, 
Marshall bemoaned the fact that political economy was: 
the only subject of which the unsystematic study in the University 
exceeds the systematic, the only one which finds a great portion of the 
ablest and most diligent students among those who are preparing for, or 
who have graduated in, Triposes in which it is not represented. I want to 
supply an Examination which ... will help to steady and systematise this 
unsystematic study. 6' 
In June 1903 Marshall got his scheme for a new Economics Tripos accepted by the 
University. It was very favourably biased in favour of Marshallian economics: half of the 
first two years and'aU of the final year was reserved for theory, leaving only one year for 
applied economics, economic history and political science. 
As Koot has commented, this achievement 'signified the triumph of economic 
theory as a professional discipline at Cambridge'. 65 As we noted above the tripos was 
deliberately engineered by Marshall to serve this purpose. Coats notes, quoting Marshall, 
that: 
62 Marshall to J. N. Keynes, 30 January 1902, cited here from Maloney, M halL OrffiodON. y,,, m. cit. p. 46. m _an h; 63 Marshall to Keynes, 30 January 1902, cited from Coats, 'Sociological Aspects... ', p. 713. 
r-, ty ewrte Marshall, 'Letter to the Vice-Chancenoe, Cambridge Unive iR ,r (1885-6), p. 
579. Cited here from 
Coats, 'Sociological Aspects... ', 2p. cit. p. 712. 
Koot, p2xit., p. 149. 
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Marshall's scheme must be seen not merely as a response to the 
development of economic science, but also as a sign of the emergence of 
professional self-consciousness among British economists. The new 
Cambridge curriculum was designed to meet the needs of those who 
proposed to 'engage in the professional study of economics, and those 
preparing for careers in the higher branches of business, or in public 
66 life'. 
Stimulated by Marshall's success with the Cambridge Tripos, and by the popularity 
of the Principles as a definitive textbook, degree courses and lectureships in economics 
were set up all over Britain. Oxford set up a Diploma in Economics in 1903 (though an 
Honours School was not established until 1921 with the Politics and Political Economy 
School); London, having absorbed the LSE (itself founded in 1895) after the reconstitution 
of the university in 1898, set up a new Bachelor degree in Economic Science in 1903; 
Manchester had had an economics chair since 1898, and in 1900 it began a certificate 
course; Leeds had a chair by 1902; Armstrong Coll ege, Newcastle, later the university, 
established an economics department in 1912; Cardiff in 1906, and the Adam Smith Chair 
of Political Economy was founded at Glasgow in 1896 with funds from Andrew Stewart, a 
local ironmaster. 67 
As the historical economist Herbert Foxwell had commented (though with some 
degree of exaggeration) as early as 1888, the perceived influence of Marshall in unifying 
British economics was great: 'Half the economic chairs in the United kingdom are occupied 
by his pupils, and the share taken by them in general economic instruction in England is 
even larger than this'. 68 
The final element ý of the professionalisation strategy was the presentation of 
economics as a science. As well as stressing the importance of mathematical analysis in 
economics, Marshall did not miss an opportunity to identify the economic enterprise with 
the methods of the natural sciences. He stated in his first book (co-credited to his wife) that: 
Economics is a science because it collects, arranges and reasons about 
one particular class of facts. A science brings together a great number of 
Coats, 'Social Composition of the Ro)ul Economic Society..., 22 cit. p. 78. The quotation from Marshall is from 
his The New Cambridge Curriculum in Economics , (London. 
1903). 
*7 Details here from Michael Sanderson, Theiiýversities and (London, RKT, 
1972). See chaptcr 7 and pp. 263-75, passim. See also Kadish and Tribe (eds) The Market - 
flor Political 
Economy... 2V--cit, passim. 
'a H. S. Foxwell. "Me Economic Movement in England', ClIarterly jotIrnal of Economics, Vol. IL p. 92. Cited hem 
from Keynes, 'Alfred Marshall... ' in Memorials p. 59. 
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similar facts and finds that they are special cases of some great 
Uniformity which exists in nature. It describes this Uniformity in a simple 
and definite statement, or Law. 69 
In 1885, he was seeking to associate econon-ks, specifically with biology and 
mechanics. He argued that economics was '.. an engine for the discovery of concrete truth, 
similar to ... the theory of mechanics'. 
70 By 1898 he was offering a subtler analysis, arguing 
that, although the early stages of economic reasoning were similar to physics, the later 
stages resembled biology, and that: 'The Mecca of the economist is economic biology rather 
than economic dynamics'. He argued that 'economic reasoning should start on methods 
analogous to physical statics, and should gradually become more biological in tone'. 71 
5.3 TiiE INIPLICATIONS OF PROFESSIONALISATION FOR THE RELATIONSHIP OF ECONOMICS 
AND POLICY-MAKING: MARSHALL'S NEGATIVE PUBLIC SCIENCE 
Cunningham believed that the result of Marshall's professional strategy was that 
political economy was stripped of any authority on contemporary political problems. He 
argued that: 
Political economy in its new-fashioned form gets beyond the old 
limitations, but only by becoming more and more of a formal science, the 
relations of which with actual life are more vague and indefinite than 
ever. 72 
Publicly this was true. To maintain the scientific integrity of Economics, economists could 
furnish no specific policy recommendations, though they could express personal opinions. 
However, such opinions were expressions of their personal ethical position and did not 
carry the authority of science. Economics could advise on the effects of different policies, 
but the ultimate choice of policy was left in the hands of the politician who alone possessed 
the separate and critical skill of political choice or will. Hence politicians were more likely 
to seek advice, on an informal basis'. from such economists,, who seemingly had no 
pretensions to institutionalised political influence within the machinery of government. 
") A. Marshall and M. P. Marshall, The Economics of Thdustry- (London, Macmillan, 1884, first edition 1879), p. 2- 
70 Marshall, 'T'he Present Position of Economics!, 2R. cit. p. 159. 
8, em ri s pp 71 Marshall, p. 314, 'Mechanical and Biological Analogies in Economics', 89 Mo al . 312-318. 7' ' William Cunningham, 'Why had Roscher so Little Influence in England', ARMIs of the American Academy o 
Political and Social Science. Vol. 5, (1894), p. 7. Cited here from Collini, Winch and Burrow, gp cit., p. 267-8. 
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Marshall's earliest statement of his views on the relationship between Economics 
71 
and policy was in two articles published in the Labour newspaper The Beehive * in 1874, In 
the first Marshall argued that the laws of science differed in kind to the laws of government: 
they were indicative, rather than imperative. Thus, 'a law of science was simply a statement 
of the consequences which follow from a given set of causes', it could tell us only. " that a 
certain course of action will produce a certain event'. 7" Economics did not possess 'the 
power of giving direct and complete answers on points involving questions of right and 
75 wrong' . Marshall stressed the need to 'distinguish' clearly between 
'economic 
investigations' and 'ethical discussionS'76 : between fact and value. He argued that: 
... 
it is absolutely necessary to keep entirely distinct two questions; that 
which must be decided according to the laws of political economy, 
viz.,, what consequences will follow from a postponed (sic] course of 
action, and that which must be decided by our moral judgements, viz., 
whether an action which produces these consequences is right. 77 
The consequences of failing to implement this distinction would be twofold: firstly men 
without the skill or intelligence to understand economic reasoning about causes and 
consequences, would nevertheless claim the authority of economic science for their moral 
arguments; secondly, if Economics was used in this public way, it would be debased by the 
infiltration of moral and political prejudice ('the heat of excited feeling is likely to be 
introduced unnecessarily at an early stage' of the inquiry"'), and it would cease to be a 
science. 
In the first chapter of the Economics of Industry, published in 1879, Marshall made 
explicit the implications of the above argument for the role of the economist in policy- 
making. MarshaH argued that Science was a specialised form of knowledge which could 
only look at a given question from that specialised viewpoint. Because questions of 
'3 Original copies of these two articles: 'The Laws of Political Economy: What they can teach and what they cannot 
teach' Bee-Hive, April 18 1874, and 'The Province of Political Economy' D-ee-HI'vg, May 7 1874, are preserved in 
the Marshall Papers, Marshall 4 (formerly Marshall 9[5]), Cabinet File 2, Notebook 5 'Method, (including press 
cuttings of Bristol lectures). ' They are also reprinted in R Harrison, -Two Early Articles by Alfred Marshall', 
Economic Journal Vol. 73, (1963), pp. 422-30, and in Critical Assessments, 2V-c-i-I, - Vol IV, 
No. 106, pp. 119-130. 
The page numý;; for the quotations here are from the latter reprint, as the copies in the papers do not have page 
numbers. See HarTisotfs article for background on the Bee-Hiv 
74 Marshall, 'The Laws of Political Economy... ', I-bLid, p. 12 1. 
73 Jýid, p. 123. 
,6 Mmhall. 'Tbe Province of Political Economy', 2P. cit. p. 126. 
Marshall has corrected his copy to read 12Topose-d. 77 Marshall, 'The Laws of Political Economy... ', 2g. cit., p. 122. 
rather than postponed, which was a qPe-setting =or by the Bee-fliv 78 Ibid., p. 123 
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government policy needed to take into account a broad range of issues and interests, many 
of them not amenable to scientific analysis, science could not be a guide to policy, and 
economic science alone certainly could not. This was the special province of the art of 
statesmanship: 
(a science] cannot claim to be a guide in life, or to lay down rules for the 
practical conduct of affairs. That is the task ... of an Art [which] ... considers some important practical end, and 
directs men in their 
efforts to obtain it. First it inquires generally into the various conditions 
of the case. Then taking one of them at a time it seeks out the science 
whose special business it is to answer questions relating to this particular 
class of conditions, and demands of this an answer to a question which 
bears directly on the end in view. Having collected such answers from 
mmy sciences, Art puts them together, and says, since we are told by the 
sciences that such effects will follow from such and such causes, 
therefore it is best to pursue such and such a course. (my emphasis] 
He continued, clearly stating that, 
... the 
Statesman ... 
is a man of Art in a yet broader sense of the term. For 
he has to consider not only what (a given course] will cost-but 
also .... what will 
be its indirect political, social and moral effects. 
He therefore concluded that: 
Economics then cannot by itself be a guide in the practical affairs of life; 
but it answers a number of difficult questions which must be asked of it 
by the statesman ... 
79 
In his lectures during the 1870s as Principal of Bristol College, Marshall emphasised 
the scientific nature of modem Economics and rejected the idea that 'the science has to do 
with politics, and that a man takes up the study because he is a Liberal or a Conservative to 
get weapons with which to serve his party. He insisted that 'a man must not thrust into the 
facts that which did not belong to them', although he was free to 'apply the conclusions of 
his study to politics' if they had been reached through objective analysis. "' 
79 A. Marshall and M. P. Marshall, Ilie Economics of Thdustry. (second edition 1884), Book One, Chapter One: 
'Introductory'. First quotation from p. 3, second and third from p. 4. Although I have concentrated here on the 
implications for policy, Marshall also tal U, here in the same terms about the relationship of Economics to business 
decisions. 
so Press report of a Bristol lecture, of unknown source, labelled by Marshall, 'Lectures 1, Special Difficulties 3, 
"Economics and Politics"', in Marshall Papers, 4 (formerly 9 [51), Cabinet File 2, Notebook on 'Method (including 
press cuttings of Bristol Lecturc4- 
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Allied to this was Marshall's distinction between his new Economics and the old 
Political Economy. " This use of new terminology is the clearest indication of the emergence 
of a new grouping around Marshall, which was putting forward its own model of the 
professional economist as an objective scientist. Evidence of this new usage can be found in 
his early work the Economics Of Indust1y. He favoured the use of the term, 'Economic 
Science, or more shortly, Economics. ' His reason was that the adjective political no longer 
connoted the general best interests of the whole nation (as it had when the nation was 
known as the Body Politic) but those of a particular political group. 82 
However, Marshall realised that the relationship of economics and politics was a 
two-way street. Just as he publicly denied the influence of politics on Economics, so he 
publicly claimed that economic theory could not be closely linked with policy-making. For 
this reason Marshall stressed the difference in kind between the functions of economic 
knowledge (specialist knowledge gained through 'patience ... trainingjand] 
intelligence 83) 
and those of political experience (generalist knowledge gained through experience of 
political processes). As he noted in 1877: 
... political economy 
is abused when anyone claims for it that it is itself a 
guide in fife. ... 
What political economy will enable us to do is to show 
men the grave evils they are inflicting on others; but when that is done all 
we can say is - do unto others what ye would that they should do unto 
you. Political economy will help us rightly to apply the motive force of 
duty, but the mill to do one's duty must come from another source. 14 [My 
emphasis] 
There is a discernible shift in this position in Marshall's later writing (i. e. after about 
1890). He now wanted to enforce the distinction between fact and value (economic advice 
and policy) less rigidly. He seemed to wish to introduce the imperative mood, the ought, 
into economic advice. In a passage dating from the third edition of the Principles (1895) 
" This distinction is encapsulated in the title of his 1896 address at Cambridge, 'The Old Generation of 
Economists and the NeW`, Memorials pp. 295-31 1. 
82 A. and M. P. Marshall, gps.. it. p. 2. Original emphasis. 
g3 Marshall, 'T'he Laws of Political Economy... ', 2p. cit.., p. 123. 
84 Marshall, Bristol lecture, "Me Aims and Methods of Economic Study, labelled by Marshall 'Use of Studying 
Political Economy, as reported in Bristol Times and the Bristol Mirro (the reports are identical), October 10, 
1877. Marshall Papers, 4 (formerly 9[5]), Cabinet File 2, Notebook, *Method (including press cuttings of Bristol 
lecturesy. Marshall had begun this lecture by stating his preference for the term 'Economic Science' but here 
continued to also use the older 'Political economy. For flirther evidence of Marshall's view that the generalist skills 
of the politician were most useful in policy decisions, see also -Me present Position of Economics' (1885), 
especially pp. 164-5. Here Marshall had Economics bowing in *social problems! before the 'supreme authority' of 
what he called 'common smd. Ile economic perspective was only one factor in a political decision and 
Economics, 'Having done its work, it retires and leaves to common sense the responsibility of the ultimate 
decision... helping where it could help, and for the rest keeping silence'. 
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Marshall claimed that, while in general Economics was a science, and therefore was unable 
to make definite policy recommendations, some parts of it were so close to an Art that they 
could so do: 
Now in such a matter as banking or taxation, in which the economic 
element predominates over all others, there may be but a short step from 
the laws of the applied science in the indicative mood to the precepts of 
practice, or Art, in the imperative mood. There may be but a short step 
from the applied science of banking in its more general sense, to broad 
rules or precepts of the general Art of banking: while the step from a 
particular local problem of the applied science of banking to the 
corresponding rule of practice or precept of Art may be shorter still-85 
In the very next paragraph, Marshall inserted the now familiar qualification that the 
economist should only express his opinion on a certain policy 'rather in his private capacity, 
than as claiming to speak with the authority of economic science'. However, he was now 
less dogmatic on this point: he equivocated, commenting that 'the matter is one on which 
opinions differ. " 
In the Fifth Edition of the Principles, (1907) this shift is even more apparent. 
Marshall no longer argued for a clear distinction between economics and policy. The role of 
the economist had expanded to include hitherto forbidden territory. The economist was no 
longer to be merely an impartial adviser, but was to move closer to a constructive role in 
formulating policy goals and specific policy choices to attain them. Marshall stated that 
economics: 
... aims indeed at helping 
him [the statesman] to determine not only what 
that end should be, but also what are the best methods of a broad policy 
devoted to that end. 
At the same time, the role of the special skill of the politician in policy-making had been 
reduced to: 
the discussion of those exigencies of party organization, and those 
diplomacies of home and foreign politics of which the statesman is bound 
to take account in deciding what measures that he can propose Will bring 
him nearest to the end that he desires to secure for his CoUntry. 97 
as See Marshall, Princil2ics 9th (Varionim) edition, 2 Vols., (Vol- I Text, Vol. 2 Notes), edited by Guillebaud, 
(London, Macmillan for the Royal Economic Society, 196 1), Vol. 2 Notes, p. 154. Parts of this passage were deleted 
and parts rewritten for the fifth edition. See Guillebaud, Vol. 1, p. 37, footnote E, for this later version. 
86 Marshafl, from Guillebaud, pp. cit. Vol. 2, Notcs. p. 154. 
97 bid., Vol. 1, p. 43. This passage dates from the 5th Edition. 
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There may be an indication here that 'I'Varshall was becoming more flexible on the 
question of the economist's role in policy as his moves to professionalise economics were 
showing some success, and as Marginalist economics (and later Welfare economics) became 
more generally accepted as a framework for economic theorising. 88 He perhaps now felt 
more confident that the subject was now more positively (and more positivistically) publicly 
perceived. Perhaps now he could risk the re-introduction of a role in policy-making for 
economics. However, even this later more radical claim for involvement in policy-making 
was phrased very cautiously. The public and political reactions to the involvement of 
economists in the tariff reform controversy were to provide a telfing demonstration of how 
necessary such caution was. 
The fact that Marshall publicly claimed that economics and policy were still, in many 
senses, distinct activities did not mean that, more privately, he practised what his rhetoric 
was preaching. In fact he did give specific policy recommendations in the Principle itself, 
advocating, for instance, increased government expenditure in aid to the helpless. He wrote 
to the Times advocating public works to help the unemployed, and opposed old age 
pensions in the Economic Journal. He also submitted a memorandum on'Ethical Aspects of 
Limitations of Poor Relief to the Royal Commission on the Aged Poor. " Furthermore his 
private notebooks are packed with comments on topical issues, and even on proposed 
legislation. Moreover, he could not stop himself from going public with his views on policy 
when roused by contentious issues close to his heart like tariff reform. 
5.4 PUBLIC DISTANCE, PRIVATE PROXDvM: MARSHALL'S INVOLVEN[ENT IN POLICY- 
MAKING: 
While the negative public science of economics emphasised. the distance between 
economics and politics, and Marshall's public work was presented as the opinions of a 
private citizen rather than as the authoritative pronouncements of a scientific economist, 
privately he enjoyed a much closer relationship with policy-making. Marshalrs activities 
See Maloney, Marshall. Orthodoxy... M. -c-i-t, chapter 
11. 
Marshall, Principl 8th edition, p. 714-5; TLines, 15 Feb. 1886; Marshall, "Me Poor Law in Relation to 
State- 
Aided Pensions!, Economic Journal March 1892; Marshall, Official PaPem bv Alfred Marshal, pp. 202-3. All cited 
here from Maloncy, M shall. OrthodoSy.., M. cit;., p. 198. 
179 
during the Tariff Reform debate of 190.3 3 illustrate this private dimension of involvement 
behind the public claims to distance. 
Marshall's position on the fiscal question had been established in 1875, when he 
visited America expressly to study protection in action. He concluded that Free Trade was 
the best policy for America and Britain alike. ' This belief remained unshaken in 1903: 
It seems to me that the policy adopted in England sixty years ago remains 
the best, in spite of increasingly rapid economic change, because it is not 
a device, but the absence of any device. A device contrived to deal with 
any set of conditions must become obsolete when they change. The 
simplicity and naturalness of Free Trade - that is, the absence of any device - may continue to outweigh the series of different small gains 
which could be obtained by any manipulation of tariffs, however scientific 
and astute. " [original emphasis] 
However, Marshall was now convinced of the very real possibility of a return of some 
elements of Protection. His letters of the period to the German historical economist 
Brentano9'are marked by a tone of woeful resolution to the inuninent collapse of Free 
Trade. 93MarshaU believed protection was most likely to return in the form of retaliatory 
measures against foreign duties on imported British goods, and against the dumping of 
cheaper foreign goods in Britain. He commented on 17 July 1903 that: 
Retaliation -especially against indirect bounties, and against "dumping" 
down sugar and other things at less than cost price- seem to me more 
insidious, and more likely to lead to real Protection than "Imperial 
Federation". 
He added on 29 September that, 'Sooner or later I fear that the dumping question will be 
the ruin of our free trade. 94 The gravity of the threat Marshall perceived to Free Trade was 
intensified by Chamberlain's propaganda campaign which included: pamphlets ('by the 
million'"); speeches and rallies; the support of sections of the popular press"'; and pro- 
"0 See Alfi-ed Marshall, 'Some Features of American Industry, Marshall Papers, Box 6 No. 7, reproduced in Vol-II 
of J. K- Whitaker (ed. ), The Early Economic Writings of Adfired Marshall - 
1867-90 (London, Macn-dllan for Royal 
Economic Society, 1975). See also 'Some Aspects of Competition', in M-eruo-rials, PP- 256-9 1, section II. 91 Marshall 'Memorandum on the Fiscal Policy of Inte=tional Trade', p. 394 (as reproduced on pp. 365420 in J. M. 
Ke)ncs, ed. Official Papm by Alfred Marshall, (London, Macmillan, for the Royal Economic Society, 1926). This 
work is hereafter referred to as the Memorandum. 
97 Lujo Brentano (1844-193 1): leading German historical economist and professor of political economy at Munich 
from 1892. 
93 See FLW- McCready, 'Alfred Marshall and Tariff Reform, 1903: Some Unpublished Letters', originally in 
Journal of Political Economy Vol. 63, June 1955, pp. 259-67. Cited here from Alfrcd Marshall: Critical 
Assessments, ov. cit., No. 100, pp. 48-6 1. 
fbid.. p. 52 and p. 58. See also letter of 24 July 1903, pp. 53-4. 
Letter Marshall to Brentano, 20 July 1903, bid, p. 52. Letters hereafter referred to as AM-LB, with date. 
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tariff articles in the Times written by W. A. S. Hewins (under the pseudonym of 'An 
Economist), with Chamberlain's hearty support and superintendence. " At first Marshall 
was loath to reply to these articles, though he keenly felt the need to do so, both on account 
of their impact and what he perceived as factual errors. He must also have felt the danger 
that the clever choice of pseudonym implied the acquiescence of the entire profession with 
the views expressed. But he would not be forced to rush into print: his model of the 
profession was, as we have seen, to stress its scientific content and to distance it from the 
taint of politics, and he did not want to jeopardise his hard work in buflding up this 
conception of the econon-dst in the public mind by becoming involved in a very public 
debate. He was acutely conscious that the intensity of the fiscal debate, and its association 
with specific political positions meant that any article could not keep economics and politics 
separate. As he wrote to Brentano on 17 July: 
.. though writing as 'an economist', he is even more dogmatic and 
omniscient in his capacity of statesman than in that of economist. And his 
later letters, even while professedly talking sheer economics, assume 
premises which he considers himself to have established as a politician. 
So if one answers him, one must n-dx up politics and economics. 
For that work the better class of newspapers and members of Parfiament 
are better fitted than economists of the chair, who make it a duty to bring 
out arguments, which teU against their ultimate conclusion, as faithfully as 
those which tell for it. 98 
Thus he turned down an offer to write replies to the articles in the Times, which had been 
the editors original wish, although he remonstrated with Hewins in private letters. 99 He also 
rejected the invitation of one of the monthly journals. "' As far as public replies were 
concerned,, he consoled himself with Chapman's articles for the Daily Mail, and those which 
Bastable was preparing. "' 
Marshall mentions the Daily Mail, as particularly influential in swaying the masses. See AM-LB, 17 July 1903, 
lid., p. 51-2. 
" Sixteen articles appeared from June to September, 1903 under the title, Ilie Fiscal Policy of the Empire'. 
Hewins received the invitation to write them from the paper (via L. S. Amery), after it had turned down his initial 
suggestion for ifticles solely on German tarifTs. But the final form of the articles (with 'plenty of quotable phrases' 
and topical appeal) came directly from Chamberlain. See HeN%in's autobiography, The Apologia of an jMpgdalist 
Vol. 1, (London, Constable, 1929), pp. 66-68. 
AM-LB, 17 July 1903, McCready, 2p-&-it., p. 5 1. 
Ibid., p. 50 - 100 According to Hewins, 2p. cL p. 67. 
101 See AM-LB, 17 July 1903, McCready, 2p. cit. -1951) was Professor of Political . p. 5o. s. J. Chapman 
(1871 
Economy at Owees College, Manchester, 1901-17. ffis four articles appeared between 30 June and II July 1903. 
He also %,, Tote Foreign Cornmtition , on the tariff question. C. F. Bastable (1835-1945), was professor of 
Political 
Economy at Trinity College, Dublin, 1982-1932. 
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However, Marshall was not averse to commenting on topical political issues, but 
rather, merely averse to doing so in public. In this same letter, he hinted to Brentano that 
he was: 
engaged at this moment in formulating my own opinions on some of the 
chief matters which are now before the country: and I must of course 
incidentally traverse many of his [Hewin's] statements and arguments. 
At this date he was committed to publishing this paper 'in some form or other, before the 
crisis is reached. 1102 His later change of mind on this reveals much about the lengths he 
would go to protect his model of the professional economist. 
This document was in fact his famous 'Memorandum on the Fiscal Policy of 
International Trade'. In his next letter to Brentano (20 July 1903), he admitted the real 
nature of this work. In a postscript which he was careful, even in this private letter, to 
clearly mark Tonfidentiar, he wrote that: 
I hate mystery. So I am going ..... to tell you in strict confldence that what I have been, and still am, engaged on here is a Memorandum on the 
whole of the Chamberlain proposal, written privately for the use of a 
leading member of the English Cabinet at his request. 'O' [original 
emphasis] 
This Memorandum has been described as 'one of the finest policy documents ever wntten 
by an academic economist'. 104 Given this, it is clearly important in understanding Marshall's 
approach to poficy-making and the relationship between the State (politicians and 
bureaucrats) and outside academic experts in this period. It is interesting to note, then, that 
it was neither commissioned nor produced through any of the more usual channels of 
communication, like Commissions or Comn-dttees. In fact it was requested unofficially and 
completed in almost total secrecy (apart from Marshall's disclosure to the foreigner 
Brentano). Furthermore, although Marshall wrote of publishing it in 1903, in fact he 
became very wary of so doing, and it was only with great reluctance that he finally allowed 
it to be published in 1908. Now, while there are obviously proximate causes for this course 
of action (for instance Balfoues Government may have felt that to grant a public enquiry 
102 Both quotations taken from AM-LB, 17 July 1903, McCready, M. -cit.., 
Pp. 50-1 - 
103 AM-LB, 20 July 1903, from JLtd, p. 52. 
10' T. W. Hutchison, On Revolutions and ProgLess in Economic nowjsjý (1978), p. 114. Cited here 
from J. C. 
Wood, 'Alfred Marshall and the Tariff Reform Campaign of 1903', originally from -Joumll of 
Law and-E-gonmn-ics, 
Oct 1980, pp-481-95, here from p. 312, Critical Assessments 2R. cLi't No. 122, pp. 312-326. 
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would be tantamount to surrendering to Chamberlain-ism), I want to argue that this episode 
is a good illustration of Marshall's attitude to Policy-making as an economist, and is an 
example of one of the two main ways in which the British State preferred to gather expert 
advice from sympathetic experts. 
On 2 July 1903, T. Llewellyn Davies, the private secretary to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, C. T. Ritchie, wrote to Marshall: 
I am sure you must be very much concerned with what the newspapers 
call the "fiscal problem". I dorft suppose you would be able to find time 
to take part in newspaper or magazine controversies and I would not 
venture to bother you on my own account. But in talking matters over 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer expressed a strong wish that he might 
have the advantage of any unofficial expression of your opinions, or any 
suggestions as to the right method of handling the questions, which you 
105 might be able to offer and it is at his desire that I now write. 
Marshall -acceded to this request and began his Memorandum on 14 July. The 
correspondence between him and the Chancellor's office kept up through July and August, 
with Llewellyn Davies often commenting on the arguments of various parts of the 
Memorandum which Marshall had sent, asking new questions on Ritchie's behalf and 
drawing the economist's attention to related problems. '" 
Marshall therefore had no need to engage in public debate, which was anyway 
anathema to him: he believed that he alone secretly had the ear of a section of the 
Government, at its own special request. No wonder we find him writing to Hewins, on that 
very same day: 
If I really thought there was any danger that the scheme which you 
advocate would be put into practice, I should feel bound to break through 
my rule against taking active part in the discussions in the market 
place. 107 
The correspondence between Llewellyn Davies and Marshall also sheds light on our 
other theme: the relations between government and outside expertise. In a letter of 25 
August Llewellyn Davies was at pains to stress that there were no plans to bring out the 
105 T. Llewellyn Davies to Marshall, 2 July 1903, Marshall Papers, Letters, M 1/252. 
106 See letters in the Marshall Papers to Llewellyn Davies of 14 July I qo3, and from him to Marshall of 13 August 
and 25 August 1903, respectively: M 1/253,254 and 255. 
c% 11 eld. ed ere from 107 Letter from Marshall to W. A. S. Hewins, July 14 1903, H vins Papers, University of She I Cit h 
p. 487, foonote I of A. W. Coats, 'The Appointment of Pigou as Marshall's Successor. Comment, Journal of Law 
and Economics Vol. 15, (1972), pp. 487-95. 
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Memorandum as a government publication, and that if Marshall should wish to have it 
published or should its existence otherwise come out, the official line was to be that the 
there was no initial request from the Government for Marshall's opinions: 
It is now clear that the Government does not mean to consult Economists 
generally in a systematic way - in fact I do not know that any others have 
been consulted..... and under all the circumstances there would be no 
question (even if we had your permission) of issuing your Memorandum 
by itself officially, so I hope it will be satisfactory to you - as I gather 
from your letters it would be - that the position should stand thus: that 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer asked you for your views: that you 
communicated to him a Memorandum which was and remains altogether 
your property: that he printed it for his own convenience,.... but that the 
question of publication remains entirely in your own hands except that he 
would prefer that. -in case of publication. any reference 
to his intervention 
in the matter should be omitted. I needn't say that I hope you may 
manage to publish it soon. "" [My emphasis] 
This caution indicates that Government was keen to avoid the constitutional issues raised by 
the informal use of outside experts as policy advisers, and how keen not to be seen getting 
this advice solely from experts particularly sympathetic to its own fundamental ideological 
position. 
Marshall himself agonised over whether or not to seek to have the Memorandum 
published. He seems to have finally decided not to in 190-33, perhaps because of the public 
backlash against academic economists sparked of by the anti-protectionist Manifesto 
published in the Times of August 15 1903.109 As we would expect, Marshall had initially 
been against this move, which was suggested by Edgeworth. But he began to feet that :70 
Chamberlain and his league had now'committed themselves to the most glaring economic 
falsities!, and needed to be answered. Marshall admitted that because of this 'I changed my 
mind' about a public rebuttal of Chamberlain and 'suggested that one should be drafted in 
England'. 110 Marshall initially thought that 'on the whole we can be proud of it'. 
ill 
log Letter from Llewellyn Davies to AM, 25/08/03, Marshall Papers, Letters, M1/255- 
109 A reply to many of the arguments of "An Economist", agreeing with the aim of closer relations %ýith the 
Empire, 
but rejecting Chamberlain's scheme as a means of achieving this goal. It was signed 
by fourteen academic 
economists, largely drawn form the orthodox side of the profession. they included: Marshall, 
Pigou, Bastable, 
Bowley, Cannari, Edgeworth, with S. J. Chapman and J. H. Claphant adding their names afterwards. 
110 Letter AM-LB, 18 August 1903, McCready, gn cit, p. 56. Another motivation for this uncharacteristic move may 
have been that Marshall sensed that the political tide was turning in favour of limited Protection. A 
letter of 29 
September 1903 to Brentano shows that he had inside information of Balfours shift. possibly 
from Llewellyn 
Davies or from Ritchie himself (See McCready, p. 57-8). He may have realiscd that the Chancellor was 
becoming 
increasingly isolated from Balfour, and decided that his private influence was no longer enough to stop 
Chamberlain, now the Government was leaning this way. It %vas the time to gO public. Ritchie 
did indeed resign in 
September, on the publication of Balfour's tLotes, and Marshall wrote a private letter to 
him expressing his 
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However, the Manifesto was Mously attacked by the Times, which accused the professors 
of 'not really speaking in their scientific character at all, but ... illegitimately employing their 
scientific position to further a political demonstration'. It concluded that 'in the public 
mind' , these gentlemen have inflicted grave injury upon the estimation and repute of the 
science they profess. 112 Within a week Marshall felt that the Manifesto was 'vulnerable' and 
he had noticed various 'blemishes in the drafting'. In reply to the charges in the Times that 
these were matters with a large political element on which economists should not comment, 
he still maintained that 'the points on which we do speak were such as economists have 
always been expected to speak decidedly about'. However, he must have felt that the 
Manifesto had misjudged the public reputation of economists, and had ended up damaging 
it ftirther. 113 From the other side, the Cambridge historical economist Foxwell, who had 
refused to sign the Manifesto and had written to the Times criticising it, agreed that the 
Manifesto had been particularly injurious to the public standing of the profession as a 
whole: 
... the Manifesto has had the effect which so many of us 
foresaw at the 
time of putting economists out of court altogether. We are now 
hopelessly discredited: in fact political economy seems to have fallen back 
in public opinion to the position it held about the 70s. I hoped that the 
more realistic and liberal tone of the work of the last generation would 
have gained for English economists something of the respect which 
German economists enjoy in the world of affairs. However the mischief is 
done and silence is now the most fitting attitude for a "professor". 114 
The public nature of the Manifesto had drawn criticism form leading politicians as well as 
from the newspapers. Balfour commented that: 
If a man of science once lets the public think that he is speaking not in the 
interests of his science, but in the interests of his party, if he once allows 
the view to get abroad that his expression of opinion may have its origin 
in his scientific views, but has a double parentage, and that the scientific 
views are in some sense moulded in conformity with our political 
differences, his whole authority from that moment will absolutely vanish: 
he will sink to the level of the unfortunate person who now addresses 
'gratitude for the stand which you have made. ' (See AM-Ritchie, 21 September 1903, Marshall Papers, Letters, 
MI/257). 
111 AM-LB, 18 August 1903, McCready, 2p. -cit,. p. 
56. 
112 Times, leader of 20 August 1903, 'Professors and Professors'. Fox%vell and Hewins also attacked the Manifesto 
in letters to the paper on this day. It is however, worth noting that the paper was avowedly proý-Chamberlain and 
that it probably exaggerates the degree to which economists were publicly discredited. 113 AM-LB, 26 August 1903, McCready, 2p. cit. p. 57. 114 Letter frorn H. S. Fo\-wcll to James Bonar, 22 November 1903, Kress Library, Harvard University. Cited here 
from p. 22 1. Coats, 'Political Economy and the Tariff Reform Campaign of 1903', Journal of Law and Economics 
Vol. 11, (April 1968), pp. 181-229. 
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you. Let him at all costs avoid that danger. It is quite true that he will in 
those circumstance not feel that he is to any great extent influencing the 
current of contemporary thought; but he will be wrong. He is influencing 
it if he treats a scientific subject in a scientific spirit. He may not be 
quoted by this or that politician, he may not figure largely in election 
addresses, but he will do what the great economists in the past have done 
-he will slowly mould public opinion; and if he aims too quick at attaining 
that result he will only sacrifice what he can get for something whýich he 
cannot get, and which, if he could get, would not be worth having. '" 
Balfour had of course moved closer towards accommodating Protection with his Economic 
Notes on Insular Free Trade a pamphlet published on 16 September 1903 ), and so his attack 
on economists may have been due to the political embarrassment that the Manifesto of the 
orthodox economists may have caused him. But I would suggest another reason. It was a 
warning that such economists had abused a trust by going public: they had not kept to the 
tacit bargain which Marshafl's position embodied, of maintaining a public silence on political 
issues, in return for private influence. Public comment on politicafly sensitive questions 
which appeared to have the authority of economic science would cost economists their 
private political influence. Given this it is no wonder that Marshall speedily returned to his 
former position. A year later he spoke of his rejection of 'all manifestos by economists on 
political questions'. 116 He now thought it best to'just lie low, and bend our backs to the 
smiters'. 117 Thus he may have decided not to publish his Memorandum at this politically 
sensitive time, for fear of further alienating himself from his privileged access to influence 
over covernment circles. 0 
Marshall was still keenly aware of the damage done to both the public and private 
standing of economists even five years later. When he was asked in 1908 by S. Armitage 
Smith, the then Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Lloyd George), for 
permission to publish the 190.3Memorandum as a government paper, "' he agreed only with 3 
the greatest reluctance. 119 He replied to Armitage Smith, expressing his reservations but 
finally agreeing: 
115 Speech of Balfour as Vice-President at Annual Dinner of Royal Economic society, Julv 1904, p. 3 53 'Meeting of 
the Royal Economic SocieW Economic Journal, Vol. 14 (1904), pp. 351-5. 
116 At ihe August 1904 meeting of the BAAS, Economic Journal Vol. 14 (1904), pp. 483-4. 
117 AM-LB 26 August 1903, McCready, 2vxat.., p. 57. 
118 See Armitage Smith to Marshall, 20 June 1908, Marshall Papers, Letters, M 1/258. 
g. ý= published when Bonar Law had challenged Asquith to 1,19 It had become necessary to have tNe, Ma cA 
ej ofl, e produce publicly the evidence when his. v corgehad quoted from Marshall's unpublished work. This story 
, 4" , comes from a letter from Marshall to J. A. Murray MacDonald, the Secretarv of the Cobden Club, 23 April 19 10, 
Marshall Papers, Letters, M 1/266. See also Parliimentarv Debates Vol. CUUM, P. 167 ; p. 1747. 10 
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But I think I am bound to accede to the Chancellor's request, although in 
so doing, I am departing from the line of procedure which I had marked 
out for myself, and am indeed acting somewhat inconsistently. 
I have always acted on the principle that a professional economist should, 
as a rule abstain from controversy of all kinds ...... he should avoid rather than seek those particular issues of the day as to which it is not easy even 
for a private citizen to present a wholly unbiased judgement. For this 
reason, instead of publishing my memorandum, as I was invited to do in 
the Autumn of 1903 3,1 am writing a large volume on National Industries 
and International Trade, in which I am endeavouring to treat solidly those 
large questions, on which the Memorandum expressed my opinions with 
a brevity, that necessitated a certain amount of dogmatism ... 
"0 
Furthermore, Marshall only agreed to publication on the condition that the above letter, 
% should form a Preface to the paper, and that it should be published as such'. 121 In the final 
version of this Preface, Marshall tellingly described the Memorandum as a dogmatic 
expression of 'private opinion' rather than a professional document. 122 In the light of the 
mistake of going public with the Manifesto he no doubt decided that the wisest course was 
to keep this private document private as long as he could. He had returned to his earlier 
position of maintaining a public separation of politics and economics, for the sake of 
maintaining his private influence. 
As a version of the Preface written on 23 September 190' ) shows, Marshall, had 
been moved to act rashly in signing the Manifesto: he 'desires to influence the public' and 'is 
after all a human being' and was incensed by what he saw as the economic falsehoods with 
which Chamberlain was stumping the country. 123 But he realised what damage he had done 
to the public standing of economics, and to the privileged private relationship he enjoyed 
with the Government, and he did not compound his error by publishing the Memorandum in 
1903. 
5.5 PIGOU'S CONTRIBUTION 
120 Marshall to Armitage Smith, 27 June 1908, Marshall Papers, Letters, 1/260. A copy in Mary Paley Marshall's 
hand, die later pages of which appear to be missing. 
121 Armitage Smith to Marshall, 4 July 1908. Armitage Smith is repeating Marshall's 'desire' that this should be 
the case, from Marshall's letter of 27ý06.17his part of Marshall's letter has not survived, as we noted above. 
Marshall Papers, Letters, M1 /261. 
122 Marshall, Preface to Memorandum, in Keýmes, 2p. c 8. Lit,, p. 36 123 Marshall, 'Preface', 23 September, 1903, Marshall Papers. 
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During the tariff debate, it was still dangerous for an economist of the Marshallian School 
to pronounce openly on policy. A further element had to be added to Marshall's synthesis 
to ensure economists spoke with a unified and thus authoritative voice in policy questions. 
This process seems to have reached its conclusion under the direction of A. C. Pigou, who, 
on Marshall's strong recommendation, succeeded him in the Cambridge Professorship in 
1908.124 I-Es Wealth and Welfare of 1912, by identifying economic welfare with total 
welfare, provided the theoretical justification for economists' involvement in policy advice, 
at just the point when the profession had developed enough to be able to make use of such 
an opportunity. While Marshall was developing the economics profession by boosting its 
public image as the producer of scientific, apolitical knowledge, the vexed question of the 
social/political role of economics had been tactfully avoided in public. In fact the needs of 
professionalisation and social/political role had seemed to be pulling 'economics in opposite 
directions'. 125 Now that economics was in a more healthy position with more university 
posts, greater internal cohesion, and degree courses established to provide for future 
generations of economists, and ensure their adherence to a deductive economics, this 
tension was resolved by welfare economics, the purpose of which was 'to provide a theory 
of economic PoliCyi. 12' The great strength of Pigou's innovation was that it was not a single 
theory, but what John Maloney has described as a 'research programme'. 127 Theory 
contributed enough to policy give it more authority than mere opinion, but theory did not 
dictate policy. It was possible to use the same theory to support different policy 
conclusions, and thus Pigou's chance 'of creating a solid and lasting professional 
grouping'. Iý were much improved. Pigou's body of theory gave 'its exponents a way of 
making policy recommendations which dfferentiat[ed] them from outsiders even when 
they.. [were] disagreeing with each other on specific policies'. 129 This unity of theory and 
practice had been hoped for by Marshall 13' but it was Pigou who achieved it. 
12' For a discussion of the issues surrounding the succession of Pigou see, R. H. Coase, 'The Appointment of Pigou. 
as Marshall's Successor', Jo=al of Law-and Economics, Vol. 15, (1972), pp. 473-85; and A. W. Coats, Ilie 
Appointment of Pigou as Marshall's Successor Comment', Jonmal of Law and F-conomics Vol. 15, (1972), 
pp. 487-95. For a useful potted biography see John Saltmarsh and Patrick Wilkinson, Arthur Cecil PiSou. 1877- 
1959. A Memoir (Cambridge, CUP for King's College, 1960). 
125 Maloney Marshall. Orthodon..... Ocit. P. 181. "'6 Ibid, 
127 See lid. pp. 181_5. 
28 Ibid. p. 182. 
29 JLid,. p. 193. 
130 See Koot, mcmit., P. 132. 
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5.6 CONCLUSION 
What are we to make then of 'Marshall's imperialistic attempt at the unification of 
economics, the addition of such professional attributes as the BEA and the Economic 
Journal,, his scientisation of the subject, and its accompanying negative public science which 
held that economics and politics were different kinds of activity? My argument is that these 
activities were intimately bound up with each other, and that, from this perspective, a new 
picture of the relations of economics and politics in this period emerges. Marshall created a 
new unified professional economics with Cambridge as its centre. Publicly political 
influence was sacrificed for professionalisation based on scientific rigour. As the position of 
the new economics became more secure, with the waning of the challenge from historical 
economics, the BEA, Journal, Tripos, and safe succession to Pigou, and the completion of 
welfare economics, the theoretical component of Marshall's strategy, he began to be more 
bold about the claims he made for economics as a guide to policy. Meanwhile, contrary to 
the public rhetoric, Marshall was closely connected with policy formation, through informal, 
ad hoc channels, activities which did not disturb the neutral, scientific public image of 
econon-dcs. 
In effect then, Marshall was adhering, at least in the short term, to the gospel of 
political activity for economists according to Balfour. And this is of great importance. 
Marshall was much more politically aware than the scientists. He had a shrewd 
understanding of British State culture. He knew that politicians and CM Servants did not 
like to be seen surrendering official control of policy-maldng to outside experts to any 
degree. At the same time he understood that this did not mean that such experts could not 
exercise influence, but rather that it could be had only on the State's terms. This meant 
relations with experts which were ad hoc in the case of the various forms of public 
enquiries, and informal in the case of advice through secret and wholly unofficial channels, 
and the wider more long term moulding of the opinions of the politically important members 
of the polity. If we add to this, in the case of informal/ad hoc influence on policy, the fact 
that Cambridge economists of this generation were largely in tune with the State culture 
ideologically - they that is to say they were economic liberals (Free Traders) and 
institutional conservatives (envisaging only a limited role for the Sate in society) - then it 
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becomes clearer that the State was more likely to turn to Cambridge economists for 
informal advice. 
In 1907, Marshall commented approvingly on the government of India, Egypt and other 
countries influenced by Britain, that 
British unconventional, elastic methods of administration give scope for 
free, fine enterprise in the service of the State; and it atones for many 
shortcomings in forethought and organisation. 
He continued, now taMng of Britain that 
Again, because the dead hand of bureaucracy has stretched but a little 
way into her affairs, this country is able to call together voluntary 
committees of men trained in strenuous private enterprise, who freely 
give good general guidance in some lar Ie matters, such as London 
transport systems and army administration. ' 1 
However, once the position of economics as the authoritative, scientific social 
science was assured, Marshall looked forward to, and even began to suggest, a 0 more 
formalised role for economists in policy-making. 
So no overt political rhetoric for immediate influence from the dominant school of 
economists. But what of those economists marginalised by Marshallian hegemony. Did they 
produce a more positiveand radical political rhetoric for influence in the short (as well as 
long) term? The obvious place to look is the historical economists, who were committed to 
a more practical economics. However, they were too heterogeneous to constitute a group, 
and were further fragmented by Marshall's subsume and conquer campaign. They produced 
no altemative school or body of theory, and thus, unsurprisingly, there seems to have been 
no characteristic positive public science from them. However, the desire for immediate, 
open, formal influence over policy-making was very strong, though it expressed itself in a 
variety of strategies, for instance, W. A. S. Hewins became (albeit briefly) a government 
minister as Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies. 132 In the next chapter, I want to 
examine the public science of one historical economist, William James Ashley, who put 
forward a strong altemative conception of the professional economist as the economist in 
action, during the controversy over tariff reform and particularly with his extensive (and 
131 Marshall, 'Social Possibilities of Economic Chivalry (I 907Y, in Mnmnno-d-2-11.5 p.. 3 343. 
132 He , xTved from 1917-19. He%%ins was a Conservative A P. from 19 12- 18. 
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high profile) government war work. Like the scientists that were studied in earlier chapters, 
Ashley propounded a positive public science: for him the economist defined himself not as 
an apolitical scientist, even onewith private influence, but openly and staightforwardly as a 
guide to policy. The economist should not 'grovel before the state"" for recognition but 
should be formally incorporated into the machinery of government as a valued resource for 
policy advice. 
133 Ashley, 'Citizenship% in The Christian OUtlook Being the Sermong of an Economist, pp. 13-26, (London, 
Longmans 6reen, 1925). 
191 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE PRACTICAL ECONONUST AT WORK: WILLIAM JAMES ASHLEY 
It is a carious academic point that economic historians were more flexible than economists. 
In the early twentieth century they provided the first Protectionists (Ashley, Cunningham. 
Hewins); between the wars they were usually social reformers or socialists (Tawney, the 
Hammonds. Cole). ' 
The period from the publication of the Principles to the First World War saw the 
domination of the Marshallian School with its emphasis on theory and the pre-eminence of the 
deductive approach in economic science. Hand-in-hand with this went the public presentation 
of economics as an objective science, the very nature of which discounted any involvement in 
controversial matters of policy (while privately, influential channels to policy were kept open). 
This kind of public science forms an interesting parallel with scientists, as was noted. 
Scientists publicly argued that the scientific method was the reason why they should be 
involved in policy, whereas Marshallian economists publicly argued that it was the very reason 
why they could not. But the scientists were able to work with a wider definition of the 
scientific method in which deduction and induction were blended together. They were able to 
do this because the professionalisation of the natural sciences was more advanced than that of 
economics. The arcane mysteries of the exact proportions of induction and deduction in the 
method of the natural sciences was not a matter for serious public concern (although it might 
still rear its head in occasional technical controversies within the scientific community). 
Publicly the idea that there was a methodological consensus within the natural sciences was 
generally accepted, and had been since the public campaigns of the Scientific Naturalists from 
the 1860s. These had used Darwinian evolutionary theory as the example of how scientific 
method was uniform in its working from facts up to general theories (ironically as it happened 
since Darwin himself was far more deductive than this). Science had used method as a bridge 
to policy because the subject matter of science was not always directly that of policy; 
1 A. J. P. Taylor in a footnote aside while discussing the passing of tariffs by the National Govcrnment 
in 1931-2. See p. 33 1, footnote 1. English History. 1914-1945, (London. Book Club Associates. 1977, 
originally OUP, 1965). 
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economics, whose subject matter was largely the same as that of policy, had no need of a 
methodological bridge, but had to have a methodological consensus. If there was any visible 
schism over method, then economics' claim to authority was undermined. 
Marshall wished to follow the professional trajectory of science, and make economics 
into a discipline with cultural and social authority, but he had first to construct a 
methodological consensus within economics. He tried to build this around economics largely 
conceived as a deductive discipline. This was partly his preferred slant, and partly since the 
subject area of economics largely overlapped with that of policy. Thus a generally agreed 
theoretical framework to approach that subject area, and from which to construct universally 
applicable economic laws as a guide to policy was one way in which economics could aspire 
to authority. Marshall thus looked to build a general theory of economic policy on which the 
long term claim of economists to guide policy could be based. 
However, this was not the only version of economics as a science, or of the social role 
of the economist. The other side of the methodological debate in economics was occupied by 
the inductive historical economists. Historical economists propounded a view of economics as 
an inductive science working from detailed observation of both past and present economic 
conditions and behaviour to historically relative generalisations. Hand-in hand with this 
definition of economics as a science went the idea of the practical economist, with his wide 
knowledge of contemporary (and past) economic conditions as the natural guide to policy. 
Here the claim to guide policy was based not on the slow elaboration of universal laws or 
theories, but on practical experience of economic behaviour and conditions. But just as 
Marshall laid too much stress on deduction, so the historicists laid too much stress on 
induction and relativism. Although they can as a group be described, as David Reisman has 
done 2, as embodying the values of historical relativism; moral commitment; social reform; 
state intervention; and economic nationalism, they were an extremely heterogeneous group 
and, consequently, did not arrive at any inductively derived body of theory, although this 
remained a stated ultimate goal. Their ultimate eclipse by Marshallianism, and their relegation 
2 See David Reisman, Alfred Marshall's Nfission (London. Macmillan. 1990), pp. 211-34 passim. 
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to the field of economic history (separated from economics and stripped of all the other 
elements of their approach- which had gone to other emerging disciplines such as philosophy 
and sociology- they were left only with their historicism) was largely due to the fact that, 
un. like Cambridge economics, they had 'no text, no leader, and no centre .... (and] 
also ... because they tried to do so much'. 
3 
In this chapter I will concentrate on one of the most public of the historicists, William 
James Ashley. Ashley was educated at St. Olaves School in Southwark and at Balliol where 
he read history. After several years at Oxford as a private tutor he was invited to take up the 
Chair of Political Economy and Constitutional History at Toronto in 1888. In 1892 Ashley 
was invited to occupy the first chair in economic history in the world at Harvard. In 1901 he 
returned to England to become Professor of Commerce at the new University of Birmingham. 
This was the first school of commerce at a British university. 4Much work has already been 
published on Ashley, but while this has explored his relations with Marshall and 
Marshallianism, the details of the Commerce Faculty at Birmingham, and Ashley's own 
ideological and political position, no attention has been given to Ashley's attitude to policy- 
making, or how his position here differed from Marshall. 5 I will attempt to uncover the 
methodological and ideological underpinning of Ashley's conception of the science of 
economics and the role of the professional economist. I will then focus on these conceptions 
in action: in the Tariff Reform debate of 1903; in the activities of the Unionist Social Reform 
Committee of 1911-14; and in Ashley's extensive war work (for which he was knighted in 
1917). 
In his 1927 obituary of Ashley in the newly founded Economic History Review, W. R. 
Scott explained Ashley's lack of publications in economic history by suggesting that he was 
not content with the isolated academic path and favoured a different role for the economist: 
3 lbid.. p. 230. 4 For details of Ashley's life see Anne Ashley, William James Ashley: a Life (London. P. S. King, 
1932). 
pp Z, es The main texts here are: Kadish. Historians, Economists and Ecopornic Aýstorv cit pecially 
pp. 228-42; Koot, 2p. cit especially chapter 5, Bernard Sernmel. Impgrialism and Social Reform: 
Ene. lish-Social-Tmverial thought 1ý95-1914 (London, George Allen and Univin. 1960). especially 
chapter XI. 
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.. one feels that Ashley could not express himself adequately ... by the contemplath-c life. In him there was a marked call to action. It was not enough for him to describe organisation. lie 
wanted himself to organisc. 
Scott went on to note that Ashley found most opportunity to satisfy this desire for active and 
meaningful influence in his government work during the First World War: 
One of the strartge discoveries then made was that the country had a use for the economist: 
even. still more strangely, for the academic economist ... In these circumstances Ashley spent himself most unsparingly. He felt that he had something to give, and he gave freely. Thus his 
later work is not to be found in books. but in the part he played in endeavouring to provide 
reliable data for the plain man to form a reasonable opinion upon the many questions which 
are perplexing him. 
Scott thought this the 'completion' of Ashley's 'temperament'. I would want to argue that it 
was also the completion of Ashley's conception of the professional economist. Ashley was 
able to 'make his experience something concrete and living, which at the same time is of 
service to this generation and will also be of service to the next'. ' For Ashley it was the 
economist's duty not only to comment on contemporary questions, but to become involved in 
the workings of the expanded State to influence policy for the welfare of the State and all its 
citizens. As J. H. Clapharn said of him, he befieved 'that it was the economist's business to 
give what he had towards satisfying each emergent public need and guiding an ill-informed 
public opinion'. 7 It was during the First World War that Ashley was most successful at getting 
into influential positions, although he was also active in the Edwardian period. 
6.1 THE CALL To ACTION: IDEOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL MOTIVATIONS 
INFORMING AsHLEYs VIEW OF THE ECONOMIST'S ROLE. 
According to his daughter, Ashley's 'attitude on social matters was of course, part of his 
reflgion'. 8 He was Trought up,... moulded and developed' in a'powerful spiritual and cultural 
environment' of evangelical Christianity. 9 Ashley's commitment to organised religion waxed 
and waned throughout his life, finally re-establishing itself firn-dy in his later years, as I will 
6 W. P, Scott. p 321. 'Memoir Sir William James Ashley'. pp. 319-21, Economic History Review 
Vol. 1 (1927). 
7 J. H. Clapham. p. 682. 'Obituary: Sir William Ashley', Economic Journal. Vol. 37, (1927), pp. 678- 
83. 
8 Anne Ashley, gR. cit. , p. 157. 9 fbid. p. 9. 
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note below. " However, his belief in the purposeful progress of society, as demonstrated by 
history, was always strong. This derived from a combination of his underlying belief in the 0 
goodness of God, which was expressed in the world as progress, and his belief in slow 
Darwinian evolution. His daughter noted that 'his agnos6cism was ... never so thorough-going 
as to allow him to doubt the duty of personal morality and altruism'. " 
From 1913, Ashley began to preach sermons in various British churches, whose 
location was no doubt contiguous with the meetings of the Modem Churchmen's Conferences 
which he had regularly attended since he joined the Churchmen's Union in I go 1.12 Some of 
these were published in 1925 as The Christian Outlook Being the Sennons of an-Economist. 
The connection between religion and social action was made abundantly clear throughout: 
The duty of the Christian is not to grovel before the state, but rather actively to interest 
himself in it, and do what he can to make use of its machinery for the furtherance of social 
well-being. In this sense a good Christian should always be a good citizen. 13 
In another sermon entitled 'A Good Time Coming', and delivered in Dudley on 26th April 
1925, but not included in this collection, Ashley began with the text from Revelation XKI: 10 
where the Holy City of Jerusalem descends out of Heaven from God. 14 He argued that there 
was not enough 'public spirit guided by intelligence' in British Society to guide competition 
onto a 'higher plane' or even replace it with something better. On the surface this seems like a 
very generai call for more active citizenship, but Ashley was quite specific about the direction 
in which efforts should be concentrated: 
It is that public spirit we must create, if we are to have new institutions that are really going 
to produce better results in human happiness than capitalism. And it is to be created not by 
talldng about it, but by example. by doing our best. unselfishly and intelligently, to get all we 
can for the community out of the social machinery al=4 available. 15 
See DLid 3 , pp. ) 7-9 and Chapter W. Ibid. p. 38 
Ibid. p. 157. Ashley later became a member of the Council and Vice-President of this organisation. 
and was also a churchwarden of Birmingham Cathedral in this period. 
Sermon o an Economist. " Ashicy, 'Citizenship', pp. 13-26, in The Christian Outlook B". in _Lhae_ý_ 
If 
(London. Longmans, Green, 1925). 
14 See Guardia I May 1925, 'The New Jerusalerre. This was the tide given the sermon by the 
editor; Ashley's original title is used here. See Ashley Papers. University of Birmingham Library 
(hereafter referred to as APB). 9/iv/4-5. 15 
Ibid. 
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Ashley felt, then, that it was part of his Christian duty to participate actively in 
contemporary social and political issues, and to work for more effective institutions from 
within the existing machinery of government. 
This sense of duty fitted well, and doubtless partly informed, Ashley's social-imperia1ist 
political stance. His position was best surnmarised in a letter he wrote to the German historical 
economist Lujo Brentano in 1913. Here he made clear the inter-connection of his views on the 
nation and the Empire, and Tariff Reform and social reform. He argued that the English 
protectionist movement was not simply the product of selfish manufacturing interests but was, 
especiaUy when it stressed Imperial preference: 
Jhe outcome of a new Idealism, the Idealism of a noble conception of the British Empire 
and the services it can render to Humanity. And among the young men of 2545 who are 
keen Imperialists there are many who are equally keen Social Reformers. J was brought up 
a strong Liberal and many of my most intimate friends are strong Liberals: but since I began 
to care for Social Reform under Toynbee's influence (1382) 1 have been indifferent towards 
the claims of the Liberal party just because the party has never, in any deep sense, been 
fundamentally the party of social reform. 16 
Even after coming to Birmingham to take up the new Chair of Commerce in 1901, 
AsWey considered himself to be a Liberal. He looked to the Liberal Party 'to exert the 
pressure to bring about advance' in those areas of 'social and educational reform' in which he 
was most interested. 17 However, he found himself becomingly estranged from Liberal circles 
over the question of tariffs, and was disenchanted with the level of its commitment to social 
reform issues. He thus moved towards the Unionists and became a Party member in 1906.18 
His Unionism was of the social-imperialist brand. In 1916, he wrote to Oliver Lodge, his 
fliend and Principal of Birmingham University, that the only imperialism he cared for was 'a 
Democratic Imperialism with a genuine Social-Amelioration intent and Content. '19 He 
believed in an interventionist state which would 'control' rather than replace individual 
action. "'O Furthermore, Ashley offered a new standard by which to test policy: the 'economic 
16 Ashley to Brentano. 25 March 1913, quoted from R. W. McCready, p. 43, 'Sir William Ashley: 
Some Unpublished Letters'. Journal of Econon-dc History, Vol. 15, (1955). pp. 34-43. 
17 Ashley quoted in Anne Ashley, 2p. git p. 126. 18 See G. M. Koot, English Historical Economists, (Cambridge. CUP. 1987). P. 119. 
19 Ashley to Lodge, 24 May 1916, quoted in p. 109, 'Municipal and National Politics' (the second 
part of & chapter contributed to Anne Ashlev. Qp. cit. by Ashley's Birmingham colleague. Professor 
J. H. Muirhead). 
20 Ashley. article in D& Ou gtlook, 20 October 1906. quoted in lbid, P. I 
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standard, the amount of wealth produced' was immoral, the moral standard was difficult to 
apply and was believed by those with legislative and administrative authority to have nothing 
to do with the state, so Ashley proposed that justice should be applied to something beyond 
the individual, and that , 'the final test ... must be the welfare of the state'. 
21 
He was strongly nationalistic, and also believed that Britain's economic future was best 
assured by closer Imperial ties. This was the reason why he was so willing to ally himself 
closely with the tariff reform campaign: like Chamberlain he stressed the imperial reciprocity 
side of the case. As his daughter noted: 'He believed that only in the overseas Dominions 
could Britain find the large and dependable market she needed'. ' His nationalism and its 
Imperial context is perhaps best illustrated in a letter he wrote to the Vice-Chancellor of 
Birmingham University (C. G. Beals) on Empire Day in 1909: 
I was very sorry to flnd on coming down to College this morning, that the flag was not 
flying from the University Buildings ... I cannot but reflect 
how on this day (the late Queen's 
Birthday) the Union Jack is flying from every Public Building or School House from end to 
end of the Dominion .... 
it seems to me unfortunate that Colonial students and Colonial 
visitors should be pained by the absence of the flag from the University Buildings on this of 
all days in the year. 23 
So high did Ashley's feelings run on this issue that he purposed to put a motion before the 
University Council that the flag should be flown over buildings on both sites on future Empire 
Days. 
The other influence which informed Ashley's view of economics, and the role of the 
economist was his early intellectual attachment to the socially oriented historical approach in 
economics. This he first encountered at Oxford from Toynbee, and it was under this influence 
that Ashley first became interested in social questions. 24 This approach dovetailed with the 
ideological views outlined above, and no doubt Ashley's receptivity to historicism was itself 
informed by these views. 
Ashley, 'What is Political Science?, P. 19-2 1, inaugural lecture at the University of Toronto, 9 
November 1888, (Toronto. Rowsell and Hutchison, 1888), APB, 9/iV1 I 
22 Anne Ashley, op. cit. p. 122. 
23 Ashley to Beals, 24 May 1909, APB, 3/vii/4-5, Dean of the Faculty of Commerce Letterbooks. 4 
(ýetterbook 2). p. 328-9. 
.4 Arnold Toynbee (1852-83), a disciple of T. H. Green. Led to economic history by his philanthropy. 
A tutor at Balliol. his lectures on the Industrial Revolution were given in 1881-2. 
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Ashley was drawn to economics from a study of history. At Oxford he gained a first in 
History in 1881, and began privately teaching while looking for a Fellowship. During 1881-2 
he taught constitutional history and stimulated by this he visited Toynbee (whose lectures on 
the industrial revolution he had recently attended after graduating) , asking to attend his 
political economy lectures to Indian Civfi Service students. Instead he was advised to write 
fortnightly essays on classical economic doctrine, which would then be discussed with 
Toynbee. Eight years later he bore witness to the strength of Toynbee's influence in making 
him a historical economist saying : 'I regard [Toynbee] more than any other man as the source 
of whatever inspiration has come to me in the investigation and teaching of the subject". 21 FES 
daughter confirmed this in her biography: 
He seems to have felt afterwards that in these taEks with Toynbee he first came to see that 
economic doctrine could be studied historically and first encountered the dynamic as 
contrasted with the static view of economic theory and fact. 26 
As Clapham noted in his obituary of Ashley: *Leaming was the foundation ... but as Toynbee's 
to lif 1.27 disciple, he must always have seen it related e 
In common with other historicists, Ashley held that 'economic conclusions [were] 
relative to given conditions, and that they possess only hypotheticaLvalidity'. 28 Awareness of 
the historical relativism of economic doctrine would naturafly have led to an interest in 
contemporary problems, even had it not been for the added impetus of the ideological 
influences described above. Such an approach led to a perception that orthodox economic 
doctrine could not be relevant to the current situation, as it had been formed in response to 
historically specific economic and social conditions. Ashley believed that orthodox economic 
doctrine was based on a narrow 'static' definition of economic behaviour. He posited that: 
The problem [of demand] is. in a wide sense of the term , an historical ne. or, if you prefer 
the phrase, a sociological one, both "static" and "dynamic". Behind the workman's wife 
making up her mind on Saturday night whether to buy another loaf or a scrap more meat 
stand the whole of human nature and the whole of social history.: ' 
15 Ashley to Brentano. 16 October 1890, quoted from McCready PJ2. cit. pp. 35-6. 
26 Anne Ashley, 22. cit.., p. 22. 
W? 2 Clapham. op. cit., p. 678. 
gi Harva Ashley, 'On the Study of Economic History', p. 3. ori nal emphasis. Inaugural address at rd (L ndon. University, 4 January 1893. reprinted as pp. 1.21 in his Sury ýs Flistoric and Economic 0 
Longmans. Green. IkO). 
29 Ashley, 'The Present Position of Political Economy'. Presidential Address to Section F of the 
BAAS, Leicester. 1907, reprinted on pp. 223-246. in P, L. Smyth (cd. ), Essays in Economic Meth 
199 
Like other historicists, Ashley's long term plan for the nature and scope of economic 
enquiry was to establish economic doctrine on a new basis as an evolutionary study of society 
founded on generalisations from observable facts, rather than from abstract theory. Ashley's 
views on evolutionary social progress, noted above, predisposed him to see the task of 
economics as the search for 'conclusions as to the character and sequence of the stages in 
economic development'. 30 But for the moment the economist should not look to &ame a new 
orthodoxy of laws, but restrict himself to offer practical advice for the solution of 
contemporary problems based not on theories but on observation of the present economic 
facts: 
The prevailing method hitherto in England has been to pursue certain abstract lines of 
argument as to cause and effect, and then occasionally to look out into the noise and turmoil 
of real Iffe and find there bits of concrete illustration. The method I urge ... is the cxact 
opposite: it is that of simple observation of actual life. with recourse, whenever it seems 
useful, to abstract explanation. 31 
This was Ashley forthrightly spelling out his methodological differences with Marshall. 
Elsewhere he was less dismissive of the deductive method, but equally clear that the 
inductive/empirical historical approach would bear more fruit. He stated his belief in 1904 that 
the deductions of orthodox economics were not used as interpretative tools with which to 
examine empirical economic data (historical and statistical), but instead used to draw 
conclusions 'which are dictated not by logic but by preconceived bias. ' He thus thought the 
older economics' to be 'an inadequate' though not a 'fundamentally mistaken' method. 
32 He 
warned against relying too heavily on theory: 
We think that econon-dc problems need to be treated far more historically than they have 
hitherto been in England in order to disentangle ... the tendencies of movements over wide 
Selected Papgrs read to Section F of the BAAS 1860-1913 . (London. 
Gerald Duckworth. 1962), 
p. 23 3., The first, emphasis is mine, the second is original. For another example of Ashley's consistent 
relativism see his 'Modem history' in A. M. Stedman (ed. ), Oxfor 1: its Life and Schools (London, G. 
Bell and Sons. 1887), p. 303, where he states that: 'the so-called "principles" of Political Economy are 
at any rate not universally true for all times and places, and. in consequence, contribute scarcely at all 
to thýe understanding of the economic life of the past. For this it is necessary to study economic 
institutions in the light of the ideas of the time and to cxan-ýne those ideas, not in relation to modem 
conditions which did not then exist. but in relation to the conditions amid which they arose'. Cited 
from p. 73, Kadish, 'Oxford Economics in the later nineteenth ccnturY'. pp. 42-77 in Kadish and 
Tribe. gA. cit. 
"0 Ashley, 'On the Study of Economic Flistory'. gp. cit. p. 7. 3 Ashley 'A Science of Commerce and Some Prolegomcnal, ScigneeProgress No. I (July 1906). p-7. 
32 Ashley, pp. 244-5, 'Political economy and the tariff problem'. in triots' Club Lectures. First 
5eries omisIs--. -. U-S-Ii-tv 
p. 234. The article 
, (London, 
1905). Cited here from Kadish. Historians. Econ-- 
was originally published in the Economic Review. Vol. XIV, July 1904 (see Senuncl, W. ci p. 
207). 
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spaces of time. The old abstract - so-called "deductive- - reasoning we regard as one of the 
means. and an important means. of interpreting the tendencies so disclosed. We accept all 
the main analysis of which it is so proud: though as they are seldom more than 
generalizations of common sense. we do not use quite such grand language about them. But 
we distinguish between these simple generalizations and the conclusions hastily drawn from 
thern. 33 (Original emphasis). 
Ashley believed that the future of economics as an academic discipline, and as a 
science with recognised authority in policy matters, would only be assured if it was shown to 
be concerned with practical realities, and could thus be studied vocationally. He thus dubbed 
the historical approach the 'realistic' method arguing that this was: 
... simply the application to the past ... of the same method of careful observation and 
ascertainment of facts, and of their appropriate grouping for purpose of presentation. as are 34 
necessarily employed in the realistic study of the present... 
As would be expected, Ashley carried over this method from general economic study into the 
work of the Commerce Faculty at Birn-ýngham. The way in which he talked about the role of 
the faculty's teachers provides a very clear illustration of his views of how the 
inductive/empirical method was to work in practice, and also of how an economist might 
work as a guide to policy. Rather than an emphasis on theory, the emphasis was on 
observation and comparison of business conditions. The faculty's teachers were to allow 
principles to emerge from a wide familiarity with the facts of business fife. The teacher, 
..., will not set himself up as a superior person to teach the men of 
business; he will collect 
and compare the experiences of the men and affairs and bring out their common features*. 
until at last he arrives at a series of principles. or gencralizations ... with the 
illustrative 
incidents grouped under several heads. Then perhaps it may be possible to show how 
commercial phenomena result from certain simple forces of human nature. working under 
such and such local or social conditions. But he will not begin with any postulates. he will 
35 rather ... end with them. (original emphasis). 
As Ashley put it elsewhere, the function of the teacher (and, by implication of the economist 
as policy guide) 'will simply be to interpret to the business world that world's own 
experience. ' The teacher's 'sole advantage will result from his wider acquaintance with the 
36 
field of inquiry than most men actually engaged in trade have time to acquire'. 
33 bid. p. 260. 34 
3 
Ashley, p. 189, 'The Enlargement of Economics% Economic Journal Vol. 18 (1908). pp. 181-204, 
s Ashley, 'Our Education: what it is and what it ought to be. III Commercial Education'. in The 
World's Work. February 1903, p. 269. Cited here from Kadish. ppcit- p. 2.3 )6. 
cit. p. 202. For more of hley s Quotations from Ashley 'The Enlargement of Economics', gp-., As 
thoughts on the role of the economist as teacher see his The Faculty of ommerce. in the Unive itv of 
eci , p. 
2. wher h Birmingham: Its PurDose and Plan. (Birmingham. University Press. 1903). esp ally ee 
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Both ideological factors and his intellectual attachment to the historical approach to 
economics, with its orientation towards facts and its 'curious bearing on modem discussions', 
which gave it for him 'a keener zest', 37 propelled Ashley towards a practical economics. But 
Ashley also went a step further and posited that the most effective practical role for the 
economist was at the heart of policy-making. 
6.2 ASHLEYS PUBLIC SCIENCE 
Ashley commented in his Toronto Inaugural in 1888 that the role of the economist was 
to offer advice on contemporary economic questions: 
Having got to certain conclusions on a particular economic question. it seems to me, it is 
then the duty of the economist to point out the evils or dangers ... that may be present. and to 
suggest means for their removal. Some English economists indeed declare that their subject 
is a science, not an art - that they must strictly limit themselves to the explanation of what is 
and give no hint as to what should be. But there has never yet been an economist who has 
not sometimes given advice in spite of himself. certainly the great public looks to the 
economist for practical guidance; and it is better to accept the situation. Surely he who has 
given more careful consideration than others to the economic side of social life. ought to be 
more capable of giving sound advice about it. '8 [original emphasis] 
Ashley's rhetoric urging the duty and necessity of giving economic advice played on many of 
the same themes which were discerned in earlier chapters in the contemporary public science 
of the scientists. He clearly intended that such advice should not only be given in the wider 
forum of public debate (for example speeches and articles, and books on current controversial 
issues) but also directly to influential politicians, both informally and formally. He desired to 
work, as was noted in chapter four, through the existing formal mechanisms of committees 
and conunissions, but also to use such opportunities to urge the need for new mechanisms of 
advice. He argued that advice and new mechanisms were necessary to offset the tendencies to 
corruption inherent in democratic government. Objective advice would ensure that British 
economic power was saved from the potentially damaging competing claims of parties and 
sectional interest groups, and was guided down the righteous middle path of, what Ashley 
perceived as, old-style Tory democracy, or to give it its newer name, Social Imperialism. 
describes the teacher's job as to impart to the businessman. 'a body of principles of policy derived 
from current practice' 3' ' Ashley, 'The War ýnd its Economic Aspects', a lecture to the Workers' Educational Association at 
Birmingham University, 18 November, 1914. Published in the series of Oxford Pamphlets. (London. 
OUP. 1914), p. 20. 
38 Ashley, 'What is Political Scicnce?, 2p. cit, p. 19-20. 
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Ashley stressed to his Canadian audience in 1888, that the masses were 'ignorant' and 
without aid 'will inevitably fall prey to the arts of unscrupulous part politicians', and that: 
With a Democratic Government politics can only be saved from corruption by a large 
number of citizens taking an active part in politics who have given a serious and honest 
attention to the questions at issue, and are determined to make their weight felt. To meet the 
industrial difficulties ... which press upon us for solution. an impartial study of the situation. 
with all the aid Economic Science can give us is our only hope. In the Oid World where a 
revolutionary socialism [he meant here the pressures on policy from big business and trade 
unions] is a menacing danger, I should urge this with more vehemence than you might think 
suitable in this place. 39 
He repeated these sentiments in 1912 in an article entitled 'Social Study'. Ostensibly this 
pamphlet contained his thoughts on the Social Studies Diploma run jointly by Birmingham 
University and the Womeds Settlement at Summer Lane. This course was, at least at this 
time, largely made up of women, and it aimed at giving them a university preparation for the 
burgeoning opportunities for Social Work: for example in local government on Education 
Committees, Medical Inspection in Schools, and Welfare Supervisors in factories. However, 
Ashley's words also give us an insight into his views on the need for expert involvement in 
policy. There is the same stress laid on the idea of citizenship and service through beneficent 
state action, the same claim that this injection of informed advice Will ensure that the 
expanded state operates for the national good: 
Besides the official of the old type and the elected councillor of the old type. we are now 
beginning to find a new order of people at work - the unpaid, unelected. appointed or co- 
opted persons of special knowledge and experience. It is practically a new state of mind on 
the part of legislators that we now see manifesting itself: a feeling that the powers of the 
State can no longer be trusted entirely either to bureaucracy or to democracy in their old 
forms. 
He noted approvingly that 'in many different ways there is a demand for ... the "expert'" . 
40 
Ashley believed that the need for expert advice on policy had increased as the 
interventionist role of the state had increased. Now that the role of the state had expanded, 
and before any further expansion, it was necessary to reform the machinery so that it could 
undertake its new responsibilities efficiently. This sentiment sprang from Ashley's belief in 
social evolution to meet new conditions, which we noted earlier. He argued in 1909 that: 
39 aid, p. 26-7. 
40 Ashley 'On Social Study', p. 4 and p. 3, printed for private circulation from The Year Book of Social 
(1912), APB, 9/iv/i. Proe 
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I cannot but think that the most pressing need of the present time is not so much any great 
additional -widening of the area of state control, as the modernization and adequate 
equipment of the machinery of control. and especially that in the hands of central 
government. The organization and procedure of each of the great departments which have to 
do with social legislation - the Home Office, the Local government Board. and the Board of 
Trade - require to be overhauled and brought up to date. 4' 
In his 1911 introduction to Hamilton's The Federalist, which contained many of the 
most cogent political arguments for the American Constitution, Ashley agreed with the author 
that 'to "accumulate in a single body all the most important prerogatives of sovereignty" is "to 
entail upon our posterity one of the most execrable forms of government that human 
infatuation ever contrived"'. He noted the absence in The Federalist of' the idea that now so 
powerfully affects all political thinkers, the idea of development or evolution'. 42 
Ashley found the trend which he perceived and encouraged in the Edwardian period 
towards bringing outside experts into policy-making flower during the First World War. He 
thought it a very hopeful sign that, even by 1914, the war had affected a 'dramatic 
transformation ... 
in the economic policy of the Home Government' which had *abandoned the 
traditional policy of economic inaction'. Every new day saw Government intervention 
% extended to some new department of commerce, some branch of trade ... some extensive new 
manufacture'. He perceived this as an extension of the existing pre-war trend towards 
intervention: it was 'only the sudden emergence in new fields of that fresh economic courage 
which has been so remarkably displayed in our recent social legislation'. Such action he noted, 
called 'for a huge and complicated administrative organizatiorf, and meant that the role of the 
government in a country which had once embarked on such measures, 'can never be as 
before'. 43 As we shall see later, Ashley benefited greatly from the expansion of government 
activities in wartime. Once on the inside of the machinery of government, he urged the 
necessity of making further use of experts in policy-making, as he had done from the outside 
before the war. But now he had the increased leverage of a valued insider, and while rendering 
Ashley, 'The Present Position of Social Legislation in England!, (Oxf d. Christian Social Union, Or 
Oxford University Branch. 1909), pp. 14-15. 
itution, (London, J. M. '2 Ashley, Introduction to A. Hamilton. et al, The Federalist or the Nc v Const 
Dent [Everyman], 1911), pp. x and dii. 
43 All quotations above from Ashley. *The War and its Economic Aspects', M-631'. p. 18-19- 
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public service, could utilize the emergency to promote his idea of the professional economist: 
a man of action. 
Such a self-conscious championing of the active role of the economist in government 
was, clearly, fundamentally at odds with the professional strategy of Marshall and his School. 
However Ashley had no desire for further conflict, no wish to re-open the old wounds of the 
methodological dispute of the 1890s (embodied in the row, which was noted in the previous 
chapter, between Cunningham and Marshall), just because he had developed the implications 
of the historicist line for the involvement of economists in policy to their logical extent. 
Instead he side-stepped antagonism by locating a gap in the Marshallian synthesis and using 
this as his justification for action. 
Ashley set out his position before he embarked on his intensive period of government 
work, in his Presidential Address to Section F of the BAAS at Leicester in 1907. Ifis tone was 
conciliatory towards Marshall, as it always was, but he argued that there was no agreement 
among international post-Ricardian economists, even on such basic concepts as rent, profit 
and the like. For example: 
on such a vital question as whether trade-unions could effect a general rise of wages. not 
only would opinions differ, but those who agreed in their answers would get at them in quite 
different ways. 
Ashley thus discredited the Marshallian idea of consensus arguing that there 'is hardly a single 
point on which there is as yet any approach to unanimity. ' Ashley concluded that while 
Marshall's effort was laudable (abstract economics was still of 'interest', and 'Its study is 
certainly sharpening to the wits, and it is hardly likely that all the opposing doctrines are 
mistakerf) it should not deter the historical economist from his rather different path: 
... an Englishman may feel a just satisfaction in the width of sympathies and 
the sober 
balance of judgement which mark the chief English treatise of this period Pvlarshall's 
Principles , and even an untheoretical reader will gratefully acknowledge the abundant 
help 
to be derived from Professor Marshall's knowledge and insight. My purpose was simply to 
show thaL though there has been a new growth of abstract speculation since the first phase 
of orthodoxy passed away. there has not emerged a second orthodoxy so far. 
and that consequently: 
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There is no reason why those who think that a very moderate amount of general reasoning 
wýill go a long way in the interpretation of facts. when once these facts have been collectcd 
and armnged. should be so dazzled by any of the new systems as to be checked in their own 
more plodding carcer. 44 
Given the absence of consensus, Ashley argued, following the Nfarshallian line, that 
economists must not speak publicly as representatives of a unified science, but still they must 
speak. Here Ashley introduces his concept of active citizenship. Marshall had used the 
argument that the economist could only speak as a private citizen as a reason for limiting his 
role. Having established that there was no economic consensus, Ashley carefully argued that 
this freed the informed citizen to give advice: 
Jt behoves each of us to make it clear that, even if he is speaking ex cathedra as people say, 
he is still speaking in propria persona with all his limitations and unconscious bias. he is 
not the mouth piece of Science. 
I venture to lay stress upon this poinL because I am most anxious that econon-dsts - not as 
exponents of a unanimous doctrine, but as individuals who have given time and thought to 
industrial and commercial affairs - should have theirjust share in guiding national action in 
45 the future. (original emphasis) 
Both Ashley and Marshall rested their claim for policy influence on the economist as 
scientist, but each emphasised a different aspect of the scientific method, and these emphases 
were themselves products of a fundamental difference of opinion over methodology in 
economics between the Marshallians and the historicists. Such tensions did not publicly 
surface in the natural sciences, where a methodological consensus had been at least publicly 
preserved for many years. For Marshall, who emphasised the deductive, theoretical approach, 
the economist must publicly distance himself from policy questions, lest he compromise his 
objectivity, or invite a public airing of differences with other economists which could only be 
to the detriment of the authority of economic science. For Ashley, who emphasised the 
inductive, empirical approach, the economist possessed the methodological tools and the 
broad experience of economic conditions to be a guide to policy: to interpret policy questions 
to the policy-makers and to draw out from the facts the most important elements of any 
question. 
44Ashley, 'The Present Position of Political Economy', 2n. cit..., pp. 236 and 237. 
43 RLi d pp. 245-6. 
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This approach, combined with his religious and political beliefs pushed Ashley towards 
involvement in policy-making. But there was also one further proximate cause of AsWey's 
involvement. The Marshallians did not foresee any drastic alteration to Britain's Free Trade 
policy, and thus saw no pressing need for influence over policy in the short term anyway. The 
historicists, who thought a change more probable, were eager to ensure that new policy was 
framed with the benefit of their economic advice: 
I recognize ... that the economist's present attitude must be affected 
by his forecast of the 
future. If he thinks that all departure from the present commercial policy of this country is 
likely to be permanently staved off, then the preservation of a future influence is not an 
object worth considering. But there must be many who-will confess that change is 
probable ... And, if so, must they not desire that the measures on which the country may 
embark should receive as much competent criticism in detail as can possibly be directed 
upon them. 46 
It was this debate over Free Trade versus Tariff Reform which highlighted the 
differences in perception of the role of the professional economist in policy-making for both 
the Marshalfians and the historicists. For Marshall, as we saw, it served as a reminder that the 
time was not yet right to seek influence (he felt that his involvement had damaged the 
reputation of the economists at a crucial re-formative period). For Ashley, the debate marked 
his first major foray into public debate and policy-making, and thus the first example of the 
economist defining himself through attempts to make policy. 
6.3 THE PRACTiCAL ECONOMIST AT WORK 
6.3.1 THE TARIFF REFORM CAMPAIGN OF 1903: 
The exact nature of Ashley's involvement in the public debate over tariff reform is 
unclear, and needs further investigation. We noted that he had despaired of the Liberals as the 
party of social reform and formally joined the Unionist Party in 1906. However, during the 
debate of 1903 he appears to have had a behind the scenes influence on Unionist policy 
towards Tariff Reform, in addition to the important contribution of his The Tariff Problem, 
(1903). His daughter wrote in her biography that his writings helped to shape Unionist policy, 
46 Ibid. p. 246. 
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but she added that 'He seems to have been the reasonable and moderating, and therefore the 
47 centralizing and uniting, mind in the tariff reform and consequently in the Unionist ranks'. 
There is some doubt about the degree of contact between Ashley and Chamberlain. A letter 
from Chamberlain of 13 May 1903 listin eleven questions needing investigation may have 9 
prompted Ashley to write his book over that Summer. But later, in a letter to John Morley, 
who had alleged in Parliament that the book had been written at Chamberlain's request, Ashley 
denied that there had at any point been, 'conference between Mr. Chamberlain and myself 
and maintained that 'My book was written entirely of my own motion, and without the 
slightest inspiration direct or indirect'. 48 This seems to be something of a refutation of my 
argument on Ashley's attitude towards the role of the economist, but there were here special 
factors which made this a unique situation. In 1903 the full glare of publicity shone on the 
actions of all economists taking any part in the controversial debate, and for Ashley, the real 
problem was not public action itself but the risk of damaging the reputation of economics by 
association in the public mind with one political party. That such considerations were in his 
rnind is bome out by the rest of the above quoted letter to Morley. Ashley's situation was 
complicated by the fact that he was at Birmingham University, and was by far the easiest 
target for accusations of political bias: he thus stressed his 'scientific independence' the more 
forcefully: 
of I want to make this clear because I realized at once ... that for a Professor in the Univcrsi Bimingharn to write on the subject was to expose himself to grave mis-representation. ýVas a 
mere accident which brought me, on my return to England, to Birmingham. I might just as 
well have gone to Manchester and there the Manifesto of the Fourteen Economists would 
have forced my little book out of me just the same. 49 
However, despite this understandable caution there may have been closer contacts 
between Ashley and Chamberlain than the former was prepared to reveal. Bonar Law wrote to 
him in December 1904 urging him to stress to Chamberlain the importance for the Tariff 
4' Anne Ashley. 2A. cit. p. 127. 
48 Ashley to Morley, 9 February 1904, from Chamberlain Papers. cited from p. 222-3, A. W. Coats. 
'Political Economy and the Tarfff Reform Campaign of 1903', Journal of Law and Economics Vol. 
11, (April 1968), pp. 181-229. 
49 R2ýid.. p. 222. 
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Reform cause of appearing to have scientific authority on its side. Ifis letter seems to assume 
that the economist had privileged access to the Birmingham politician. 50 
However, notwithstanding such proximate difficulties, Ashley's attitude towards the 
role of the economist inside the government machine was unchanged. He recommended in 
The Tariff Problem., that, if retaliation were adopted, a "Ministry of Trade and Commerce 
should be established and that its advice to government should be guided by local 
correspondents or delegates advised by provincial university professors of Commerce. " This 
would, at least, have guaranteed Birmin2ham's Professor a key advisory role! 
6.3.2 THE UNIONIST SOCIAL REFORM COMMITTEE (USRQ 
Ashley's involvement as policy adviser to the Unionists was not confined to the Tariff 
Reform debate. He helped Bonar Law with economic questions at least from 1904,52 and was 
valued as an adviser by Stanley Baldwin. The latter wrote the introduction to Anne Ashley's 
1937 biography of her father and, when President of the Board of Trade between April 1921 
and October 1922, included Ashley's name in the permanent panel from which committees 
were to be appointed under the 1921 Safeguarding of Industries Act. 53 In Baldwin's second 
administration Ashley was invited to fill a place on the Balfour Committee on Industry and 
Trade. 
But Ashley was also involved in an unofficial Unionist policy-making body - the 
Unionist Social Reform Committee - in the years immediately before the war. This was a neo- 
Fabian policy-making group founded by F. E. Smith (later Lord Birkenhead) in April 1905, 
which aimed to re-invigorate Unionism by supplying it with a coherent social policy harking 
back to the perceived traditional paternalistic principles of Tory democracy. 5' The USRC 
5') 'There is one point ... which-I wish you would bring to the notice of 
Mr. Chamberlain. There is 
nothing, I think. which tells more against us than the idea that scientific uthority is against us'. 
toriginal emphasis), Bonar Law to Ashley, December 1904. quoted in Anne Ashley, 2a. cit. p. 135. 
5 
Ashley, The Tariff Problem, (1903), pp. 133-6. See Coats. Qn. cit.. p. 209, footnote 77. 
See Iýtier from Law to Ashley, December 1904, asking for occasional economic ad0ce. in Anne 
Ashley, 2p. cit, p. 134. 
5' See Ashley Official Papers. British Library, London (hereafter referred to as AOP), Add. Mss. 
42,2153. VoIML E 151 and following. 
54 On the USRC see Jane Ridley, 'The USRC, 1911-14: Wets Before the Deluge'. Historical Journal, 
Vol. 30, No. 2, (1987), pp. 3 )91-413. 
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operated outside of official party machinery perhaps as a model of the kind of policy-making 
body its members would have liked to have seen within the party, or even within the 
government machinery. The sub-committees reported on current bills on the poor law, 
housing, agriculture, education, industrial unrest and health. There was considerable 
involvement of outside expertise: Morant and the Webbs were closely involved with the health 
report and Ashley was a member of the sub-committee on industrial unrest 55 and was singled 
out in the published report for special mention for his contributions both 'in discussion and in 
writing'. So great was Ashley's part felt to be that his pennission was obtained to add his name 
as co-aut or. 56 Of the report's many recommendations, the most interesting for our present 
purposes, and the one which seems to have been suggested by Ashley, was that there should 
be an improvement in the statistical information available to government. This was to be 
achieved by the creation of a permanent statistical section of the Labour Department, charged 
with preparing annual reports; by the compilation of physiological and dietary reports by a 
departmental committee of physiological experts; and by the creation of an inter-departmental 
Statistical Committee. 57 
6.3.3 WAR WoRK 
But it was during the war that Ashley was able to put his principles most fully into 
practice and become active in policy-making. Clapham noted in his obituary that: 'In a 
way... the war brought him satisfaction, as it did to many who after studying affairs, were 
caUed to share in thenf. " I will discuss briefly here one further key example of Ashley's war 
work, to underline the points already made by the material on his role in the Royal Society's 
Food (War) Committee (FWC) in chapter four. " Thus I will concentrate here on Ashley's 
role in the Committee of Economists (COE) of the Board of Trade set up in 1916. This 
further example has been chosen as it has been totally neglected in the existing literature on 
55 Ashley also signed the 1913 report 'A Unionist Agricultural Policy'. although he does not seem to 
have been a member of the sub-committee. See Ridley, 9R.!; Lt. 
56 J. W. Hills, Professor William James Ashley and Maurice Woods- Industrial Unrest -A Practical 
Solution. The Repgrt of the USRC (London. John Murray, 1914). Quotation is from the Preface. p. iii 
51 RLid 
, pp. 
36-7. 
58 Clapham. 2p. cit. p. 682. 59 See the Appendix to this chapter for a list of AshIcy's war work. 
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the role of economists in government, " and also Oust as was the case with the FWC) while he 
served on the COE, Ashley used his position to put forward recommendations for further 
future involvement for economists in policy-making. 
Ashley was originally invited to serve on the Committee of Economists in early 1916 
by S. J. Chapman, the Professor of Economics at University College, Manchester 1901-17, 
who was then working at the Labour Exchange Department of the Board of Trade. Chapman 
wrote that the Board of Trade was thinking about post-war and demobilisation problems and 
was keen to recruit economists for a committee .61 The Committee seems to 
have held its first 
meeting on 7 June 1916 at 6 WI-dtehall Gardens. The purpose of this meeting was: 
to arrange for the co-operation of a number of economists %vith the Board of Trade, in the 
preparation of industrial reports with special reference to employment in the various 
industries of the United Kingdom in the period succeeding the ivar. 62 
The meeting was chaired by Llewellyn Smith and many of the most notable contemporary 
economists were present: including Ashley, Cannan, Chapman, Clapham, Gonner, Pigou and 
SCott. 63 It was agreed to assign a group of industries to each economist, and that a 
preliminary report should be submitted for discussion among all of them by I November 
1916.64The slant was to be 'primarily industrial, with special reference to employment. 65 
60 See for example the articles by Furner and Supple. Winch and Harris in Furner and Supple (eds. ), 
The State and Economic Knowle4ge, (Cambridge, CUP, 1990), none of which mention the 
institutional novelty of the Committee of Economists; and lose Harris. 'Bureaucrats and Businessmen 
in British Food Control. 1916-19', which sees food as a battle-ground between these two groups and 
does not mention any role for outside academic experts. 
61 Chapman to Ashley, 1916 (probably April), AOP, Add. Mss. 42.247A. VoLVI (1), E 159. 
62 Nfinutes of first meeting of thý Committee of Economists of the Board of Trade. titled 
'Arrangements made in Connection with Post-War Reports on Employment', AOP. Vol. VI(l), 
op. cit. ff. 166-7. Quotation is from f. 166. 
" Present at the first meeting were: Smith. Beveridge. Percy J. Ashley, Ashley, Cannan. Chapman. 
Clapham. Gonner. Professor H. M. Hallsworth. Professor A. W. Kirkcaldy, Professor D. Knoop. Pigott, 
Professor W. R. Scott. Professor J. A. Todd, Mrs. F. Wood. Mr. CK Hobson and Mr. H. D. 
Henderson. Extra members were added later: Nfiss Anne Ashley, Nfiss W. A. Elkin. NEss D-P 
Edinger, J. W. Nixon. and J Hartley Withers from the Treasury. See Minutes of First Meeting, 2p_. oit, 
and Nfinutes of Fourth Meeting, AOP, Vol VI(l), gpý. jcit 
f. 219. 
64 The work was finally distributed as follows: Chapman: cotton; Ashley: general and constructional 
engineering; Cannan: paper and printing; Clapharn: woollen and worsted; Elkin: finplatc. galvanised 
sheets, metal manufacture other than iron and steel, textile dyeing, finishing and bleaching; Edinger: 
electrical engineering; Gonner: shipping and shipbuilding; Hobson: iron and steel. Jackson: 
jewcllcry; Kirkcaldy: marine engineering, cycles and motors, Knoop: cutlery, china and earthenware, 
glass. implements and tools. Nixon: rubber. Pigou: building, quarries. brick and cement. wood and 
furniture trades; Scott: food. drink and tobacco-, Tillyarct tailoring, shirt- and dress-making; Todd: 
raw cotton supply, jutc, hosiery, lace. boot and shoe-, Wood:: chemical trades. Taken from Qencral 
Rqgrt of the Committee of Economists Avpgintcd by the Board of Trade to consider the PrnIYIhIe 
State of Industry after the War with Spgdal Reference to Employment, (privately printed, 1917). ff. 
245-289. AOP, Vol. VI(I). 2p,. cit. 
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However, though the government desired economic advice, it firmly indicated that the 
experts should know their place: be on tap but not on top. To this end, it was made clear at 
the first meeting that: 
The Reports are ... to be concerned primarily with what the position will be rather than with 
what ought to be done. The Economists need not regard themselves as dcbaffcd from 
making any practical suggestions that may occur to them, but. where possible, any such 
suggestions should be made in a supplementaxy part of the report. 66 
No doubt so that they could be ignored more easily. Likewise, although the economists were 
to be given access to all the relevant information held by the Board of Trade, they were 
expressly forbidden from making enquiries among employers, traders or trade unions, or visit 
any district in an official capacity without gaining the prior permission of the Board. 67 
The Committee met again on 7 February, 14 March and 2 May 1917, though these 
meetings would usually be continued for three days from the original date. The importance of 
standardising the various reports was stressed at these meetings. 
The final Report appeared in 1917 and ran to some eighty nine pages. Perhaps most 
interesting here are its recommendations and suggestions. The general tone of these was 
interventionist, nationalist, concerned with social welfare and technocratic. These themes 
came together in its advocacy of 'An Econon& General Staff: 
During the course of the war governmental control has been extended over many fields 
where it did not wdst before. It is certain that for some time after peace has been restored 
measures of control %ill need to be enforced. -During the war machinery 
for exercising 
control has been developed through the War Office. the Ministry of Munitions, the Board of 
Trade, the Board of Agriculture, the Ministry of Food. the National Service Department, and 
the various "Controllers" and special CommMons who have been appointed from time to 
time. Even now serious conflicts arise between these different authorities. When peace 
returns and an entirely new situation has to be faced. -thc danger of friction, overlapping and divided counsels is bound to be much enhanced. To obviate this danger we strongly urge that 
attention should be paid in time to the problem of co-ordinating the various authorities... To 
prepare for and supervise the transition from war conditions to peace conditions an 
"economic general staff" should be built up and organiscd forthwith. "g 
6S Minutes of First Meeting of Committee of Economists. Qp. cit. f. 166. 
66 Ibid. 
67 
68 Ge eral Repgrt of the Committee of Economists-, Qp-c-it , f. 256. 212 
It appears that this section was compiled by Ashley, Clapham and Pigou. 69 It is obviously 
impossible to tell who had the m&or hand in the drafting of this section, though the sentiments 
chime well with what has been argued about Ashley's views about the role of the economist 
and its formalisation in government. 
The report was privately printed and its circulation was restricted to the War Cabinet. 
The other recommendations echoed the sentiments described above: for example there were 
calls for greater involvement of outside experts, notably in a proposed census of modem 
machinery to be carried out by an expert committee. It was also advised that an expert 
comnlittee should consider the future of the National Factories. There was also a marked 
concern for national welfare, and a desire for continued interventionist policies to secure it: 
for example, two new Boards of Control, one to vet British foreign investment for anti- 
national repercussions, and one along the lines of the Development Commission, to make 
special grants in aid to enterprises developing sources for important raw materials or 
providing for urgent social needs at home, were suggested. There were also proposals to 
expand the role of worker/management committees into security and conditions of work; to 
increase technical education, relevant to local industry; a commitment to public works to 
relieve unemployment in a post-war depression, after an initial settling down period for 
industry, so as not to upset the natural business-cycle; and plans to extend the Insurance Act 
and stagger demobilisation. AH-in-afl a managed approach to the peace time economy was 
proposed, with a considerable input from experts. " 
Ashley's direct involvement with the Committee of Economists seems to have ended 
after this report, though Llewellyn Smith did write to him in August 1917, seeking his 
opinions on the new topic which the Committee of Economists was considering, war-time 
price inflation in Britain. In his reply Ashley again argued for the formalisation of the role of 
69 See Minutes of Third Meeting of Comn-dttee of Economists. AOP, Vol-VIO), PP. cit. f. 217, where 
this point is discussed: 'The danger of too many departments attempting to control industry during the 
period after peace is restored. The Comrnitteý decided to recommend that one body only should be 
responsible for control -a draft suggestion to this effect to be written by Professor Ashley, Dr. 
Clapham. and Professor Pigou. and to be discussed at the next meeting'. '0 See General RMrt of Committee of Economists-, gp. cit. 
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the economist in government. He suggested a new committee to establish whether or not 
there was any inflation and added: 
the formal appointment of such a Committee would appear preferable to a Memorandum 
from particular individuals, because it would render confidentially available information 
which otherwise might be inaccessible; and the conclusions. if the Committee were properly 
constituted. would carry more weight. 
In so-saying Ashley aptly reminds us of the difference between his view of the role of the 
economist and that which Marshall thought was appropriate in the short term. 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
There were two distinct versions of the idea of the professional economist put forward 
in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Britain. Marshall's was based on the image of the 
economist as objective scientist and produced a negative public science which stressed the 
distance which should be maintained between economics and politics. The economist was a 
scientist whose specialised, compartmentalized form of knowledge could not, and should not 
seek to frame policy, which was the common sense art of considering national issues from a 
range of perspectives. This was best done by the generalist politician. However, this fine both 
contributed to (in the longer term) and masked (in the short term) a strategy for political 
influence. Marshall's plan was to build up the public reputation of economics as an objective 
theoretical science, by disassociating it with politics: for he felt that the standing and thus 
potential influence of classical economics had suffered a decline by its attachment in the public 
mind too exclusively with the political position of laissez-faire. Once economics was firmly 
perceived as a science, and once theoretical differences had been resolved in the acceptable 
general theory of welfare economics (begun by Marsha and completed by his disciple Pigou) 
then the foundations would have been laid for a safe return to policy influence. In the mean 
time, in spite of the negative public science, these economist. % still enjoyed a privileged access 
to government via informal (privately requested memoranda) and ad hoc (committees and 
commissions) channels. 
Ashley, as a representative of a form of historical economist, posited a very different 
version of the professional econornist. This proposed that the economist should not be bound 
214 
by theory, but should base his claim to influence on having a wide empirical experience of 
economic conditions. I-Es expertise lay in being a general interpreter of these conditions. His 
authority rested more on his ability to collect relevant facts and to interpret them in the light 
of the evolution of economic conditions and local and national institutions. This approach 
produced a more politicay radical public science, which aimed at securing immediate 
influence over policy for the economist. In fact it was claimed that the economist was partly 
defined by his involvement in shaping national policy. Thus Ashley involved himself as much 
as he could in the existing machinery of government and pressed for the institutional 
formalisation of the role of the economist in pofty-making, through an economic general 
staff, from inside. 
in fact, because of the methodological dispute in economics, each of the above 
positions stressed one element of the scientific method (as the term was used in the natural 
and medical sciences) over the other Marshall the deductive; Ashley the inductive. It was not 
until the Marshallian paradigm was firmly in place that such tensions finally died. Keynes, as 
we shall see, felt able to talk technocratically about the need for economic scientists in the 
policy-making process, with less fear that his audience would wonder which method these 
economists would be using. By the 1920s Marshallianism had triumphed: historicism had been 
contained within economic history, and a methodological consensus was emerging within the 
profession of economics, as in science. 
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6.5 LIST OF ASHLEVS NWOR GovERNmENT WAR WORK 
1. From October 1914: Intelligence Officer for the Birmingham Citizens' Committee, and 
Local Correspondent to the Local Gover=ent Board. He wrote in glowing terms of the 
Committee's work that 'There has never been a time when so much thought has been put into 
the distribution of relief, when so much expert knowledge of industrial conditions has been 
invoked .... Surely it furnishes the beginnings of a permanent Civic Organization'. 
I 
2. February 1915: member of Board of Trade Departmental Committee on Retail Coal Prices. 
(See Cd. 7866). 
3. July 1915-June 1916: member of the food sub-committee of the Sectional Committee on 
Physiology, or Physiology (War) Conurfttee, of the Royal Society. 
4. November 1915: becomes member of Huth Jackson Committee on Trade Relationships 
After the War. (In September 1915 Ashley had previously prepared a memo for this 
committee on the relation between the economic position of the U. K. and military service, 
from the perspective of recruitment versus maintenance of exports). 
S. Beginning May 1916: writes memorandum on Reparations for Prime Minister (Vaughan 
Nash asks Llewellyn Smith at Board of Trade who asks Ashley). Has some, though not much, 
help from Keynes. 
6. June-September 1916: member of the Board of Trade Departmental Committee on Food 
Prices. 
7. June 1916-July 1917: member of Committee of Economists attached to the Industrial (War 
Enquiries) Branch of the Board of Trade, engaged in considering state of industry after war, 
with particular emphasis on labour. 
Ashley, 18 November 1914, cited in Anne Ashley, 2g,. dt p. 150. 
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S. February 1917- July 1917 : second period of service on Royal Society Food (War) 
Commýittee, as it is now called. Considers British food supplies: including scientific studies of 
nutritional requirements and practical schemes for rationing. Is knighted in 1917 for war 
work. 
9.1918: member of three Committees: (i) February-June, member of Ministry of Food 
Consumers Council; (H) March-November, member of Sumner Committee (Treasury) on the 
rise in the cost of living of the working classes: causes and counterbalancing factors; (iii) April 
1918-March 1919, member of Departmental Committee on Cost of Living of Rural Workers 
(Agricultural Wages Board) Ashley resigned after ninth meeting and A. L. Bowley (Prof. 
Statistics, University of London) took his place. 
PEACE WORK: 
1. June 1919-February 1920: member of Royal Commission on Agriculture 
November 1921: Chairman of the Board of Trade Departmental Committee on the 
Glassware Industry, set up under the Safeguarding of industries Act of 1921. 
3. December 1922-May 1924: member of Agricultural Tribunal with Prof W. G. S. Adams and 
Prof D. H. McGregor. To enquire into optimum food production methods with reference to 
wages of agricultural labour. 
4.1923: member of Tariff Advisory Committee, whose job was to advise the Board of Trade 
Departmental Committee on the framing of a general tariff. Milner was Chairman. Other 
members: Hewins (only attended first and last meetings as busy trying to get elected as M. P. 
for Swansea), Kylsant, Peter Rylands, Algernon Firth, Pugh. Work interrupted by general 
Election. Report drawn up but not published. 
5.1925-6: member of Balfour Committee on Industry and Trade. Chairman: Sir Arthur 
Balfour (Lord Riverdale), a Sheffield steel magnate and no relation to A. J. Balfour. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE ECONONUST AS PHILOSOPHER KING: THE ETHICAL PUBLIC 
SCIENCE OF J. M. KEYNES 
No! The economist is not king; quite true. But he ought to be! He is a better and wiser 
governor than the general or the diplomatist or the oratorical lawyer. I 
In the 1920s Keynes (like Ashley before him) departed from the Marshallian public 
stance, and actively sought a new positive role for the economist in policy-making in the 
short-term, and new governmental mechanisms through which to express it. But for Keynes 
this new role sprang from the pursuit, in theory and practice, of an ethical ideal: a vision of a 
utopian society. Like the historical economists, Keynes sought a middle way between 
capitalist individualism and state socialism. But with Keynes the role of the economist, armed 
with new theoretical weapons, was central in facilitating the new society. Thus a new public 
science emerged in economics: a new rationale for the involvement of economists in policy- 
making. Keynes argued that policy decisions would not only be more scientific if the 
economist was involved, but that they would be more ethical. For Keynes the usefulness of 
economics did not rest on its scientific nature alone, but on the assertion that science could 
usher in the new society. 
That science was thus invested with ethical, and concrete political, purposes was not 
problematical for Keynes, as it was for Marshafl. Keynes' perception of the role of the 
economist was similar to Ashley's. But here Moorean ethics took the place of Christian social 
duty as the spur to political involvement. Also, both the form of the ideal society, and the role 
of economists in creating it, reflected Keynes' own perception of a new kind of political 
Liberalism, and his Platonic elitism. 
Furthermore, unlike Ashley, but like Marshall, Keynes was a theorist. By the time he 
was rising to public prominence as an economist in the 1920s, economics was a profession 
1 J. M. Keynes. 'Reconstruction in Europe: An Introduction', Manchester Guardian Commercial, 18 
May 1922, in Collected Wdfin VI pp J y, s (hereafter CW followed by volume number) Vol. X 1. . 432-3. 
2 &. 18 
with a recognised sphere of knowledge and an established methodology. Thus Keynes, in one 
way, built on the work of Marshafl: he felt more free to pronounce on controversial policy 
questions since economics had now established some social and cultural authority. In fact, 
Keynes sought to re-use Marshall's strategy: Keynes himself, like Marshall, wished to develop 
and have accepted a new general theory, on which all policy advice could be based. So, in 
spite of the fact that, as we noted, Marshall's successor, Pigou, adhered in public rigidly to the 
early MarshalUan line of distance from policy questions, it can be argued that Keynes was 
taking forward Marshall's professional strategy along the path Marshall himself had intended, 
once the status of economics had been assured. 
In this chapter, I will want to draw on recent Keynesian exegesis which stresses the 
centrality of his early ethical position to his whole economic endeavour, 2 and to add to this 
the extra dimension of how his 'vision' and his 'philosophy of practical action'3 translated into 
a new type of call for economists in policy-making. 
7.1 THE UTOPIAN SOCIETY: THE ROLE OF THE ECONOMIST IN ITS CREATION 
Keynes' enduring ethical position was formulated under the influence of the work of 
G. E. Moore, and particularly his Principia Ethica of 19033. Keynes first read this in a 
formative period, as an undergraduate at Cambridge. In 1938 he was still conynitted to it. He 
declared: 'I see no reason to shift from the fundamental intuitions of Principia Ethic .... It 
is 
still my religion under the surface'. 4 Moore propounded an elitist ethics which held that the 
most valuable things were 'certain states of consciousness ... the pleasures of 
human 
intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects' and that 'it is only for the sake of these 
2 For example: Atholl Fitzgibbons. Keynes's Vision: A New Political Economy (Oxford, Clarendon. 
1990, originally 1988); R. SIddelsky, John MaMrd Keynes. Vol. l: Hopqs Betraved, 1883-1920 
(London, Macmillan, 1983); and'Keynes's Political Legacy', pp. 3-28 in Harnouda and Smithin (eds. ), 
Keynes and Public Policy After Fifty Years. Vol. l: Economics and Policy (Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 
1988); 'Keynes's Philosophy of Practice and Economic Policy', pp. 1034 1. in O'Donnell (ed. ), Knnes 
as a Philosopher Economi Ninth Keynes Seminar, University of Kent at Canterbury, 1989, 
(Houndmills, Nbcmillan. 199t). and P, OVonnell 'Keynes Political Philosophy'. pp. 3-28 in Barber 
(ed. ), PcrMgctives on the Histoly of Economic Thought Vol. VT Themes in K! n, _mc_sian 
Criticism and 
Supplementary Modem Tovics (Aldershot. Edward Elgar, 199 1). 
3 Fitzgibbons. gp. cit.. Preface, p. v. 
4 Keynes, 'My Early Beliefs. CW IX, p. 444. 
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things - in order that as much of them as possible may at some time exist - that anyone can be 
justified in performing any public or private duty'. 5 This philosophy underlay Keynes work in 
two ways: it was a motivation to social reform, and a justification of elitism. 
These two came together in Keynes' vision of the ideal society and how it was to be 
achieved. Keynes was not content with capitalist individualism, nor with state socialism. He 
envisaged a middle way: a society in which the economic problem was solved. An equitable 
distribution of wealth would lead to the decline of the money-making motive and to a new 
morality. In the new society, Keynes argued in 1930: 
I see us free-to return to some of the most sure and certain principles of 
religion and traditional virtue - that avarice is a vice, that the exaction of usury 
is a misdemeanour, and the love of money is detestable, that those walk most 
truly in the paths of virtue and sane wisdom who take least thought for the 
morrow. We shall once more value ends above means and prefer the good to 
the useful. We shall honour those who can teach us how to pluck the hour and 
the day virtuously and well, the delightful people who are capable of taking 
direct enjoyment in things, the lilies of the field who do not toil, neither do they 
spin. 6 
The existing framework of capitalism was to be retained in the short term so that the 
accumulation of capital by compound interest and scientific/technical advance could combine 
with 'avarice, usury and precaution' to solve the economic problem: 'For only they can lead us 
out of the tunnel of economic necessity into daylight'. 7 Keynes believed that change, though 
gradual, would be automatic. Only the pace of change was alterable. This could be influenced 
by four things: our power to control population; avoidance of foreign and civil wars; rate of 
accumulation of capital and 'our willingness to entrust to science the direction of those 
matters which are properly the concern of science'. 8 In this early version, the form of the new 
society was unclear as wie the tasks of science. However, by 193 6, and the publication of the 
General Theo , Keynes had a more developed 
image. The appearance of the new society 
5 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (1903). pp. 188_9 , cited from 
Slddclsky, 'Keynes's Philosophy of 
Practice... ', 22--cit., p. 105-6. 
6 Keynes. pp. 330-1, 'The Economic Possibilities for Our GrandchildrcrL CW LX. pp. 321-32, 
(1930). 
7 BLid-, p. 3' ) 1. 
8 Ibid. 
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would not be automatic but managed. He now argued that it was the (Keynesian) economist 
who could bring about the appearance of the new society by advising governments to lower 
the rate of interest, ending the scarcity of capital and thus causing the 'euthanasia of the 
rentier, and consequently, the euthanasia of the cumulative oppressive power of the capitalist 
to exploit the scarcity of capital'. 9 This would lead not only to fairer wealth distribution and 
full employment, but would also, Keynes argued, prevent war: 
... if nations can team to provide themselves with full employment 
by their 
domestic policy (and, we must add, if they can also attain equilibrium in the 
trend of their population), there need be no important economic forces 
calculated to set the interests of one country against that of its neighbours. 10 
Keynes now saw the economist not only as being able to remedy all the drags on the pace of 
change which he had identified in 1928 (with the exception of population control, which was 
the concern of Qjh= scientists), but also as initiating the change to the new society. 
I want to argue that this was a type of public science, which emphasized the scientific 
skill of the economist as the facilitator of an ethically superior society. The emphasis was on 
the ethics. It was a rhetoric which stressed, as Keynes had put it in 1928, the 'ends (ethics] 
above the means [science] and prefer(red] the good to the useful'. The economist was useful 
because he was good. Keynes saw economics as a practical ethical mission. He wrote that: "I 
want to emphasise strongly the point about economics being a moral science ... 
it deals with 
introspection and with values'. II He favoured the inclination of Malthus who had, 
... approached the central problems of economic theory 
by the best of all routes. 
He began to be interested as a philosopher and moral scientist, one who had 
been brought up in the Cambridge of Paley, applying the a priori method of the 
political philosopher. 12 
We come back, then, to the thrust of our opening quote. The economist should be 
king: should be closely involved in policy-making. Only he was capable of understanding the 
9 Keynes. The General Theory of Emnloyment Interest and Mone (London. Macmillan. 1936), 
p. 3 )76. 
10 Ibid., p. 382. 
II Keynes. CW XIV. p. 300, cited from Fitzgibbons. 212. cit, p. 34. 
12 Keynes. CWX p. 107, cited from RLU, p. 195. 
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fundamental nature of modem society. Even before the new society, itcqjonly the economist 
who coulJ manage policy to create wealth, and only he cwIJ solve the economic problem and 
usher in the ideal society. The opening quote continued: 
In the modem over-populated world, which can only live by all the nice 
adjustments, he is not only useful but necessary. It is he who can provide the 
mayor with a good house within whose comfortable walls the mayor can 
collect for himself the other ingredients of a good life. But where the rulers of 
the state dethrone the economic power in favour of the false idols of diplomacy 
or any other of A Hanotaux's mystic and incalculable forces, squalor follows, 
and the Mayor of Pargnan fives and dies in a ceUar. 13 
Keynes' ethical position, his economics and his views on the role of the economist 
were formulated as a response to contemporary problems of war, unemployment, socialism, 
the decline of Keynes' natural home, the Liberal Party, and the challenge of totalitarianism. 
Keynes intellectual endeavours were part of what Skidelsky has called the 'second liberal 
revival' of the interwar period when liberalism perceived its role as averting social revolution 
by moderating capitalism. 14 
Tff- 
However, recent Keynes scholarship has raised the question of whether Keynes 
became disillusioned,, and whether in his later conception of the ideal society he was forced to 
become more limited, more conservative, and to retain unfettered capitalism. Fitzgibbons has 
argued that Keynes lost faith in the perfectibility of human nature, and thus doubted the 
possibility of the end of the money-making motive. 15 Skidelsky has argued that the Keynesian 
ideal society was classic liberalism with a managerial philosophy of ad hoc interven6on-16 I 
would argue that these analyses confuse Keynes' short-term aims with the change in morality 
that Keynes believed was only possible for the utopian society in the long run. I would also 
argue that this confusion is readily understandable given these authors' failure to take into 
13 Keynes, pp. 432-3, 'Reconstruction in Europe... ', ojR-cit- The reference to the Mayor of Pargnan is 
a response to a (possibly apocryphal) anecdote from the article contributed to the Manchestc 
Guardian supplements on reconstruction by Gabriel Hanotaim, the former French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. The Mayor had complained to Hanotaim that in spite of all diplomatic efforts his house 
remained ruined from 1914, and he was forced to live in his cellar. where he inNitcd Keynes to stay. 
14 Siddelsky, 'Keynes' Political Legacy', 2p. cit. p. 15. 
15 Fitzgibbons, 2p. -cit or ex p. 
197, f. arnple. 
16 See Skidclsky, 'Keynes' Political Legacy', 2p. cit pp. 14-16. Quotation from p. 15. 
222 
account the different audiences which Keynes was writing for in different works. When 
writing as an economist, Keynes stressed the need to retain capitalism, partly because he 
restrained his radicalism when addressing an audience of professional economists, and partly 
because of a related consideration: his belief in the limitations of predictive science, and his 
accompanying belief in the inadvisability of risking a short-term good for a, necessarily 
uncertain, long term gain. Keynes famously wrote in 'A Tract on Monetary Reform' in 1923 
that , in the long run we are A dead', but the rest of this quote 
is also informative. Here he 
stressed that the long run was 'a misleading guide to current affairs' and argued that 
economists must seek to utter useful things about current problems, rather than useless 
platitudes about the return of equilibrium in the long term: 'Economists set themselves too 
easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only teR us that when the storm is 
long past the ocean is flat again'. 17 However, I want to argue that this part of the quote can 
also be interpreted to mean that when making long run predictions, the economist should not 
speak merely in technical, scientific terms about the cyclic nature of business trends, but 
should also, if he so believes, talk of fundamental changes in the long run to the nature and 
purpose of that cycle. Keynes warned of confusing these short and long-term goals, writing in 
1936 that: 
The task of transmuting human nature must not be confused with the task of 
managing it. Though in the ideal commonwealth men may have been taught or 
inspired or bred to take no interest in the stakes [of money-making], it may still 
be wise and prudent statesmanship to allow the game to be played, subject to 
rules and limitations, so long as the average man, or even a significant section 
of the community, is in fact strongly addicted to the money-making passion. 18 
Aks Keynes wrote: 'The Republic of my imagination lies on the extreme left of celestial 
space'. 19 When writing of short-term change for a professional economic audience, he was 
apt to stress the 'moderately conservative ... 
implications' of his theories. 20 Thus in the -General 
Theo , 
he talked of aiming at an economic order in which the 'full potentialities' of the 
Manchester System could be realised, to ensure 'personal liberty, 'personal choice', 
17 Keynes, p. 65, *A Tract On Monetary Reform', (1923), CW IV. 
IS Keynes. General Theo gp. cit. p. 374. 
19 Keynes, pp. 308-9, 'Liberalism and Laboue, (1926), CW IX My emphasis. 
QP =:, 
20 Keynes, General Theoa -cit. p. 377. 223 
W efficiency and freedom'. 21 However he had used exactly the same language in 1926 in 
explaining why he was fundamentally attached to the Liberal Party: 
The political problem of mankind is to combine three things: economic 
efficiency, social justice and individual liberty. The first needs criticism, 
precaution, and technical knowledge; the second, an unselfish and enthusiastic 
spirit, which loves the ordinary man; the third, tolerance, breadth, appreciation 
of the excellence of vari ' ety and 
independence, which prefers, above everything, 
to give individual opportunity to the exceptional and the aspiring. 22 
However, when, as in 'The Econon& Possibilities for our Grandchildren! Keynes took 
on a visionary theme, and a much longer perspective, he had a more optimistic view of the 
probable complete demise of the money-making motive as an end in itself, and thus the 
possibilities for the development of the nobler side of human nature. 
Moreover, in confusing the short and the long run, these accounts also n-ýistake 
realism for disillusionment. Keynes realised that human nature could not be quickly or 
automatically transmuted. He also realised, that money-making would be necessary in utopia, 
but believed that the removal of poverty would enable us to: 
... assess the money-motive at its true value. The 
love of money as a possession 
- as distinguished from the love of money as a means to the enjoyments and 
realities of fife - will be recognised for what it is, a somewhat disgusting 
morbidity, one of those semi-criminal, semi-pathological propensities which 
one hands over with a shudder to the specialists in mental disease. 23 
I would argue that perhaps the only shift in Keynes' thought here was that whereas in 
1928 he believed that the change in morality would follow automatically from the solution by 
economists of the economic problem, by 1936 he realised thatthis changetw9ki have to be 
induced. By 1936 he was talking of the economist advising the prudent statesman to manage 
the 'transitional phase' (the 'rentier aspect of capitalism') which would 'disappear when it has 
done its worle. 24 He believed that with this disappearance 'much else in it will suffer a sea- 
21 Ibid. p. 379; and p. 381. 
22 Keynes, p. 3 11. 'Liberalism and Labour', 2p.. cit 
23 Keynes, p. 329. 'Economic Possibdities... ', 2p. cit. 
24 Keynes. General Theo oncit., p. 376. M 
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change"25 but if this sea change did not eradicate the love of money as an end, utopia could be 
hastened by longer term methods. Keynes indicated that, 'in the ideal commonwealth men may 
have been taught or inspired or bred to take no interest in the stakes'. 26 
More importantly for our present theme, in both the long and the short term, Keynes 
stressed the critical role of intellect in formulating policy to hasten the arrival of the ideal 
commonwealth. In the shorter term the 'economic problem ... should 
be a matter for 
specialists'. 27 In the longer term 'it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for 
good or eviII. 28 In 1925 in 'Am Ia LiberalT, Keynes argued that his 'fundamental position, on 
Policy-making was the importance of thought: 
I believe that in the ffiture, more than ever, questions about the economic 
framework of society will be far and away the most important of political 
issues. I believe that the right solution will involve intellectual and scientific 
elements ... 
29 
Keynes wanted to harness the energies of capitalism to produce utopia, but these potentially 
amoral forces were to be guided aright by science. Like H. G. Wells' hero Clissold, Keynes 
was 'to the Left - far, far to the Left; but 
he seeks to summon from the Right the creative 
force and the constructive will which is to carry him there (to the ideal commonwealth]1.30 
Keynes wanted to tap the intellectual power of academic economists and harness it to his 
moral vision. He believed that, 'The remoulding of the world needs the touch of the creative 
Brahma. But at present Brahma is serving science and business, not politics or government'. 31 
He castigated Wells for underestimating the potential of the Universities: '... they may yet 
become temples of Brahma which even Siva will respect'. 32 In Keynes' scheme, With 
capitalism serving the ultimate goal of the ideal commonwealth by providing the prerequisite 
25 lbid 
26 Raid-, P. 374. 
27 Keynes. p. 332. 'Economic Possibilities... ', 2M. -Cit. 28 Keynes, General Theory. 22--ci-t-., p. 384. 
29 Keynes. p. 295, 'Am Ia LiberalT, (1925), CW M pp. 295-366. 
30 Keynes, p. 319, review of The World of William Clissold by H, G. Wells, CW IX, pp. 315-20 
(Originally from the Nati and Atenaeum 22 January 1927). 
31 iCL n2i- 
32 lbid.. 320. 
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elimination of poverty, even classical economists, guided by Keynesian theory, could be useful 
and moral! 
7.2 KEYNES AND THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POLICY-MAKING 
Keynes, then, had created an ethical rationale, a new ethical public economics, for the 
involvement of economists in policy. But how should the economist set about obtaining 
influence? Skidelsky argued that: 'Keynes believed that the economic problem of his day was 
an intellectual and not a structural or institutional problem'. 33 I want to argue that Keynes had 
a theory of policy-making which incorporated an element of institutional change. Briefly, it 
consisted of three stages, which in practice could run concurrently. The first was a Kuhnian 
scientific revolution: establishing a new dominant paradigm amongst the professional 
economic community; the second was to get the theory accepted by the political leaders, the 
wider social elite of business, and the public. This would lead to a new governmental agenda: 
a new conception of the role of government in the economy. The third, following from the 
first two, was to create a new body, within the machinery of government, through which 
economists could work towards the utopian society. 
As Wayne Parsons has argued, Keynes has been portrayed as being politically naive: as 
overestimating the power of ideas and rationality in policy-making, and of failing to 
understand that ideas are unhkely to be adopted unless they serve the interests of the dominant 
social elite. 34 However, Parsons argued that Keynes realised that ideas had to appear to serve 
the interests of the dominant social groups to be taken up by them. Keynes understood that 
the domination of Ricardian economics: 
... must have been due to a complex of suitabilities 
in the doctrine to the 
environment into which it was projected ... That 
it could explain much social 
injustice and apparent cruelty as an inevitable incident in the scheme of 
progress, and the attempt to change such things as fikely ... to do more 
harm 
than good, commended it to authority. That it afforded a measure of 
33 Skidelsky. 'Keynes' Political Legacy', gp. cit, pp. 15-16. 
34 W. Parsons. 'Keynes and the Politics of ideas. History of Political Thought, Vol. IV. (1983). 
pp. 367-392. Parsons cites the work of Harrod and Moggridgc. for example. as adhering to this view. 
See PLF. Harrod. The Life of John Maynard Keynes n. Macmillan. 1951): and D. E. , (Londo Moggridge. KoMes (London. Macrnillan. 1979. originally 1976). 
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justification to the free activities of the individual capitalist, attracted to it the 
support of the donýnant social force behind authority. 35 
After the upheavals of the First World War, Keynes, as we noted, no longer thought that new 
economic ideas would eventuaUy influence policy automatically. There was a time-lag 
between theory and influence on policy, which could only be overcome by direct action. As 
Keynes famously wrote at the very end of the General Thýorv, ideas were very potent 'over a 
period of time': 
... the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right 
and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. 
Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves 
to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of 
some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are 
distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am 
sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the 
gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately, but after a certain 
interval; for in the field of economic and political philosophy there are not 
many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty 
years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants and politicians and even 
agitators apply to current events are not Rely to be the newest. But soon or 
late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil. 36 
That Keynes had thought along these lines since the end of the war is demonstrated by the 
manner in which he made the same point in an article on Russia for the Manchester Guardian 
in July 1922. Writing about the economic doctrines (or lack of consciously applied ones ) that 
underpinned the Revolution, he conunented: 
The leaders, in Russia as elsewhere, were politicians not economists, and, 
taking their economics from the atmosphere, were equally open to new 
economics from a new atmosphere. 37 
If the economist wanted new ideas to influence current policy, he had actively to seek such 
influence. He had to accelerate the natural osmotic process of absorption of ideas into the 
35 Keynes, General Theoly pp. cit. pp. 32-3 ). 
36 lbidp pp. 383-4. 
37 Keynes, p. 4' )6. 'Russia', Manchester Guardian Commercial 6 July 1922, CW XVIL This was 
one in a series of articles under the general title of 'Reconstruction in Europe' which appeared 
throughout the Sununer of 1922. See also footnote I above. 
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I atmosphere' of accepted wisdom, and thence into policy, by his own propagandist efforts. He 
had to create his own new 'atmosphere'. 
Parsons argued that Keynes had a strategy by which ideas could be made to influence 
policy. The first task of the economýist was to establish a consensus in the professional 
economic community about the new idea. This was the purpose of the General Thgo 
Keynes made this purpose clear from the very first words of the Preface, stating that: 'This 
book is chiefly addressed to my fellow economists'. 38 He continued that the work was, 
... an attempt by an economist to bring to an issue the 
deep divergences of 
opinion between economists which have for the time being almost destroyed 
the practical influence of economic theory, and wiU, until they are resolved, 
continue to do So. 39 
Keynes was thus here following the strategy of 'I'Varshall and Pigou and creating a new general 
theory within which he hoped all economists could work; like them he was trying to create a 
new theory of policy-making. 
Secondly, the economist should popularize his ideas, and demonstrate their benefits to 
political leaders. Thus Keynes associated himself with the Liberal Party, was a member, and 
worked at its Summer schools during the 1920s. The economist should also seek a wide 
currency for his ideas among the general public. Keynes knew that public opinion was a 
potent way to influence political leaders: 
Even if economists and technicians knew the secret remedy, they could not 
apply it until they had persuaded the politicians; and the politicians, who have 
ears but no eye, will not attend to the persuasion until it reverberates back to 
them as an echo from the great public. 40 
This Keynes did in the 1920s with numerous articles in the Nation-and Athenaeum and the 
Manchester Guardian. The goal of this activity was, as Parsons has argued, to influence the 
agenda of government, 'the framework within which political argument and policy discussion 
38 Keynes. General Theory, on. cit.., Preface, p. v. 
39 lbicL i p. V1. 
40 Keynes, p. 427, 'Reconstruction in Europe: An Introduction', 2P-. cit. 
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took place'. 41 Keynes argued in 1926 that there must be an open-minded debate about the 
limits of government intervention: 
Perhaps the chief tasks of econon-dsts at this hour is to distinguish afresh the 
Agenda of government from the Non-Agenda; and the companion task of 
Politics is to devise forms of Goverrunent within a Democracy which should be 
capable of accomplishing the Agenda. 
However, I want to argue that there was a third stage in Keynes' strategy for 
influencing policy. Once the new atmosphere had been created, new institutional mechanisms 
needed to be set up to involve economists (all now ideally working within the new general 
theory) in the framing of economic policy. This would ensure that the full influence of 
economic expertise was brought to policy problems. Thus, once the intellectual agenda for the 
feasible scope of government intervention in the economy had been sufficiently broadened, 
Keynes supported calls for the establishment of an Economic General Staff. This body would 
help the politicians to accomplish the agenda which the economists had set. 
Beveridge had put the case for an Economic General staff in two articles in the Nation 
and Athenaeum in December 1923 and January 1924.42 Here he argued for an Economic 
General StafT, as a precursor to a putative standing economic committee along the lines of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence: 
The time has come when the Government of this country should have a general 
intelligence division for economic problems -a staff of experts not engaged in 
administration and not attached to any one Department. This Economic 
General Staff would be expected and entitled to comment on the technical side 
of all important proposals raising economic questions that came forward from 
any of the departments. They would be expected on their own initiative to 
secure that the main economic problems of the day were being explored, and 
to submit, on their own initiative, or on the request of the Government, 
appreciations of the problems and alternative solutions for them. 43 
The new body would have a Chief of Staff (whose description as 'a person of high authority in 
the science of econon-dcs,, and of corresponding authority in the public service' sounds 
41 Parsons, W. cit p. 379. 
42 Sir W. H. Beveridge, 'An Economic General StafT, parts I and II, The Nation and Athcnacuml 29 
December 1923, pp. 485-6: and 5 January 1924, pp. 509-10. 
43 Ibid., p. 509. 
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suspiciously like Beveridge himselfl), and two or three 'responsible' experts, plus lay 
administrative staff The body would call in outside experts for advice, 'in particular ... [from] 
the economic departments of the Universities', to secure, 'several views ... for consideration by 
the Government. 44 
Keynes was thinking along similar lines in 1925: 
I believe that in the future the government will have to take on many duties 
which it has avoided in the past. For these purposes Nfinisters and Parliament 
will be unserviceable. Our task must be to decentralise and devolve wherever 
we can, and in particular to establish semi-independent corporations and 
organs of administration to which duties of govermnent, new and old, will be 
entrusted - without, however, impairing the democratic principle or the 
ultimate sovereignty of Parliament. These questions will be as important and 
difficult in the future as the franchise and the relation of the two Houses have 
been in the past. 45 
In 1926, replying to a leader in the Westnýnster Gazette about a recently published edition of 
his article 'The End of Laissez-Faire', Keynes put flesh on these bones and gave full support to 
Beveridge's scheme for an Economic General Staff- 
In your leading article of 12 July-your contributor ... argues that one of the 
most pressing tasks of the modem state is to remedy economic ignorance - 
inevitable ignorance due to the vastness and comple)dty of the modem world, 
and avoidable ignorance arising out of the aptitudes and inclinations of 
politicians. He therefore supports the appointment of a body on the lines of the 
Economic General Staff proposed some little time ago by Sir William 
Beveridge. 
I am sure that this is right. A whole series of events here and elsewhere have 
proved that the modem statesman needs to be supplemented by something 
additional to and a little different from the Civil 5ervice. We shall never enjoy 
prosperity again if we continue indefinitely without some deliberate machinery 
for mitigating the consequences of selecting our governors on account of their 
gifts for oratory and their power of detecting in good time which way the wind 
of uninstructed opinion is blowing. It is this need which I had in mind, amongst 
some other things, in the latter part of this sentence from my book: 'Perhaps 
the chief task of Econonists of this hour is to distinguish afresh the Agenda of 
Government from the non-Agenda; and the companion task of Politics is to 
devise forms of Government within a Democracy which should be capable of 
accomplishing the Agenda'. 46 
4 id., pp. 509-10. 4a --- 45 Keynes, p. 30 1, 'Am IA Liberal', 22. cit. 
46 Keynes, pp. 567-8, letter to the editor of the Westminster Gaz-ett-c 17 July 1926, CW XLX. 
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In 1929 Keynes was one of the participants in a series of meetings between government and 
civil servants, businessmen and economists, which ultimately led to the long-mooted 
formation of the Economic Advisory Council by the Labour Government of Ramsay 
MacDonald. 47 In response to requests, Keynes produced a memorandum on an 'Economic 
General Staff in December. Keynes' scheme was strikingly similar to that of Beveridge. Its 
object was to obtain the services for policy-making, 
... of individuals whose bent and desire is to devote their fives to scientific 
research, and to guiding from the centre the evolution of the economic 
structure, rather than to administration or to politiCS. 48 
Keynes argued here that the establishment of such a body, from the 'nucleus, and ... model' of 
the Committee of Civil Research would be: 
... an act of statesmanship, the importance of which cannot easfly 
be 
exaggerated. For it would mark a transition in our conceptions of the functions 
and purposes of the state, and a first measure towards the deliberate and 
purposive guidance of the evolution of our economic fife. It would be a 
recognition of the enormous part to be played in this by the scientific spirit as 
distinct from the sterility of the purely party attitude, which is never more out 
of place than in relation to complex matters of fact and interpretation involving 
technical difficulty. It would mean the beginning of ways of doing and thinking 
about political problems which are probably necessary for the efficient working 
of modem democracy. For it would be an essay in the art of combining 
representative institutions and the voice of public opinion with the utilisation 
by Governments of the best technical advice in spheres, where such advice can 
never, and should not, have the last word or the power, but must be a 
necessary ingredient in the decisions of those who have been entrusted by the 
country with the last word and with the power. 49 
While the Staff was to be made up of civil servants (though ones with a scientific economic 
training) there was also to be a further means of securing scientific economic advice attached 
to it. Keynes further suggested that: 
47 For the pre-history of the EAC (which is the history of the Committee of Civil Research. Out Of 
which it developed), see Roy NbcLeod and E. Kay 
ýndrcws. *The Committee of Civil Rescarch: 
Scientific Advice for Economic Development, 1925-1930', hgrgery& Vol. 7, (1968-9), pp. 680-705; 
and Anthea Bennett, 'Advising the Cabinet - the Committee of Civil Research and the Economic 
Advisory Council', Public Administmtio Vol. 56, (1978), pp. 51-71. On the EAC, scc Susan 
Howson and Donald Winch. The Economic Advisory Council. 1930-1939, (Cambridge, CUR 1977). 
48 Keynes, p. 26, Memorandum on an 'Econonk General SUM 10 December 1929, pp-22-7, CW 
xx 
49 rbid. p. 27. 
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In addition to temporary ad hoc committees, there should be a permanent 
panel or scientific committee of economists and others [he no doubt had in 
rnind here businessmen], for which the Staff would act as secretariat, which 
would be expected to give, confidentially, impartial outside advice and 
assistance on any questions which the Government of the day may wish to 
submit to it. 50 , 
7.3 CONCLUSION 
Keynes produced a new form of ethical public science in economics, in which the 
economist's claim to policy influence rested on both his scientific expertise and his ethical 
intentions. The economist was useful and good, and, in the final analysis, useful because he 
was good. This new publicly expressed rationale was rooted in elitist Moorean morality and 
aesthetics. The political medium through which this was expressed was Liberalism, but a re- 
forged Liberalism. Like Well's Clissold, Keynes believed that 'political Liberalism must die "to 
be born again with firmer features and a clearer will"'. 51 Keynes held that: 
The transition from economic anarchy to a regime which deliberately aims at 
controlling and directing economic forces in the interests of social justice and 
social stability, will present enormous difficulties both technical and political. I 
suggest, nevertheless, that the true destiny of New Liberalism is to seek their 
solution. 52 
This New Liberalism would produce a new moral agenda, to be effected by a new political 
agenda with new bodies to carry it out. But, mindful of the failures of Soviet Communism, 
Keynes stressed that new solutions must come, 'not from political agitation or premature 
experiments, but ftom thought'. 53 
In this gradualist approach, Keynes reflected the position of the Reformist scientists. 
He wanted to work to reform the existing democratic capitalist society and institutions from 
within, rather than to overthrow them violently. For Keynes, this latter course would have 
been to follow one's 'sympathy' without using one's 'judgement'. Thought had to precede 
and guide action. The mechanism for producing the new agenda would be an elite of 
50 Ibid. p. 24. 
51 Keyncs. p. 319, '... ClissOld. 29--cit. 
52 Keyncs, p. 305, 'Am Ia Liberal', 2p. cit. 
53 Keyncs, p. 294, 'The End of Laissez-Faire'. 2p. cit.. 
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econonusts, whose role in policy was to be formalised in a new Econoýnic General Staff 
reporting directly to the Prime Nfinister and the Cabinet. 54 This new elite would begin the 
changes towards Utopia; would translate value into fact. 
54 See Keynes, p. 25. 'An Economic General Stair, 'Section 11: the Status and Organisation of the 
Staff, CWXX 
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CONCLUSION 
This study has shown that scientists and economists both produced distinctive 
rhetorics for the consumption of politicians, civil servants and the wider British public 
that aimed to secure meaningful influence for these expert groups over central 
government policy-making. Though differing in form because of the extent to which 
the leaders of these groups perceived their discipline to have become professionalised, 
these rhetorics shared a common aim: the formalisation of the expert's role in framing 
policy. 
The natural scientists, who had put methodological disputes largely behind 
them and publicly constituted a cohesive group united by a commonly proclaimed 
scientific method, ' had reached an advanced stage of professionalisation by around 
1880. The various branches of science were well represented at the universities, 
forming a highly visible professional power-base. Furthermore science could boast a 
variety of national and international learned journals. There were also a plethora of 
learned societies, together with respected national umbrella groups like the Royal 
Society and the British Association for the Advancement of Science. Scientists had 
achieved cultural and social authority by being seen to win the struggle with religion 
over the Darwinian controversy. In fact the idea of a battle between science and 
religion had been largely manufactured by public scientists like Huxley and Tyndall, so 
that science could be presented as the victorious champion of all things progressive 
and modem; central to this process was the contrast between the irrationality of 
religious'dogma and the rationality of scientific method. 2 As we have seen, in the 
years after 1880 a growing number of leading scientists had begun to argue that the 
scientific method, now accepted as having a social and cultural authority, was fully 
I See Richard Yeo. 'Scientific Method and the Rhetoric of Science in Britain, 18.30-1917', in 
The Politics and Rhetoric of Scientific Method (Historical Studic-sl Yeo and JA Schuster (eds. ), 
(Dordrecht. Rcidel. 1986). pp. 259-97. 
2 See F. M. Turner, 'Rainfall. Plagues, and the Prince of Wales: a Chapter in the Conflict of 
Religion and Science', Journal of British Studies, Vol. 13, (1973-4). pp. 46-65: 'The Victorian 
Conflict between Science and Religion: a Professional Dimension', -Isi-s, 
Vol. 69, (1978), pp. 356- 
376; and 'Public Science in Britain. 1880-1919", Isis Vol. 71 (1980), PP. 589-608. See also 
his 
Betwen Science and Religi6n: the Reaction to Scientific Na England, 
(New Haven, Yale University Press. 1974). 
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translatable into all areas of national policy. Pressure was exerted on the existing 
national umbrella organisations to take a lead as the authoritative voice of science in 
national questions, and when these groups proved reluctant, a new national (though 
initially London based) organisation was formed (the British Science Guild) 
specifically to argue for more technocratic government. 
Influence over policy-making presented itself as the natural next step for an 
ambitious professionalising group, particularly as the activities of the State were now 
increasingly expanding into areas (like industrial regulation, public health and the like) 
of scientific expertise. Furthermore, science had become more expensive as it 
progressed, and its practitioners naturally increasingly looked to the resources of the 
State for financial support. To assert that if the State was to control science, scientists 
had better control the State is not the whole story, but is part of it. Scientists viewed 
the State as antithetical to the aims and methods of science. Politicians were largely 
generalists, as was the post Northcote-Trevelyan Civil Service. 3 Moreover, as Roy 
MacLeod has suggested, the authority of those individual scientists who were already 
inside the government machine was being progressively squeezed by civil servants 
from about 1870.4A further influencing factor was the ongoing debate about national 
efficiency of the Edwardian years. Scientists were heavily influenced by such concerns, 
with their explicit criticisms of traditional party government, but they also viewed the 
debate as an opportunity to create and publicise an argument for government by 
scientists. ' Scientists were to have executive authority via the constitutional 
innovation of a national scientific council which government departments would be 
obliged to consult, and whose recommendations would become policy. 
In arguing thus, I have expanded the pioneering work of Frank Tumer. 6 He 
discerned that there were three distinct historically and ideologically specific rhetorics 
of science during the nineteenth century, and first suggested that in the third period 
3 See Peter CoNvan, 'The Origins of the Administrative Elite'. New Left RCNjqw No. 162. 
(1987), pp. 4-34. 
4 See Roy MacLeocl. 'Introduction' to Government and E qper_tise. -. . 2P--cit- 
(Oxf 5 See GR Searle, The Quest for National Efficicncy A Study in British Politics ord. Basil 
Blackwell, 1971). especially pp. 83-4. 
6 FM Turner, 'Public Science... ', pp. cit. 
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(from c. 1875) scientists began to seek political power. However, Turner only posited 
that scientists wanted 'power or influence in the civic arena'. 7Working from a detailed 
analysis of the rhetoric, I have shown that the scientists, specifically and self- 
consciously, wanted power to make policy, via a new national scientific council. 
As well as deepening Turner's analysis, I have extended its chronological span 
and looked in some detail at public science arguments during, and after, the First 
World War. The war seemed to fulfil all the scientists' prophecies about the dire 
consequences to the nation of a neglect of science, and to reinforce their arguments 
for scientific government, which they thus reasserted with a renewed vigour. The war 
provided scientists with many new opportunities for government service and, as we 
note, particularly in the case of the Food (War) Committee of the Royal Society, these 
were used as platforms from which to underline the need for a formalisation of 
scientific advice which would carry over into the coming peace. But these new 
opportunities for influence also exposed tensions and divisions within the scientific 
community as to the most effective means of organising State scientific research. 
Though more work needs to be undertaken in this area, I would tentatively 
suggest that elements within the Royal Society consistently blocked pressure for the 
Society to become officially recognised as the formal central organising body in British 
science. It seems that the Council wished to preserve the traditional distance between 
the Society and government. I would argue that this position was adopted not only to 
preserve the objectivity of science, as was often publicly claimed, but also because of a 
belief that a network of close but informal connections between the Society and 
government would be more productive, in terms of policy influence, than formal 
connections. I would further suggest that this may have reflected a greater degree of 
political awareness on the part of elements of the Society, than those scientists who 
pressed it to take more of the centre stage. Elements within the Society may have 
discerned that the path of new State bodies to organise science (controlled as much as 
possible by eminent scientists, though ultimately under the control of non-scientific 
7 Thid. , p. 592. 
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bureaucrats and politicians) with strengthened informal linkages was all that was 
possible without alienating politicians and civil servants steeped in a State culture 
which wished to preserve the art of policy-making as the special preserve of 
generalists like themselves. The State was willing to see the expert on tap but not on 
top. Thus the Society supported a model for the organisation of British science which 
centred on the DSIR and the various research councils. The Society retained control 
over the selection of the key top personnel in these new bodies, although they 
remained, nominaRy at least, government bodies. Research agendas and their co- 
ordination behind-the-scenes were, however, in the control of the Society through its 
eminent fel. lows, who either headed or were on the scientific advisory committees of all 
the new bodies. Thus the access of scientists to govenunent at the highest level was 
taken to a new plane without antagonising the State. This Royal Society model for the 
organisation of science and advice became enshrined in the new relations between 
government and science, as was underlined by its incorporation in Haldane's key 
report on the machinery of government in 1918. 
The public science activities of the Food (War) Committee demonstrated 
aspects of the Royal Society model in action. Hardy and the other leading members 
pressed for a formalisation of the policy-making status of the committee as far as was 
possible. But, realising the ambiguous status of outside expert advice, and the primacy 
of other political priorities, the comn-dttee at the same time attempted to increase its 
influence by utilising a range of informal channels of acces to the Government. In ýact 
the only way found to continue the work of the committee into the post-war period 
was through Hardy acting as a key individual at the Food Investigation Board, set up 
under the DSIR. 
However, in spite of such large gains, the immediate post-war years were 
problematical for public scientists. Firstly the implications of the Royal Society model 
had to be addressed. New State bodies controlling science was fine as long as those 
bodies were themselves controlled by eminent scientists linked to the Royal Society or 
other branches of the scientific establishment. However, this model also presented the 
possibility that the State could come to control science through non-scientific chiefs of 
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the new bodies. Thus public science was dominated by the need to control research by 
scientists. Other wartime legacies dictated the remainder of the public science agenda 
in the 'twenties. The public image of science itself as politically neutral and beneficent 
had become tarnished by association with the development of ever more deadly 
weapons technology, and especially poison gas. The other legacy was of a new 
solidarity, particularly among less eminent scientific workers. This resulted in new 
professional and trades union bodies being formed to protect the new status, pay and 
prospects of scientists. Partly this was a reaction against the control of science by the 
scientific elite, as embodied in the Royal Society model. Partly, like the rehabilitation 
of science's public image, and the control of research, it was a way of shoring up 
science's wartime gains. This was felt by public scientists to be a crucial precursor to 
any further policy influence. 
While the majority of public scientists united in a public relations campaign to 
represent science as largely civilian and the key to peaceffil economic prosperity, to 
increase professional status, and to control research, the war had brought out a 
fundamental ideological split within the public science community, which had 
profound implications for its political goals. For the first time, left-wing public 
scientists began to obtain access to the major organ of the scientific community 
(Nature) and to create their own platforms (the NUSW and its organ the Scientiflc 
Worke ). These scientists (like Hyman Levy and Frederick Soddy) shared the view of 
the pre-war broadly Liberal/Social Imperialist majority of public scientists that 
scientists should have power over policy, but argued that this could only come through 
a reorganisation of society along socialist lines. Their view was that the war had so 
fatally wounded the public image of science, because science had been the willing ally 
of an essentially morally corrupt and wasteful capitalist society. In order to reconstruct 
science, and to ensure it had its proper say in the counsels of the nation, society itself 
had to reconstructed on scientific (which to them meant) socialist lines. 
This view continued to be expressed only by a minority of public scientists in 
the 1920s, partly because of the unpopularity of socialism after the revolution in 
Russia, as well as the troubled labour situation at home. The majority of public 
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scientists stuck to the more moderate Liberal/Social Imperialist position of the 
Edwardian era. They wanted power within the existing social organisation, and 
thought this best achieved by promoting science as essentially liberal and the handmaid 
of the peaceful reconstruction of a economically successful and socially stable 
Edwardian model of the nation. These two positions became increasingly polarised 
during the 1930s, the socialist element becoming increasingly vocal. 
Gary Werskey8 has aptly labelled these factions as 'Radical' and 'Reformist' in 
the 1930s, and the importance of my analysis is that it links the work of Turner and 
Werskey. I argue that the period c. 1917-1925 constitutes a new transitional phase of 
public science: in Turner's terminology, a new period. It was a time when the social- 
imperialist vision of the kind of society science should empower, and have power in, 
first came under challenge, albeit in a muted form, from a socialist alternative. As in 
other periods or phases, the rhetoric was sensitive to contemporary concerns. The 
bulk of the public science community now stressed science as essentially civil, but the 
more radical elements were able - in a climate of public opinion broadly hostile to, or 
at least wary of, science - to press their analysis of the problems of achieving scientific 
government further. Informed by a socialist political agenda, they pinpointed the 
existing social and political Organisation as the root of the problem. SO this period was 
transitional between the common context of public science in the Edwardian and early 
wartime period and that of the 19330s. The rhetoric of public science was beginning to 
change again with changing contemporary social concerns, as Turner demonstrated it 
had changed throughout the nineteenth century, and as I noted that it responded to the 
special circumstances of both the Edwardian and wartime periods. 
The analysis of my companion group of academic experts, the economists, 
yielded a rather different, though comparable, pattern of the emergence of a strategy 
for policy influence. I have demonstrated that what came to be the dominant 
Marshallian strand in British economics felt that economics was not in the same 
enviable position of social and cultural authority as the natural sciences in the 1880s. 
8 See all of Werskey's publications as listed in my Bibliography, but most crucially his 'British 
Scientists and "Outsider" Politics. 193 1-45. pp. cit. 
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Economics was still riven by a long-standing methodological dispute between 
theoreticians and empirical historicists. Marshall's view was that before political 
influence could be achieved, economics had to be at least presented successfully as a 
unified science, with all that implied. This was, I suggest, one of the chief motivations 
behind Alfred Marshall's campaign to professionalise economics in Britain. Marshall 
was playing the long game. Economics had to be re-presented to the public (including 
politicians and civil servants) as a united discipline with universal scientific 
applicability for its generally agreed laws. In following such a strategy for long term 
policy influence, Marshall was openly following what he perceived to be the 
professional trajectory of science. In order for scientific method to be transferable to 
policy problems, Marshall had to create the image of a scientific economics in the 
public mind. This was a long term goal, as it entailed not only a national association 
with teamed journal, a curriculum and tripos at Cambridge for replication elsewhere, 
but also the standardisation of what Maloney has called a 'research programme' 
around welfare economics. Marshall wanted ultimately to create a definition of 
economic theory within which all members of the economic community could 
comfortably work. 
While this entire edifice was being built up, Marshall viewed open attempts to 
influence policy-making as ill-timed and counterproductive, as they ran the risk of 
exposing fundamental differences of emphasis within the economic community. Thus, 
for the short term, Marshall standardised a negative form of public science, which 
involved actively distancing economics from politics, and renouncing any desire to 
influence policy. However, this was only part of a longer term strategy for policy 
influence once all the elements were in place. Privately, even in the short term, 
Marshall attempted, via ad hoc and informal contacts with sections of government, to 
influence policy during this formative period for economics. 
This public version of the professional economist as detached scientist did not 
go unchallenged, however. An alternative version, rooted in an adherence to a 
different, more inductivelempirical methodology in economics, and thus a different 
view of the discipline's nature, scope and social purpose, was put forward by the 
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historicists. My example here was the rhetoric and activities of W. J. Ashley. He 
propounded a more positive public science for the short as well as long term, which 
was akin to that of the scientists. He believed that the economist should define himself 
and justify his social use (or create his expertise) not by cloaking himself in the mantle 
of scientific method, but by his real experience of social, and industrial problems. On 
this latter basis, Ashley argued for a formalisation of the role of the economist in 
policy-making, and took every opportunity whilst in government service during the 
war to press for this. Ashley's public science, though similar in its goals to that of the 
natural scientists, was based on experience and interpretation of economic behaviour, 
rather than theory and scientific method. 
While, again this is an area in which further research is needed, I would 
tentatively suggest that, in spite of the general involvement of both historicists and 
Marshallian theoreticians in government service during the war, it was the Marshallian 
position of preserving a public distance from policy pronouncements which remained 
dominant even into the 1920s. 'I have however suggested that there was at least one 
exception to this general line: Maynard Keynes. During the late war and the 1920s he 
argued vociferously and very publicly for certain fines of economic policy to be 
pursued, and, in general, that econon-dsts should play a more formalised part in the 
policy-making process. I have argued that Keynes's positive, ethical public science 
should be seen squarely in the context of the earlier Marshallian developments. Keynes 
worked within the tradition of Marshall's professional synthesis in two ways. Firstly he 
was able to operate as an economist with the knowledge that this was now a 
recognised profession with a certain social and cultural authority (and for this he had 
Marshall to thank, and did so). Keynes behaved exactly as Marshall had envisaged 
economists behaving, once the reputation and status of economics had been firmly 
established. In this sense Keynes was true to Marshall's vision, though the 
Marshallians (like Pigou), who perhaps did not fully understand that part of Marshall 
which dealt with long term influence, did not agree. Secondly, Keynes himself 
attempted, like Marshall, to create a new paradigm within which all economists could 
work with his General Theory. Further work needs to be done on economists to 
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establish if Keynes was simply a maverick, and how the public science of economics 
developed through the late 'twenties and beyond. Was there, for instance, a group of 
socialist economists producing a rhetoric similar to the scientific Radicals ?; and was 
there a group of Reformists, which adhered to the Marshallian line and simultaneously 
pursued informal channels of influence, while involving itself in the emerging new 
channels of economic advice to the government, like the Committee of Civil Research 
and the Economic Advisory Council? 
The importance of these analyses is two-fold. Firstly they add to the body of 
literature arguing the essentially social nature of 'scientific' activity. This mode of 
analysis, is well-established in the history of the natural, medical and human sciences, 
though not in this area. In the history of economic thought, this mode of analysis is in 
its infancy, and there is much scope for further work, as Margaret Schabas has 
recently argued. 9 Secondly, some understanding of the existence and importance of 
the kind of rhetoric I have demonstrated, is, I would argue, an essential precursor to 
studies whose aim is to establish, empirically, the degree of influence which experts 
had on government policy. This is best illustrated in the case of natural science. Just as 
most accounts of the history of the relations of science and the State argue for a 
continuing State niggardliness and reluctance to support scientific work financially, 
based on the special pleadings of the scientific community itselfý so the real degree of 
influence may be masked by the scientists' unrealistic ambitions for power, and a 
consequent underplaying of their true influence, which undoubtedly increased during 
the period under consideration. Similarly with economics, the argument that the 
British State has been consistently backward in developing formal institutions for 
economic advice and the input of expert economists into policy, while economists 
themselves have been reluctant to commit themselves publicly on policy issues, may 
entirely miss the point. An analysis of the public science of economics shows that it is 
important to know exactly what it was that economists wanted, and how they set 
about achieving it, before any attempt is made to evaluate their influence. It is a 
9A Schabas, 13rcaking Away: History of Economics as History of Science' and the various 
'Comments' malcing up the Minisymposium'. HistoKy of _politicall 
Etconomv , Vol. 24, No. 
1. 
Spring 1992, pp. 185-247. 
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question of recognising the rhetoric as such, and not taking it as undisputed historical 
fact. This may well have implications for the debate about how much, and what kind 
of expert advice the British State received, and how it received it. This in turn has a 
crucial bearing on the whole debate about the economic and scientific 'decline' of 
Britain. The State cannot be said to have been anfi- scientific, though it was anti- 
technocratic, preferring not to give experts any formalised role at the heart of the 
policy-making process. Experts groups which grasped the nature of this State culture 
pushed their claims for policy influence forward on two simultaneous fronts. While 
pressing for the formalisation of contacts with the State (either in the short or long 
term), they also maintained a network of informal contacts through which advice was 
independently given by the experts and also sought by the State. Thus the British State 
has historically tended to get its scientific/economic expert advice in a much less 
visible form perhaps than other States (and I am thinking here of both Germany and 
America). But this is not the same as saying that there was very little expert input into 
policy-making. 
In any study of this kind, there will be questions which are necessarily 
neglected. The most obvious of these I have just touched on: the question of 
international comparisons. Certainly related developments may have been taking place 
in Germany, America, Russia and Japan, and it would be particularly interesting to 
analyse the situation in these nations which were contemporarily perceived as potential 
econon-dc and military threats to Britain. But there are many other areas which this 
analysis highlights as worthy of further investigation. For instance, which other groups 
in society were expressing similar arguments about political ambitions? It would be 
particularly interesting to extend this kind of analysis of public science more 
thoroughly into the medical and engineering communities. I have also noted in passing 
at variovs points in the thesis that a form of public science was being produced by (or 
on behalt) of businessmen and business methods. This non-academic group seemed to 
have presented itself, and to have been presented, as possessing a peculiar form of 
natural expertise. What is interesting is that such points about the applicability of 
business methods to policy were expressed in the language of public science. If this 
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form of natural kwoledge was seen as an antidote to an increasingly professionalised 
society run by experts, how interesting that the idea of the expert and his authority 
should have permeated so deeply that even pro-business rhetoric utilised it (perhaps 
unconsciously). Another avenue would be to extend the concept of public science 
itself, as I have done to some extent, to take in the range of public relations activities 
engaged in by scientists. What bearing for example do exhibitions, public lectures and 
demonstrations, pamphlets, newspapers articles (particularly if part of a series), radio 
and cinema broadcasts and other communications media have on the campaign for 
influence over policy? Turning to specific areas, more work needs to be done to 
elucidate fully the role of the Royal Society (including all of its neglected wartime 
committees) in the First World War, and further work could also usefully be done on 
a broader range of economists than I have been able to study here, to see if the 
positions I have identified hold, as I believe they do. Finally, we need to know the 
patterns of public science during the years following the period covered by this thesis, 
perhaps right up to the present day. 
The concept of public science, then, can, and hopefully will, be developed as a 
useful tool of historical analysis. This thesis seeks to be a first contribution to what 
will, I trust, be an ongoing debate and area of research in social and political history. 
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